nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2023‒03‒20
thirteen papers chosen by
Christopher Decker
Oxford University

  1. Electricity Markets in Transition and Crisis: Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Security By Jamasb, Tooraj; Nepal, Rabindra; Davi-Arderius, Daniel
  2. The Energy Community and the Grid By Axel Gautier; Julien Jacqmin; Jean-Christophe Pooudou
  3. Strategic capacity investment with common ownership or cross holdings By Richard Ruble; Dimitrios Zormpas
  4. Un marché neutre au genre ? Les barrières du notariat français By Grégroire Massé
  5. Emerging privacy-enhancing technologies: Current regulatory and policy approaches By OECD
  6. Why Economists Should Support Populist Antitrust Goals By Mark Glick; Gabriel A. Lozada; Darren Bush
  7. (Sports) economics upside down? A comment on the Advocate General opinion in European Super League versus UEFA/FIFA By Budzinski, Oliver
  8. Downstream Cross-Holdings and Upstream Collusion By Konstantinos Charistos; Ioannis Pinopoulos; Panagiotis Skartados
  9. Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization By Clarissa Lotti; Arieda Muço; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Tommaso Valletti; Tommaso M. Valletti
  10. Water Governance: effective needs for Sustainable Development By Mishra, Mukesh Kumar
  11. A Theory of Monopolistic Competition with Horizontally Heterogeneous Consumers By Sergey Kokovin; Alina Ozhegova; Shamil Sharapudinov; Alexander Tarasov; Philip Ushchev; Sergey G. Kokovin
  12. A thorough look into the state-market divide: depoliticisation of privatisation in post-crisis Greece By Sarımehmet Duman, Özgün
  13. Cartel Damages Claims, Passing-On and Passing-Back By Garrod, Luke; Han, Tien-Der Jerry; Harvey, James; Olczak, Matthew

  1. By: Jamasb, Tooraj (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Nepal, Rabindra (University of Wollongong); Davi-Arderius, Daniel (University of Barcelona)
    Abstract: Two electricity market crises following the lifting of post-Covid restrictions in 2021 and the natural gas supply interruptions in 2022, challenged the functioning of the EU electricity market and its design. This paper argues that the market design was already ripe for an overhaul as the efficient market paradigm has gradually given way to as instrument of cost-effective attainment of green targets and balancing of the elements of energy trilemma. We discuss the linkages between the long-term and short-term markets. While policy interventions to alleviate short-term affordability are important, they cannot constraint the long-term sustainability and security of supply. Short-term electricity markets have, technically, worked according to design. However, the distributional implications of them call for revisiting how resources are allocated to and operate in the market. We revisit several dimensions of market design with a view to the recent calls and to review and overhaul them such as windfall tax, contract for differences, market decoupling etc.
    Keywords: Electricity; Market design; Energy markets; Natural gas; Energy reform; Affordability; Security of supply; Sustainability
    JEL: D20 D30 D60 L10 L50
    Date: 2023–02–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2023_004&r=reg
  2. By: Axel Gautier; Julien Jacqmin; Jean-Christophe Pooudou
    Abstract: Renewable energy communities involve various agents who decide to jointly invest in renewable production units and storage. This paper examines how these communities interact with the energy system and can decrease its overall cost. First, we show that a renewable energy community can contribute positively to welfare if the electricity produced by the investment is consumed close to its place of production, i.e. if the community has a high degree of self-consumption. Second, our analysis identifies the condition on prices and grid tariffs to align the community’s interest with welfare maximization. We also show that some of these grid tariffs do not have a negative impact on non-members of the community and could therefore limit potential distributional issues. Third, we argue that various internal organization of the renewable energy communities are feasible. The internal organization impacts the distribution of benefits among members but not the global efficiency of the community.
    Keywords: energy communities, decentralized production unites, energy transition, grid regulation
    JEL: L30 L94 Q48
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10254&r=reg
  3. By: Richard Ruble; Dimitrios Zormpas
    Abstract: We study how overlapping ownership affects the timing and size of capacity investments in duopoly. In addition to standard accommodation and delay strategies, internalization allows a leader to block follower entry. Follower timing and capacity reactions are less aggressive, making outcomes less competitive ex-post. Positional competition is more intense, and entry occurs earlier in equilibrium. Internalization raises a leader's incentive to delay follower entry rather than accommodate, and we show with an example that this strategic shift can benefit consumers.
