nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2023‒02‒20
twenty-two papers chosen by
Christopher Decker
Oxford University

  1. Antitrust, Regulation, and User Union in the Era of Digital Platforms and Big Data By Lin William Cong; Simon Mayer
  2. Financial Contracts for Differences By Schlecht, Ingmar; Maurer, Christoph; Hirth, Lion
  3. Chasing the Sun and Catching the Wind: Energy Transition and Electricity Prices in Europe By Mr. Serhan Cevik; Keitaro Ninomiya
  4. From prosumer to flexumer: Case study on the value of flexibility in decarbonizing the multi-energy system of a manufacturing company By Markus Fleschutz; Markus Bohlayer; Marco Braun; Michael D. Murphy
  5. Multi-Objective Auctions for Utility-Scale Solar-Battery Systems: The Case of ASEAN and East Asia By Toba, Natsuko; Jamasb, Tooraj; Maurer, Luiz; Sen, Anupama
  6. Enforcing Fintech Competition: Some Reflections on Institutional Design By Jens-Uwe Franck
  7. Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets By Elias Carroni
  8. Search Disclosure By Carl-Christian Groh; Marcel Preuss
  9. Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses By Schlütter, Frank
  10. Market Definition and Three 19a Designations under German Antitrust Law: Alphabet, Meta, and Amazon By Jens-Uwe Franck; Martin Peitz
  11. Optimizing Multiple Airport Charges with Endogenous Airline Quality Considering the Marginal Cost of Public Funds By Doi, Naoshi; Kono, Tatsuhito; Suzaki, Izumo
  12. Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies By Bruno Jullien; Markus Reisinger; Patrick Rey
  13. Merger control in retail markets with national pricing By Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen; Bjørn Olav Johansen; Odd Rune Straume
  14. The Cost of Curbing Externalities with Market Power: Alcohol Regulations and Tax Alternatives By Christopher Conlon; Nirupama L. Rao
  15. Understanding Indian Telecom Industry post 4G rollout: Regulatory Governance and Market Structure By M S, Navaneeth
  16. Search, Data, and Market Power By Carl-Christian Groh
  17. Regulating For-Hire Autonomous Vehicles for An Equitable Multimodal Transportation Network By Jing Gao; Sen Li
  18. Auctions without commitment in the auto-bidding world By Aranyak Mehta; Andres Perlroth
  19. The Law and Economics of AI Liability By Miriam Buiten; Alexandre de Streel; Martin Peitz
  20. Self-Preferencing at Amazon: Evidence from Search Rankings By Chiara Farronato; Andrey Fradkin; Alexander MacKay
  21. Common Subcontracting, Multimarket Contact, and Airline Prices By Gaurab Aryal; Dennis J. Campbell; Federico Ciliberto; Ekaterina A. Khmelnitskaya
  22. Who Pays For Your Rewards? Redistribution in the Credit Card Market By Sumit Agarwal; Andrea F. Presbitero; André F. Silva; Carlo Wix

  1. By: Lin William Cong; Simon Mayer
    Abstract: We model platform competition with endogenous data generation, collection, and sharing, thereby providing a unifying framework to evaluate data-related regulation and antitrust policies. Data are jointly produced from users' economic activities and platforms' investments in data infrastructure. Data improves service quality, causing a feedback loop that tends to concentrate market power. Dispersed users do not internalize the impact of their data contribution on (i) service quality for other users, (ii) market concentration, and (iii) platforms’ incentives to invest in data infrastructure, causing inefficient over- or under-collection of data. Data sharing proposals, user privacy protections, platform commitments, and markets for data cannot fully address these inefficiencies. We introduce and analyze user union, which represents and coordinates users, as a potential option for antitrust and consumer protection in the digital era.
