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on Regulation |
| By: | Massimo Dragotto (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Italy); Marco Magnani (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Italy and Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Network and the Environment (ARERA)); Paola Valbonesi (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Italy and Higher School of Economics, National Research University, (HSE-NRU), Moscow) |
| Abstract: | By exploiting an original 4-year dataset on the Italian retail electricity market, we investigate the relationship between firm incumbency — measured by market concentration at the regional level — and consumer inertia — identified by the yearly percentage of consumers switching providers and/or contract, both from the regulated to the free market and within the free market. Our main results show that i) regions recording stronger firm incumbency exhibit larger consumer inertia in leaving the regulated market, this effect being reinforced by the number of active free market retailers; ii) switching by consumers who already are in the free market is, instead, positively affected by firm incumbency. In light of these results, we provide prescriptions for policymakers targeting the migration of consumers towards free-market contracts and, consequently, full energy market liberalisation. |
| Keywords: | Electricity Retail Markets, Liberalisation in Electricity Markets, Incumbency, Consumer Behaviour |
| JEL: | D12 L11 L98 Q48 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0277&r= |
| By: | David Martimort (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Jérôme Pouyet (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université, ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School); Thomas Trégouët (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université) |
| Abstract: | An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer and faces the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent's service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity given to all buyers. |
| Keywords: | excessive entry,foreclosure,exclusionary behavior,incomplete information |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03328387&r= |
| By: | Döpper, Hendrik; Rasch, Alexander |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effect of different pricing schemes on horizontally differentiated firms' ability to sustain collusion when customers have the possibility to combine (or mix) products to achieve a better match of their preferences. To this end, we compare two-part tariffs with linear prices and quantity-independent fixed fees in two different scenarios. First, we consider exogenously determined pricing schedules such as in the case of legal or third-party restrictions. We find that the additional price component of the two-part tariff makes it more difficult to sustain collusion. Additionally, the pricing schedule that is most beneficial for customers in absence of collusion harms customers most in presence of (partial) collusion. Second, we consider the scenario in which firms endogenously choose collusive tariffs. We find that firms can commit to using only the fixed price component of the two-part tariff to facilitate collusion at maximum prices. However, once we consider partial collusion, firms prefer to use both price components of the two-part tariffs. We discuss policy implications in the context of the media and entertainment industry. |
| Keywords: | Collusion,Combinable products,Media markets,Mixing,Price discrimination,Two-part tariff |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L41 L82 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:377&r= |
| By: | Rosas-Munoz, Juan (University of Nottingham); Espinola-Arredondo, Ana (Washington State University); Munoz-Garcia, Felix (Washington State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines a common-pool resource where quotas and fines are set by a regulator, an artisanal organization (cooperative), or both. We analyze the interaction between the policies of both regulatory agencies under an inflexible policy regime, where quotas and fines can be revised across periods, and under an inflexible policy regime, where they cannot. We show that inefficiencies arise in the inflexible regime, but they are eliminated when the two agencies coexist. We then extend our model to a setting where regulator and artisanal organization have misaligned preferences, demonstrating that both agencies are still preferable when the stock regenerates rapidly, but a single agency is preferable otherwise. |
| Keywords: | Common-pool resource; regulation; artisanal organization; flexible policy; inflexible policy; inefficiencies |
| JEL: | H23 L13 Q50 |
| Date: | 2022–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:wsuwpa:2022_001&r= |
| By: | ITF |
| Abstract: | This report provides an overview of technological, operational and policy measures that can accelerate the decarbonisation of aviation. Its goal is to support governments and aviation stakeholders looking to introduce aviation decarbonisation measures regionally, nationally and internationally. All measures are discussed in light of their cost-effectiveness and the potential barriers to their implementation. The report summarises the conclusions from an expert workshop held in February 2020 as part of the International Transport Forum’s Decarbonising Transport initiative. |