    Keywords: ownership, cross-ownership, dynamic competition, Stackelberg leadership, strategic capacity investment
    JEL: D25 G32 L13
    Date: 2022–09–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:2201&r=reg
  4. By: Grégroire Massé (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: This article focuses on the impact of an increase of supply on professional market's gendered structure, namely the french notariat's regulation and its segregative effects. It shows that entry barriers lead to both a market closure and an exclusion of women from the profession. The new entry regulatory framework renews this gendered closure, and duplicates it on the market. A prospective on market segmentation questions the construction of mobility barriers after entry, and analyzes their effects in terms of professional re-segregation
    Keywords: Legal Services; Gender; Regulation; Freedom of installation; Mobility barriers
    JEL: L51 L84 J16 K29
    Date: 2023–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:23003&r=reg
  5. By: OECD
    Abstract: This report examines privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), which are digital solutions that allow information to be collected, processed, analysed, and shared while protecting data confidentiality and privacy. The report reviews recent technological advancements and evaluates the effectiveness of different types of PETs, as well as the challenges and opportunities they present. It also outlines current regulatory and policy approaches to PETs to help privacy enforcement authorities and policy makers better understand how they can be used to enhance privacy and data protection, and to improve overall data governance.
    Date: 2023–03–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaab:351-en&r=reg
  6. By: Mark Glick (University of Utah); Gabriel A. Lozada (University of Utah); Darren Bush (University of Houston)
    Abstract: Antitrust economists have generally supported the Consumer Welfare Standard as a guide to antitrust policy questions because of its origins in Marshall's consumer surplus approach and the general economic surplus approach to welfare economics. But welfare economists no longer support the surplus approach because decades of research pertaining to the surplus approach have uncovered numerous inconsistencies and serious ethical challenges. However, the surplus approach to welfare survives in industrial organization textbooks and among industrial organization economists that specialize in antitrust. We argue in this paper that the Consumer Welfare Standard is not a reliable standard and should be abandoned. We cite several reasons: (1) it limits antitrust goals a priori without any defensible justification, (2) it considers all transfers of surplus between stakeholders in antitrust cases to be welfare neutral, (3) it is biased in favor of big business and the rich, and (4) the accumulation of inconsistencies and problems documented by welfare economists renders the theory completely unreliable. In a final section of the paper, we preliminarily contend that modern research in welfare economics concerning the factors that influence human welfare could be used to inform a more progressive standard for determining antitrust goals.
    Keywords: Consumer Welfare Standard, Consumer Surplus, Antitrust, Law and Economics, Compensating Variation, Equivalent Variation, Kaldor Hicks, Pareto Efficiency.
    JEL: K1 D61 L4
    Date: 2022–12–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp195&r=reg
  7. By: Budzinski, Oliver
    Abstract: This comment addresses the opinion of the Advocate General (AG) of the European Court of Justice on the pending case European Super League versus UEFA/FIFA. It takes a critical perspective on selected aspects of the opinion's reasoning from a (sports) economics perspective. Highlighting the special characteristics of sports markets, the assessment of the AG Opinion raises questions such as (i) the (lack of) empirical evidence that the incumbent pursues and/or meets the legitimate objectives while the latter is still used as justifying reasons for anticompetitive conduct and arrangements (section III), (ii) the prohibitive entry barriers raised by the non-existence of a transparent and non-discriminatory authorization system preventing open competition for championships formats and organization by objective and effect (section IV), and (iii) the difficult search for a convincing theory of harm justifying the brutal enforcement of single-homing by the incumbent (section V).
    Keywords: European football, sports economics, antitrust, competition policy, Super League, Champions League, abuse of dominance, market power
    JEL: Z20 K21 L12 L40 L83
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:173&r=reg
  8. By: Konstantinos Charistos; Ioannis Pinopoulos; Panagiotis Skartados
    Abstract: We examine the effects of (passive) cross-holdings in the downstream market on the sustainability of upstream collusion. We consider two competing vertical chains with downstream Cournot and homogeneous goods. Each downstream firm holds a (symmetric) non-controlling share of its rival.
    Keywords: competing vertical chains; cross-holdings; passive ownership; tacit collusion
    JEL: D43 L13 L40 L81
    Date: 2023–02–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:2303&r=reg
  9. By: Clarissa Lotti; Arieda Muço; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Tommaso Valletti; Tommaso M. Valletti
    Abstract: Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government’s direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally-procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22% among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones.
