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on Regulation |
| By: | Asantewaa, Adwoa (Durham University Business School); Jamasb, Tooraj (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School); Llorca, Manuel (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School) |
| Abstract: | The financial viability of electric utilities in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is a central energy policy issue. This follows a persistent under-recovery of costs despite having some of the highest electricity prices in the world. However, discussions on electricity price-cost margins often focus on the revenue aspects and tariff and utility reforms, but inadequately on costs and broader sector reforms. Through a synthesis of reform theories and case studies and using small electricity systems as a surrogate for liberalised sectors without competitive markets, this paper examines the connection between sector reforms and costs. It brings economic perspective to financial performance in SSA electricity systems and the need for a holistic approach for cost-recovery. We recommend the promotion of mobile power plants to facilitate contestability in generation and competitive procurement of new capacity to lower costs. Small systems should participate in regional power markets to neutralise the scale limitations of autarkic demand, and form platforms to share information on cost opportunities to inform procurement designs and regulatory benchmarks. Regional markets could partner with governments to develop subsidy schemes such as contracts for differences to remove rigidities in national power purchasing contracts to promote participation of small systems in regional markets. Yardstick competition in the distribution segment is viable in small electricity systems and should be pursued. |
| Keywords: | Small electricity systems; sub-Saharan Africa; electric utilities; financial performance; cost under recovery; electricity prices |
| JEL: | D47 D52 D61 E13 L97 P18 P41 P48 |
| Date: | 2022–08–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2022_012&r= |
| By: | Peter Cramton (University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany 50923); Emmanuele Bobbio (University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany 50923); David Malec (University of Maryland, College Park MD 20742); Pat Sujarittanonta (Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand 10400) |
| Abstract: | "Electricity markets worldwide are undergoing a many‐decade transition in the way electricity is generated and consumed. The success of this transition depends critically on climate policy and market design. We model the most advanced electricity markets in the world to evaluate the impact of alternative policies on electricity market outcomes over the next 40 years, including costs, profits, social welfare, risks, and reliability. Each year, investors decide which resources enter and exit given forward‐looking consistent expectations about energy profits, prices, and costs. The model is unique in modeling investment decisions at the individual unit level based on precisely calculated profits from energy, reserves, and capacity markets. These profits depend critically on the resource structure, which changes each year with investor decisions. New and essential elements of electricity markets, such as battery storage and price responsive demand are fully integrated. The model provides detailed insights into how policies such as carbon pricing impact the transition to renewable energy." |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:183&r= |
| By: | Peter Cramton (University of Cologne and University of Maryland) |
| Abstract: | A local flexibility market is presented that addresses intrazonal congestion in a zonal electricity market. The market lets system operators access flexibility at multiple voltage levels to satisfy transmission constraints. Market participants offer local flexibility intraday in a continuous trading process. This supply is matched with demand from system operators. The market-based redispatch is transparent and technology neutral. Inc-dec gaming is mitigated with features to detect and sanction the behavior. Cost-based redispatch from conventional generation serves as a backstop if additional flexibility is required close to real time. This further mitigates inc-dec gaming by disciplining behavior in the spot market. An advantage of the approach in Europe is that it represents a modest change from the current market and therefore can be implemented sooner and with less risk. |
| Keywords: | local flexibility, congestion pricing, market design, electricity markets, electricity regulation |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:182&r= |
| By: | Steven Fries (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report on Climate Change Mitigation highlights the vast gap between climate change mitigation actions and climate stabilization goals. But its broad policy prescriptions are likely to leave policymakers pondering what specific actions to take. Informed by accumulating evidence on transforming aspects of energy systems like power generation from solar and wind resources and battery electric cars, this paper develops a more pointed energy reform strategy than that of the IPCC to deliver the necessary systemwide changes. It makes the case for two unorthodox policies. One is for governments to provide, in addition to R&D supports, market-creating supports for early deployment of low-carbon technologies in initial markets. The second is to sequence emissions pricing after innovation and market-creating supports and differentiate this pricing across key energy sectors rather than impose one economywide price. Compared with a single price, targeting higher emissions pricing on sectors that are costlier to decarbonize still promotes cost-effective emission cuts but limits adverse distributional impacts. The paper also considers nonprice barriers to change and ways to coordinate domestic reforms across countries. |
