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on Regulation |
| By: | Mathias Dewatripont; Jean Tirole |
| Abstract: | Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality by offering consumer choice: "If I don't do it, someone else will". This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of protable suppliers, however may reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or non-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace. |
| Keywords: | Competition, consequentialism, replacement effect, non-profits,corporate social responsability, strategic complementarities, race to the ethical bottom. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/351283&r=reg |
| By: | Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Sappington, David E. M. (University of Florida) |
| Abstract: | We examine the reductions in electricity procurement costs that can be secured when gain-sharing regulation is employed to induce a regulated load serving entity (LSE) to undertake forward contracting despite associated political risk. We identify arguably plausible conditions under which a modest degree of gain sharing can induce an LSE to undertake forward contracting that substantially reduces the LSE's procurement costs, to the benefit of retail consumers. |
| Keywords: | forward contracting; incentive regulation; gain sharing |
| JEL: | L51 L94 Q28 Q40 |
| Date: | 2022–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2022_010&r=reg |
| By: | Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Eckert, Andrew (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Silveira, Douglas (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In electricity markets, system reliability requires the instantaneous balancing of supply and demand. In addition to the wholesale electricity market, the procurement of various ancillary services is vital in achieving this objective. An important design feature is whether ancillary service markets clear simultaneously or sequential with wholesale markets. We propose a model to study the strategic implications of simultaneous versus sequential timing when firms compete in the ancillary services and wholesale electricity markets. Considering the case where ancillary services markets clear before wholesale markets, we demonstrate that when firms face increasing marginal cost curves, a strategic incentive to reduce ancillary services output and, consequently, lower their marginal costs in the wholesale market arises. We employ data from Alberta’s electricity markets to demonstrate the quantitative implications of our findings. Our numerical results show that the strategic commitment effect has a small impact on wholesale market outcomes but a large impact on the equilibrium in the ancillary services market, elevating the market-clearing price. |
| Keywords: | ancillary services; electricity; market power; strategic commitment |
| JEL: | L13 L50 L94 Q40 |
| Date: | 2022–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2022_011&r=reg |
| By: | Brown, David P. (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Sappington, David E. M. (University of Florida) |
| Abstract: | It has been suggested that increasing (or eliminating) the caps on short-term wholesale prices will increase long-term forward contracting for electricity. We find that a higher price cap often enhances the incentives of electricity buyers (e.g., load-serving entities) to undertake forward contracting. However, a higher cap can diminish the incentives of electricity generators to engage in forward contracting. Consequently, higher wholesale price caps are not certain to increase industry forward contracting. |
| Keywords: | wholesale price caps; forward contracting; electricity markets |
| JEL: | L51 L94 Q28 Q40 |
| Date: | 2022–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2022_012&r=reg |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver; Mendelsohn, Juliane |
| Abstract: | The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of socalled gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economic perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, several issues of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified; and, in addition, Art. 5-7 DMA seem to contain three distinct regulatory instruments; last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the 'tipping' of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by the proposed regulation, this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as the DMA's norm addressee. While the goals and nature of the DMA have gained in clarity throughout the legislative process, its scope remains somewhat obtuse. On the one hand it seems set on regulating gatekeepers as they exist today, on the other, also wants to bring about systemic change in the digital single market. How it expects to achieve the latter is not entirely clear. In this light and by critically looking at the nature of ex ante and ex post measures in broader competition policy, we conclude that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the overalls aims of reining in big tech in future. |
| Keywords: | big tech,digital economy,digital ecosystems,GAFAM,competition policy,antitrust,Digital Markets Act (DMA),sector-specific regulation,law and economics |
| JEL: | K21 K23 K24 L40 L50 L81 L86 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:168&r=reg |
