nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2025–07–28
twelve papers chosen by
Christopher Decker, Oxford University


  1. Charting a way forward for the use of data science in competition enforcement and platform regulation By Graef, Inge; Laitenberger, Ulrich; Prüfer, Jens
  2. A System Dynamics Approach to the Rebound Effect: Policy Volatility and Energy Justice in Emerging Economies By Gerardo Blanco; Emilio Padilla Rosa; Martín Bordón-Lesme; Jaume Freire González
  3. Broadband Access and Markups in Europe By Emilio Colombo; Luca Michele Portoghese; Patrizio Tirelli
  4. How cost-effective were subsidies for solar energy in Germany? By von Ditfurth, Jakob; Rausch, Sebastian
  5. Booms and Busts and the Regulatory Cycle: A speech at The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., July 16, 2025 By Michael S. Barr
  6. Multimarket contact, cross-market externalities and platform competition By Éric Darmon; Thomas Le Texier; Zhiwen Li; Thierry Pénard
  7. How the design of cartel fines affects prices: Evidence from the lab By Sindri Engilbertsson; Sander Onderstal; Leonard Treuren
  8. Welfare Implications of a Carbon Tax in a Long-Distance Passenger Market By Ivaldi, Marc; Cherbonnier, Frédéric; Muller-Vibes, Catherine; Van Der Straeten, Karine
  9. Exploring rural energy poverty and needs By Hormigos Feliu Clara; Florio Pietro; Dijkstra Lewis; Auteri Davide; Bertozzi Cecilia
  10. Worldwide Rebound Effects: A Multiregional Input–Output Analysis By Qian Chen; Martín Bordón-Lesme; Jaume Freire González
  11. From deletion to substitution: A smart regulatory path for EU securitisation reform By Lindner, Vincent; Riedel, Max
  12. Are M&As Spurring or Stifling Innovation? Evidence from Antidiabetic Drug Development By Jan Malek; Jo Seldeslachts; Reinhilde Veugelers

  1. By: Graef, Inge (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Laitenberger, Ulrich (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Prüfer, Jens (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c56b0190-4900-4f47-b5ee-4d5dc0f9bc9d
  2. By: Gerardo Blanco; Emilio Padilla Rosa; Martín Bordón-Lesme; Jaume Freire González
    Abstract: Energy efficiency is critical for decarbonization, yet its benefits are often undermined by the rebound effect, particularly in emerging economies where pent-up demand is high. Traditional static models fail to capture the temporal dynamics, behavioral feedbacks, and systemic instabilities that shape policy outcomes. This study addresses these gaps by developing a novel system dynamics model to serve as a 'policy sandbox.' We analyze the dynamic consequences of policy interventions, moving beyond conventional metrics to assess household welfare trajectories. Our findings reveal that while isolated efficiency gains can backfire, conventional corrective taxes, when interacting with realistic household financial behaviors, can engineer a devastating energy poverty trap—a state where vulnerable households pay more for a reduced level of essential energy service. This research unmasks a fundamental tension not just between sustainability and equity, but between a policy's intended equilibrium and the survivability of its transient path. We provide a robust analytical tool for designing adaptive, justice-centered policies capable of navigating this complex landscape and avoiding the most severe, unintended consequences of the energy transition.
    Keywords: Rebound effect, emerging economies, energy justice, energy affordability, system dynamics modeling, Time-varying policy
    JEL: Q41 Q48 H23 C61
    Date: 2025–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1499
  3. By: Emilio Colombo; Luca Michele Portoghese; Patrizio Tirelli
    Abstract: What is the relationship between internet (broadband) connectivity shocks, markups, and fixed costs? We address the issue by exploiting a large dataset based on balance sheets of European firms. Broadband shocks raise sales, profits-to-sales ratios, fixed costs, and markups of firms that are large, are more efficient (high TFP) and already bear large fixed costs. For these firms, the shock therefore is expansionary, and firms exploit it to raise profit margins. Firms at the opposite tails of the distribution exhibit a substantially muted response. Our results hint that the shock lowers the cost of entering new markets, inducing some firms to bear larger fixed costs as part of their profit-maximizing strategy.
