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on Regulation |
| By: | Saglam, Ismail |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a duopoly with asymmetric costs and demand uncertainty to study the welfare effects of pretend-but-perform regulation (PPR) of Koray and Sertel (1988) under three modes of competition, involving the Cournot, conjectural variations, and supply function competitions. PPR induces a two-stage game where each firm declares in the first stage a cost report and produces in the second stage accordingly. Theoretically characterizing and numerically computing the equilibrium of this game, we show that the consumer surplus increases if PPR is applied under the Cournot competition and it decreases if PPR is applied under the other modes of competition. |
| Keywords: | Duopoly; regulation, Cournot, conjectural variations, supply function equilibrium. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L51 |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:116767&r=reg |
| By: | Johannes Muthers; Sebastian Wismer |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical twopart tariffs only as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator’s incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, which may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees. |
| Keywords: | Intermediation, Platform Tariff, Hold-Up Problem |
| JEL: | D40 L14 L81 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2023-03&r=reg |
| By: | Lencz, Dominic (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI)) |
| Abstract: | Variable renewable electricity (VRE), generated for instance by wind or solar power plants, is characterised by negligible variable costs and an availability that varies over time and space. Locating VRE capacity at sites with the highest average availability maximises the potential output. However, potential output must be curtailed, if system constraints prevent a local use or export. Such system constraints arise from the features defining the system, which I denote as system topology. Therefore, site choices that are unfavourable from a potential output perspective may still be optimal from a total system cost perspective. Previous research has shown that first-best investments require nodal prices that take account of the system constraints. Market designs that do not reflect nodal prices, such as uniform pricing, typically fail to achieve optimal site choices. However, a profound theoretical understanding of the economic trade-offs involved in the optimal spatial allocation of VRE is lacking. My paper contributes to filling this research gap. To do so, I develop a highly stylised model in which producers, taking into account the system topology, allocate VRE capacity in a one-shot game. Using the model, I analytically show that the optimal spatial allocation can be grouped into three spatial allocation ranges. Which of these ranges applies, I find to be highly dependent on the system topology parameters. In the first range, valid for relatively low VRE penetration levels, it is optimal to allocate all capacity to the node with the higher average availability. In the second and third range, it is optimal to allocate marginal capacity either fully or partially to the node with the lower average availability, i.e., the less favourable site from a potential output perspective. For uniform pricing, I show that producers allocate capacity inefficiently when VRE penetration exceeds a certain threshold.The resulting welfare losses I find to be especially high when transmission capacity is low, the difference in average VRE availability is large, and demand is concentrated at the node with the lower availability. |
| Keywords: | Variable renewable electricity; spatial allocation; nodal pricing; uniform pricing; theoretical analysis |
| JEL: | D47 Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2023–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:ewikln:2023_002&r=reg |
| By: | Jiajia Cong; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | This study examines how consumers' personal data management affects firms' competition in the data collection and data application markets and welfare outcomes. Consumers purchase products from differentiated firms in two markets. Firms compete to collect consumer data first to predict their preferences in the data application market, where each firm offers personalized prices to its targeted consumers and a uniform price to untargeted consumers. Before firms offer prices, their targeted consumers can erase data to become untargeted for a fixed cost. We show that consumers' privacy management mitigates price competition, reduces firms' profits, and harms consumer surplus and social welfare in the data application market; privacy management intensifies competition and improves consumer surplus in the data collection market. Across these two markets, profits and social welfare decline. The change in consumers' two-market surplus depends on their foresight regarding the outcomes in the data application market, with only forward-looking consumers having a higher surplus. We extend the model in several directions, including data-enabled product personalization, privacy costs, data portability, and data ownership, and discuss the implications for privacy laws. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1201&r=reg |
| By: | Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo; Guccio, Calogero; Rizzo, Ilde |