    JEL: L10 L41 L50 O30
    Date: 2023–01
  2. By: Schlecht, Ingmar; Maurer, Christoph; Hirth, Lion
    Abstract: Contracts for differences are widely discussed as a cornerstone of Europe’s future electricity market design. This is a paper on CfD contract design. We summarize the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches that are used to overcome these shortcomings, and the problems these fixes introduce. We then propose an alternative contract that we dub “financial” CfD. It is a hybrid between conventional CfDs and forward contracts that mitigates revenue risk to a very large degree while providing undistorted incentives and avoiding margin calls. Like traditional CfDs, these contracts are long-term and tailored to technology-specific (wind, solar, nuclear) generation patterns but, like forwards, decouple payments from actual generation. We also propose to mitigate volume risk and to accept physical assets as collateral to avoid margin calls.
    Keywords: renewable energy, contracts for differences, CfDs, electricity
    JEL: Q4
    Date: 2023
  3. By: Mr. Serhan Cevik; Keitaro Ninomiya
    Abstract: European power markets are in the midst of unprecedented changes, with a record-breaking surge in energy prices.This paper investigates the impact of green power resources on the level and volatility of wholesale electricity prices at a granular level, using monthly observations for a panel of 24 European countries over the period 2014–2021 and alternative estimation methods including a panel quantile regression approach. We find that renewable energy is associated with a significant reduction in wholesale electricity prices in Europe, with an average impact of 0.6 percent for each 1 percentage points increase in renewable share. We also find evidence for a nonlinear effect—that is, higher the share of renewables, the greater its effect on electricity prices. On the other hand, while quantile estimation results are mixed with regards to the impact of renewables on the volatility of electricity prices, we obtain evidence that renewable energy has a negative effect on volatility at the highest quantiles. Overall, our analysis indicates that policy reforms can help accelerate the green transition while minimizing the volatility in electricity prices.
    Keywords: Energy transition; renewables; electiricity prices; panel quantile regression; Europe; electricity price; quantile estimation result; electricity generation; dampening effect; Electricity; Renewable energy; Renewable resources; Oil prices; Global
    Date: 2022–11–04
  4. By: Markus Fleschutz; Markus Bohlayer; Marco Braun; Michael D. Murphy
    Abstract: Digitalization and sector coupling enable companies to turn into flexumers. By using the flexibility of their multi-energy system (MES), they reduce costs and carbon emissions while stabilizing the electricity system. However, to identify the necessary investments in energy conversion and storage technologies to leverage demand response (DR) potentials, companies need to assess the value of flexibility. Therefore, this study quantifies the flexibility value of a production company's MES by optimizing the synthesis, design, and operation of a decarbonizing MES considering self-consumption optimization, peak shaving, and integrated DR based on hourly prices and carbon emission factors (CEFs). The detailed case study of a beverage company in northern Germany considers vehicle-to-X of powered industrial trucks, power-to-heat on multiple temperatures, wind turbines, photovoltaic systems, and energy storage systems (thermal energy, electricity, and hydrogen). We propose and apply novel data-driven metrics to evaluate the intensity of price-based and CEF-based DR. The results reveal that flexibility usage reduces decarbonization costs (by 19-80% depending on electricity and carbon removal prices), total annual costs, operating carbon emissions, energy-weighted average prices and CEFs, and fossil energy dependency. The results also suggest that a net-zero operational carbon emission MES requires flexibility, which, in an economic case, is provided by a combination of different flexible technologies and storage systems that complement each other. While the value of flexibility depends on various market and consumer-specific factors such as electricity or carbon removal prices, this study highlights the importance of demand flexibility for the decarbonization of MESs.
    Date: 2023–01
  5. By: Toba, Natsuko (International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group, US); Jamasb, Tooraj (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Maurer, Luiz (LM Engineering and Consulting, Richmond, US); Sen, Anupama (Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, UK)
    Abstract: Globally, auctions are increasingly popular to competitively promote and procure renewable energy technologies to meet energy, social, and climate change objectives. To do so, auction designs need to accommodate technological progress, declining costs, and increasing demand for Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG). This chapter focuses on auctions of large scale solar photovoltaic (PV) and battery energy storage system (BESS) in Southeast and East Asia. It revisits the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of auctions while focusing on the ESG component from the perspective of key stakeholders, such as investors, government, bidders, and communities regarding efficient allocations of risks, costs, and benefits. The chapter then relates this framework to real-world practices and international evidence on solar PV as well as those without BESS. The analysis shows that integrating ESG in the auction designs and business models is possible and could benefit business and sustainable development.
