nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2022‒02‒28
24 papers chosen by
Christopher Decker
Oxford University

  1. How does COVID-19 affect intertemporal price dispersion? Evidence from the airline industry By Luttmann, Alexander; Gaggero, Alberto A
  2. A RHOMOLO assessment of the impact of regulation in the EU services sector By Javier Barbero; Manol Bengyuzov; Martin Christensen; Andrea Conte; Simone Salotti; Aleksei Trofimov
  3. Consumer Reviews and Regulation: Evidence from NYC Restaurants By Chiara Farronato; Georgios Zervas
  4. Myopic Oligopoly Pricing By Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D.
  5. Disclosure regime of contract terms and bargaining in vertical markets By Petrakis, Emmanuel; Skartados, Panagiotis
  6. Measuring market power: macro and micro evidence from Italy By Emanuela Ciapanna; Sara Formai; Andrea Linarello; Gabriele Rovigatti
  7. Economics of Electric Mobility: Utilities and Electric mobility By Yannick Perez; Wale Arowolo
  8. Winners and Losers: The Distributional Effects of the French Feebate on the Automobile Market By Isis Durrmeyer
  9. Technology licensing and Collusion By Sen, Neelanjan; Minocha, Priyansh; Dutta, Arghya
  10. The case for a Carbon Border Adjustment: Where do economists stand? By Aliénor Cameron; Marc Baudry
  11. Tradable instruments to fight climate change: A disappointing outcome By Philippe Quirion
  12. Comparison between China, the EU and the US's climate and energy governance: How policies are made and implemented at different levels By Xinqing Lu; Erpu Zhu; Loyle Campbell; Manfred Hafner; Michel Noussan; Pier Paolo Raimondi
  13. The economic costs of NIMBYism: evidence from renewable energy projects By Jarvis, Stephen
  14. How do Gasoline Prices Respond to a Cost Shock ? By Erwan Gautier; Magali Marx; Paul Vertier
  15. Advance sales and deterrence with heterogeneous firms By Henry Thille; Sebastien Mitraille
  16. Should Governments Tax Digital Financial Services? A Research Agenda to Understand Sector-Specific Taxes on DFS By Munoz, Laura; Mascagni, Giulia; Prichard, Wilson; Santoro, Fabrizio
  17. Cost-benefit analysis of bank regulation: Does size matter? By Mulindi, Hillary
  18. Liberalizing Passenger Rail: The Effect of Competition on Local Unemployment By Badura, Ondrej; Melecky, Ales; Melecky, Martin
  19. Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs By Ma, Siyu; Sen, Debapriya; Tauman, Yair
  20. Quality Transparency and Healthcare Competition By Kepler, John D.; Nikolaev, Valeri V.; Scott-Hearn, Nicholas
  21. Does NICE influence the adoption and uptake of generics in the UK? By Serra-Sastre, Victoria; Bianchi, Simona; Mestre-Ferrandiz, Jorge; O’Neill, Phill
  22. Achieving Inclusive and Innovative Growth with Competition Policies By Han, Minsoo; Kim, Subin
  23. The late emerging consensus among American economists on antitrust laws in the 2nd New Deal (1935-1941) By Thierry Kirat; Frédéric Marty
  24. De la Grande Guerre à la National Recovery Administration (1917-1935) : Les arguments en faveur d'une concurrence régulée dans les États-Unis de l'entre-deux-guerres By Thierry Kirat; Frédéric Marty

  1. By: Luttmann, Alexander; Gaggero, Alberto A
    Abstract: This study provides empirical evidence documenting how COVID-19 affects intertemporal price dispersion in the airline industry. Exploiting a unique panel of 43 million fares collected before and during the pandemic, we find that airlines discounted fares by an average of 57%. The rate of intertemporal price increases also declined, particularly in the last week to departure. We also find that flight-level price dispersion increased during the pandemic. Fare decreases (and the associated increase in price dispersion) are found to be driven primarily by the diffusion of COVID-19 at the destination as opposed to the origin market.