| Abstract: | Public infrastructure procurement is crucial as a prerequisite for public and private investments and for economic and social capital growth. However, low performance in execution severely hinders infrastructure provision and benefits delivery. One of the most sensitive phases in public infrastructure procurement is the design because of the strategic relationship that it potentially creates between procurers and contractors in the execution stage, affecting the costs and the duration of the contract. In this paper, using recent developments in non-parametric frontiers and propensity score matching, we evaluate the performance in the execution of public works in Italy. The analysis provides robust evidence of significant improvement of performance where procurers opt for design and build contracts, which lead to lower transaction costs, allowing contractors to better accommodate the project in the execution. Our findings bear considerable policy implications. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure provision, Transaction costs economics, propensity score matching, non-parametric frontiers, public works procurement, performance, design and build contracts |
| JEL: | H57 D73 O18 C14 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:270729&r=reg |
| By: | Fan Yang (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates the effect of recent EU regulations on hedge fund performance. The expansion of hedge funds attracts the attention from authorities who are responsible for monitoring the market risks but the influence of the oversight has been argued for a long time. Prior studies usually focus on the US regulations and they provide controversial findings about the relationship of hedge fund performance and regulations. However, to our knowledge, no studies discuss the impact of the EU regulations-the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD). The analysis of the AIFMD and the comparison of the rules from the US and the EU show that the EU Directive has more extensive requirements, compliance cost, and wider scope of disclosure to the public. Considering the additional compliance cost and higher possibility to reveal managers´ strategies, we expect the hedge fund performance is negatively influenced by the EU regulation. Based upon the common difference-in-difference method (DID), we utilize the characteristic that the scope of the AIFMD exempts some EU hedge funds and add the third factor to formulate the triple difference method to test the triple interaction relationship. This method allows us to mitigate the different influence from potential various sensitivities or development speed from control group and treatment group. Our results show that hedge funds domiciled or marketed in the EU had a drop of 0.2% in the alpha. The result has been further enhanced by comparing the matched control group and treatment group by using the propensity matching score, which ensures our research compares the changes of individual authorized hedge funds based on the specified authorization date. |
| Keywords: | hedge fund, regulation, stock returns |
| JEL: | G23 G28 |
| Date: | 2023–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2023_07&r=reg |
| By: | Didier Laussel (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Joana Resende (Cef.up, Economics Department, University of Porto) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates duopoly competition when horizontally differentiated firms are able to make personalized product-price offers to returning customers, within a behavior-based discrimination model. In the second period, firms can profile old customers according to their preferences, selling them targeted products at personalized prices. Product-price personalization (PP) allows firms to retain all old customers, eliminating second-period customer poaching. The overall profit effects of PP are shown to be ambiguous. In the second period, PP improves the matching between customers' preferences and firms' offers, but firms do not make any revenues in the rival's turf. In the Bertrand outcome, second-period profits only increase for both firms if the size of their old turfs are not too different or initial products are not too differentiated. However, the additional second-period profits may be offset by lower first-period profits. PP is likely to increase firms' overall discounted profits when consumers' (firms') discount factor is low (high) and firms' initial products are exogenous and sufficiently different. When the location of initial products is endogenous, profits are hurt because of an additional location (strategic) effect aggravating head-to-head competition in the first period. Likewise, when a fraction of active consumers conceals their identity, PP increases second-period profits at the cost of aggressive first-period price competition. Finally, we show that the room for profitable PP enlarges considerably if firms rely on PP as an effective device to sustain tacit collusive outcomes, with firms credibly threatening to respond to first-period price deviations with second-period aggressive relocations of their standard products. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. |
| Keywords: | behavior-based discrimination, price and product targeting, consumer poaching, consumer retention, segmentation, tacit collusion |
| Date: | 2022–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03740642&r=reg |