| By: | David Martimort (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Guillaume Pommey (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata [Roma]); Jerome Pouyet (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université, ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | Modern airports provide commercial services to passengers in addition to aeronautical services to airlines. We analyze how the airport's market power impacts the pricing of services when the airport also invests in the quality of its infrastructure. There is a need to regulate the airport and the optimal regulation can be implemented with a price-cap and a subsidy scheme targeted to the investment. The choice between a single-till and a dual-till approach does change neither the optimal regulation nor its implementation. We also investigate the consequences on the optimal regulation of the nature of the airport-airline relationship and of the observability of investment. |
| Keywords: | airports,regulation,commercial services,investment |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-03328394&r=reg |
| By: | Conall Heussaff; Simone Tagliapietra; Georg Zachmann; Jeromin Zettelmeyer |
| Abstract: | Action to intervene in the gas and electricity wholesale markets is also being taken at European Union level, which is what we analyse in this paper. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:polbrf:node_8331&r=reg |
| By: | Atayev, Atabek; Hillenbrand, Adrian |
| Abstract: | Policymakers have been discussing various potential measures to cushion the impact of skyrocketing gas prices and prevent supply shortages. On 10 October 2022 an expert commission in Germany proposed a plan to keep natural gas affordable while also preventing shortages. The main element of the plan is a direct subsidy for gas-consuming households. This ZEW Policy Brief aims to warn that price subsidies in the retail market for natural gas could impair competition between providers by reducing incentives for customers to search for cheaper service plans. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewpbs:62022&r=reg |
| By: | Dewenter, Ralf (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg); Löw, Franziska (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | In contrast to traditional business models, two-sided platforms internalize indirect network effects that exist between different groups of platform participants. The strength of the network effects has a decisive influence on the success of the platform and its market position. Markets with particularly strong network effects are also often characterized by a high degree of concentration. However, the strength of the network effects is not exogenously given but can be influenced by targeted investment. This paper analyses how platforms can affect network effects by investing in appropriate infrastructure, data, or artificial intelligence. We derive optimal quantities, prices, profits, and investments depending on different types of investments. |
| Keywords: | two-sided markets; indirect network effects; endogenous network effects; optimal investment strategy |
| JEL: | D21 D42 L10 |
| Date: | 2022–08–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2022_194&r=reg |
| By: | Nuño Ledesma José G.; Wu Steven Y.; Balagtas Joseph V. |
| Abstract: | We report an experiment contrasting the impacts of a tax and a cap rule in a single-product market with two privately-informed buyers. We discuss the effects on choice set and consumer surplus. The policy environment varies across treatments. With regulations, we aim to halve the size of the unregulated large option. Compared to the regulation-free baseline, sellers facing a cap attempt to serve the buyers separately with similar frequency. With a tax, subjects are less likely to offer menus with two alternatives. We find that consumer surplus remains unaffected under a cap rule, while buyers with high appreciation for the product see their surplus diminished by the tax. These results have implications for policy making in the food retail industry and others where authorities aim to regulate consumption while protecting consumer surplus. |
| Keywords: | Experiment;Non linear pricing;portion cap rule;quantity restriction;tax |
| JEL: | C9 D82 L51 |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2022-10&r=reg |
| By: | Alvaro J. Riascos Villegas; Julian Chitiva; Carlos Salazar |
| Abstract: | En este trabajo introducimos una metodología de generación de alertas de potenciales prácticas anticompetitivas en el mercado mayorista de electricidad colombiano. La metodología se compone de dos partes: (1) Con base en la disponibilidad declarada de los agentes, se identifican aquellos que potencialmente pueden tener un impacto alto en el precio de bolsa (i.e., pivotales en el sentido del índice de oferta residual - IOR) y (2) Usando métodos de aprendizaje de máquinas se identifican las ofertas de energía (i.e., precios) de aquellos agentes pivotales que, de acuerdo al estado del mercado y su historia (i.e., oferta pasadas, recursos hídricos, tecnología de generación, etc.) se podrían considerar atípicos o anómalos. Con base en estos dos indicadores se generan alertas de potenciales prácticas anticompetitivas. Reportamos los resultados de la aplicación de esta metodología al mercado mayorista colombiano en el período Agosto 16, 2018 - Julio 30, 2019. Una característica importante de esta metodología es que puede ser aplicada con la información disponible del operador del sistema, 24 horas antes de que se observen los resultados del mercado