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on Regulation |
| By: | Adrián, Nerja |
| Abstract: | Parallel airline alliances have negative effects on consumers a priori; however, they can be counteracted if airports may modify the behavior of airlines. In particular, vertical airport–airline agreements allow the airport to influence the competition downstream market, changing the effects of parallel alliances. In this paper, we analyze the effects of parallel alliances in the context of competition between vertical airport–airline pairs competition. We show that under the influence of airports, parallel alliances are welfare improving, and the number of passengers increases, against former studies. These results offer a new brand of analyses to be considered by authorities that evaluate parallel alliances. |
| Keywords: | Airlines parallel alliances; Concession revenue sharing; Vertical agreements; Airports competition |
| JEL: | D43 D47 L13 L93 R49 |
| Date: | 2022–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119174&r=reg |
| By: | Jens-Uwe Franck; Till Seyer |
| Abstract: | If an antitrust fine has been imposed on a company, the question of managerial recourse liability arises. We present court cases from the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany, in part denying managerial liability and claiming that it would undermine the fines’ deterrent effect. We analyse whether managerial liability should be limited or banned to prevent, on the one hand, the company or its shareholders being under-deterred or, on the other hand, the company’s management being over-deterred. Regarding the former, we argue that a ban of managerial liability – which would have to be accompanied by a ban on any other type of internal financial sanction – would take an indispensable governance instrument out of the hands of shareholders. This holds true despite the availability of D&O insurance. Regarding the latter, we identify risks of over deterrence but also see mitigating mechanisms at work. We conclude that, while a restriction on managerial liability may be regarded a reasonable measure, this should be viewed as lying within the discretion of company law legislation and jurisprudence but not as a mandatory implication of antitrust fining laws. |
| Keywords: | antitrust law, cartels, antitrust fines, deterrence, managerial liability, antitrust compliance, D&O insurance, EU law, principle of effectiveness |
| JEL: | K21 K22 K42 L40 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_429v2&r=reg |
| By: | Groh, Carl-Christian |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 L15 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277701&r=reg |
| By: | Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian |
| JEL: | D04 L12 Q48 K33 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277575&r=reg |
| By: | Mark Armstrong; John Vickers |
| Abstract: | We study a market in which several firms potentially each supply a number of “brands” of fundamentally the same product. In fashion, for example, a single firm might retail similar items under different labels and different prices. Consumers differ in which products they consider for their purchase, and firms compete using (multi-dimensional) mixed pricing strategies for their brands. Using relative elasticity conditions, we discuss when firms choose to offer uniform pricing across their brands, and when they use segmented pricing so that one “discount” brand is always priced below another. We solve duopoly models in which equilibria can be derived for all parameters. We discuss the impact of introducing a new brand, of imposing a requirement to set uniform prices across a firm’s brands, and of mergers between single-brand firms. |
| Date: | 2023–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1029&r=reg |
| By: | Werner, Tobias |
| JEL: | C90 D83 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277573&r=reg |
| By: | Heyen, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp |
| JEL: | D23 D62 D82 H23 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277647&r=reg |
| By: | Brian C. Albrecht; Tom Phelan; Nick Pretnar |
| Abstract: | What are the welfare implications of markup heterogeneity across firms? In standard monopolistic competition models, such heterogeneity implies inefficiency even in the presence of free entry. We enrich the standard model with heterogeneous firms so that preferences are non-separable in off-market time and market consumption and show that this changes the welfare implications of markup heterogeneity. In this context, homogeneity of markups is neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency. The marginal cost of the marginal firm is weakly inefficiently high when off-market time and market consumption are complements and inefficiently low when they are substitutes, and the equilibrium allocation devotes weakly too few resources to firm creation. However, when off-market time and market consumption are perfect complements, markups are heterogeneous across firms and yet the equilibrium allocation is efficient. |
| Keywords: | monopolistic competition; markups; efficiency; time use; home production; elasticity of substitution; selection; heterogeneous firms |
| JEL: | D1 D4 D6 L1 |
| Date: | 2023–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwq:97319&r=reg |
| By: | Caterina Colombo; Corrado Benassi; Alessandra Chirco |
| Abstract: | Within the standard framework of mixed oligopoly theory, in this paper we investigate how changes in the distribution of income affect demand and the incentives towards privatization. We show that the scope for privatization is widened when the market is poorer, and when incomes become moreconcentrated. These results are accounted for in terms of the way distributional shocks alter the allocative inefficiency of imperfectly competitive markets. |
| Keywords: | Mixed oligopoly; income distribution; privatization |
| JEL: | L13 L32 H44 |
| Date: | 2023–12–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udf:wpaper:20230812&r=reg |
| By: | Holler, Marit |
| JEL: | D43 D47 D62 L13 L22 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277602&r=reg |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver; Eckert, Sandra |
| Abstract: | Wettbewerb und Regulierung werfen sowohl aus einer wirtschafts- als auch aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive interessante Fragestellungen auf und haben daher in beiden Disziplinen umfangreiche Beachtung gefunden. Während die Wirtschaftswissenschaften zwischen den Subdisziplinen Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsökonomik trennt, begreift die Politikwissenschaft die marktschaffende als auch marktkorrigierende 'regulative Politik' weitgehend als Einheit (Abschnitt 2). Der Hauptbeitrag der Wirtschaftswissenschaften liegt im Bereich einer wettbewerbsökonomischen Wirkungsanalyse (Abschnitt 3), während die politikwissenschaftliche Domäne in der Analyse von Institutionen und Prozessen der regulativen Politik zu verorten ist (Abschnitt 4). Aus einer interdisziplinären Perspektive kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass beide Sichtweisen in erster Linie komplementär sind und sich gegenseitig befruchten können. Insbesondere das Verständnis jüngster Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Wettbewerb und Regulierung, die eine stärker industriepolitische und geostrategische Ausrichtung beinhalten, kann von einer politökonomischen Perspektive profitieren. |
| Keywords: | Wettbewerb, Regulierung, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Politikwissenschaft, Wettbewerbspolitik |
| JEL: | A12 A20 L40 L50 P40 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:280395&r=reg |
| By: | Diego Rodríguez |
| Abstract: | Como es conocido, el sector eléctrico y el gasista 4enen un sistema de ingresos y de pagos regulados con los que se a4ende, principalmente, al coste de las redes, los pagos a algunos ac4vos de generación y el pago de la deuda contraída en el pasado. Aunque la norma reguladora básica establece que la planificación ex ante de ingresos y pagos para cada año debe asegurar que el sistema esté equilibrado, lo cierto es que dis4ntas circunstancias pueden conducir a la aparición de importantes desequilibrios ex post en forma de déficits o superávits anuales. |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdafen:2023-23&r=reg |