| By: | Farag, Markos (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI)); Jeddi, Samir (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI)); Kopp, Jan Hendrik (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI)) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the integration of the American, European, and Asian natural gas markets over the period 2016-2022, with a focus on how the demand shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the supply shock caused by geopolitical tensions in the European market affected this integration.We also examine which regional market is leading in reflecting new information and shocks into the market price. Our analysis indicates that the market integration process has been impacted by external shocks, leading to a decrease in the degree of integration between the European and Asian markets. Additionally, we find that the American market is no longer integrated with the other two markets after the supply shock, potentially due to the US's congested and fully utilized LNG infrastructure. Our analysis also shows that the gas price differentials adjust asymmetrically in response to disturbances, suggesting that markets respond differently to positive and negative shocks. Moreover, we show that the lead/lag relationship changes over time and exhibits a dynamic behavior. Finally, we discuss the fundamental changes in the global gas market that align with our empirical results. |
| Keywords: | Natural gas markets; Market integration; Threshold Co-integration; Time-varying causality |
| JEL: | C32 D40 D58 F21 F41 G13 G14 L95 Q35 Q41 |
| Date: | 2023–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:ewikln:2023_003&r=reg |
| By: | Rim Lahmandi-Ayed (UR MASE - Modélisation et Analyse Statistique et Economique - ESSAIT - Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information - Université de Carthage - University of Carthage); Didier Laussel (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a public monopoly, i.e. which is owned equally by all individuals. The question is under which conditions the firm will be privatized and at which rate/price. The decisions are taken through majority vote in a plurality system. When the firm is controlled by the State, the price is determined through a vote among all the population. Otherwise, the price is the one which maximizes the profit. We prove that, when the maximum disutility of working in the firm is higher than the maximum utility of consuming its output, privatization may emerge as a possible choice of the majority, even if no hypothesis is made on the efficiency of a private management relative to a public one. |
| Keywords: | Democracy, General equilibrium, Privatization, Vertical preferences, Majority vote, Public monopoly |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03702671&r=reg |
| By: | SOLER GARRIDO Josep (European Commission - JRC); TOLAN Songul; HUPONT TORRES Isabelle (European Commission - JRC); FERNANDEZ LLORCA David (European Commission - JRC); CHARISI Vasiliki (European Commission - JRC); GOMEZ GUTIERREZ Emilia (European Commission - JRC); JUNKLEWITZ Henrik (European Commission - JRC); HAMON Ronan (European Commission - JRC); FANO YELA Delia (European Commission - JRC); PANIGUTTI Cecilia (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | The European Commission presented in April 2021 the AI Act, its proposed legislative framework for Artificial Intelligence, which sets the necessary regulatory conditions for the adoption of trustworthy AI practices in the European Union. Once the final legal text comes into force, standards will play a fundamental role in supporting providers of concerned AI systems, bringing the necessary level of technical detail into the essential requirements prescribed in the legal text. Indeed, harmonised standards provide operators with presumption of conformity with legal requirements. AI has been an active area of work by many standards development organizations in recent years. In this report, we analyse a set of specifications produced by the IEEE Standards Association covering aspects of trustworthy AI. Several of the documents analysed have been found to provide highly relevant technical content from the point of view of the AI Act. Furthermore, some of them cover important standardization gaps identified in previous analyses. This work is intended to provide independent input to European and international standardisers currently planning AI standardisation activities in support of the regulatory needs. This report identifies concrete elements in IEEE standards and certification criteria that could fulfil standardisation needs emerging from the European AI Regulation proposal, and provides recommendations for their potential adoption and development in this direction. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence, Standards, Technical Specifications |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc131155&r=reg |
| By: | Enste, Dominik; Hensen, Julia; Potthoff, Jennifer |
| Abstract: | Private Haushalte sind angesichts der drohenden Gasmangellage aufgerufen, ihren Gas- und Energiekonsum zu reduzieren. Die moralischen Appelle der Regierenden bergen die Gefahr, dass Menschen mit Reaktanz statt mit der gewünschten Verhaltensänderung reagieren. Statt zu sparen, versuchen sie den eingeschränkten Freiheitsspielraum zurückzuerlangen. Mit weniger freiheitseinschränkenden, verhaltensökonomischen Maßnahmen könnte energiesparendes Verhalten besser gefördert werden. Ein Lösungsansatz ist das Nudging. Nudges sind Anstupser, die menschliches Verhalten und individuelle Entscheidungen durch minimal-invasive, nicht-finanzielle Eingriffe in eine gewünschte Richtung lenken, ohne die Wahlfreiheit einzuschränken. Die analysierten Nudges des Feedbacks, der Selbstverpflichtung und Zielsetzung, Gamification, Sozialer Vergleich und Default-Änderungen zeigen Einsparpotenziale im Bereich des Energie- und Gasverbrauchs von 4 bis 20 Prozent - je nach Ausgestaltung der Maßnahmen. Insbesondere Gamification und soziale Vergleichsprozesse sind dabei in Kombination mit Feedback besonders effektiv. Die spielerische Komponente sorgt dafür, dass Energiesparen nicht mehr (nur) moralische Pflicht ist, sondern auch Spaß machen darf. Nebenbei kann bei einer geschickten Kombination der Maßnahmen ein 4-Personen-Haushalt beim aktuellen Preisniveau bei Strom- und Gaskosten durchschnittlich bis zu 1.000 Euro im Jahr sparen. |