| Date: | 2021–07–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:itfaac:94-en&r= |
| By: | Andres, Raphaela; Slivko, Olga |
| Abstract: | We analyze the impact of the Network Enforcement Act, the first regulation which aims at restraining hate speech on large social media platforms. Using a difference-in- differences framework, we measure the causal impact of the German law on the prevalence of hateful content on German Twitter. We find evidence of a significant and robust decrease in the intensity and volume of hate speech in tweets tackling sensitive migration-related topics. Importantly, tweets tackling other topics as well as the tweeting style of users are not affected by the regulation, which is in line with its aim. Our results highlight that legislation for combating harmful online content can influence the prevalence of hate speech even in the presence of platform governance mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Social Networks,User-Generated Content,Hate Speech,Policy Evaluation |
| JEL: | H41 J15 K42 L82 L86 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21103&r= |
| By: | Cameron, Anna; Khanal, Mukesh; Tedds, Lindsay M. |
| Abstract: | Canada’s short-term rental (STR) market has grown considerably in recent years, resulting in a heightened focus by local governments on adopting regulatory approaches to manage it. Indeed, since 2018, an increasing number of Canadian governments (largely cities) have introduced regulatory frameworks to both mitigate perceived negative impacts of the STR market, as well as reap some of its benefits. In light of the gap in Canada-focused research on STR regulation, this article analyzes in comparative perspective the regulatory approaches adopted in 11 Canadian jurisdictions in response to the rise of platform-mediated home sharing. We find that aspects of regulation, such as licensing and registration, are increasingly a question, not of “if,” but rather “how” and “to what extent,” with the most promising approaches being those that reflect sophisticated understandings of the range of activity that plays out in the market and the various actors, including platforms and property managers, involved. For jurisdictions looking to introduce or tweak approaches going forward, there is potential benefit in reframing market regulation as a governance issue, rather than a technical legal problem. From this standpoint, of particular promise are joint governance approaches which involve municipalities and other local jurisdictions implementing distinct rules within the context of an overarching provincial framework. |
| Keywords: | Short-term Rental, Market Failure, Regulatory Fracture, Regulation, Innovative Disruption, Community Impact |
| JEL: | H79 R19 |
| Date: | 2022–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:111535&r= |
| By: | Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim; Wenzel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the provision of consumer rights can decrease welfare when some consumers remain ignorant of these rights. We find that consumers uninformed about a mandated warranty demand excessively safe products in some circumstances. In other circumstances, uninformed consumers buy the efficient product variety like informed consumers but the former cross-subsidize the latter via firms' pricing. With respect to the salient policy option of improving information about consumer rights, we find that increasing the share of informed consumers may actually raise the risk of inefficiency. |
| Keywords: | consumer policy,imperfect information,efficiency,product safety,distribution |
| JEL: | D18 K12 K13 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21098&r= |
| By: | Patrice Bougette (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS); Oliver Budzinski (Technische Universität Ilmenau); Frédéric Marty (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anti-competitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms' capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality. |
| Keywords: | Self-preferencing, antitrust, regulation, European Union competition law, exploitative abuse, Digital Markets Act |
| JEL: | K21 L12 L40 L42 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2022-01&r= |