| Keywords: | low-carbon technologies, innovation policy, market-creating policies, cost-effective emissions pricing, distributional fairness, efficiency regulation, institutional reforms, international coordination. |
| JEL: | O25 O38 Q48 Q58 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp22-13&r= |
| By: | Emmanuele Bobbio; Simon Brandkamp; Stephanie Chan; Peter Cramton; David Malec; Lucy Yu |
| Abstract: | Electricity markets balance supply and demand with price. Historically, this price response has come almost entirely from supply. However, when much of supply is intermittent or inflexible, price responsive demand becomes essential for reliability and resiliency. We measure how responsive consumers are to price in Britain from July 2020 to July 2021 with half-hourly individual-household data. Our sample includes customers with a dynamic rate that tracks wholesale cost, as well as flat-rate customers used to control for weather and other factors. A one percent increase in price reduces demand by 0.26 percent. This elasticity is larger for consumers owning low-carbon technologies. This price response is sufficient to maintain system balance in extreme events even when most consumers are unresponsive. Regulators can encourage price responsive demand through retail choice and subsidize enabling technologies. Regulators can protect consumers with mandated hedging in dynamic plans. Low-income households benefit most from such policies. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:185&r= |
| By: | Jolian McHardy (Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, UK); Michael Reynolds (Department of Economics, University of Leeds, UK); Stephen Trotter (Economic Policy, University of Hull, Hull, UK) |
| Abstract: | We show that a novel pricing system can help resolve a series of perennial problems evident in the deregulated British urban public transport market that have compromised economic growth, access equality and environmental ambitions. A two-stage pricing system, with operators setting their multi-operator service ticket prices collusively in one stage and their single-operator ticket prices independently, in the other, offers potential consumer surplus, profit and welfare gains over, what we characterise as, the ‘Status Quo’. The proposed win-win pricing regime can also support a larger number of operators and services with potential additional welfare gains. The Block Exemption in the UK allowing collusive pricing on a limited basis is due to expire and is under statutory review, making this is a timely contribution. We also compare the proposed regime against a multi-operator ticketing card (MTC) scheme, permitted under the Block Exemption, and show, whilst the MTC offers higher welfare when all regimes provide the same number of services, the proposed regime supports a larger number of operators in the presence of fixed costs, which can reverse the welfare ranking in its favour. A calibration exercise indicates the market may be in the region where the proposed regime can dominate the ‘Status Quo’ in profit, consumer surplus and welfare terms and supports a larger network than the ‘Status Quo’ or MTC with further welfare gains. The resulting higher public transport patronage may also offer further indirect benefits via reduced pollution, congestion and accidents. Furthermore, by improving transport efficiency it may help improve city density, especially in Britain’s second-tier cities which do not tend to benefit from extensive public transit rail and underground networks, with associated agglomeration effects contributing to the current leveling-up priority. Given the salience amongst developed countries of the private aspect of urban public transport in Britain, along with an unresolved private vs public debate, this issue is of potential interest to urban planners and policymakers beyond the UK. |
| Keywords: | Urban Transport; Networks; Pricing; Welfare |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L92 R11 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shf:wpaper:2022012&r= |
| By: | DHaultfoeuille, Xavier (CREST-ENSAE); Wang, Ao (University of Warwick and CAGE); Fevrier, Philippe (CREST); Wilner, Lionel (CREST) |
| Abstract: | Despite the wide adoption of revenue management in many industries such as airline, railway, and hospitality, there is still scarce empirical evidence on the gains or losses of such strategies compared to uniform pricing or fully flexible strategies. We quantify such gains and losses and identify their underlying sources in the context of French railway transportation. The identification of demand is complicated by censoring and the absence of exogenous price variations. We develop an original identification strategy combining temporal variations in relative prices, consumers’ rationality and weak optimality conditions on the firm’s pricing strategy. Our results suggest similar or better performance of the actual revenue management compared to optimal uniform pricing, but also substantial losses of up to 16.2% compared to the optimal pricing strategy. We also highlight the key role of revenue management in acquiring information when demand is uncertain. |
| Keywords: | Revenue management ; dynamic pricing ; demand estimation ; demand learning ; moment inequalities JEL Codes: C25 ; C61 ; D12 ; R40 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:621&r= |
| By: | Juan Pablo Atal; José Ignacio Cuesta; Morten Sæthre |