    Keywords: airlines, COVID-19, intertemporal pricing, price dispersion
    JEL: D40 I19 L11 L93
    Date: 2022–02–02
  2. By: Javier Barbero (European Commission - JRC); Manol Bengyuzov (European Commission - DG GROW); Martin Christensen (European Commission - JRC); Andrea Conte (European Commission - JRC); Simone Salotti (European Commission - JRC); Aleksei Trofimov (European Commission - DG GROW)
    Abstract: Services account for about 70% of the GDP of the European Union (EU), and a similar share of employment. The 2006 Services Directive aims at promoting trade and investment in services by removing unjustified regulatory and administrative barriers. Nevertheless, the Single Market for services remains fragmented. The analysis reported here shows that the realised removal of barriers between 2006 and 2017 results in discounted cumulative gains of 2.1% of GDP by the year 2027. Additional ambitious reforms could generate an additional growth potential of up to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, resulting in a total cumulative gain in GDP of up to 4.65% by 2027.
    Keywords: rhomolo, general equilibrium, economic growth
    JEL: C68 R13
    Date: 2022–01
  3. By: Chiara Farronato; Georgios Zervas
    Abstract: We investigate the informativeness of hygiene signals in online reviews, and their effect on consumer choice and restaurant hygiene. We first extract signals of hygiene from Yelp. Among all dimensions that regulators monitor through mandated restaurant inspections, we find that reviews are more informative about hygiene dimensions that consumers directly experience - food temperature and pests - than other dimensions. Next, we find causal evidence that consumer demand is sensitive to these hygiene signals. We also find suggestive evidence that restaurants that are more exposed to Yelp are cleaner along dimensions for which online reviews are more informative.
    JEL: D18 D22 D82 K2 K20 L15 L51 L80 L86
    Date: 2022–02
  4. By: Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D.
    Abstract: This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and o ers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for di erent pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hypercompetition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.
    Keywords: International Relations/Trade, Political Economy
    Date: 2021–12–21
  5. By: Petrakis, Emmanuel; Skartados, Panagiotis
    Abstract: We consider a vertically related market where an upstream monopolist supplies two downstream Cournot competitors. We allow the vertical contract terms to be either interim observable or secret. We address a dichotomy in the literature by endogenizing the disclosure regime of contract terms. The latter could be set via a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Firms bargain over both the disclosure regime and the contract terms. Our results indicate that when firms trade over two-part tariffs, universal interim observability is the unique equilibrium no matter the bargaining power distribution or the product differentiation. Yet, when firms trade over linear tariffs there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. We also show that under competing vertical chains we get universal interim observability as a unique equilibrium no matter the upstream structure. Our results qualitatively hold under Bertrand competition too. Our welfare analysis indicates that universal interim observability and two-part tariffs yield the highest consumer surplus and total welfare.
    Keywords: Bilateral Contracting; Vertical Relations; Two-Part Tariffs; Bargaining; Nondisclosure Agreements; Secret Contracts
    JEL: D43 L13 L14
    Date: 2022–02–16
  6. By: Emanuela Ciapanna (Bank of Italy); Sara Formai (Bank of Italy); Andrea Linarello (Bank of Italy); Gabriele Rovigatti (Bank of Italy)
    Abstract: In this paper, we provide an assessment of the evolution of markups in Italy in the last twenty years. To this aim, we resort to both macro and micro data and estimation techniques, namely reduced forms accounting measures (price-cost margins) and production function model-based indicators. When using aggregate data, we adopt a comparative approach and analyse markup dynamics in the four main euro area countries, whereas the micro-level analysis is focused on Italy. According to our findings i) markups have shown flat/slightly decreasing dynamics in the last decades in the major EU countries, settling on average in level at 1.1; ii) aggregate dynamics hide substantial across sector and firms heterogeneity in markups patterns; iii) the micro-level analysis for Italy indicates the within-firms component as the most relevant in explaining markups behavior; iv) no top firms-driven dynamics emerge; v) our evidence conflicts with the results obtained in De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) because the latter suffers of two main sources of bias: a strong sample selection, and the assumption of a common technology parameter across countries. Finally, we propose an encompassing measure of market power, summarizing the several indices investigated in a principal component framework. This synthetic indicator describes the markups evolution for the Italian economy and we confirm its effectiveness based on a set of validation variables.
