nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2023‒02‒27
23 papers chosen by
Christopher Decker
Oxford University

  1. Welfare Cost of Mobile Spectrum (Mis)allocation By Aimene, Louise; Guiffard, Jean-Baptiste; Ivaldi, Marc; Liang, Julienne
  2. The Impact of Environmental Regulations on the Manufacturing Sector: The Role of Electricity Prices By Lee, Sul-Ki
  3. Decentralised Cross-Border Interconnection By Claude Crampes; Nils-Henrik M. von Der Fehr
  4. Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection By Andrea Attar; Thomas Mariotti; François Salanié
  5. What Drive HSR' Prices and Frequencies? An Analysis of Intermodal Competition and Multiproduct Incumbent's Strategies in the French Market By Thierry Blayac; Patrice Bougette; Florent Laroche
  6. Governing knowledge and technology: European approach to artificial intelligence By Moreira, Hugo
  7. An Insurance Paradigm for Improving Power System Resilience via Distributed Investment By Farhad Billimoria; Filiberto Fele; Iacopo Savelli; Thomas Morstyn; Malcolm McCulloch
  8. Governing knowledge and technology: Technological pressure for convergence in EU, California, and China data protection regulation By Moreira, Hugo
  9. Measuring the effects of bank remuneration rules: evidence from the UK By Sakalauskaite, Ieva; Harris, Qun
  10. Taming Overconfident CEOs Through Stricter Financial Regulation By Bernhard Kassner
  11. Window dressing of regulatory metrics: evidence from repo markets By Bassi, Claudio; Behn, Markus; Grill, Michael; Waibel, Martin
  12. Public procurement as an innovation policy: Where do we stand? By Chiappinelli, Olga; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
  13. A Capability Approach to Merger Review By Boa, I.; Elliott, M.; Foster, D.
  14. Opaque Contracts By Andreas Haupt; Zoe Hitzig
  15. Anticompetitive bundling when buyers compete By Taylor, Greg
  16. Internal Migration and Energy Poverty By Leonard Le Roux; Johanna Choumert-Nkolo
  17. Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion By David Spector
  18. The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing By Dirk Bergemann; Tibor Heumann; Stephen Morris
  19. Data and Competition: A Simple Framework By de Cornière, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
  20. Value for Money and Selection: How Pricing Affects Airbnb Ratings By Christoph Carnehl; Maximilian Schaefer; André Stenzel; Kevin Ducbao Tran
  21. Competition in supply functions and conjectural variations: a unified solution By Flavio M. Menezes; John Quiggin
  22. Governing knowledge and technology: The European approach on data protection By Moreira, Hugo
  23. Politicization of the 5G Rollout: Litigation Way for Huawei? By Bogdanova, Iryna

  1. By: Aimene, Louise; Guiffard, Jean-Baptiste; Ivaldi, Marc; Liang, Julienne
    Abstract: Conditions under which spectrum is allocated are significant in determining the market structure in the telecom sector which in turn affects the prices and the quality of mobile services. In a more concentrated market, the quantity of spectrum is less diluted, and operators can offer higher quality to their customers; In a more competitive market, consumers can benefit from a lower price but at the expense of less quality for each operator. To address this trade-off, we first fit a demand model of mobile telecommunications services on a unique panel database of 23 European MNOs; we then conduct counterfactual simulations to measure the effect on consumer surplus of different schemes of spectrum allocation in Germany. Reallocating additional spectrum to three instead of four operators is consumer welfare improving as increasing prices is compensated by larger improvement in quality.
    Keywords: spectrum allocation; network investment; market structure; investment and; competition
    JEL: L40 L96 L11
    Date: 2023–02
  2. By: Lee, Sul-Ki (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade)
    Abstract: The role of policy (among various other factors) in determining the stability of the power supply and electricity rates is becoming more important. Policy-based pressure on rising electricity prices is expected to intensify as countries prepare stronger environmental regulations in an international effort to cope with climate change. Under the Paris Agreement, countries submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) that comprise plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. South Korea has declared a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 by 24.4 percent compared to 2017 levels. In addition, at the end of 2020, countries submitted plans of a long-term low-carbon vision by 2050. Recently, major countries including the United States, European nations and South Korea have been pushing for a Green New Deal, and more and more countries are targeting net-zero emissions. This trend has only intensified in the post-COVID-19 era, as countries build consensus around the establishment of an eco-friendly and low-carbon society. GHG reductions and environmentally-friendly trends are likely to lead to higher electricity prices. It is self-evident that if the shares of renewable energy and natural gas of the power mix increase and the amount of power generated from fuels that were previously responsible for baseloads (such as nuclear and coal power) decreases, upward pressure on electricity prices will continue to build. The purpose of this study is to reveal the future impact of power sector-related regulations on the manufacturing sector and to provide insight for firms in establishing strategies to deal with such policies.
