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on Regulation |
| By: | Cariolle, Joël; Houngbonon, Georges Vivien; Silue, Tarna Abdoul Hamid; Strusani, Davide |
| Abstract: | Submarine cables enable international connectivity and are essential for high-speed internet access. This paper tests their potential to improve the affordability of internet access by supporting a price drop through cost savings or increased competition intensity. The empirical framework relies on a dataset that combines the capacity of submarine cables with price data on fixed and mobile internet across 150 countries over a decade. Using a two-way fixed effects estimator, the analysis finds that the expansion of submarine cables is associated with a statistically significant drop in the price of internet access, up to 14–21 percent, depending on the technology, for every doubling of the capacity of submarine cables, and with large regional disparities. These effects stem from cost savings in the short run and tend to decline over time, concomitant with a rise in domestic telecom market concentration. The analysis also finds that these effects can be enhanced by telecom regulations, especially de-jure independence of the regulator, and the regulation of network interconnection and access, shared telecom infrastructure, and competition from international players across the broadband value chain. The main findings are robust to alternative estimation strategies, including an instrumental variable and a staggered difference in differences. |
| Date: | 2024–07–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:10840 |
| By: | Clara Calini (Italian Competition Authority - AGCM); Alessandra Catenazzo (Italian Competition Authority - AGCM); Elisabetta Iossa (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and AGCM) |
| Abstract: | Well-functioning competitive procurement is essential to reach efficiency of public services and public spending. Drawing from the experience of the Autorit`a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, this paper argues that fostering competition in public procurement is most effective when employing a diverse range of tools. First, identifying the functioning of compensatory mechanisms that result in anomalous bidding behaviour, as well as diversifying the sources of information, is important for effectively prosecuting bid rigging ex post and helping contracting authorities detect anticompetitive conduct. Second, ex ante advocacy contributes to enhance the competence of public buyers, helping them design pro-competitive procurement processes. Third, adopting legality rating systems incentivizes compliance with competition law and also helps select the most efficient bidder. The paper makes these points whilst reviewing enforcement practice. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Advocacy, Bid rigging, Legality Rating, Public Procurement |
| JEL: | D44 D73 H57 K4 L4 |
| Date: | 2025–02–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:594 |
| By: | Rhodes, Andrew; Zhou, Jidong; Zhou, Junjie |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes with many single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem is able to use data collected on one product to improve the quality of its other products. We study the impact of data regulation which either restricts the ecosystem’s cross-product data usage, or which requires it to share data with small firms. Each policy induces small firms to innovate more and set higher prices; it also dampens data spillovers within the ecosystem, reduces the ecosystem’s incentive to collect data and innovate, and potentially increases its prices. As a result, data regulation has an ambiguous impact on consumers, and is more likely to benefit consumers when small firms are relatively more efficient in innovation. A data cooperative among small firms, which helps them to share data with each other, does not necessarily benefit small firms and can even harm consumers. |
| Keywords: | digital ecosystems; innovation; data regulation; data cooperative |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L51 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130354 |
| By: | Tzanaki, Anna |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:311856 |
| By: | Grégroire Massé (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | The French notary profession has been transformed over the last ten years, leading to increased competition. However, regulatory indicators that initiated this process did not change. In other words, indicators have promoted and directly inspired regulatory changes that they fail to quantify. This paper questions the reasons for this failure by revisiting the methodology behind the indicators of professional regulation. It interrogates their double aim of quantifying regulation and giving insights for policymaking. Both lie in a representation of regulation on a competition continuum. Thus, the indicators can be interpreted equally as indicators of both regulation and deregulation. Challenging their positive dimension (regulation), we show that, in fact, they do not quantify professional regulation itself, but rather measure the distance from an ideal model in a "flat" world. Analysing their normative dimension (deregulation), we show that they often contradict the policies they are used to justify. These indicators can only promote complete deregulation or a one-size-fits-all model. Finally, we advocate for developing indicators more suitable for both economic analysis and policymaking, by adopting a more "legal markets-based" methodology for constructing indicators |