    Keywords: Renewable energy; Solar power; Battery storage; Auction design
    JEL: D00 D40 D80 L00 L10 L90
    Date: 2023–01–15
  6. By: Jens-Uwe Franck
    Abstract: This paper focuses on institutional design aspects of the enforcement of competition law and other procompetitive regulation in fintech markets. Those interventions may prove necessary because the market entry of technology-enabled innovation may depend on accessing other (competing) market operators’ data and facilities or the enabling of data portability and interoperability of complementing financial services. Basic choices of allocating enforcement powers are identified. Five institutional design topics are discussed: bureaucratic enforcement styles and strategies; efficient use of administrative resources; motivation of staff; treatment of conflicting regulatory objectives; and legitimising elements in competition procedures.
    Keywords: Fintech, Competition Enforcement, Enforcing Regulation, Institutional Design, Enforcement Style, Regulatory Capture
    JEL: K20 K21 K22 K23 K42
    Date: 2022–11
  7. By: Elias Carroni (University of Bologna Author-Name: Leonardo Madio; University of Padova Author-Name: Shiva Shekhar; Tilburg University)
    Abstract: In most platform environments, the exclusive provision of premium content from leading creators (Superstars) is employed as a strategy to boost user participation and secure a competitive edge vis-Ã -vis rivals. In this article, we study the impact of Superstar exclusive content provi- sion on platform competition and complementors’ homing decisions. Two competing platforms facilitate interactions between consumers and suppliers, of which the latter are identified by the Superstar and a fringe of complementors (e.g., independent developers, amateurs). When platform competition is intense, more consumers become affiliated with the platform favored by Superstar exclusivity. This mechanism is self-reinforcing as it generates an entry cascade of complementors and some complementors singlehome on the favored platform. We find that cross-group externalities are key in shaping market outcomes. First, exclusivity benefits complementors and might make consumers better off when cross-group externalities are large enough. Second, contrary to con- ventional wisdom, vertical integration (platform-Superstar) may make exclusivity less likely than vertical separation under reasonable conditions. Finally, we discuss implications for the strategies of platform owners, managers of Superstars and complementors, and antitrust enforcers.
    Keywords: exclusivity, platforms, two-sided markets, vertical integration, network externalities.
    Date: 2023–01
  8. By: Carl-Christian Groh; Marcel Preuss
    Keywords: Search, Information Exchange, Antitrust, Price Discrimination We study information sharing between competing sellers in markets where consumers sample sellers sequentially. Sellers can disclose to their rival when they encounter a buyer. Providing this information, which we call search disclosure, can enable all forms of search history-based price discrimination. Yet, firms only conduct search disclosure in equilibrium if search costs are low or price revisions are infeasible. The kind of search disclosure that can emerge in equilibrium leads to price discrimination that reduces consumer surplus and total welfare. However, if firms were mandated to use search disclosure at all times, consumer surplus would be higher.
    JEL: D18 D83 L13 L86
    Date: 2022–12
  9. By: Schlütter, Frank (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)
    Abstract: This article investigates the incentive and ability of a platform to limit the extent of competition between the sellers it hosts. Absent contractual restrictions, a platform has an incentive to ensure competition between the sellers. This incentive can change with the introduction of so-called platform most-favored nation clauses (PMFN) that require the online sellers not to offer better conditions on other distribution channels. Such clauses can align the interests between sellers and platforms to restrict competition. I illustrate that a platform can stabilize seller collusion to its own benefit. These results offer a novel rationale to treat PMFNs with scrutiny.
    Keywords: Platform MFN ; digital economics ; collusion in vertically-related markets ; agency model
    JEL: L13 L40 L50
    Date: 2022–11–29
  10. By: Jens-Uwe Franck; Martin Peitz
    Abstract: The Bundeskartellamt has designated Alphabet, Meta, and Amazon as 19a firms. Thus, they are potentially subject to specific competition law interventions under a special procedure. In these three designation decisions, market definition plays an important role. This article points to several noteworthy aspects that concern market definition. In all decisions the authority focuses on one national market, arguing that the respective platform operator is dominant. The authority’s considerations are made at a somewhat aggregate level, abstracting from differences across market segments.
