nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2020‒03‒23
fifteen papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Industrial Demand Response: How Network Tariffs and Regulation Do (Not) Impact Flexibility Provision in Electricity Markets and Reserves By Jörn C. Richstein; Seyed Saeed Hosseinioun
  2. On the long-term efficiency of market splitting in Germany By Fraunholz, Christoph; Hladik, Dirk; Keles, Dogan; Möst, Dominik; Fichtner, Wolf
  3. The Electric Vehicle Transition and the Economics of Banning Gasoline Vehicles By Stephen P. Holland; Erin T. Mansur; Andrew J. Yates
  4. Learning from Developing Country Power Market Experiences : The Case of Peru By Rudnick,Hugh; Velasquez,Constantin
  5. The Role and Performance of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Post-Crisis Greece By Manto Lampropoulou; Stella Ladi
  6. The economics of electric roads By Börjesson, Maria; Johansson, Magnus; Kågeson, Per
  7. Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games By James D. Dana Jr.; Kevin R. Williams
  8. Development of High-Speed Rail in the People’s Republic of China By Haixiao, Pan; Ya, Gao
  9. What Is State Capacity ? By Khemani,Stuti
  10. On Outsourced Abatement Services: Market Power and Efficient Regulation By Damien Sans; Sonia Schwartz; Hubert Stahn
  11. Policies, regulatory framework and enforcement for air quality management: The case of Japan By Enrico Botta; Sho Yamasaki
  12. Towards Sustainable Energy Consumption Electricity Demand Flexibility and Household Fuel Choice By Daniel, Aemiro Melkamu
  13. Congestion Surcharge and Wage Regulation on TNCs: A Case Study for San Francisco By Sen Li; Kameshwar Poolla; Pravin Varaiya
  14. Consequentiality, elicitation formats, and the willingness-to-pay for green electricity: Evidence from Germany By Andor, Mark Andreas; Frondel, Manuel; Horvath, Marco
  15. Demand-side management and renewable energy business models for energy transition A systematic review By Michael Hamwi; Iban Lizarralde

  1. By: Jörn C. Richstein; Seyed Saeed Hosseinioun
    Abstract: Incentives for industrial loads to provide demand response on day-ahead and reserve markets are affected both by network tariffs, as well as regulations on the provision of flexibility in different markets. This paper uses a numerical model of the chlor-alkali process with a storable intermediate good to investigate how these factors affect the provision of demand response in these markets. We also model the effect of network tariffs and regulation on endogenous investment into process excess capacities, which are needed to provide load shifting. We find that fixed network tariffs based on peak-demand (demand charges) can be detrimental to the provision of demand response, especially to new investments in process capacity. For existing excess capacities, only high network tariffs inhibit demand response by limiting the optimal peak load below its physical limit. Marketing flexibility on the day-ahead market and in the reserves are substitutes for each other. The choice where to market flexibility is affected both by fixed peak-demand network tariffs and existing excess capacities. For endogenous investments, there are synergies between primary reserve participation and day-ahead flexibility provision, with the combination leading to increased capacity investments. In contrast, so-called interruptible load reserves, regular payments to industrial loads to be able to reduce electricity consumption at any point in time, incentivize a flat demand level. Consequently, such reserve markets reduce investments into additional flexibility capacities and often crowd out active participation in other markets.
    Keywords: demand response, optimization, day-ahead market, reserves, network tariffs, chemical production
    JEL: C61 L65 Q40 Q48
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1853&r=all
  2. By: Fraunholz, Christoph; Hladik, Dirk; Keles, Dogan; Möst, Dominik; Fichtner, Wolf
    Abstract: In Europe, the ongoing renewable expansion and delays in the planned grid extension have intensified the discussion about an adequate electricity market design. Against this background, we jointly apply an agent-based electricity market model and an optimal power flow model to investigate the long-term impacts of splitting the German market area into two price zone. Our approach allows capturing long-term investment and short-term market behavior under imperfect information. We find strong impacts of a German market splitting on electricity prices, expansion planning of generators and required congestion management. While the congestion volumes decrease significantly under a market split in the short term, the optimal zonal configuration for 2020 becomes outdated over time due to dynamic effects like grid extension, renewable expansion and new power plant investments. Policymakers and regulators should therefore regularly re-assess bidding zone configurations. Yet, this stands in contrast to the major objective of price zones to create stable locational investment incentives.