| By: | Hirth, Lion; Khanna, Tarun; Ruhnau, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Electricity is a peculiar economic good, the most important reason being that it needs to be supplied at the very moment of consumption. As a result, wholesale electricity prices fluctuate widely at hourly or sub-hourly time scales, regularly reaching multiples of their average, and even turn negative. This paper examines whether the demand for electricity responds to such price variations in the very short term. To solve the classical identification problem when estimating a demand curve, we use weather-driven wind energy generation as an instrument. Our robustness checks confirm that wind energy is indeed a strong and valid instrument. Using data from Germany, we estimate that a 1 €/MWh increase in the wholesale electricity price causes the aggregate electricity demand to decline by 67–80 MW or 0.12–0.14%, contradicting the conventional wisdom that electricity demand is highly price-inelastic. These estimates are statistically significant and robust across model specifications, estimators, and sensitivity analyses. At average price and demand, our estimates correspond to a price elasticity of demand of about –0.05. Comparing situations with high and low wind energy (5–95th percentile), we estimate that prices vary by 26 €/MWh, and the corresponding demand response to wholesale electricity prices is about 2 GW, or 2.6% of peak load. Our analysis suggests that the demand response in Germany can be attributed primarily to industrial consumers. |
| Keywords: | Electricity markets,price elasticity,demand response,instrumental variables |
| JEL: | Q41 D47 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:249570&r= |
| By: | Gilmore, J.; Nolan, T.; Simshauser, P. |
| Abstract: | Over the period 2016-2021 Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) experienced an investment supercycle, with 16,000MW of new utility-scale variable renewable plant commitments (and an additional 8,000MW of rooftop solar PV) in a power system with a ratcheted peak demand of 35,000MW. The sharp rise in intermittent asynchronous resources and the disorderly loss of 5,000MW of synchronous coal-fired generation plant placed strains on system security – most visibly represented by the rapid deterioration in the distribution of the power systems’ (50Hz) Frequency. This in turn necessitated material changes to the NEM’s suite of Frequency Control Ancillary Service (FCAS) markets. Utility-scale batteries are ideally suited for FCAS duties, but unlike the wholesale electricity market, there is no forward price curve for Frequency Control Ancillary Services, nor is there any systematic framework for determining equilibrium prices that might otherwise be used for investment decision-making. In this article, we develop an approach for quantifying long run equilibrium prices in the markets for Frequency Control Ancillary Services, with the intended application being to guide the suitability of utility-scale battery investments under conditions of uncertainty and missing forward FCAS markets. |
| Keywords: | Frequency control ancillary services, electricity markets, battery storage |
| JEL: | D25 D80 G32 L51 Q41 |
| Date: | 2022–01–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2203&r= |
| By: | Tselika, Kyriaki (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of intermittent renewable generation on the distribution of electricity prices and their variability in Denmark and Germany. We exploit hourly data from 2015 to 2020 and employ a novel panel quantile approach - the Quantiles via moments (MMQR) method. The combination of hourly-specific effects and the quantile approach allow us to estimate the renewable sources effect on various price quantiles while controlling for market dynamics. The results suggest that the merit-order effect occurs in both countries, with wind and solar generation having diverse effects on the electricity price distribution. Thus, policy makers should consider this diversifying effect to develop efficient renewable support schemes. We also explore non-linearities by including different demand levels in our model and investigate price variability. The outcomes indicate that wind generation increases (decreases) the occurrence of price fluctuations for low demand (high demand) in both countries. Meanwhile, in Germany, solar power stabilizes price fluctuations for high demand levels, stronger than wind. Market risk information could be useful for organizations in recognizing beneficial investment opportunities or hedging strategies. We finally aggregate the hourly observations into daily and compare the estimation outcomes. Hourly-related features seem to affect the merit-order effect and its robustness, and a panel approach shall be considered when investigating electricity markets. |
| Keywords: | Electricity prices; panel quantile regression; renewable sources; merit-order effect; price variability |
| JEL: | Q20 Q40 |
| Date: | 2022–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2022_004&r= |
| By: | Gohdes, N.; Simshauser, P. |
| Abstract: | The cost of capital is among the most important variables determining the feasibility of investment in renewable energy projects. In Australia’s National Electricity Market, the ability of new variable renewable energy (VRE) plant to arrange requisite project finance at favourable rates largely determines project viability. Such financings are typically only achieved when VRE projects are underpinned by long-dated Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), under which prices are guaranteed by an investment-grade counterparty. In this article, we quantify the relationship between PPAs, counterparty credit quality and the cost of capital in the context of Australia’s energy-only wholesale market under conditions of policy uncertainty. Our analysis benefits from the application of confidential data from Australia’s capital markets. We find higher credit quality drives higher gearing, and somewhat counterintuitively, lower expected returns to equity. This in turn produces a lower cost of capital and by implication, higher post-construction VRE plant valuations – an outcome seemingly at odds with Modigliani and Miller’s classic 1958 article. In practice, risk has been repackaged and reallocated. |
