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on Regulation |
By: | Andreassen, Gøril Louise (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Rosendahl, Knut Einar (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
Abstract: | What factors determine whether it is optimal with one or more technologies in a decarbonized road transport sector, and what policies should governments choose? We investigate these questions theoretically and numerically through a static, partial equilibrium model for the road transport market. We find that two important factors that determine whether it will be and whether it should be one or more technologies are how close substitutes the two vehicle technologies are and the number of vehicles of the other technology. Our numerical results indicate that with two incompatible networks, two differentiated goods are optimal compared to only one if they are not too close substitutes. The first-best policy is a subsidy of the markup on charging and filling, where the markup is higher the higher the increased utility of more stations. In addition, to avoid an unwanted lock-in, a temporary stimulus may be needed to reach the stable equilibrium. |
Keywords: | Indirect network effects; Decarbonization; Climate policy; Electric vehicles; Hydrogen vehicles |
JEL: | H23 L14 L91 Q58 |
Date: | 2020–03–25 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2020_003&r=all |
By: | Fleming, Kelly L.; Cohen D'Agostino, Mollie |
Abstract: | Electrifying Transportation Network Company (TNC) vehicles is a high-impact strategy for reducing emissions. This issue paper synthesizes research related to electrification of TNC vehicles and considers policy pathways for addressing barriers to electric-vehicle (EV) use among TNC drivers. |
Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences |
Date: | 2020–05–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsdav:qt9zx112v2&r=all |
By: | Erica Bosio (World Bank); Simeon Djankov (Peterson Institute for International Economics); Edward Glaeser (Harvard University); Andrei Shleifer (Harvard University) |
Abstract: | In this paper we examine a new dataset of laws and practices governing public procurement, as well as procurement outcomes, in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring agents. We find that laws and practices are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practices are correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a model of procurement in which both regulation and public sector capacity determine the efficiency of procurement. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, and detrimental in countries with high public sector capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion. We find evidence broadly consistent with this prediction: Regulation of procurement improves outcomes but only in countries with low public sector capacity. |
Keywords: | Procurement, Law, Practice, Corruption |
JEL: | H40 H57 K42 |
Date: | 2020–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp20-14&r=all |
By: | Mullen, Jeffrey D.; Dong, Luren |
Keywords: | Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Demand and Price Analysis |
Date: | 2020–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304456&r=all |
By: | Feng Shenghao; Philip Adams; Zhang Keyu; Peng Xiujian; Yang Jun |
Abstract: | This study uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to quantify the economic implications of the proposed Global Electricity Interconnection (GEI) electricity system. Enhancements to the model for this study include: (a) a detailed and up-to-date electricity database; (b) a new fuel-factor nesting structure; (c) re-estimated values for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) parameters between fossil fuel power generation and non-fossil fuel power generation; (d) a base-case (for years between 2011-2050) consistent with the New Policy Scenario outlined in the World Energy Outlook 2018; and (e) the stylized characteristics of the operation of the GEI network. Modelling results suggest that, by 2050, compared to the base-case: (1) the GEI network will increase world GDP by 0.33 per cent; (2) all regions will benefit from GEI development; (3) world output of coal, oil and gas will fall by 1.4, 0.2 and 0.9 per cent, respectively; (4) the shares of renewable energy in total electricity and total primary energy will increase by 4.3 and 2.9 percentage points; and (5) global CO2 emissions will fall by 0.72 per cent. |
Keywords: | GEI (global energy interconnection) CGE (computable general equilibrium) nesting structure CES (constant elasticity of substitution) Economic impacts |
JEL: | C68 F17 Q43 |
Date: | 2020–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cop:wpaper:g-307&r=all |
By: | Farhangdoost, Sara; Etienne, Xiaoli L. |
Keywords: | Demand and Price Analysis, Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Research Methods/Statistical Methods |
Date: | 2020–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304476&r=all |
By: | Fuller, Sam; Brown, Austin |
Abstract: | California’s Clean Vehicle Rebate Program (CVRP) is the largest zero-emissions vehicle (ZEV) incentive program in the United States. This policy brief summarizes how changes to the CVRP incentive structure may have affected California's ZEV market. |
Keywords: | Engineering, Law |
Date: | 2020–04–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsdav:qt3kj611tv&r=all |
By: | Patrice Bougette (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS); Christophe Charlier (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS) |
Abstract: | In 2019, following several investigations, the European Union decided to impose definitive anti-subsidy (AS) duties on imports of biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia. While AS duties protect the domestic market and R\&D, this trade defense policy may interfere with environmental preservation. We investigate this issue using an international duopoly model with an environmental externality. We discuss the economic rationale of AS measures in the biodiesel context. We show that the larger the size of the domestic market, the higher the optimal AS level. Second, trade policies are less necessary when firms become more cost-efficient. Third, the sensitivity of AS policies to environmental externalities is ambiguous. Fourth, under certain conditions, the success of the innovation is negatively correlated with the strategic levels of both subsidies and AS policies. |
Keywords: | Anti-subsidy, countervailing duties, biodiesel, European Union, trade, environmental impact |
JEL: | D43 F18 F13 Q48 |
Date: | 2020–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-38&r=all |
By: | Masaki,Takaaki; Granguillhome Ochoa,Rogelio; Rodriguez Castelan,Carlos |
Abstract: | Senegal has experienced a rapid expansion in fixed and mobile broadband internet infrastructure over the past decade. This paper examines the relationship between access to broadband internet and household welfare between 2011 and 2018 by integrating the latest two rounds of household budget surveys with data on the location of fiber-optic transmission nodes and coverage maps of 3G mobile technology. The results show that 3G coverage is associated with a 14 percent increase in total consumption and a 10 percent decline in extreme poverty. These results are robust to controlling for household demographics and other spatial characteristics, such as region fixed effects, road density, nighttime lights, and elevation above sea level, as well as for access to complementary digital infrastructure, such as 2G coverage or fixed broadband internet. The findings are also robust to an instrumental variable approach that relies on distance to 3G coverage in neighboring areas. These effects are larger among households in urban areas and households headed by men or younger cohorts. Although they are in the same direction, the welfare effects of proximity to fixed broadband infrastructure are not statistically significant. |
Keywords: | Information Technology,Telecommunications Infrastructure,Inequality,Energy Policies&Economics |
Date: | 2020–09–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9386&r=all |
By: | Liang, Yuanning |
Keywords: | Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
Date: | 2020–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304312&r=all |
By: | Wallander, Steven; Maguire, Kelly B. |
Keywords: | Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Agricultural and Food Policy |
Date: | 2020–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304400&r=all |
By: | Elbakidze, Levan; Beeson, Quinn |
Keywords: | Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
Date: | 2020–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304638&r=all |
By: | Johnson, Justin Pappas; Rhodes, Andrew; Wildenbeest, Matthij |
Abstract: | Using both economic theory and Artificial Intelligence (AI) pricing algorithms, we investigate the ability of a platform to design its marketplace to promote competition, improve consumer surplus, and even raise its own profits. We allow sellers to use Q-learning algorithms (a common reinforcement-learning technique from the computer-science literature) to devise pricing strategies in a setting with repeated interactions, and consider the effect of steering policies that reward firms that cut prices with additional exposure to consumers. Overall, the evidence from our experiments suggests that platform design decisions can meaningfully benefit consumers even when algorithmic collusion might otherwise emerge but that achieving these gains may require more than the simplest steering policies when algorithms value the future highly. We also find that policies that raise consumer surplus can raise the profits of the platform, depending on the platform’s revenue model. Finally, we document several learning challenges faced by the algorithms. |
Date: | 2020–09–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:124696&r=all |