    JEL: L9 L16 L25
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2505
  4. By: von Ditfurth, Jakob; Rausch, Sebastian
    Abstract: We study Germany's photovoltaic (PV) subsidy program, estimating a dynamic model of new technology adoption which accounts for heterogeneity in residential ownership structures. We find that homeowner and landlord investors heavily discount future benefits, highlighting the suboptimality of the feed-in tariff structure and the inefficient use of government funds. The high administrative costs associated with tenant electricity contracts strongly discourage landlords from investing in new energy technologies. Our analysis suggests that policy design should prioritize upfront investment subsidies over feed-in tariffs to promote renewable energy adoption. Reducing administrative costs associated with tenant electricity programs is key to unlock investments by landlords and expand tenants' access to solar energy, thereby enhancing cost-effectiveness.
    Keywords: Renewable Energy, Subsidies, Germany, Households, Undervaluation, Cost-Effectiveness
    JEL: C51 D15 Q48 Q58
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:319889
  5. By: Michael S. Barr
    Date: 2025–07–16
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgsq:101313
  6. By: Éric Darmon (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Thomas Le Texier (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Zhiwen Li (Southeast University [Jiangsu]); Thierry Pénard (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Antitrust authorities are concerned with the dominant market position of Tech Giants such as Google, Meta, or Amazon. These digital conglomerates are characterized by platform-based business models and multimarket contact (MMC). In traditional one-sided markets, theory and empirical evidence show that MMC tends to relax competition. In this paper, we revisit this result in the context of platform competition with competitive bottleneck and cross-market externalities, and provide new insights into the impact of MMC on platform competition. In this context, when platforms charge the two groups of users (bilateral pricing), we find that MMC always decreases the profitability of platforms regardless of the nature and magnitude of cross-market externalities. Then we consider the case in which platforms can only charge one group of users (unilateral pricing). When platforms charge the side on which they are not directly competing for users (i.e. the side that is not the competitive bottleneck), MMC may relax competition only if cross-group externalities and cross-market externalities are both sufficiently small. From a competition policy perspective, our paper provides insights into how antitrust authorities should review conglomerate mergers in digital markets and assesses the effects of the diversification strategies of digital platforms in the context of cross-market externalities and competitive bottleneck.
    Keywords: Two-sided markets, Platform competition, Digital markets, Multimarket contact, Cross-market externalities, Competitive bottleneck, Competition policy
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05107385
  7. By: Sindri Engilbertsson (University of Amsterdam); Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Leonard Treuren (KU Leuven)
    Abstract: Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms engaging in illegal price-fixing. We examine how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly game, we show that revenue-based fines incentivize firms to charge prices above the monopoly price, whereas only overcharge-based fines encourage prices below the monopoly price. Cartels are stable for a smaller range of discount factors when fines are based on overcharges rather than other bases. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where subjects can form cartels, which allows them to discuss pricing at the risk of being detected and fined. By equalizing expected fines across treatments, we isolate the effect of the fine's base. We find that market prices are lowest under overcharge-based fines and highest under revenue-based fines. Variation in market prices across treatments is fully driven by cartel prices. While these results align with the theoretical predictions, cartel incidence remains unchanged across regimes. Our results suggest competition authorities could improve enforcement by shifting from revenue-based fines to profit- or overcharge-based fines.
    Date: 2025–02–21
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250012
  8. By: Ivaldi, Marc; Cherbonnier, Frédéric; Muller-Vibes, Catherine; Van Der Straeten, Karine
    Abstract: This study estimates the impact of a carbon tax on welfare, considering modal shifts to less carbon-intensive transport, as well as its effects on environmental and fiscal externalities. We calibrate a modal competition model using logit demand functions for a specific long-distance connection in France and simulate the introduction of a Pigouvian tax. Our key findings are: First, a €190/tCO2 carbon tax is nearly welfare-neutral but significantly detrimental to consumer surplus; Second, rail price regulation has the side effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by subsidizing the cleanest transport mode; Third, the widespread adoption of electric vehicles enhances overall welfare without significantly harming consumer surplus.
