nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2025–04–07
thirteen papers chosen by
Christopher Decker, Oxford University
  1. Local marketplaces By Neuhoff, Karsten; Adamson, Seabron; Bichler, Martin; Klaucke, Franziska; Mindrup, Klaus; Olmos, Luis; Papavasiliou, Anthony; Staschus, Konstantin; Stolle, Leon; Vitiello, Silvia
  2. Implications of renewable electricity curtailment for delivered costs By David Newbery
  3. Scale, governance and net zero: decentralisation vs centralisation in electricity By Michael G Pollitt
  4. Wholesale Electricity Market Design: Rationale and Choices By Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
  5. Vertical market structure matters: The case of a horizontal retail merger in the German gasoline market By Oschmann, Sebastian
  6. Collusion when players take turns By Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
  7. The Determinants of Cartel Duration in Brazil By Paulo Burnier da Silveira
  8. Net Zero Energy by 2060 By World Bank
  9. Unlocking the Energy Transition By Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
  10. From Sun to Roof to Grid By Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
  11. Unleashing Rail Station Potential through Station Redevelopment By World Bank
  12. Distributional Analysis for Informing Energy Subsidy Reforms By Anne Olivier; Mikhail Matytsin; Defne Gencer
  13. Energy Storage for Mini Grids By Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
  1. By: Neuhoff, Karsten; Adamson, Seabron; Bichler, Martin; Klaucke, Franziska; Mindrup, Klaus; Olmos, Luis; Papavasiliou, Anthony; Staschus, Konstantin; Stolle, Leon; Vitiello, Silvia
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esrepo:314371
  2. By: David Newbery
    Keywords: Variable renewable electricity, marginal curtailment, average curtailment, levelised cost of electricity, VRE support design
    JEL: L94 Q42 Q48
    Date: 2025–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg2503
  3. By: Michael G Pollitt
    Keywords: Scale, scope, governance, net zero, decentralisation
    JEL: L94
    Date: 2025–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg2504
  4. By: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
    Keywords: Energy-Power & Energy Conversion
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:39720
  5. By: Oschmann, Sebastian
    Abstract: This article examines the price effects of gasoline stations following a retail merger in 2022. Using detailed station-level price data from 2020 to 2024, the analysis shows that fuel prices increase at both merging stations and their competitors, but with regional differences. These regional differences cannot be explained by horizontal merger effects. Instead, changes in the vertical market structure play a key role. The divestment of the station network disrupts supply chains, creating demand pressure on local refineries. The findings highlight the importance of vertical relationships in merger assessments.
    Keywords: Gasoline Retail Markets, Ex-Post Merger Evaluation, Competition
    JEL: D22 K21 L13 L41 L81
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:314431
  6. By: Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
    Abstract: Traditional collusion models typically assume that players coordinatetheir actions actively during the competition process to influence the outcomes.In contrast, we consider a repeated interaction setting betweentwo players where collusion occurs through well-defined strategies: theplayers take turns, with one holding monopoly power while the other eitherrefrains from participating or behaves as if absent. We provide afull characterization of when taking turns constitutes a subgame perfectNash equilibrium in repeated games. By allowing players to discount timedifferently, we uncover a novel, non-monotonic condition on the discountfactor that sustains collusion. We apply our findings to three specificcontexts: contests, duopoly, and political competition.
    Keywords: Collusion; Political competition; Repeated games; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Take-turns
    JEL: D43 C62 C73 D72
    Date: 2025–03–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:46355
  7. By: Paulo Burnier da Silveira
    Abstract: This paper analyses the determinants of cartel duration by using a dataset of 120 cases sanctioned by the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) between 1999 and 2022, which corresponds to all cartels sanctioned by CADE in Brazil from its inception until December 2022. The research considers the starting and the ending dates of the infringement as indicated in the case files, and it reveals an average duration of 4 years per cartel. Around 20% of the cartels had a very short duration (less than 3 months), while the longest cartel durations were around 20 years per cartel (i.e. the cartels in the markets of cement, salt extraction and marine hoses). The research then focuses in exploring the key determinants that may affect the duration of cartels, including the affected economic sector, the number of defendants and the geographic scope (i.e. local, national or international cartel). For this purpose, the research provides a statistics description of the database, which includes more than 2.500 defendants and total fines of around 10 billion BRL (2 billion Euros). The paper also explores possible correlations between these key determinants and the duration of cartels, by applying tests to measure the intensity of the correlations and its statistical significance. Last, a cartel survival estimation based on a Kaplan-Meier modelling indicates the probability of a cartel surviving after a given number of years, and a regression exercise using OLS and WLS completes the analysis. The paper concludes with a summary of the key findings and suggestions for future work.
    Keywords: Cartel duration; key determinants; correlation analysis; cartel survival estimation; Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE); economic analysis of competition law enforcement
    JEL: C01 K21 L49 L51
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2025-18
  8. By: World Bank
    Keywords: Energy-Energy Demand Energy-Energy Resources Development Energy-Renewable Energy
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:41170
  9. By: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
    Keywords: Energy-Energy Resources Development Energy-Solar Energy Environment-Adaptation to Climate Change
    Date: 2023–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40790
  10. By: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
    Keywords: Energy-Renewable Energy Energy-Energy Resources Development
    Date: 2023–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40470
  11. By: World Bank
    Keywords: Urban Development-Transport in Urban Areas Infrastructure Economics and Finance-Private Participation in Infrastructure
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40830
  12. By: Anne Olivier; Mikhail Matytsin; Defne Gencer
    Keywords: Energy-Energy and Poverty Alleviation Energy-Energy Finance
    Date: 2023–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40449
  13. By: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP)
    Keywords: Energy-Energy Resources Development Energy-Energy and Environment
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:40848
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