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitiip:38&r=all
  3. By: Stephen P. Holland; Erin T. Mansur; Andrew J. Yates
    Abstract: Electric vehicles have a unique potential to transform personal transportation. We analyze the transition to electric vehicles with a dynamic model that captures the falling costs of producing electric vehicles, the decreasing pollution from electricity generation, the increasing substitutability of electric for gasoline vehicles, and the durability of the vehicle stock. Due to the external costs from pollution, inefficiencies under business as usual result from the mix of vehicles as well as the transition timing, the severity of which depends on substitutability. We calibrate the model to the US market and find the magnitude of the inefficiency is rather modest: less than 5 percent of total external costs. The optimal purchase subsidy for electric vehicles and the optimal ban on the production of gasoline vehicles both give about the same efficiency improvement, but the latter leads to a sharp increase in gasoline vehicle production just before the ban. Phasing out gasoline vehicles with a bankable production quota reduces deadweight loss substantially more than the other policies, but may lead to a very large deadweight loss if set incorrectly.
    JEL: D62 H23 Q40 Q53 Q54
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26804&r=all
  4. By: Rudnick,Hugh; Velasquez,Constantin
    Abstract: The Peruvian power market was established in 1992, amid serious supply constraints and financially distressed power utilities. Since its inception, the market has been adapted by competitive market reforms and adaptations due to government-driven public policy objectives. This paper analyzes the experience of Peru with power markets, including market design, implementation, and outcomes. A cost-based power pool with locational marginal prices was established overnight, with bilateral contracts among market participants and regulated capacity payments. After an initial period of rapid investment, sluggish capacity additions and a prolonged drought in 2003-04 motivated the successful introduction of competitive supply auctions in 2006, to ensure that needed capacity additions were made to meet demand growth. Competitive auctions for renewable capacity have also been successful, attracting investment at falling prices. However, the market has been adapted by the government, pushing technology-specific auctions to develop a balanced mix of gas and hydro power generation, with additional costs passed through to final customers. As a result, supply is less prone to hydrological conditions, but it is now subject to gas transport constraints; prices are depressed at US$9/megawatt hour; and the reserve margin increased to 81 percent in 2017. Overall, continuous adaptations to the Peruvian power market have delivered competitive outcomes, with concentration falling steadily and security of supply increasing over the past decade. However, the mixed approach of competitive forces and government-driven adaptations for public policy objectives calls into question the long-term efficiency of the market.
    Keywords: Energy Policies&Economics,Energy Demand,Energy and Mining,Energy and Environment,Power&Energy Conversion,Transport Services,Inflation
    Date: 2019–03–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8772&r=all
  5. By: Manto Lampropoulou; Stella Ladi
    Abstract: The importance of independent agencies aiming to regulate the market has increased during the crisis years. Existing agencies such as the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission, the Regulatory Authority for Energy and the Hellenic Competition Committee have been strengthened while new ones such as the Regulatory Authority for Railways and the Regulatory Authority for Ports have been introduced. This has been the result of the increased pressure for privatizations and the liberalization of sectors of the economy (network industries) which used to be dominated by state-owned enterprises (DEKO). This paper aims to map the landscape of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Greece and to provide an assessment their performance up to now.