    Keywords: climate change; emissions; energy policy; green new deal; net-zero; carbon neutrality; manufacturing; electricity prices
    JEL: L50 Q41 Q43 Q48
    Date: 2021–04–01
  3. By: Claude Crampes (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Nils-Henrik M. von Der Fehr (UiO - University of Oslo)
    Abstract: Reaping the full benefits from cross-border interconnection typically requires reinforcement of national networks. When the relevant parts of the networks are complements, a lack of coordination between national transmission system operators typically results in investment below optimal levels in both interconnectors and national infrastructure. A subsidy to financially sustain interconnector building is not sufficient to restore optimality; indeed, even when possible, such subsidisation may have to be restrained so as not to encourage cross-border capacities that will not be fully utilised due to lack of investment in national systems.
    Keywords: Electrical grid, Interconnector, Externality, Regulation, Regional, Cooperation
    Date: 2023
  4. By: Andrea Attar (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Thomas Mariotti (TSE - Unité de recherche Transformation des Systèmes d'Élevage - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); François Salanié (TSE - Unité de recherche Transformation des Systèmes d'Élevage - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase coverage from several firms whose pricing strategies are subject to an anti-dumping regulation. The resulting regulated game supports a single allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who can neither observe consumer types nor monitor their trades with firms. Accordingly, we argue that public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should penalize firms that cross-subsidize between contracts, while leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.
    Keywords: Insurance Markets, Regulation, Multiple Contracting, Adverse Selection., Insurance Markets Regulation Multiple Contracting Adverse Selection. JEL Classification: D43 D82 D86, Adverse Selection. JEL Classification: D43, D82, D86
    Date: 2022–08
  5. By: Thierry Blayac (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Patrice Bougette (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Florent Laroche (LAET - Laboratoire Aménagement Économie Transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of service prices and frequencies of conventional high-speed rail (HSR) in France. We use original data for the period 09/2019-03/2020 and consider the intensity of intermodal competition and the diversification strategy of the incumbent rail operator. The main econometric results show that the determinants of the price per kilometer of conventional HSR services (1st and 2nd class) are partly common (especially for the variables explaining the technical characteristics of the routes and the alternative offer) and partly specific (competitive environment, economic and demographic environment). Frequencies depend mainly on travel time. On the routes for which the conventional HSR does not provide a quality service (frequency and/or price), a complementary alternative offer compensates the low frequency of conventional HSR services.
    Keywords: HSR, Intermodal competition, Multiproduct firms' strategies, Low-cost transportation, France, Working Papers du LAET
    Date: 2023
  6. By: Moreira, Hugo
    Abstract: This study conducts a threefold analysis of the EU proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). The first objective is a regulatory analysis of the proposal, focusing on the proposed structures for implementation, concepts, and key requirements for Artificial Intelligence (AI) producers. The second objective is a comparison with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and its complementarity in providing a robust response to the needs of operators and users of data-driven algorithmic technologies. The third objective is to examine the potential for harmonization of the EU internal market and competitiveness with non-EU markets. The analysis includes a regulatory comparison with the GDPR, which highlights the EU's digital economy policy based on national authorities, risk-based approaches and European bodies for harmonization. The analytical framework of the Brussels Effect is also applied to the AIA proposal, which expresses the intentions of the regulations, both from internal and external pressures. The study concludes that the AIA proposed by the European Commission has the potential to have a significant impact on the development and use of AI systems, particularly in the EU and for companies operating internationally. However, it also poses challenges in terms of implementation and enforcement, which could hamper growth.