    Keywords: centralization, informational externalities, procurement, public contracts
    JEL: D44 H11 H57 H83 L38 L88
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10274&r=reg
  10. By: Mishra, Mukesh Kumar
    Abstract: Over the past decades, there has been increasing competition for the available water resources and increasing water pollution. Consequently, water shortages, water quality degradation, and destruction of the aquatic ecosystem are seriously affecting prospects for economic and social development, political stability, as well as ecosystem integrity. In developing countries, scarcity and degradation of water resources may have a severely limiting impact on development options, especially for poor people. In order to meet basic human and ecological needs and services, societies need to address and solve several serious water challenges and must come to terms with dwindling water resources, their uneven geographic and seasonal distribution, and an inadequate and inequitable allocation of water services. Poor resource management, corruption, inappropriate institutional arrangements, bureaucratic inertia, insufficient human capacity, and shortages of finances for investments also undermine the effective governance of water in many places. These are also the challenges to be addressed by governance reforms. There is general agreement that improvements to water governance are a necessary part of the solution to the specific challenges that fall within this nexus of water ecosystem management and poverty reduction within the context of climate change. The objective of this paper is to contribute to integrated, participatory governance processes and a sense of urgency around the need to reclaim and rejuvenate water bodies in more effective ways to ensure the sustainable and equitable use of water resources and to expand the delivery of clean water supply and sanitation services to all, which will help the effort of the impact under "Jal-Jeevan-Hariyali Abhiyan."
    Keywords: Water Governance, Integrated water management
    JEL: Q25 Q2
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:268739&r=reg
  11. By: Sergey Kokovin; Alina Ozhegova; Shamil Sharapudinov; Alexander Tarasov; Philip Ushchev; Sergey G. Kokovin
    Abstract: Our novel approach to modeling monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms and consumers involves spatial product differentiation. Space can be interpreted either as a geographical space or as a space of characteristics of a differentiated good. In addition to price setting, each firm also chooses its optimal location in this space. We formulate conditions for positive sorting: more productive firms serve larger market segments and face tougher competition; and for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. To quantify the role of the sorting mechanism, we calibrate the model using cross-sectional haircut market data and perform counterfactual analysis. We find that inequality in the distribution of the gains among consumers caused by positive market shocks can be substantial: the gains of consumers from more populated locations are 3-4 times higher.
    Keywords: firm heterogeneity, geographical space, product space, positive sorting, product niches
    JEL: F10 L11 L13
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10263&r=reg
  12. By: Sarımehmet Duman, Özgün
    Abstract: Privatisation is a strategic policy restructuring the relationship between the state and the market, the public and the private, and hence, the political and the economic. It opens non-capitalist spaces to capital accumulation and creates new markets for international competition. Privatisation alters a society’s relationship to public goods, services and rights by commodification practices, and turns into a highly controversial reform in economic restructuring. This paper discusses how privatisation gained priority in Greece with the economic crisis. It incorporates the concept of depoliticisation to offer a new perspective on the analysis of the economic plans, programmes and documents that Greece signed with international creditors for the sake of its economic recovery. It claims that depoliticisation functioned as a strategy for putting privatisation policies onto the agenda by simply reproducing the elusive separation between the political and the economic. The paper argues that introducing extensive privatisation policies through internationally agreed-upon documents confirms the attempt to erode the political character of the process in order to (i) present such policies as a technical, economic imperative, (ii) externalise political decisions, and (iii) limit public discontent. The depoliticisation and privatisation processes reinforce each other in widening the state-market divide.
    Keywords: depoliticisation; economic crisis; eurozone; Greece; privatisation
    JEL: N0 R14 J01
    Date: 2022–07–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:114448&r=reg
  13. By: Garrod, Luke; Han, Tien-Der Jerry; Harvey, James; Olczak, Matthew
    Abstract: Firms can mitigate the harm of an input cartel by passing on some of the overcharge to their customers through raising their own prices. Recent claims for damages have highlighted that firms may also respond by negotiating lower prices with their suppliers of other complementary inputs, thereby passing back some of the harm upstream. By analysing a model where downstream supply requires two inputs, we derive the equilibrium `passing-on' and `passing-back' effects when one input is cartelised. We show that the cartel causes a larger passing-back effect when there is greater market power in the complementary input sector. This reduces the passing-on effect. We find that the passing-back effect can inflict substantial harm on the complementary input suppliers and reduce the harm inflicted on direct and/or indirect purchasers.
    Keywords: damages, cartel overcharge, pass-on, complements, negotiation
    JEL: D4 K21 L13 L40
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:116471&r=reg

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