    Keywords: Independent regulatory agencies, regulatory reform, network industries, regulatory performance, Greece
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hel:greese:145&r=all
  6. By: Börjesson, Maria (Research Programme in Transport Economics); Johansson, Magnus (Research Programme in Transport Economics); Kågeson, Per (Research Programme in Transport Economics)
    Abstract: In this paper we present a method for evaluating social benefits of electric roads and apply it to the Swedish highway network. Together with estimated investments costs this can be used to produce a cost benefit analysis. An electric road is characterized by high economies of scale (high investment cost and low marginal cost) and considerable economies of scope (the benefit per kilometre electric road depends on the size of the network), implying that the market will produce a smaller network of electric roads, or charge higher prices for its use, than what is welfare optimal. For this reason, it is relevant for governments to consider investing in electric roads, making the cost-benefit analysis a key decision support. We model the behaviour of the carriers using the Swedish national freight model system, SAMGODS, determining the optimal shipment sizes and optimal transport chains, including mode and vehicle type. We find that if the user charge is set as to optimize social welfare, the revenue will not fully cover the investment cost of the electric road. If they are instead set to optimize profit for the operator of the electric road operator, we find that the revenue will cover the costs if the electric road network is large enough. Electric roads appear to provide a cost-effective means to significantly reduce carbon emissions from heavy trucks. In a scenario where the expansion connects the three biggest cities in Sweden, emissions will be cut by one-third of the overall emissions from heavy trucks in Sweden. The main argument against a commitment to electric roads is that investment and maintenance costs are uncertain and that, in the long run, battery development or hydrogen fuel cells can reduce the benefit of such roads.
    Keywords: Pricing and economic analysis; Cost-benefit analysis; Electric road; Carbon emissions; Freight transport; E-motorways
    JEL: R12 R41 R42
    Date: 2020–03–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:trnspr:2020_001&r=all
  7. By: James D. Dana Jr.; Kevin R. Williams
    Abstract: This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits assigned to individual prices. We show that competing firms can profitably use inventory controls. Thus, although typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls can also facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly.
    JEL: D21 D43 L0 L13
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26794&r=all
  8. By: Haixiao, Pan (Asian Development Bank Institute); Ya, Gao (Asian Development Bank Institute)
    Abstract: High-speed rail (HSR) construction is continuing at a rapid pace in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to improve rail’s competitiveness in the passenger market and facilitate inter-city accessibility. To take advantage of spillover effects, bring economic cohesion at the local level, and recover the local matching investment in infrastructure, all cities have planned new towns around HSR stations. Speeding up HSR construction has required the development of many standardized technologies and processes. Plans for HSR stations usually situate them in suburbs, far from city centers, to reduce the cost of property right of way relating to the removal of housing or industry as well as to lower the complexities in negotiations. However, city centers remain the main starting and destination terminals for most HSR passengers, especially businessmen who use HSR frequently. Besides, large railway stations in suburbs, providing a comfortable waiting space for passengers, have prolongate the travel time for HSR users. A reliable and high-quality public transit service, connecting an HSR station and the city center at the launch of HSR operations, is essential to curb the increase in car/taxi use. Studies have also suggested that, instead of building one big HSR station in the suburb of a metropolis, constructing multiple stations in the vicinity of city centers will greatly reduce the access/egress time, thereby enhancing travel efficiency.
    Keywords: high-speed rail; multimodal intercity transport; People’s Republic of China
    JEL: L92 R11 R40 R58
    Date: 2019–05–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0959&r=all
  9. By: Khemani,Stuti
    Abstract: Reform leaders who want to pursue technically sound policies are confronted with the problem of getting myriad government agencies, staffed by thousands of bureaucrats and state personnel, to deliver. This paper provides a framework for thinking about the problem as a series of interdependent principal-agent relationships in complex organizations, where one type of actor, the agent, takes actions on behalf of another, the principal. Using this framework to review and forge connections across a large literature, the paper shows how the crux of state capacity is the culture of bureaucracies -- the incentives, beliefs and expectations, or norms, shared among state personnel about how others are behaving. Although this characterization might apply generally to any complex organization, what distinguishes agencies of the state is the fundamental role of politics -- the processes by which the leaders who exercise power over bureaucracies, starting from the lowest village levels, are selected and sanctioned. Politics shapes not only the incentives of state personnel, but perhaps more importantly, it coordinates their beliefs and expectations, and thereby the performance of government agencies. Recognizing these roles of politics, the paper offers insights for what reform leaders can do to strengthen state capacity for public goods.