    Date: 2023–01–25
  7. By: Farhad Billimoria; Filiberto Fele; Iacopo Savelli; Thomas Morstyn; Malcolm McCulloch
    Abstract: Extreme events, exacerbated by climate change, pose significant risks to the energy system and its consumers. However there are natural limits to the degree of protection that can be delivered from a centralised market architecture. Distributed energy resources provide resilience to the energy system, but their value remains inadequately recognized by regulatory frameworks. We propose an insurance framework to align residual outage risk exposure with locational incentives for distributed investment. We demonstrate that leveraging this framework in large-scale electricity systems could improve consumer welfare outcomes in the face of growing risks from extreme events via investment in distributed energy.
    Date: 2023–02
  8. By: Moreira, Hugo
    Abstract: This study employs a historical comparative methodology to explain the emergence time frame of comprehensive data protection regulations in Europe, the United States, and China. The study marks the beginning of the big data era in 2010 and explains the variation in the emergence of data protection regulations by examining the international problem-solving landscape, societal institutional organization, and individual interactions pressures. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has had a significant impact on the alignment of regulations in other countries and the behavior of the private sector in terms of regulatory compliance. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in the United States is a response to a growing social movement against corporativism and the abuse of personal data by large companies. The Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) in China focuses on international data sovereignty and aims to protect the personal information of Chinese citizens from foreign companies and countries. Overall, the data protection case shows that when new technologies emerge, there is a natural tendency for regulatory convergence. The GDPR is an example of a regulatory solution that has been successfully propagated, due to the EU strong institutional reaction to new circumstances and ability to negotiate with all parties to create solutions for complex problems.
    Date: 2023–01–27
  9. By: Sakalauskaite, Ieva (Bank of England); Harris, Qun (Bank of England)
    Abstract: In this paper, we study whether and how some of the remuneration rules introduced after the Global Financial Crisis affected bankers’ compensation using a unique regulatory dataset on remuneration in six major UK banks during 2014–19. We find that for bankers most affected by limits on their bonus to fixed pay ratios (the bonus cap), total pay growth did not decrease, but compensation shifted from bonuses to fixed remuneration. We also find some evidence which could indicate that requiring bankers’ bonuses to be deferred for longer periods was correlated with increases in total compensation and a lower proportion of bonuses being deferred.
    Keywords: Remuneration regulation; bonus cap; deferral; bank regulation
    JEL: G21 G28 G38 J33 L51
    Date: 2022–12–19
  10. By: Bernhard Kassner (LMU Munich)
    Abstract: A large body of literature finds that managerial overconfidence increases risk-taking by financial institutions. This paper shows that financial regulation can be effective at mitigating this type of risk. Exploiting regulatory changes introduced after the financial crisis as a natural experiment, I find that overconfidence-induced risk-taking decreases in financial institutions subject to stricter regulation. Following the easing of these regulations, overconfidence-induced risk-taking increases again. These findings confirm the effectiveness of financial regulation at correcting overconfident behavior, but also suggest that the impact fades away quickly once removed.
    Keywords: overconfidence; risk; regulation; financial sector;
    JEL: G28 G32 G38 G40
    Date: 2023–01–27
  11. By: Bassi, Claudio; Behn, Markus; Grill, Michael; Waibel, Martin
    Abstract: This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory reporting dates. We establish a causal link between these reductions and banks’ incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing behaviour. Our findings suggest that regulatory action is warranted to limit banks’ ability to window dress. JEL Classification: C23, G14, G18, G21, G28
    Keywords: banking regulation, G-SIBs, leverage ratio, repo markets, window dressing
    Date: 2023–02
  12. By: Chiappinelli, Olga; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Abstract: Economics and innovation scholars have long recognized the potential of public procurement to trigger innovation. To what extent has this potential been realized so far? What can be done to improve the performance of PPI in this regard? This paper addresses these issues by providing a literature survey of research on public procurement of innovation (PPI). After categorizing PPI instruments, the paper discusses existing interdisciplinary knowledge to answer four broad questions: i) Does PPI spur innovation? ii) How should PPI be designed to best spur innovation? iii) What are the main barriers to implement PPI? iv) What is the role of PPI in the innovation policy mix? The paper concludes with a discussion of future research needs and policy insights in light of current global challenges.