    Keywords: Markups, competition measures, Euro Area, micro-macro data
    JEL: D2 D4 E2 L1 O3
    Date: 2022–02
  7. By: Yannick Perez (LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - CentraleSupélec - Université Paris-Saclay); Wale Arowolo (LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - CentraleSupélec - Université Paris-Saclay)
    Date: 2021–07
  8. By: Isis Durrmeyer (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: I quantify the welfare and environmental gains and losses from a policy establishing an environmental tax/subsidy for new cars in France in 2008. I estimate a structural model of demand and supply that features heterogeneity in consumer preferences to go beyond the average policy effects and analyse distributional aspects. The policy reduces average carbon emissions by 1.6% at the cost of additional emissions of local pollutants. The regulation favours middle-income individuals but has redistributive effects when combined with a tax that is proportional to income. Moreover, local pollutant emissions increase least in poor and rural areas, suggesting another redistribution channel.
    Date: 2021–10–21
  9. By: Sen, Neelanjan; Minocha, Priyansh; Dutta, Arghya
    Abstract: This paper considers the possibility of technology licensing and tacit collusion between firms that produce homogeneous goods under asymmetric cost structures and compete in quantities. We discuss the possibility of collusion under Grim-Trigger strategies when technology may be licensed via fixed fee or royalty or two-part tariff. Irrespective of the type of licensing contract, the possibility that a stable cartel is formed is the same. In the no-licensing stage, the cartel formation is more likely if the cost difference between the firms is higher. In contrast to Lin (1996), all forms of licensing facilitate (obstruct) collusion, if the initial cost difference between the firms is less (more). Technology will always be licensed in the first stage and the optimal form of licensing is either fixed-fee or royalty or two-part tariff. The cartel will be formed if the firms are relatively patient and welfare either increases or decreases in the post-licensing stage.
    Keywords: Technology licensing; Oligopoly; Cartel; Grim-Trigger Strategy; Cournot Competition
    JEL: D24 L13 L24
    Date: 2022–02–23
  10. By: Aliénor Cameron (Climate Economics Chair, Université Paris-Nanterre & EconomiX-CNRS); Marc Baudry (Climate Economics Chair, Université Paris-Nanterre & EconomiX-CNRS)
    Abstract: On 14 July 2021, the European Commission formally adopted a proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage caused by its increasingly ambitious environmental policies. There is a gap between the ways in which this issue is discussed in political spheres and the evidence provided by economic literature on it. The aim of this paper is to bridge this gap by presenting the context and policy debate surrounding carbon leakage and CBAs in the EU, reviewing the state of the economic literature on this topic, and discussing further research that is necessary to answer remaining policy concerns and unresolved research questions.
    Keywords: climate policy, carbon border adjustments, carbon leakage, ,
    JEL: H23 L51 O33 Q58
    Date: 2022–02
  11. By: Philippe Quirion (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Various tradable instruments have been implemented for climate change mitigation: emission trading systems, tradable energy-efficiency obligations, and tradable renewable energy quotas. Their track record has been disappointing so far: almost every emission trading has suffered from over-allocation which has undermined its effectiveness; tradable energy-efficiency obligations seem to have mostly co-financed investments that would have taken place anyway; tradable renewable energy quotas suffer from several shortcomings compared to alternative support systems, i.e., feed-in tariffs and premiums. I discuss the reasons for these failures (especially too superficial a reading of the work of researchers by policy makers) and ways to improve the situation (including encouraging systematic syntheses of academic work).
    Date: 2021–05
  12. By: Xinqing Lu (Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs); Erpu Zhu (Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs); Loyle Campbell (Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs); Manfred Hafner (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs, The John Hopkins University – School of Advanced International Studies); Michel Noussan (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Sciences Po – Paris School of International Affairs, Decisio); Pier Paolo Raimondi (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Istituto Affari Internazionali)
    Abstract: This paper compares the different multi-level climate and energy governance in China, the European Union and the United States. While many comparisons across these three economies exist, they concentrate on comparing the climate and energy “policy instruments” and their results. This paper puts a focus on the importance of institutionalized multi-level governance processes, i.e., the “politics” - the actors and interaction processes inherent in a mode of governance, and the “polities” - the institutional setting. How are priorities and targets decided from both bottom-up and top-down processes? How do the central governments exert control over local authorities and ensure the implementation of their policies? How do the central governments enforce and evaluate the results of the policies? And finally, how do citizens play a role in the multi-level governance in these three blocs? Analysis of multilevel governance highlights the importance of target setting and cadre evaluation in China whereas legislation is the dominant process in the EU and the US.