| JEL: | D91 D78 Q58 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkpps:22023&r=reg |
| By: | Jakub Sokolowski; Jan Frankowski; Joanna Mazurkiewicz |
| Abstract: | The geopolitical situation and the EU's ambitious climate policy are driving energy prices up. And when these rise, they inflate the risk of poverty and inequality – especially among poorer households. These risks should be mitigated and energy-poor households compensated for the increase in energy prices. The Anti-inflation Shield proposed by the Polish government in November 2021 will not do this; it is merely a temporary cut in energy prices that will potentially benefit high-income households the most. Energy vouchers are an alternative that would effectively work to reduce poverty, inequality and contribute to achieving climate policy goals. These vouchers should: (1) go to energy-poor households, (2) cover their average energy expenditure, (3) encourage households to enroll in energy transition support programmes. And while this solution is expensive, its benefits far outweigh its costs. Poor households must be compensated for rising energy costs to foster greater public acceptance of a cleaner and greener energy transformation. |
| Keywords: | energy and climate, |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ibt:ppaper:pp052021&r=reg |
| By: | Marc Ivaldi (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Ambre Nicolle (LMU Munich School of Management - LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München); Frank Verboven (KU Leuven - Catholic University of Leuven - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); Jiekai Zhang (Helsinki School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Do new digital consumption channels of music depress sales in old physical ones, or are they complementary? To answer this question, we exploit product-level variation in sales and prices of over 4 million products, observed weekly between 2014 and 2017 for the entire French market. A unique feature of our data is that we observe sales for both physical and digital products, as well as streaming consumption. At the track-level, we find that streaming displaces digital sales. At the more aggregate artist-level, digital sales displace physical sales, but streaming implies a promotional effect on physical sales. This complementarity is driven by popular genres, i.e., Pop and Variety. Most of our findings are robust to whether we consider the hits or include the products that belong to the long tail. Our findings bridge two streams of literature as we show that displacement between consumption channels at the product level can coexist with complementarity at a more aggregate level. |
| Keywords: | Digitization, Music industry, Music consumption, Streaming |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04020859&r=reg |
| By: | Goodhart, Charles; Lastra, Rosa |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyse why the changing and growing roles of independent Central Banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate. |
| Keywords: | accountability; central banking; financial stability; independence; monetary policy |
| JEL: | M40 J1 |
| Date: | 2023–02–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:118448&r=reg |
| By: | Benjamin Ouvrard (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaële Préget (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Arnaud Reynaud (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Laetitia Tuffery (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement) |
| Abstract: | We use a discrete choice experiment with treatments to test if voluntary adoption of smart water meters by French farmers can be fostered by i) a collective conditional subsidy offered to farmers who adopt a smart meter only if the rate of adoption in their geographic area is sufficiently high, and ii) informational nudges. Using a sample of 1, 272 farmers, we find contrasted results regarding our nudges, but we show that a conditional subsidy is an effective tool to foster adoption of smart meters. Interestingly, the willingness to pay for the conditional subsidy is equal to the subsidy amount and independent of the collective adoption threshold. |
| Keywords: | Choice experiment, Nudges, French farmers, Smart water meters, incentives |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04043374&r=reg |