    Keywords: Modal competition; environmental externalities; carbon tax; high-speed rail
    JEL: D43 L91 R40 Q51
    Date: 2025–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130752
  9. By: Hormigos Feliu Clara (European Commission - JRC); Florio Pietro (European Commission - JRC); Dijkstra Lewis (European Commission - JRC); Auteri Davide (European Commission - JRC); Bertozzi Cecilia (European Commission - JRC)
    Abstract: In the context of the European path towards carbon neutrality and energy resilience, this report investigates energy poverty in EU households and energy need challenges in the EUâs building stock, focusing on the vulnerabilities and opportunities for rural areas. Based on measures of consensual comfort levels, economic strain and dwelling energy efficiency from the Household Budget Survey and the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, our results indicate that rural households could face higher levels of energy poverty. A high-resolution analysis of the building stock shows that rural areas feature higher residential building volumes per inhabitant and less compact shapes, which challenges their energy efficiency and increases heating needs. On the other hand, rural areas lead in energy efficiency improvements, and are particularly suited for the implementation of self-consumption renewable systems such as rooftop photovoltaics thanks to large roof areas per inhabitant and a high share of rural ownership (78% of owned dwellings). With rooftop PV, rural areas could potentially produce 2 200 kWh/inhabitant annually, 38% more than the average household electricity consumption in the EU.
    Date: 2025–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc142243
  10. By: Qian Chen; Martín Bordón-Lesme; Jaume Freire González
    Abstract: Rebound effects from energy efficiency improvements have been widely studied over the past decades across different resources and regions using different approaches and data. This diversity has hindered comparability among studies. To date, no single study has globally estimated these effects within a common framework. This paper addresses this gap by providing estimates of direct and indirect rebound effects in 43 countries and five aggregated "rest of the world" regions using an Environmentally Extended Multiregional Input–Output (EEMRIO) model, which covers all the world. This comprehensive, data-consistent approach effectively captures spillover effects through interregional economic flows that have been overlooked in previous studies. Moreover, it improves result comparability and offers insights for previously unexamined regions. Our findings indicate that in most countries, increased energy use due to households' re-consumption surpasses expected energy savings from efficiency improvements. When the efficiencies of coal, fuel, gas, electricity and all types of energy combined improve, the proportion of countries experiencing backfire (where the rebound effect exceeds 100%) is 81.25%, 56.25%, 68.75%, 56.25% and 56.25% respectively. These results highlight the critical need to control high rebound effects to achieve reductions in global energy consumption.
    Keywords: Rebound effect, sustainability, input output analysis, energy conservation
    JEL: C67 Q43
    Date: 2025–04
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1489
  11. By: Lindner, Vincent; Riedel, Max
    Abstract: This policy letter critically assesses the European Commission's proposed revisions to the Securitisation Regulation, which aim to simplify disclosure requirements by reducing reporting fields by at least 35%. While the Commission frames this as a step toward cutting red tape, this quantitative approach risks undermining the core function of securitisation reporting: to ensure transparency and enable effective risk assessment. We argue that politically expedient deregulation overlooks key qualitative dimensions of financial supervision. Using the case of auto asset-backed securities (ABS), we propose a costeffective alternative that reduces administrative burden while enhancing information depth. Specifically, we demonstrate that the mandatory reporting of just two existing vehicle identifiers can yield highly granular and reliable vehicle data. Using public datasets from the European Environment Agency, we show that these identifiers can reproduce or surpass the current data quality for key vehicle characteristics, including CO₂ emissions, fuel type, and engine power. We conclude that regulatory simplification should aim for intelligent substitution rather than deletion.
    Keywords: Securitisation, Disclosure Requirements, Collateral Identifiers
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safepl:321878
  12. By: Jan Malek; Jo Seldeslachts; Reinhilde Veugelers
    Abstract: This paper provides empirical evidence on which M&A deals spur innovation, and which stifle it. To do so, we consider not only the product market position of the acquiring firm, but also the position of both target and acquirer in the technology space. Focusing on the antidiabetic drugs market, our dataset tracks the lifecycle and patenting of all individual antidiabetic projects in development between 1997 and 2017. We show that most terminations of acquired projects occur while the projects are still far from product market entry. Nevertheless, a number of these early-stage acquisitions have a positive impact on innovation. These cases arise when incumbents acquire projects close to their own projects in product markets, but only if these projects are also close in technology markets. Those deals are associated with increased subsequent patenting, which is consistent with the exploitation of technological synergies. Our results point to the crucial role of combining both product market and technology market positions in assessing the innovation effects of pharmaceutical M&As.
    Keywords: M&As, innovation, R&D, pharmaceutics, technology, novelty, patents
    JEL: L41 L65 O31
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2128

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