    Keywords: digital platforms, Big Tech, market definition, multi-markets approach, German Competition Act, 19a designations, competition law
    JEL: K21
    Date: 2023–01
  11. By: Doi, Naoshi; Kono, Tatsuhito; Suzaki, Izumo
    Abstract: Airport operation costs are financed by charge revenues from airport users and funds transferred from general government funds. This study quantitatively optimizes the rates of three types of airport-related charges: per-passenger charges (e.g., passenger service facility charges), per-flight charges (e.g., landing fees), and aviation fuel tax, explicitly considering the marginal cost of public funds of the general funds. This study uses a route-level empirical structural model in which airlines with market power set both airfares and service quality (i.e., flight frequency). Our results show that it is optimal to increase the transfer from the general funds from the current amount and that the optimization increases social welfare by 19 percent. Even if the amount of the transfer is fixed at the current level, the social welfare can be increased by 10 percent only by adjusting the current rates of the airport-related charges. In particular, we show that charges should be adjusted so as to increase flight frequency on routes where small aircraft are used.
    Keywords: Optimal taxation, Airport-related charge, Marginal cost of public funds, Discrete choice model, Endogenous quality
    JEL: H21 H41 L13 R48
    Date: 2023–01
  12. By: Bruno Jullien (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Markus Reisinger; Patrick Rey
    Abstract: The availability of consumer data is inducing a growing number of firms to adopt more personalized pricing policies. This affects both the performance of, and the competition between, alternative distribution channels, which in turn has implications for firms' distribution strategies. We develop a formal model to examine a brand manufacturer's choice between mono distribution (selling only through its own direct channel) or dual distribution (selling through an independent retailer as well). We consider different demand patterns, covering both horizontal and vertical differentiation and different pricing regimes, with the manufacturer and retailer each charging personalized prices or a uniform price. We show that dual distribution is optimal for a large number of cases. In particular, this is always the case when the channels are horizontally differentiated, regardless of the pricing regime; moreover, if both firms charge personalized prices, a well-designed wholesale tariff allows them to extract the entire consumer surplus. These insights obtained here for the case of intrabrand competition between vertically related firms are thus in stark contrast to those obtained for interbrand competition, where personalized pricing dissipates industry profit. With vertical differentiation, dual distribution remains optimal if the manufacturer charges a uniform price. By contrast, under personalized pricing, mono distribution can be optimal when the retailer does not expand demand sufficiently. Interestingly, the industry profit may be largest in a hybrid pricing regime, in which the manufacturer forgoes the use of personalized pricing and only the retailer charges personalized prices. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
    Date: 2022–07–26
  13. By: Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen (Department of Economics, University of Bergen); Bjørn Olav Johansen (Department of Economics, University of Bergen); Odd Rune Straume (NIPE/Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Minho, Portugal; and Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway)
    Abstract: We analyze theoretically the efficiency of structural remedies in merger control in retail markets and show that this crucially depends on the retail chains´pricing policy. Whereas a retail merger can be perfectly remedied by divestiture of stores under local pricing, such remedies are not only less effective, but might even be counterproductive, if the chains set national prices. Paradoxically, such remedies might be even more counterproductive if the chains also compete locally along non-price dimensions such as quality. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be very cautious when reviewing structural remedies in retail markets with national pricing.
    Keywords: Retail mergers; structural remedies; national pricing.
    JEL: L11 L22 L41
    Date: 2022
  14. By: Christopher Conlon; Nirupama L. Rao
    Abstract: Products with negative externalities are often subject to regulations that limit competition. The single-product case may suggest that it is irrelevant for aggregate welfare whether output is restricted via corrective taxes or limiting competition. However, when products are differentiated curbing consumption through market power can be costly. Firms with market power may not only reduce total quantity, but distort the purchase decisions of inframarginal consumers. We examine a common regulation known as post-and-hold (PH) used by a dozen states for the sale of alcoholic beverages. Theoretically, PH eliminates competitive incentives among wholesalers selling identical products. We assemble unique data on distilled spirits from Connecticut, including matched manufacturer and wholesaler prices, to evaluate the welfare consequences of PH. For similar levels of ethanol consumption, PH leads to substantially lower consumer welfare (and government revenue) compared to excise, sales or Ramsey taxes by distorting consumption choices away from high-quality/premium brands and towards low-quality brands. Replacing PH with volumetric or ethanol-based taxes could reduce consumption by over 9% without reducing consumer surplus, and increase tax revenues by over 300%.