    Keywords: innovation, public procurement, public policy, R&D, green purchases
    JEL: H23 H57 O30 O31 O32 O35 O36 O38
    Date: 2023
  13. By: Boa, I.; Elliott, M.; Foster, D.
    Abstract: Merger analysis typically focuses on possible strategic price effects in markets where there is existing competition between the merging firms. We refer to this as the product based approach. This paper proposes a complementary approach based on an assessment of the merging firms’ capabilities that can provide insights on potential merger effects, including in circumstances where the product based approach offers little practical guidance to antitrust authorities. Our approach is rooted in the resource-based view of business strategy that starts from the premise that it is a firm’s capabilities (sometimes called core competencies), which drive its competitive advantage across markets. We argue that mergers in which firms’ capabilities are less overlapping are more pro-competitive on several dimensions: immediate competition in overlapping markets, immediate competition in other markets, long-run competition and innovation.
    Date: 2023–02–03
  14. By: Andreas Haupt; Zoe Hitzig
    Abstract: Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed regulations aim to increase transparency, especially in digital markets. In order to understand when opacity arises in contracting and the potential effects of proposed regulations, we study a moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral principal faces a continuum of weakly risk-averse agents. The agents differ in an observable characteristic that affects the payoff of the principal. In a described contract, the principal sorts the agents into groups, and to each group communicates a distribution of output-contingent payments. Within each group, the realized distribution of payments must be consistent with the communicated contract. A described contract is transparent if the principal communicates the realized contract to the agent ex-ante, and otherwise it is opaque. We provide a geometric characterization of the principal's optimal described contract as well as conditions under which the optimal described mechanism is transparent and opaque. We apply our results to the design and description of driver payment schemes on ride-hailing platforms.
    Date: 2023–01
  15. By: Taylor, Greg
    Abstract: We study the profitability of bundling by an upstream firm who licenses com-plementary technologies to downstream competitors, and who faces a superior competitor for one of its technologies. In an otherwise standard “Chicago-style” model, we show that the existence of downstream competition can make inefficient bundling profitable. Forcing downstream firms to use a less efficient technology can soften competition, thus allowing the upstream firm to extract more profit through the licensing of its monopolized technology. Bundling is more likely to be profitable if downstream competition is intense and if technologies are strongly complementary. The mechanism requires a public commitment to bundling (e.g. technical bundling) and the unobservability of the contracts offered to downstream firms. A similar logic can make it profitable for the upstream firm to degrade the interoperability between its technologies and those of its rivals, even without foreclosing competition.
    Date: 2023–01–31
  16. By: Leonard Le Roux (Sciences Po Department of Economics); Johanna Choumert-Nkolo (EDI Global)
    Abstract: This paper presents a first analysis of the relationship between rural-urban migration and energy poverty in South Africa, and to the authors' knowledge in Africa, using a nationally representative panel dataset. Using a dynamic difference in differences approach, energy poverty changes for both migrants and non-migrants are tracked over a ten-year period from 2008 to 2017. On average, moving to urban areas results in reductions in energy poverty for migrants themselves, with especially dramatic reductions in the use of traditional cooking fuels. Roughly one in five new urban arrivals move into informal shack dwellings where initial gains in energy access are negligible, but even for these migrants, the gains from migration grow over time. Effects on households, differences between male and female migrants, and other amenitities are also explored.
    Keywords: Energy Poverty, Migration, Urbanization, Panel data
    JEL: Q41 N50 D10 O15
    Date: 2023–02
  17. By: David Spector (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: Many collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between competitors, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. Such communication may facilitate collusion even if it is unverifiable cheap talk and the underlying information becomes publicly available with a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars. Such communication may allow firms to earn profits that could not be earned in any collusive, symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium without communication.
    Date: 2022–03
  18. By: Dirk Bergemann (Yale University); Tibor Heumann (Yale University); Stephen Morris (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distributions of willingness to pay of the buyers. With a constant elasticity cost function, constant markup pricing provides the optimal revenue guarantee across all possible distributions of willingness to pay and the lower bound is attained under a Pareto distribution. We characterize how profits and consumer surplus vary with the distribution of values and show that Pareto distributions are extremal. We also provide a revenue guarantee for general cost functions. We establish equivalent results for optimal procurement policies that support maximal surplus guarantees for the buyer given all possible cost distributions of the sellers.