    Keywords: Multi-level Governance, Climate Policy, Energy Policy, Energy Transition, China, the European Union, the United States
    JEL: N50 Q48 Q58
    Date: 2021–12
  13. By: Jarvis, Stephen
    Abstract: Large infrastructure projects can have important social benefits, but also prompt strong local opposition. This is often attributed to NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) attitudes. I study the economic costs of NIMBYism and local planning restrictions by looking at renewable energy projects. Using hedonic methods I find that wind projects can impose significant external local costs, while solar projects do not. I then show that planning officials are particularly sensitive to local costs in their area. The resulting misallocation of investment may have increased wind power deployment costs by 10-29%. I conclude by examining compensation payments as a policy solution.
    JEL: Q42 R11 Q51 Q31
    Date: 2021–11
  14. By: Erwan Gautier; Magali Marx; Paul Vertier
    Abstract: Using several millions of daily prices collected over the period 2007-2018 in France, we investigate how gasoline retail prices respond to a common shock on marginal cost (i.e. the wholesale gasoline price quoted on the Rotterdam market). We find that the pass-through is complete: a 1% change in Rotterdam price translates to a change in retail price of 0.8%, in line with the share of the wholesale gasoline in total costs. The adjustment is gradual: the full pass through takes about 3 weeks. In a broad class of sticky price models, the ratio of the kurtosis over the frequency of price changes is shown to be a sufficient statistic for the cumulative impulse response of prices (CIRP) to a nominal shock. We provide evidence that the sufficient statistic prediction holds when we look at how gasoline prices respond to a common cost shock. Relating, at the gas station level, the CIRP to moments of the price change distribution, we find that the CIRP correlates with the ratio of kurtosis over frequency, but also with both frequency and kurtosis taken separately. The sign and the magnitude of the correlations are fully in line with theoretical predictions. We also show that other moments do not correlate with CIRP as robustly as the frequency and the kurtosis.
    Keywords: Price Rigidity, Gasoline, Sufficient Statistic
    JEL: E31 D43 L11
    Date: 2022
  15. By: Henry Thille (Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph ON Canada); Sebastien Mitraille (Toulouse Business School)
    Abstract: We examine the e?ects of ?rm heterogeneity when ?rms can compete in advance for future demand by either entering forward contracts or by selling to agents that store the good to meet future demand. Firms’ sales in the second period are reduced by aggregate advance sales, so high-cost ?rms may produce zero output in equilibrium if aggregate advance sales induce a price below their marginal cost. The endogenous number of active ?rms leads to the possibility of a deterrence equilibrium in which lower-cost ?rms act to deter the activity of higher-cost ?rms. In this case, the presence of inactive higher-cost ?rms in the market results in a lower price than would otherwise obtain. In addition, the advance sales equilibrium with heterogeneous ?rms has higher market shares for relatively e?cient ?rms compared to that in both the heterogeneous ?rm Cournot equilibrium and the homogeneous ?rm advance sales equilibrium. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome results in industry output produced at a lower average cost, which represents an additional welfare gain associated with the pro-competitive e?ects of strategic advance sales even though the reallocation of market shares leads to higher measured concentration.
    Keywords: Advance sales, oligopoly, quantity competition
    JEL: C72 D43 L13
    Date: 2022
  16. By: Munoz, Laura; Mascagni, Giulia; Prichard, Wilson; Santoro, Fabrizio
    Abstract: Digital financial services (DFS) have rapidly expanded across Africa and other low-income countries. At the same time, low-income countries face strong pressures to increase domestic resource mobilisation, and major challenges in taxing the digital economy. A growing number are therefore advancing or considering new taxes on DFS. These have generated much debate and there are significant disagreements over the rationale for the taxes and their likely impacts. This paper examines three key questions that could help governments and other stakeholders to better understand the rationale for, and impacts of, different decisions around taxing DFS – and to arrive at policies that best meet competing needs. First, what is the rationale for imposing specific taxes on money transfers or mobile money in particular? Second, and most importantly, what is the likely impact of DFS taxes? Third, how do the policy processes through which taxes on DFS and money transfers are introduced function in practice? The paper looks at the core principles of good taxation and presents the existing debate around whether taxes on DFS observe them. It explains why understanding the landscape of financial services is essential to designing suitable tax policies and lays out a framework for developing the necessary analysis of the impacts of taxes on DFS. It also highlights the importance of better understanding the processes that give rise to these taxes.