| Abstract: | Quality regulation attempts to ensure quality and foster competition by reducing vertical differentiation, but it may also have adverse effects on market structure. We study this trade-off in the context of pharmaceutical bioequivalence, which is the primary quality standard for generic drugs. Exploiting the introduction of bioequivalence in Chile, we find that stronger regulation decreased the number of drugs in the market by 21% and increased average paid prices by 13%. We estimate a model of drug entry, certification, and demand to study the role of drug quality, aversion against generics, and certification costs in shaping the equilibrium effects of quality regulation. We find that quality regulation increased demand for generic drugs by resolving asymmetric information and reducing aversion against unbranded generics, which induced entry of high-quality drugs in place of low-quality drugs. Consumer welfare increased despite higher prices and a lower number of firms. We compare minimum quality standards to quality disclosure and other designs of quality regulation. |
| JEL: | I11 L11 L15 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30325&r= |
| By: | Emmanuele Bobbio; Simon Brandkamp; Stephanie Chan; Peter Cramton; David Malec; Lucy Yu |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:184&r= |
| By: | Pierre M. Picard; Alessandro Tampieri; Xi Wan |
| Abstract: | Picard et al. (2019) show that allocative inefficiency may occur in a private airport when passenger fees are regulated. In this paper, we investigate the presence of inefficiency in slot allocation when an airport faces no regulation over per-passenger charges. In the model, passengers favor peak times and the number of available peak-time slots is constrained by airport capacities. Consistent with empirical evidence, we find that fees deregulation solves allocative inefficiency by raising per-passenger fees. However, when the infrastructural resources appear to be more efficiently employed, the increase in fees leads to a fall in social welfare. |
| Keywords: | Slot allocation, Endogenous fee, Airport capacity |
| JEL: | R41 H21 H23 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2022_18.rdf&r= |
| By: | van Basshuysen, Philippe |
| Abstract: | Where economists previously viewed the market as arising from a ‘spontaneous order’, antithetical to design, they now design markets to achieve specific purposes. This paper reconstructs how this change in what markets are and can do came about and considers some consequences. Two decisive developments in economic theory are identified: first, Hurwicz’s view of institutions as mechanisms, which should be designed to align incentives with social goals; and second, the notion of marketplaces – consisting of infrastructure and algorithms – which should be designed to exhibit stable properties. These developments have empowered economists to create marketplaces for specific purposes, by designing appropriate algorithms. I argue that this power to create marketplaces requires a shift in ethical reasoning, from whether markets should reach into certain spheres of life, to how market algorithms should be designed. I exemplify this shift, focusing on bias, and arguing that transparency should become a goal of market design. |
| Keywords: | markets; algorithms; market design; bias; transparency; T&F deal |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2022–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:115694&r= |
| By: | Ivan T. Ivanov (Federal Reserve Board); Tom Zimmermann (University of Cologne); Nathan Heinrich (Federal Reserve Board) |
| Abstract: | We examine recent regulation requiring US municipal governments to disclose private debt. We show that governments fail to disclose 55-80% of reportable debt events and that, conditional on disclosure, filings often omit contract details essential for bond pricing. Non-compliant issuers are also riskier than compliers, with disclosure decreasing in the potential of private debt to adversely affect bondholders. Event studies suggest that disclosure reveals positive news and is especially informative to investors in low-rated bonds or during market turmoil episodes. Overall, private debt disclosure remains largely voluntary, highlighting challenges to recent federal initiatives to increase transparency for municipal bond investors. |
| Keywords: | Bond pricing, disclosure regulation, private debt |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:186&r= |
| By: | Samir Bellal (UMMTO - Université Mouloud Mammeri [Tizi Ouzou]) |
| Abstract: | This paper briefly describes how the question of institutional change is approached by the theory of regulation. It allows us to situate the contribution of this current in the analysis of institutional change and to underline its affiliations and specificities. |
| Abstract: | Ce papier décrit brièvement la manière dont la question du changement institutionnel est abordée par la théorie de la régulation. Il nous permet de situer l'apport de ce courant dans l'analyse du changement institutionnel et d'en souligner les filiations et les spécificités. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency,Accumulation regime,Regulation.,Institution,Efficacité,Régime d'accumulation,Régulation. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03726304&r= |
| By: | Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University); Jonathan Payne (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | Digital money requires a ledger. By integrating this ledger with its other ledgers, a platform can enforce repayment of uncollateralized credit, beyond the ability of the banking sector. However, by controlling interoperability to other platforms’ ledgers, an incumbent platform can “lock-in†customers and increase its market power. Open banking, which gives users control of interoperability, limits uncollateralized credit. Introducing CBDC as digital legal tender (on an isolated ledger) hurts credit extension, but enhances it when combined with an open architecture public ledger as a “smart CBDC.†|
| Keywords: | Tokens, ledgers, interoperability, smart contracts, platforms, open banking, open architecture, financial inclusion, “smart CBDC†, “PlatFi†|