y generando alertas ex-ante a la realización de los eventos. Esta posibilidad de generar alertas casi en tiempo real es aun más importante de cara al nuevo mercado intradiario que próximamente entraría en rigor en el sistema eléctrico colombiano. **** We introduce a methodology for generating alerts of potential anti-competitive practices in the Colombian wholesale electricity market. The methodology is made up of two parts: (1) Based on the declared availability of the agents, those that can potentially have a high impact on the stock price are identified (i.e., pivotal in the sense of the residual supply index - IOR ) and (2) Using machine learning methods, the energy offers (i.e., prices) of those pivotal agents are identified that, according to the state of the market and its history (i.e., past offers, water resources, generation technology, etc.) could be considered atypical or anomalous. Based on these two indicators, alerts of potential anti-competitive practices are generated. We report the results of the application of this methodology to the Colombian wholesale market in the period August 16, 2018 - July 30, 2019. An important characteristic of this methodology is that it can be applied with the information available from the system operator, 24 hours before that the results of the market are observed and generating alerts ex ante to the realization of the events. This possibility of generating alerts almost in real time is even more important in view of the new intra-day market that will soon come into force in the Colombian electricity system. |
| Keywords: | Pool Electricity Markets, Anomaly Detection, Market Power, Machine Learning, Pool Electricity Markets, Anomaly Detection, Market Power, Machine Learning |
| JEL: | H62 H63 J23 J31 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdr:borrec:1217&r=reg |
| By: | Benjamin R. Shiller |
| Abstract: | Emerging tracking data allow precise predictions of individuals’ reservation values. However, firms are reluctant to conspicuously implement personalized pricing because of concerns about consumer and regulatory reprisals. This paper proposes and applies a method which disguises personalized pricing as dynamic pricing. Specifically, a firm can sometimes tailor the “posted” price for the arriving consumer but privately commits to change price infrequently. Note such pricing may unintentionally arise through algorithmic pricing. I examine outcomes in four contexts: one empirical and three hypothetical distributions of consumer valuations. I find that this strategy is most intense and raises profits most for medium popularity products. Furthermore, improvements in the precision of individual-level demand estimates raise the range of popularities this strategy can be profitably applied to. I conclude that this is an auspicious strategy for online platforms, if not already secretly in use. |
| Keywords: | personalized pricing, algorithmic pricing, price discrimination, targeted pricing, behavioural pricing, dynamic pricing, sticky pricing |
| JEL: | L81 D40 L10 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10025&r=reg |
| By: | Strausz, Roland (HU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | A multi-product monopolist sells sequentially to a buyer who privately learns his valuations. Using big data, the monopolist learns the intertemporal correlation of the buyer’s valuations. Perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable—even when the seller learns the correlation perfectly, has full commitment, and in the limit where the consumption good about which the buyer has ex ante private information becomes insignificant. This impossibility is due to informational externalities which re- quires information rents for the buyer’s later consumption. These rents induce upward and downward distortions, violating the generalized no distortion at the top principle of dynamic mechanism design. |
| JEL: | D82 L52 |
| Date: | 2022–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:347&r=reg |
| By: | Dubois, Pierre; Majewska, Gosia |
| Abstract: | In many industries, market structure determines how firms not only compete in terms of prices but also utilize promotional activities. We study how price and advertising strategies change when firms merge in pharmaceutical markets in the US. We show that across all drug markets, although mergers indeed increase prices, advertising spending also decreases. Merger simulations not accounting for advertising reductions may thus obtain biased price eects. Considering the merger effects of two large pharmaceutical companies on an antimicrobial drug market, we estimate a structural model of supply and demand and simulate the merger effect. We find that the merger effect on prices is smaller given the reduction in the amount of advertising. We also provide a simple method through which to evaluate long-term welfare effects using some known value of the sensitivity of innovation to profits. |
| Keywords: | Merger; Advertising; Drugs; Welfare; Innovation; |
| JEL: | I10 L22 L41 |
| Date: | 2022–11–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:127469&r=reg |
| By: | Xuan Teng |