    Keywords: Governance,
    Date: 2022
  17. By: Mulindi, Hillary
    Abstract: This study investigates the trade-off between costs and benefits of bank regulation in Kenya. Using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Annual data for the period 2003 - 2019, extracted from KBA Financial Database and KNBS macroeconomic data, the study models Industry-level and cluster level relationship between bank regulation and cost inefficiency of banks. The industry-level analysis indicates that stringent capital requirement has a positive and significant effect on the cost-efficiency of banks, while tighter liquidity requirements hurt cost efficiency. Further, the bank tier-level analysis established that the double-layered regulatory framework creates Cost inefficiencies amongst middle-tier banks. The key policy implication would be to consider reviewing, identifying, and amending the regulatory provisions that are creating inefficiencies among the listed middle-tier banks
    Keywords: Bank Regulation,Cost-Benefit Analysis,Stochastic Frontier Analysis
    JEL: G28 D61 C24
    Date: 2021
  18. By: Badura, Ondrej; Melecky, Ales; Melecky, Martin
    Abstract: Competitive passenger rail can help workers access new or better jobs. This paper studies the wider economic impacts on local unemployment of the liberalized passenger rail between Ostrava, the third-biggest city in the Czech Republic, and Prague, its capital. The local impacts are estimated at the LAU 1 level (administrative districts) using the difference-in-differences method. The liberalization motivated the entry of two new private providers. The resulting competition in ticket prices, the number of connections, and service quality had a strong beneficial effect on labor market connectivity. It significantly reduced unemployment in the districts along the line compared with the control districts. The effect weakens with the level of urbanization of the treated district. It could partly transmit through higher firm entry and lower firm exit in the local market, as well as better skill matching on the back of higher inward and outward migration.
    Keywords: Competition; difference in differences; districts; liberalization; local labor market; passenger transport; railways; unemployment; urbanization; EU country; OECD country
    JEL: J6 L40 R10 R40
    Date: 2022–01
  19. By: Ma, Siyu; Sen, Debapriya; Tauman, Yair
    Abstract: We consider the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly where an outside innovator uses three part tariffs that are combinations of upfront fees, per unit royalties and ad valorem royalties. The key insight of our analysis is per unit royalties have a location effect and ad valorem royalties have a scale effect on marginal costs. Using these two effects, we show that the same market outcome (price, quantities, operating profits) can be sustained by multiple combinations of per unit and ad valorem royalties. In the monopoly case, under three part tariffs it is optimal to set a pure upfront fee while the unique optimal two part royalty is a pure ad valorem royalty. In the case of a general oligopoly with linear demand, for relatively insignificant innovations, it is optimal to set a pure upfront fee; otherwise there is a continuum of optimal policies and there always exists an optimal policy consisting of a positive per unit royalty and upfront fee but no ad valorem royalty. For intermediate innovations, provided the demand intercept is relatively large, there exists an optimal policy that has both kinds of royalties but no fees. Finally in a Cournot duopoly it is illustrated that when the innovator is one of the incumbent firms rather than an outsider, market outcomes separately depend on two kinds of royalties and a pure ad valorem royalty is optimal among all three part tariffs.
    Keywords: patent licensing; per unit royalties; ad valorem royalties; three part tariffs; acceptability and feasibility constraints
    JEL: D43 D45 L13 L14
    Date: 2022–01–21
  20. By: Kepler, John D. (Stanford U); Nikolaev, Valeri V. (U of Chicago); Scott-Hearn, Nicholas (U of Chicago)
    Abstract: Transparency of quality in the healthcare sector primarily aims to facilitate patients’ care decisions, however, it also provides useful information to competing healthcare providers. We study how competitors respond to increased transparency about rivals’ quality by exploiting a regulatory change that initiated disclosure about the quality of all kidney dialysis facilities in the United States. We show that competitors are 27% more likely to open new facilities near low-quality incumbents after the transparency program is implemented. We also show that the effect of transparency on competition is concentrated in states without licensing requirements that create barriers to entry. Evidence from patient referrals indicates that the new transparency regime increases the sensitivity of demand to quality and that the increase in competition is costly to low-quality incumbents, as they lose 31% of their referrals—equivalent to a $3.74 million loss of a facility’s annual revenue—to higher-quality entrants. Finally, losing referrals leads incumbents to invest in better patient care through an immediate increase in the use of nurse practitioners and social workers.