    Keywords: Educational Institutions&Facilities,Effective Schools and Teachers,Health Care Services Industry,Educational Sciences,Public Health Promotion,Health Service Management and Delivery
    Date: 2019–02–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8734&r=all
  10. By: Damien Sans (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Sonia Schwartz (CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International - Clermont Auvergne - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Hubert Stahn (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In this paper, we consider competitive polluting firms that outsource their abatement activity to an upstream imperfect competitive eco-industry to comply with environmental regulation. In this case, we show that an usual environmental policy based on a Pigouvian tax or a pollution permit market reaches the first-best outcome. The main intuition is based on the idea that purchasing pollution reduction services instead of pollution abatement inputs modifies for each potential tax rate (or out of the equilibrium permit price) the nature of the arbitrage between pollution and abatement. This induces a demand for abatement services which is, at least partially, strongly elastic and therefore strongly reduces upstream market power. This argument is first illustrated with an upstream monopoly selling eco-services to a representative polluting firm under a usual Pigouvian tax. We then progressively extend the result to permit markets, heterogeneous downstream polluters and heterogeneous upstream Cournot competitors. JEL Codes: Q58, D43
    Keywords: Environmental regulation,Eco-industry,Imperfect Competition,Abatement Outsourcing
    Date: 2019–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02477911&r=all
  11. By: Enrico Botta (OECD); Sho Yamasaki (OECD)
    Abstract: The pollution intensity of the Japanese economy, measured as emissions per dollar of GDP, is among the lowest within OECD countries. However, air pollution remains a significant issue. Almost 80% of the Japanese residents were exposed to an annual concentration of PM2.5 above the WHO guideline while the attainment rate of the domestic air quality standard for photochemical oxidants is below 1%. The analysis of the regulatory and enforcement framework for air quality management in Japan identifies best practises and key remaining challenges, including a limited understanding of the generation mechanism of ozone pollution and the need to strengthen cooperation among Prefectures. This paper complements two case studies on air quality policies in China and Korea, and a third case study on international regulatory cooperation on air quality in North America, Europe and North-East Asia.
    Keywords: air pollution, Japan, monitoring and enforcement, regulatory policy
    Date: 2020–03–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaaa:156-en&r=all
  12. By: Daniel, Aemiro Melkamu (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
    Abstract: Paper [I] investigates household heterogeneity in valuing electricity contract attributes that include various load controls and information sharing to induce demand flexibility. Using a stated preference choice experiment conducted with Swedish households, this paper shows that, although a large proportion of households asks for substantial compensation, some households are willing to share their electricity consumption information and require relatively lower compensation to allow load controls. In addition, this paper finds that some households that are willing to provide flexibility by accepting load controls at a relatively low compensation ask for sizeable compensation to share their electricity consumption information, and vice versa. From the perspective of the contract providers, these findings suggest that information-optional contracts can generate more customers than contracts that bundle households’ consumption information with various load controls. Paper [II] uses a flexible model to accommodate heterogeneous decision rules in analysing data obtained from a discrete choice experiment aimed at eliciting Swedish households’ willingness to accept compensation for restrictions on household electricity and heating use during peak hours. The model combines behavioural processes based on random utility maximization with an elimination-by-aspects strategy, where the latter involves a two-stage decision process. In the first stage, respondents are allowed to eliminate from their choice set alternatives that contain an unacceptable level, in this case restrictions on the use of heating and electricity. In the second stage, respondents choose between the remaining alternatives in a rational utility maximizing manner. Our results show that about half of the respondents choose according to an elimination-by-aspects strategy, and considering elimination-by-aspects behaviour leads to a downward shift in elicited willingness-to-accept. Paper [III] tests the effect of a pro-environmental framing on households’ stated willingness to accept restrictions on their electricity use. We use a split-sample choice experiment and ask respondents to choose between their current electricity contract and hypothetical contracts featuring various load controls and monetary compensation. Our results indicate that the pro-environmental framing has little impact on the respondents’ choices. We observe a significant framing effect on choices and marginal willingness-to-accept for only a few contract attributes. The results further suggest that there is no significant framing effect among households that are already engaged in pro-environmental activities. Paper [IV] explores the socio-demographic and housing characteristics that affect household fuel choice and fuel use decisions in urban Ethiopia. The results indicate that, whereas households with a female head are more likely to combine traditional solid (firewood and charcoal) and modern (electricity) fuels for different uses, households with less-educated heads, many family members, and poor living conditions (fewer rooms) tend to use traditional solid biomass fuels. We find that households with an individual electricity meter are significantly less likely to use charcoal. Further, the results show the satiation effect from the increasing use of a fuel by households is relatively higher for firewood and lower for electricity.