| Abstract: | Platforms may give preferential treatment to their own products in search results. Whether and how to regulate this self-preferencing behavior is an intensely debated antitrust issue. This paper identifies self-preferencing and quantifies its equilibrium welfare effects in Apple App Store. I start by examining the effect of a change in the platform’s search algorithm that dropped several Apple’s apps from top positions. I find that the search algorithm change leads to significantly higher installations and update frequencies of independent apps that compete with Apple’s apps in the same categories. Then I develop an empirical model of consumer search and update competition allowing for potential self-preferencing. The model is estimated with aggregate data on consumer search and purchase, search ranking, and app characteristics. Estimation results point to self-preferencing: Apple’s apps are more likely to be ranked higher than independent apps conditional on app quality, price, ratings, and title match with search terms. Based on counterfactual simulations, I find that eliminating the identified self-preferencing modestly increases the quality of independent apps on average. Furthermore, the elimination improves consumer surplus by $2.2 million and profits of independent developers by $1.6 million per month. |
| Keywords: | search algorithm, consumer search, endogenous product characteristics, mobile application |
| JEL: | D12 D43 D83 L13 L41 L86 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10042&r=reg |
| By: | Michael Holscher; David Ignell; Morgan Lewis; Kevin J. Stiroh |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a stylized framework to assess conceptually how the financial risks of climate change could interact with a regulatory capital regime. We summarize core features of a capital regime such as expected and unexpected losses, regulatory ratios and risk-weighted assets, and minimum requirements and buffers, and then consider where climate-related risk drivers may be relevant. We show that when considering policy implications, it is critically important to be precise about how climate change may impact the loss-generating process for banks and to be clear about the specific policy objective. While climate change could potentially impact the regulatory capital regime in several ways, an internally coherent approach requires a strong link between specific assumptions and beliefs about how these financial risks may manifest as bank losses and what objectives regulators are pursuing. We conclude by identifying several potential research opportunities to better understand these complex issues and inform policy development. |
| Keywords: | Climate change; Regulatory capital |
| JEL: | G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2022–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2022-68&r=reg |
| By: | Kawaguchi, Kohei; Kuroda, Toshifumi; Sato, Susumu |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes an empirical model of mobile app competition, in which consumers decide downloads and usage time, and apps compete in price and advertising intensity. We estimate the model using data from Google Play in Japan from 2015 to 2017. We demonstrate merger simulation and the analysis of the vertical relation with Google Play. We find that a reduction of the fee imposed by Google Play can increase the price for game apps by inducing the shift of revenue source from advertising to downloads, highlighting the importance of considering two-sidedness and mixed business models. |
| Date: | 2022–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:2bdk4&r=reg |
| By: | Bernhardt, Lea (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg); Dewenter, Ralf (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses all final merger decisions by the European Commission from the beginning of 1990 up to the end of 2019. We use a novel dataset, containing information about 6245 merger cases from all economic sectors and combining all sorts of decisions, inclusive of withdrawn and prohibited cases. Using text analyses techniques, we first analyse merger decisions documents in order to find trends and differences in language and wording with respect to the 2004 regulation. As a result, we find a shift in favour of terms associated with the More Economic Approach. On the contrary, the concept of dominance has decreased since 2004, indicating a strong decline in structural market parameters for merger reviews. While the tonality is found to be largely positive (especially for cleared cases), again, a change under different merger regimes seems to be evident. Second, accounting for differences in the usage of competition-related terms and by using simple OLS and logit regressions, we find that the duration of the merger review has increased significantly after the 2004 reform. At the same time, the probability of a merger being prohibited has not changed significantly. |
| Keywords: | Merger policy; Competition policy; Regulatory reform; EU Commission |
| JEL: | D78 K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2022–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2021_195&r=reg |
| By: | KUBO, Takahiro; Mieno, Taro; Uryu, Shinya; Terada, Saeko; Veríssimo, Diogo |