    JEL: D83 G14 L14 M41
    Date: 2021–11
  21. By: Serra-Sastre, Victoria; Bianchi, Simona; Mestre-Ferrandiz, Jorge; O’Neill, Phill
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine generic competition in the UK, with a special focus on the role of Health Technology Assessment (HTA) on generic market entry and diffusion. In the UK, where no direct price regulation on pharmaceuticals exists, HTA has a leading role for recommending the use of medicines providing a non-regulatory aspect that may influence the dynamics in the generic market. The paper focuses on the role of Technology Appraisals issued by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). We follow a two-step approach. First, we examine the probability of generic entry. Second, conditional on generic entry, we examine the determinants of generic market share. We use data from IQVIA British Pharmaceutical Index (BPI) for the primary care market for 60 products that lost patent between 2003 and 2012. Our results suggest that market size remains one of the main drivers of generic entry. After controlling for market size, intermolecular substitution and difficulty of manufacturing increase the likelihood of generic entry. After generic entry, our estimates suggest that generic market share is highly state dependent. Our findings also suggest that while NICE recommendations do influence generic uptake, there is only marginal evidence they affect generic entry.
    Keywords: generic competition; generic entry; market share; NICE
    JEL: I11 I18
    Date: 2021–12–07
    Abstract: In recent years, inequality has grown worse worldwide. Recent studies have pointed out weakening market competition and deepening industrial concentration as one of factors for this phenomenon. Therefore, the role of competition policies in promoting market competition should also be considered as a countermeasure against deepening inequality beyond the traditional view about competition policies. Against this backdrop, we empirically analyze cases of the US, the EU and Korea, and then propose a competition policy direction to achieve inclusive and innovative growth pursued by the Korean government.
    Keywords: competition policy; market competition; US; EU; Korea; inclusive and innovative growth
    Date: 2022–01–19
  23. By: Thierry Kirat (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Frédéric Marty (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: The article presents the late convergence process from American economists that led them to support a strong antitrust enforcement in the Second New Deal despite their long-standing distrust toward this legislation. It presents the path from which institutionalist economists, on the one side, and members of the First Chicago School, on the other one, have converged on supporting the President F.D. Roosevelt administration towards reinvigorating antitrust law enforcement as of 1938, putting aside their initial preferences for a regulated competition model or for a classical liberalism. The appointment of Thurman Arnold at the head of the Antitrust Division in 1938 gave the impetus to a vigorous antitrust enforcement. The 1945 Alcoa decision crafted by Judge Hand embodied the results of this convergence: in this perspective, the purpose of antitrust law enforcement does consist in preventing improper uses of economic power.
    Keywords: Economic Power,Institutional Economics,Antitrust,Efficiency,Chicago School,New Deal
    Date: 2021–06–16
  24. By: Thierry Kirat (IRISSO - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Sciences Sociales - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Frédéric Marty (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: L'expérience de l'économie de guerre a renforcé aux États-Unis l'influence d'arguments en faveur d'une concurrence organisée. Étendant les prescriptions du management scientifique des firmes à l'ensemble de l'économie, cette approche visait leur coordination par des échanges d'informations. Cette dernière était vue à la fois comme une nécessité en termes d'efficacité économique et de réponse aux fluctuations cycliques. Une telle perspective conduisait à réduire drastiquement la portée des règles de concurrence.Cependant, des propositions faites lors de la crise de 1929 conduisirent à reproduire en temps de paix l'expérience de l'économie de guerre au risque de mener l'économie américaine à une cartellisation sous l'égide de l'État fédéral.Elles furent rejetées par le Président Hoover pourtant défenseur dans les années1920 d'un modèle de concurrence régulée. Ces projets furent paradoxalement repris par le Président Roosevelt dans le cadre du premier New Deal. Cet article traite des arguments qui furent avancés pour s'abstraire des règles de concurrence et explique pourquoi l'administration démocrate décida finalement de revenir à une activation résolue du Sherman Act
    Keywords: économie de guerre,cartellisation,règles de concurrence,management scientifique,échanges d'information
    Date: 2021–03–04

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