| Keywords: | Renewable Energy, PPAs, Project Finance, Counterparty Credit, Cost of Capital |
| JEL: | D25 D80 G32 L51 Q41 |
| Date: | 2022–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2206&r= |
| By: | David M. Arseneau; Grace Brang; Matt Darst; Jacob M. M. Faber; David E. Rappoport; Alexandros Vardoulakis |
| Abstract: | This paper uses data from the Financial Accounts of the United States to map out the regulatory boundaries of assets held by U.S. financial institutions from a macroprudential perspective. We provide a quantitative measure of the regulatory perimeter—the boundary between the part of the financial sector that is subject to some form of prudential regulatory oversight and that which is not—and show how it has evolved over the past forty years. Additionally, we measure the boundaries between different regulatory agencies and financial institutions that operate within the regulatory perimeter and illustrate how these boundaries potentially become blurred in the face of regulatory overlap. Quantifying the regulatory perimeter and the boundaries for macroprudential regulators within the perimeter is informative for assessing financial stability risks over the credit cycle. |
| Keywords: | Regulation; Regulatory reach; Boundary problem; Financial institutions |
| JEL: | E58 G18 G28 |
| Date: | 2022–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2022-02&r= |
| By: | Matthew Gibson (Williams College) |
| Abstract: | Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the eects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. Estimates indicate each agreement cost affected workers approximately 2.5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected. |
| Keywords: | , |
| JEL: | J42 K21 J30 L41 |
| Date: | 2021–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2021-14&r= |
| By: | Jana Gieselmann (HHU); Matthias Hunold; Johannes Muthers; Alexander Rasch |
| Abstract: | In a market with two exclusive manufacturer-retailer pairs, we show that colluding manufacturers may not be able to attain supra-competitive profits when contracts with retailers are secret. The stability of manufacturer collusion depends on the retailers’ beliefs. We consider various dynamic beliefs and find that industry-profit-maximizing collusion is feasible for some. Collusion is even renegotiation-proof under trigger beliefs if a novel condition of opportunism-proofness holds, which can be more demanding than the standard stability condition. Trigger beliefs are not flexible enough to allow for formation of collusion. We demonstrate that adaptive beliefs may be necessary for the formation of manufacturer collusion in a non-collusive industry. |
| Keywords: | opportunism, credible punishment, cartel formation, manufacturer collusion, vertical relations, renegotiation-proof, secret contracting |
| JEL: | C73 D43 L13 L41 L81 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2021-18&r= |
| By: | Pierre Dubois (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Toulouse School of Economics); Rachel Griffith (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Manchester); Martin O'Connell (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Wisconsin) |
| Abstract: | Soda taxes aim to reduce excessive sugar consumption. Policymakers highlight the young, particularly from poor backgrounds, and high sugar consumers as groups whose behavior they would most like to influence. There are also concerns about the policy being regressive. We assess who are most impacted by soda taxes. We estimate demand using micro longitudinal data covering on-the-go purchases, and exploit the panel dimension to estimate individual specific preferences. We relate these preferences and counterfactual predictions to individual characteristics and show that soda taxes are relatively effective at targeting the sugar intake of the young, are less successful at targeting the intake of those with high total dietary sugar, and are unlikely to be strongly regressive especially if consumers benefit from averted internalities. |
| Date: | 2020–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:20/8&r= |
| By: | Christian Loenser (University of Cologne); Joost Röttger (Deutsche Bundesbank); Andreas Schabert (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines financial regulation and distortionary taxes in a heterogeneous-agents economy with pecuniary externalities induced by a collateral constraint. Limiting of the loan-to-value benefits only few unconstrained borrowers and reduces ex-ante social welfare. A Pigouvian-style symmetric debt tax (that subsidizes savings) raises collateral prices and lowers interest rates, which stimulates borrowing and generates welfare gains for almost all income groups. A Pigouvian-style asset subsidy induces a wealth appreciation, while an asset tax particularly benefits low-wealth borrowers and enhances social welfare. Overall, collateral effects are of minor importance and interest rate rather than asset price responses are decisive for welfare effects. |