    JEL: D6 H21 H23 L13 L5 L66
    Date: 2023–01
  15. By: M S, Navaneeth
    Abstract: The paper attempts to give insights into the allocation of spectrum in Indian Telecom Industry with a particular focus since the rollout of the 4G services. While attempting to give insights into the various methods of Spectrum allocation and analyse their efficiency, the paper will also be analysing the market structure in the Indian Telecom Industry through Quantitative Indicators like the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Four-Firm Concentration ratio (CR4). The paper would also attempt to give insights and constructive criticism regarding unallocated and inefficient methods of allocating spectrums and possibilities of monopolistic market concentrations in the Telecom Sector as well as the prospects of 5G services
    Date: 2023–01–19
  16. By: Carl-Christian Groh
    Keywords: search, information exchange, antitrust, price discrimination approach, German Competition Act, 19a designations, competition law I study the relationship between data and market power in a duopoly model of price discrimination with search frictions. One firm receives a signal about the valuation of any arriving consumer while its rival receives no information. A share of consumers, referred to as searchers, have equal valuation for the good of either firm and optimally choose which firms to visit. The remaining consumers are captive. In equilibrium, a large majority of searchers will only visit the firm with data. The market share of the firm with data converges to one as the share of searchers in the market goes to one, regardless of the signal structure. Reductions of search frictions induce higher market concentration. The establishment of a right to data portability can address the competitive imbalances caused by data advantages.
    JEL: D18 D83 L13 L86
    Date: 2022–11
  17. By: Jing Gao; Sen Li
    Abstract: This paper assesses the equity impacts of for-hire autonomous vehicles (AVs) and investigates regulatory policies that promote the spatial and social equity in future autonomous mobility ecosystems. To this end, we consider a multimodal transportation network, where a ride-hailing platform operates a fleet of AVs to offer mobility-on-demand services in competition with a public transit agency that offers transit services on a transportation network. A game-theoretic model is developed to characterize the intimate interactions between the ride-hailing platform, the transit agency, and multiclass passengers with distinct income levels. An algorithm is proposed to compute the Nash equilibrium of the game and conduct an ex-post evaluation of the performance of the obtained solution. Based on the proposed framework, we evaluate the spatial and social equity in transport accessibility using Theil index, and find that although the proliferation of for-hire AVs in the ride-hailing network improves overall accessibility, the benefits are not fairly distributed among distinct locations or population groups, implying that the deployment of AVs will enlarge the existing spatial and social inequity gaps in the transportation network if no regulatory intervention is in place. To address this concern, we investigate two regulatory policies that can improve transport equity: (a) a minimum service-level requirement on ride-hailing service, which improves the spatial equity in the transport network; (b) a subsidy on ride-hailing trips that serve as first/last-mile connection to public transit, which promotes the use of public transit and improves the social equity of the transport network. We show that the minimum service-level requirement entails a trade-off: as a higher minimum service level is imposed, the spatial inequity reduces, but the social inequity will be exacerbated. In contrast...