| Abstract: | Regulation of natural resource use might have unintended spillover impacts beyond the policy targets. Overexploitation is a major cause of species extinction and banning wildlife trade is a common and immediate measure to tackle it. However, few rigorous studies have investigated consequences of wildlife trade bans, and those few studies have focused only on the policy target species. This means governments and researchers may have overlooked side effects of trade bans on unregulated threatened species. This study explores whether trade ban regulations on three threatened species (i.e., giant water bugs Kirkaldyia deyrolli, Tokyo salamanders Hynobius tokyoensis and golden venus chub Hemigrammocypris neglectus) have spillover impacts on the demand for non-banned species considered as substitutes. We draw on a 10-year online auction dataset and the recently developed causal inference approach—synthetic difference-in-differences—to analyze the trade ban regulation implemented in February 2020 in Japan, one of the largest wildlife trade markets. The results show that bans on the giant water bugs and Tokyo salamanders led to an increase in the trade of non-banned species, whereas there was no such evidence concerning the golden venus chub. The findings suggest that policy evaluations ignoring spillover effects might overstate the benefits of trade bans. Our findings raise concerns about the unintended consequences caused by trade bans and restate the importance of further efforts around consumer research, monitoring and enforcement beyond the species targeted by policies, while minimizing the costs by applying modern technologies and enhancing international cooperation. |
| Date: | 2022–05–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:s6gwu&r=reg |
| By: | Di Foggia, Giacomo; Beccarello, Massimo |
| Abstract: | Governance of waste management is historically based on local issues, with different applications and rules across countries. To meet the increasing number of circular economic goals, countries worldwide are seeking to improve the efficiency of waste management markets in terms of environmental performance and cost efficiency. For this market to effectively move toward a more circular perspective, sound reforms are needed at the market design level. We suggest that a system operator should be introduced in the industry to coordinate and support the healthy functioning of the market. We develop our idea starting from lessons learned from the energy market that apply governance characteristics and environmental goals. Focusing on the industry structure, we identify tasks and duties that a waste management system operator should perform to boost the transition toward a more circular economy. Our proposal has policy ramifications, with the most important identifying an appropriate legal entity. The study has managerial implications, and we suggest that a system operator is needed for reporting environmental results, ensuring the universality of service, planning and monitoring environmental goals, and supporting local authorities, as well as other coordination activities. These activities will facilitate a move toward a more circular economy, addressing issues concerning the complexity of waste management industries, markets, and outputs. |
| Date: | 2022–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:7gw8c&r=reg |
| By: | Diego Rodríguez Rodríguez |
| Abstract: | El propósito de este trabajo es ordenar, describir y valorar brevemente las medidas que se han ido tomando en España para paliar los efectos derivados del incremento de los precios de la energía (electricidad y gas) en el transcurso del último año. Para ello, en el apartado 2 se sigue un esquema temático, agrupando las medidas en función de su contenido y no según su orden cronológico. En todos los casos, se describe inicialmente la medida adoptada para, posteriormente, hacer un comentario o valoración sobre la misma. En el apartado 3 se concluye y se valora brevemente la situación actual de la discusión sobre nuevas medidas regulatorias en el ámbito europeo. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdafen:2022-27&r=reg |
| By: | Maximilian Andres; Lisa Bruttel; Jana Friedrichsen |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. |
| Keywords: | cartel, collusion, communication, machine learning, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D43 L41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10024&r=reg |
| By: | Motta, Matt (Oklahoma State University); Callaghan, Timothy; Trujillo, Kristin Lunz |
| Abstract: | The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) play a central role in responding to communicable disease threats. Its authority to do so, however, has recently met significant political and legal opposition. Unpacking the dynamics of public support for CDC authority is an important question, as doing so can provide insight into whether policymakers might have an incentive to expand (or curtail) the agency’s regulatory powers. In a demographically representative survey of 5,483 US adults, we find that most Americans support the CDC’s role in responding to health crises, although self-identified conservatives are less likely to do so. Consistent with the idea that opposition to CDC-authority may result (in part) from receptivity to elite anti-CDC rhetoric, the effect of ideology holds when accounting for respondents’ limited government and anti-expert attitudes; an effect we replicate in nationally representative data from the American National Election Study (ANES). Encouragingly, though, we find via a novel survey experiment that emphasizing the CDC’s central role in combating the spread of COVID-19 is associated with significantly stronger levels of support on the ideological right. We conclude by discussing how these findings might influence effective health communication in the face of mounting political and legal challenges to CDC regulatory authority. |
| Date: | 2022–09–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:pxrn3&r=reg |