| Keywords: | Financial regulation, heterogeneous agents, collateral constraint, pecuniary externalities |
| JEL: | D31 E44 G28 H23 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:143&r= |
| By: | Altmiks, Peter |
| Abstract: | Dieser Beitrag beschreibt und bewertet die Änderungen und Herausforderungen durch die 10. GWBNovelle, die seit Januar 2021 in Kraft getreten ist. Schwerpunkt ist die Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht, um den Wettbewerb auf digitalisierten Märkten zu schützen bzw. zu etablieren sowie Antworten auf die zunehmende Marktmacht von Online-Plattformen zu finden. Künftig können die Kartellbehörden auch eingreifen, wenn ein Markt zu kippen droht (Tipping). Die neu gestaltete Fusionskontrolle bezweckt sowohl eine Entlastung der Kartellbehörden als auch ein flexibleres Eingreifen bei Fusionsvorhaben unterhalb der Aufgreifschwellen, die aber sukzessive zu wettbewerbseinschränkenden Konzentrationen führen können. |
| Keywords: | GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz,Missbrauchsaufsicht/präventive Verhaltenskontrolle,veränderte Fusionskontrolle |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fomstr:8&r= |
| By: | Li, Jianpei; Zhang, Wanzhu |
| Abstract: | We analyse a two-period model in which a monopolistic seller may adopt behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) and charge consumers different prices based on their purchasing histories. We show that if there is quality uncertainty and prices convey valuable information about product quality, BBPD can be profitable for the seller both when the seller can and can not commit to future prices, contrasting the traditional view that the seller would like to avoid BBPD due to strategic delay of consumption on the consumers' side. BBPD increases consumers' sensitivity to a price change in the first period and enables the high type seller to signal product quality with relatively low prices, effectively reducing signaling costs in comparison to uniform pricing. In the separating equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion, first-time purchasers pay lower prices than repeat purchasers. |
| Keywords: | Behavior-based Price Discrimination (BBPD); Quality Uncertainty; Signaling |
| JEL: | D82 L11 L15 |
| Date: | 2022–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:111572&r= |
| By: | Inderst, Roman; Thomas, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Die notwendige ökologische Transformation aber auch darüberhinausgehend die zunehmenden Erwartungen, die Gesellschaft und Politik an die Wirtschaft stellen, erfordern eine Prüfung des Wettbewerbsrechts und seiner Durchsetzung, insbesondere auch der dabei verwendeten (ökonomischen) Konzepte und Methoden, dahingehend, ob die aktuelle Praxis nicht einer stärkeren Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeitszielen in unbegründeter Weise im Wege steht. Auf europäischer Ebene hat der Diskurs darüber im Jahr 2021 erheblich an Fahrt gewonnen. Wir stellen wesentliche Initiativen dar. Dabei zeigt sich unseres Erachtens allerdings auch, dass für eine konstruktive Weiterentwicklung noch die nötigen konzeptionellen und methodischen Grundlagen fehlen. |
| Keywords: | Nachhaltigkeit,ESG,Wettbewerbsrecht |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safepl:94&r= |
| By: | Azzutti, Alessio |
| Abstract: | As in many other sectors of EU economies, 'artificial intelligence' (AI) has entered the scene of the financial services industry as a game-changer. Trading on capital markets is undoubtedly one of the most promising AI application domains. A growing number of financial market players have in fact been adopting AI tools within the ramification of algorithmic trading. While AI trading is expected to deliver several efficiency gains, it can also bring unprecedented risks due to the technical specificities and related additional uncertainties of specific 'machine learning' methods. With a focus on new and emerging risks of AI-driven market manipulation, this study critically assesses the ability of the EU anti-manipulation law and enforcement regime to achieve credible deterrence. It argues that AI trading is currently left operating within a (quasi-)lawless market environment with the ultimate risk of jeopardising EU capital markets' integrity and stability. It shows how 'deterrence theory' can serve as a normative framework to think of innovative solutions for fixing the many shortcomings of the current EU legal framework in the fight against AI-driven market manipulation. In concluding, this study suggests improving the existing EU anti-manipulation law and enforcement with a number of policy proposals. Namely, (i) an improved, 'harm-centric' definition of manipulation; (ii) an improved, 'multi-layered' liability regime for AI-driven manipulation; and (iii) a novel, 'hybrid' public-private enforcement institutional architecture through the introduction of market manipulation 'bounty-hunters'. |
| Keywords: | algorithmic trading,artificial intelligence,market manipulation,market integrity,effective enforcement,credible deterrence |
| JEL: | G18 G28 G38 K14 K22 K42 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:54&r= |