    Keywords: Choice experiment; demand flexibility; electricity contract; fuel choice; fuel stacking; household heterogeneity; load control; pro-environmental framing; willingness-to-accept
    JEL: C25 C99 D01 D12 Q42 Q48 Q51
    Date: 2020–03–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:0971&r=all
  13. By: Sen Li; Kameshwar Poolla; Pravin Varaiya
    Abstract: This paper studies the joint impact of congestion surcharge and wage regulation on transportation network companies (TNCs). These impacts are assessed by a market equilibrium model that captures the incentives of the passengers, drivers, and the platform, and accounts for the congestion externalities of the TNC vehicles. Under a wage floor on TNC drivers, we consider two schemes of congestion surcharges: (a) surcharge based on each TNC trip, and (b) surcharge based on each vehicle hour (regardless of whether the vehicle has a passenger or not). We show that both congestion surcharges can reduce the TNC ridership, but their impacts are mitigated by the wage floor and cannot significantly reduce the number of TNC vehicles. In contrast to the trip-based surcharge, we advocate the time-based congestion surcharge, which penalizes idle vehicle time and improves the vehicle occupancy. Through a case study for San Francisco, we show that the time-based congestion surcharge offers a Pareto improvement. It leads to higher passenger surplus, higher driver surplus, higher platform profits, and higher tax revenue for the city.
    Date: 2020–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2003.02550&r=all
  14. By: Andor, Mark Andreas; Frondel, Manuel; Horvath, Marco
    Abstract: Based on hypothetical responses originating from a large-scale survey among about 6,000 German households, this study investigates the discrepancy in willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for green electricity across single-binary-choice and open-ended valuation formats. Recognizing that respondents self-select into two groups distinguished by their belief in their answers' consequences for policy making, we employ a switching regression model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondents' belief in consequences and, hence, biases from sample selectivity. Contrasting with the received literature, we find WTP bids that tend to be higher among those respondents who obtained questions in the openended format, rather than single-binary-choice questions. This difference substantially shrinks, however, when focusing on individuals who perceive the survey as politically consequential.
    Keywords: Elicitation format,contingent valuation,consequentialism
    JEL: D03 D12 Q48 Q50 H41
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:841&r=all
  15. By: Michael Hamwi (Ecole Supérieure des Technologies Industrielles Avancées (ESTIA)); Iban Lizarralde (ESTIA Recherche - Ecole Supérieure des Technologies Industrielles Avancées (ESTIA))
    Abstract: Recent developments in technology have been considered a critical factor in fighting climate change and accelerating energy transition. These developments are changing the current centralized and fossil fuel-based energy system into a new system with integrated renewable energy resources. The developments also facilitate the emergence of new business models and allow entrepreneurs to propose new products and services. This paper aims to identify the existent energy business models based on a systematic literature review, focusing on two main areas: renewable energy and demand-side management. With that purpose, a framework is described including specific characteristics for energy business models. Based on this framework, 22 different energy business models are presented clustered in eight patterns. The study draws on an exhaustive picture of the emerging business models and provides insights for researchers and for early-stage companies to innovate through business model transformation.
    Keywords: Business model,energy services,energy entrepreneur,renewable energy,demand-side management,demand response
    Date: 2019–07–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02448505&r=all

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