| Keywords: | Regulation Indexes (Regulatory Indicators); Legal Services (notaries); Professional competition; Comparative Law and Economics; Optimal regulation |
| JEL: | J44 L51 D45 K23 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24004r |
| By: | Ariell Reshef; Cailin Slattery |
| Abstract: | The employment share of legal services in the U.S. more than doubled during 1970–1990, in stark contrast to stability during 1850–1970 and after 1990. The relative wage of lawyers and law firm partners also doubled between 1970 and 1990. We argue that this demand shift was driven by important legislative and regulatory events, starting in the mid-1960s and lasting throughout the 1980s. These changes increased the scope of the law and uncertainty over legal outcomes. Consistent with this, we find that employment and compensation of lawyers are tightly correlated with federal regulation, fee-shifting statues and civil litigation, over a period of 100 years. These findings are supported by state-level and individual-level analysis. Other factors, e.g., changes in lawyers’ quality, industrial composition and technology are not important determinants of the demand shift. We calculate that 40% of payments to legal services in 1990 are in excess of what they would have been had their relative income remained at 1970 levels. This represents an excess cost of 75 billion dollars in 2024 alone. |
| Keywords: | legal services, lawyers, legislation, deregulation, litigation, labor demand |
| JEL: | J20 J30 N30 K00 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11661 |
| By: | Silva, Jose I.; Okabe, Tomohito; Urzay, Sergi |
| Abstract: | This study examines the relationship between firms’ market power, captured by product markups and labor markdowns, and the labor share within European firms. Using firm-level data from the CompNet database, we develop a microeconomic framework linking the labor share to firms’ market power. Empirical results show that labor markdowns reduce the labor share, while product markups have a hump-shaped effect on it. Specifically, moderate increases in product markups initially lead to a rise in the labor share. However, as markups reach higher levels, firms with significant pricing power increasingly exercise monopsony power over their workers, amplifying markdowns and suppressing labor costs. Additionally, the analysis uncovers substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship between markups, markdowns, and the labor share. |
| Keywords: | product markup, labor markdown, firms’ labor share. |
| JEL: | D21 D22 J31 L12 |
| Date: | 2025–01–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:123442 |
| By: | Cañón Salazar, Carlos (Bank of England); Tanaka, Misa (Bank of England); Thanassoulis, John (Warwick Business School, University of Warwick and CEPR and UK Competition and Markets Authority) |
| Abstract: | We develop a game-theoretic model in which financial regulators compete to attract internationally mobile banks by setting the level of regulatory stringency to meet both financial stability and growth objectives. We show that competitive deregulation will not arise if the relatively growth-focused regulator becomes even more growth focused, but it becomes more likely if the relatively stability-focused regulator becomes more growth focused. We also demonstrate that domestic nonregulatory inducements to retain banks (eg tax, labour laws) create an externality on the global equilibrium of regulatory stringency chosen by financial regulators with a growth objective. |
| Keywords: | Financial regulation; global financial markets; growth; competitiveness |
| JEL: | F43 G18 G28 L50 |
| Date: | 2024–12–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:1098 |
| By: | Alzate, David; Eliana Carranza; Duran-Franch, Joana; Truman G. Packard; Celina Proffen |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an extensive review of the literatures on product and labor market regulations and their effects on labor market outcomes. It uncovers the interdependence of these two types of regulations, an area that has received limited attention in research. The paper highlights why understanding the intricate relationship between product and labor market regulations is crucial for effective policy making and advancement of labor market conditions. The findings strongly discourage adopting uniform policies and advocate for tailored approaches to labor market promotion. |
| Date: | 2024–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:10961 |
| By: | Chintamani Bagwe |
| Abstract: | RegTech is a rapidly rising financial services sector focused on using cutting-edge technology to improve the process of regulatory compliance. RegTech solutions are characterized by numerous features and benefits that can considerably contribute to helping organizations operate effectively in the increasingly regulated environment, when it comes to compliance and risk management. This paper sheds light on why RegTech will be one of the most promising markets, driven by the rising cost of compliance and the growing reliance on technology in crisis management. Moreover, this paper will examine the advantages of using such solutions to strike a balance between compliance and operational efficiencies. This paper will deepen the understanding of regulatory compliance, introduce RegTech, and examine the benefits of using these solutions to achieve compliance. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.18910 |