    Date: 2023–01
  19. By: de Cornière, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
    Abstract: Does enhanced access to data foster or hinder competition among firms? Using a competition-in-utility framework that encompasses many situations where firms use data, we model data as a revenue-shifter and identify two opposite effects: a mark-up effect according to which data induces firms to compete harder, and a surplus-extraction effect. We provide conditions for data to be pro- or anti-competitive, requiring neither knowledge of demand nor computation of equilibrium. We apply our results to situations where data is used to recommend products, monitor insuree behavior, price-discriminate, or target advertising. We also revisit the issue of data and market structure.
    JEL: L1 L4 L5
    Date: 2023–01–31
  20. By: Christoph Carnehl; Maximilian Schaefer; André Stenzel; Kevin Ducbao Tran
    Abstract: We investigate the impact of prices on ratings using Airbnb data. We theoretically illustrate two opposing channels: higher prices reduce the value for money, worsening ratings, but they increase the taste-based valuation of the average traveler, improving ratings. Results from panel regressions and a regression discontinuity design suggest a dominant value-for-money effect. In line with our model, hosts strategically complement lower prices with higher effort more when ratings are relatively low. Finally, we provide evidence that, upon entry, strategic hosts exploit the dominant value-for-money effect. The median entry discount of seven percent improves medium-run monthly revenues by three percent.
    Date: 2022
  21. By: Flavio M. Menezes (Australian Institute for Business and Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia); John Quiggin (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia)
    Abstract: This paper reconciles the concepts of ex ante and ex post supply function equilibria of, respectively, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Menezes and Quiggin (2020) with the conjectural variations equilibrium of Bowley (1924) and Bresnahan (1981). We show that under appropriate conditions, the ex ante and ex post equilibrium supply curves coincide with each other and with the consistent conjectural equilibrium solution. Further, this is a dominant strategy equilibrium for both ex ante and ex post games, and represents the case in which players are indifferent regarding move order. We explore the implications of our results for empirical work.
    Keywords: Imperfect competition, games in supply functions, conjectural variations
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2023–02–04
  22. By: Moreira, Hugo
    Abstract: At a systems level data, knowledge and technology are interconnected. Data is the raw material that is used to create knowledge, and technology is the application of knowledge. In recent decades, the growth of data technology has been exponential due to the development of digital technologies such as computers and the internet. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was implemented in response to the increasing use of data by private companies and the inadequacy of the 1995 Directive on Data Protection in addressing these issues. The GDPR has effectively strengthened data protection in the EU through its harmonization with the European Data Protection Board, the requirement for Data Protection Officers within data controllers' organizations, and the implementation of clear rules and explicit fines. However, it is important to recognize the limitations of the regulation, including its selective nature regarding the growth of personal data and the potential negative impact on citizens' knowledge about themselves. An efficiency and efficacy analysis found that it has contributed to the development of a common European data protection culture and the protection of individuals' rights, though it has had a negative impact on the financial performance of some companies. A systems analysis using systems thinking illustrates the implications of the regulation for the functioning of societal systems and the relationships between them. As data technology and the use of data-driven synthetic agents like AI continue to advance, it may be necessary to consider alternative approaches, such as focus on anonymization, in future addiction to the data protection regulatory framework.
    Date: 2023–01–06
  23. By: Bogdanova, Iryna
    Abstract: Abstract The great-power rivalry between the United States and China, the European Union’s policy of technological sovereignty, as well as the nature and economic implications of the fifth-generation wireless (5G) set the context for the politicization of said technology. This politicization is reflected in the growing resistance to the participation of the Chinese technology giant Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. in the 5G projects. As numerous states shore up legislation and administrative actions geared toward eliminating Huawei’s participation in their 5G networks, China has maintained a proactive posture and redoubled efforts to export Chinese 5G infrastructure. In its turn, Huawei, as the company bearing financial and reputational costs deriving from the prohibitions on its participation in the 5G rollout, seized the opportunity of calling into question the legality of such restrictions. To achieve this, the company initiated administrative proceedings and disputes at the domestic and international levels.
    Date: 2023–01–31

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