| JEL: | E50 E59 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2022-8&r= |
| By: | Philippe Corruble (Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie) |
| Abstract: | The European regulation on the control of business concentrations has created a framework structuring the Single European Market and has ensured the legal security of merger and acquisition operations. As companies are obliged to notify transactions that exceed the European turnover thresholds, they have adapted their acquisition strategies by anticipating the application of the regulation in an ongoing dialogue with the Commission, both before and after notification. The increasing number of acquisitions - outside the scope of the regulation - of technology start-ups by powerful companies has led the Commission to review the rules of the game, upsetting the subtle balance of relations between companies and the regulatory authorities. |
| Abstract: | Le règlement européen sur le contrôle des concentrations d'entreprises a créé un cadre structurant le Marché Unique Européen et assuré la sécurité juridique des opérations de fusionacquisition. Contraintes de notifier les opérations franchissant les seuils européens de chiffre d'affaires, les entreprises ont adapté leurs stratégies d'acquisition en anticipant l'application du règlement dans un dialogue permanent avec la Commission, en amont et en aval de la notification. La multiplication des acquisitionshors-champ d'application du règlement-de jeunes pousses technologiques par des entreprises puissantes, a amené la Commission à revoir les règles du jeu, bouleversant l'équilibre subtil des rapports entre les entreprises et les Autorités de contrôle. |
| Keywords: | Control of mergers and Acquisitions,European Commission,Thresholds,Notification,Killer Acquisitions,Contrôle des concentrations,Commission européenne,Seuils |
| Date: | 2022–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03736149&r= |
| By: | Wuckel, Christiane |
| Abstract: | Many health care systems aim to enhance hospital quality by encouraging competition. However, evidence on the relationship between quality and competition is inconclusive. My contribution to this literature is two-fold. Analyzing the relationship between competition and quality for the German hospital market can give valuable insights about the nature of the relationship in a market with regulated prices that is characterized by a high number of hospitals and a diverse ownership structure. While most studies look at competition as market structure, I distinguish effects of market structure from effects of strategic behavior. I find evidence for a significant, non-linear relationship between market structure and care quality. Additionally, I find evidence for strategic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Hospitals,quality,competition,spatial econometrics |
| JEL: | C21 I11 L11 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:959&r= |
| By: | Filippo Lancieri; Eric A. Posner; Luigi Zingales |
| Abstract: | Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges who, with a few exceptions, did not express skepticism about antitrust law in confirmation hearings. We find little evidence that academic ideas played an important role in the decline of antitrust enforcement except where they coincided with the interests of big business, which appears to have exercised influence behind the scenes. |
| JEL: | K21 L40 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30326&r= |
| By: | Antelo, Manel; Bru, Lluís |
| Abstract: | We examine how a social planner should allocate productive capacity in a downstream industry when, upstream, there is an efficient supplier and a set of less efficient suppliers of an essential input. We show that optimal allocation consists of setting a large quota and small quotas for the remaining capacity. This allows the planner, without necessarily harming consumers, to reap licensing rents above those that would be obtained in a competitive downstream market or under public management of capacity. We also discuss circumstances under which a use-or-lose requirement for the large quota is welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, and under which banning price discrimination in the intermediate market may be socially optimal. |
| Keywords: | Capacity allocation, dominant firm, use-or-lose requirement, price discrimination, quota licence, soft-budget constraint |
| JEL: | D43 F13 L13 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113984&r= |
| By: | Braganza, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Modern societies, almost unequivocally, pursue the goal of economic growth. The central normative reason for this has recently been called the 'consumerist claim', namely the standard economic claim that increases in consumption (i.e. growth), by and large entail welfare increases. However, the consumerist claim does not take account of behavioral economics. Specifically, it disregards that consumption increases can also be achieved by nudging, as practiced e.g. in marketing or advertising. Remarkably, proponents of the consumerist claim are often vocal critics of governmental nudging, which is decried as manipulative and paternalistic, but are simultaneously dismissive or apologetic about market-derived nudging. Here we argue, that in light of behavioral economics Adam Smiths 'invisible hand' will often produce outcomes as if it belonged to an 'invisible paternalist', who systematically and efficiently nudges individuals towards ever increasing consumption. Specifically, we develop the notion of 'market paternalism' (MP), based on a synthesis of behavioral and evolutionary economic reasoning. MP entails three central properties: First, unregulated markets naturally give rise to pervasive nudges, modifying our behavior, preferences and beliefs in ways beyond our