    Date: 2023–01
  18. By: Aranyak Mehta; Andres Perlroth
    Abstract: Advertisers in online ad auctions are increasingly using auto-bidding mechanisms to bid into auctions instead of directly bidding their value manually. One prominent auto-bidding format is the target cost-per-acquisition (tCPA) which maximizes the volume of conversions subject to a return-of-investment constraint. From an auction theoretic perspective however, this trend seems to go against foundational results that postulate that for profit-maximizing bidders, it is optimal to use a classic bidding system like marginal CPA (mCPA) bidding rather than using strategies like tCPA. In this paper we rationalize the adoption of such seemingly sub-optimal bidding within the canonical quasi-linear framework. The crux of the argument lies in the notion of *commitment*. We consider a multi-stage game where first the auctioneer declares the auction rules; then bidders select either the tCPA or mCPA bidding format and then, if the auctioneer lacks commitment, it can revisit the rules of the auction (e.g., may readjust reserve prices depending on the observed bids). Our main result is that so long as a bidder believes that the auctioneer lacks commitment to follow the rule of the declared auction then the bidder will make a higher profit by choosing the tCPA format over the mCPA format. We then explore the commitment consequences for the auctioneer. In a simplified version of the model where there is only one bidder, we show that the tCPA subgame admits a *credible* equilibrium while the mCPA format does not. That is, when the bidder chooses the tCPA format the auctioneer can credibly implement the auction rules announced at the beginning of the game. We also show that, under some mild conditions, the auctioneer's revenue is larger when the bidder uses the tCPA format rather than mCPA. We further quantify the value for the auctioneer to be able to commit to the declared auction rules.
    Date: 2023–01
  19. By: Miriam Buiten; Alexandre de Streel; Martin Peitz
    Abstract: When AI systems possess the characteristics of autonomy and unpredictability, they present challenges for the existing liability framework. (Semi)-autonomous AI systems shift control over these systems away from users and towards producers, while errors of AI systems may be difficult to foresee. Policymakers are faced with the questions when existing civil liability rules do not adequately cover risks arising in the context of AI systems, and how they then should be adapted. This paper addresses these two questions for EU non-contractual liability rules. It considers how liability rules affect the incentives of producers, users, and bystanders that may be harmed by AI. The paper provides concrete recommendations for updating the EU Product Liability Directive and for an EU liability framework for owners and users of AI.
    Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, EU law
    JEL: K13 O33
    Date: 2022–11
  20. By: Chiara Farronato; Andrey Fradkin; Alexander MacKay
    Abstract: We study whether Amazon engages in self-preferencing on its marketplace by favoring its own brands (e.g., Amazon Basics) in search. To address this question, we collect new micro-level consumer search data using a custom browser extension installed by a panel of study participants. Using this methodology, we observe search positions, search behavior, and product characteristics. We find that Amazon branded products are indeed ranked higher than observably similar products in consumer search results. The prominence given to Amazon brands is 30% to 60% of the prominence granted to sponsored products.
    JEL: D12 D83 L13 L15 L81
    Date: 2023–01
  21. By: Gaurab Aryal; Dennis J. Campbell; Federico Ciliberto; Ekaterina A. Khmelnitskaya
    Abstract: In the US airline industry, independent regional carriers fly passengers on behalf of different national airlines, giving rise to $\textit{common subcontracting}$. On the one hand, we find that subcontracting is associated with lower prices, confirming the accepted notion that regional airlines can fly passengers at lower costs. On the other hand, we find that $\textit{common}$ subcontracting is associated with higher prices. These two countervailing effects suggest that the growth of regional carriers can have anticompetitive implications for the airline industry. In line with the literature, we continue to find that multimarket contact among national airlines is associated with higher prices.
    Date: 2023–01
  22. By: Sumit Agarwal; Andrea F. Presbitero; André F. Silva; Carlo Wix
    Abstract: We study credit card rewards as an ideal laboratory to quantify redistribution between consumers in retail financial markets. Comparing cards with and without rewards, we find that, regardless of income, sophisticated individuals profit from reward credit cards at the expense of naive consumers. To probe the underlying mechanisms, we exploit bank-initiated account limit increases at the card level and show that reward cards induce more spending, leaving naive consumers with higher unpaid balances. Naive consumers also follow a sub-optimal balance-matching heuristic when repaying their credit cards, incurring higher costs. Banks incentivize the use of reward cards by offering lower interest rates than on comparable cards without rewards. We estimate an aggregate annual redistribution of $15 billion from less to more educated, poorer to richer, and high to low minority areas, widening existing disparities.
    Keywords: Household finance; Credit cards; Financial sophistication; Rewards
    JEL: G21 G40 G51 G53
    Date: 2023–01–20

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