| By: | Marcel Boyer (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | In the assessment of the cost of public funds, there is a pervasive economic fallacy that is frequently repeated in public policy circles: because the cost of borrowing is higher for a private-sector firm than it is for a public-sector firm, the cost of carrying out an activity (investment, production, distribution, provision of goods and services, and borrowing) will necessarily be lower ceteris paribus in the public sector than in the private sector. The statement is erroneous because part of the government's cost of borrowing, namely the risk borne by citizens, customers, and taxpayers, is hidden from the casual observer of market interest rates or yields. The all-inclusive borrowing cost, more generally the all-inclusive cost of capital, is the same for both the public and the private sectors. I discuss four specific real cases in which the error is present: the Quebec Generations Fund, the Quebec CDPQ Infra-Reseu express metropolitain project, the Infrastructure Ontario methodology to assess the riskiness of costs, and the BC Hydro Site C hydroelectric megaproject. I also discuss a general fifth case, namely government support programs for businesses (grants, loans, guarantees, subsidies, etc.), which are generally justified on the fallacious claim that the cost of financing is lower for the government than for the private sector. I propose an auction process by which the true cost of business support programs could be made transparent. I conclude with an appeal for a more rigorous use and management of public funds because miscalculation, misinformation, mismanagement, and fallacious analysis will eventually backfire. |
| Abstract: | Dans l'évaluation des fonds publics se répand un raisonnement économique fallacieux qu'on reproduit souvent dans les cercles politiques publics : étant donné que l'emprunt coûte plus cher aux entreprises privées qu'aux entreprises publiques, les frais d'exercice (investissement, production, distribution, offre de produits et services et l'emprunt), toutes choses égales par ailleurs, coûtent forcément moins au secteur public qu'au secteur privé. Cette affirmation est erronée car une partie du coût d'emprunt par le gouvernement, notamment le risque supporté par les citoyens, les clients et les contribuables n'est pas perçu par l'observateur occasionnel des taux d'intérêts et des rendements du marché. Le coût d'emprunt global, plus généralement le coût global du capital est le même pour les secteurs privé et public. Je m'intéresse à quatre cas réels dans lesquels l'erreur est présente : le Fond des générations du Québec, le projet Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec–Infra Réseau express métropolitain, la Méthode d'évaluation du niveau de risque lié aux coûts d'Infrastructure Ontario, et le mégaprojet hydroélectrique BC Hydro's Site C de la Colombie-Britannique. Je me penche également sur un cinquième cas général, à savoir les programmes de soutien du gouvernement aux entreprises (allocations, prêts, garanties, subventions, etc.), qu'on justifie généralement en se fondant sur le faux postulat que le financement coûte moins au gouvernement qu'au privé. Je propose un système d'adjudication selon lequel le coût réel des programmes de soutien aux entreprises sera transparent. Je conclus avec un appel pour une utilisation et une gestion plus rigoureuses des fonds publics car les mauvais calculs, la désinformation, la mauvaise gestion et les analyses erronées finiront par nous rattraper. |
| Keywords: | Cost of Capital, Public Debt, Site C Project, Generations Fund, REM, Infrastructure Ontario, Coût du capital, Dette publique, Fonds des générations, Projet du site C |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04039054&r=reg |
| By: | Klaus M. Miller; Bernd Skiera |
| Abstract: | In recent years, European regulators have debated restricting the time an online tracker can track a user to protect consumer privacy better. Despite the significance of these debates, there has been a noticeable absence of any comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. This article fills this gap on the cost side by suggesting an approach to estimate the economic consequences of lifetime restrictions on cookies for publishers. The empirical study on cookies of 54, 127 users who received 128 million ad impressions over 2.5 years yields an average cookie lifetime of 279 days, with an average value of EUR 2.52 per cookie. Only 13% of all cookies increase their daily value over time, but their average value is about four times larger than the average value of all cookies. Restricting cookies lifetime to one year (two years) decreases their lifetime value by 25% (19%), which represents a decrease in the value of all cookies of 9% (5%). In light of the EUR 10.60 billion cookie-based display ad revenue in Europe, such restrictions would endanger EUR 904 million (EUR 576 million) annually, equivalent to EUR 2.08 (EUR 1.33) per EU internet user. The article discusses these results' marketing strategy challenges and opportunities for advertisers and publishers. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.09147&r=reg |
| By: | Juan Andres Espinosa-Torres; Jaime Ramirez-Cuellar |
| Abstract: | We explore firm-level markup and profit rates during the COVID-19 pandemic for a panel of 3, 611 publicly traded firms in Compustat and find increases for the average firm. We offer conditions to give markups and profit rate forecasts a causal interpretation of what would have happened had the pandemic not happened. Our estimations suggest that had the pandemic not happened, markups would have been 4% and 7% higher than observed in 2020 and 2021, respectively, and profit rates would have been 2.1 and 6.4 percentage points lower. We perform a battery of tests to assess the robustness of our approach. We further show significant heterogeneity in the impact of the pandemic on firms by key firm characteristics and industry. We find that firms with lower than forecasted markups tend to have lower stock-exchange tenure and fewer employees. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.08765&r=reg |