conscious awareness and control. Second, these nudges will coalesce towards an emergent system-level end, that cannot be derived from any coherent notion of individual preferences. Third, MP operates in part by a cultural evolutionary mechanism, implying that it will occur with computational and coordinative power far beyond any individual (or government). To assess the potential practical relevance of MP, we survey the literature, finding clear evidence that MP drives or exacerbates numerous pressing societal problems, including rampant obesity, mass surveillance and the climate crisis. It does so by covertly and incessantly nudging not only our behavior, but also our preferences, values and beliefs towards the single goal of increasing consumption. The surprising consequence is that, in light of behavioral economics, unregulated markets should be expected to systematically subvert individual autonomy and rationality, the very values typically invoked to defend the consumerist claim. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifsowp:23&r= |
| By: | Dan Ben-Moshe; David Genesove |
| Abstract: | Regulation is a major driver of housing supply, yet often not easily observed. Using only apartment prices and building heights, we estimate $\textit{frontier costs}$, defined as housing production costs absent regulation. We achieve identification using conditions on the support of supply (i.e., regulatory) and demand shocks without recourse to instrumental variables. In an application to new Israeli residential construction, we find about $45\%$ of housing price ascribable to regulation, with higher rates in areas that are higher priced, denser, and closer to city centers. We also find economies of scale in frontier costs at low building heights. This estimation takes into account measurement error, which includes random unobserved structural quality. When allowing unobserved structural quality to vary with amenities (i.e., locational quality), and assuming their weak complementarity locally (i.e., the return in price on structural quality is non-decreasing in amenities among nearby buildings), we bound average regulation by about $25\%$ of prices. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2208.01969&r= |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina |
| Abstract: | Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop structures that allow them to establish trust and ensure cooperation. We analyze 15 German cartels, focusing on the individual participants, the communication and internal structures within the cartels as well as their breakup. Our results indicate that cartel members are highly homogeneous and often rely on existing networks within the industry. Most impressively, only two of the 156 individuals involved in these 15 cartels were female, suggesting that gender also plays a role for cartel formation. We further identify various forms of communication and divisions of responsibilities and show that leniency programs are a powerful tool in breaking up cartels. Based on these results we discuss implications for competition policy and further research. |
| Keywords: | Cartels,Collusion,Social Networks,Trust,Antitrust |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:390&r= |
| By: | Andreas Stephan (Centre for Competition Policy and School of Law, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper undertakes a qualitative analysis of the relationship between EU cartel enforcement in the chemical industry in the period 1997-2010 and compliance measures announced in the Annual Reports of the undertakings involved. It goes on to focus on Akzo Nobel NV’s unique use of an internal amnesty programme, and the level of compliance in the industry following this period of enforcement. Its findings are consistent with cartel enforcement prompting significant investment in compliance measures, with some evidence of those measures resulting in the earlier reporting of cartels in return for leniency and in enforcement action against only one hard core cartel in the decade that followed. |
| Keywords: | Cartels, compliance |
| Date: | 2022–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2022_03&r= |
| By: | Poonam Gupta (National Council of Applied Economic Research); Arvind Panagariya (National Council of Applied Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Banks play a critical role in economic growth. In India, the banking sector, dominated by public sector banks (PSBs), has underserved the economy and their stakeholders. The underperformance of PSBs has persisted despite several policy initiatives during the past decade. Meanwhile, private banks have further improved their performance and have gained significant market share. In this paper, we have made the case for privatization of PSBs. Due to its better performance and adhering to the development view of the PSBs, we propose that the State Bank of India (SBI) may remain under government ownership for now, but all other banks should be privatized. In order for them to set an example for the success of future privatizations, the first two banks for privatization should be the ones with better asset quality and higher returns. The most critical element for privatization to succeed would be the withdrawal of the government from the post-privatization board of the bank. The paper proposes a couple of different pathways to successfully transition the sector toward private ownership. It cautions that the status quo will result in further erosion of the market share of PSBs toward oblivion, while impeding India’s economic growth and inflicting substantial costs onto the depositors, firms, taxpayers and the government as their majority owner in the interim. |
| Keywords: | Bank credit, Public sector banks, Privatization, India |
| JEL: | G21 G28 K23 L33 E23 |
| Date: | 2022–08–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nca:ncaerw:141&r= |