nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2020‒02‒17
ten papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Climate policy without a price signal: Evidence on the implicit carbon price of energy efficiency in buildings By Ghislaine Lang; Bruno Lanz
  2. Cost Recovery and Financial Viability of the Power Sector in Developing Countries : Insights from 15 Case Studies By Huenteler,Joern Torsten; Hankinson,Denzel J.; Rosenthal,Nicole; Balabanyan,Ani; Kochnakyan,Arthur; Nguyen,Tu Chi; Rana,Anshul; Foster,Vivien
  3. Public Charging Infrastructure and the Market Diffusion of Electric Vehicles By Illmann, Ulrike; Kluge, Jan
  4. Do British wind generators behave strategically in response to the Western Link interconnector? By Intini, Mario; Waterson, Michael
  5. Efficient representation of supply and demand curves on day-ahead electricity markets By Mariia Soloviova; Tiziano Vargiolu
  6. Examining the level of competition in the energy sector By Halkos, George
  7. Excess returns in Public-Private Partnerships: Do governments pay too much? By Marco Buso; Michele Moretto; Dimitrios Zormpas
  8. Climate Change and Agriculture By G. Cornelis van Kooten
  9. Smart City: process of emergence. Interactions between governance and digital technologies By Yoann Queyroi; Pierre Marin
  10. Energy transition in Germany and integration of non-conventional energy sources By Jesús Botero García; David Cardona Vásquez; John García Rendón

  1. By: Ghislaine Lang; Bruno Lanz
    Abstract: In the absence of a global carbon price, many individual countries set up policies to incentivize specific abatement interventions. In turn, minimizing compliance cost requires policy-makers to identify interventions that are worth pursuing. With this in mind, the objective of this paper is to document heterogeneity in the price of carbon implicitly associated with a range of interventions to improve buildings' energy efficiency. We use data for a portfolio of 548 multi-unit buildings observed over 16 years, representing 12,820 rental units, and quantify the impacts of more than 400 energy efficiency interventions among 240 treated buildings. We exploit variation in the timing of investments to provide evidence that treated and control buildings follow the same trend in the absence of energy efficiency investments, and use staggered difference-in-differences regressions to document building-level energy savings, CO2 abatement, and heating expenditure reductions. Our results indicate significant heterogeneity in energy savings across interventions, and suggest that the implicit price of carbon associated with frequently subsidized measures (such as wall insulation and windows replacement) is well in excess of available benefit estimates for avoided emissions.
    Keywords: Regulation; climate policy; implicit carbon price; energy efficiency investments; energy savings; staggered design.
    JEL: H21 H23 Q41 Q49 Q58 R31
    Date: 2020–03
  2. By: Huenteler,Joern Torsten; Hankinson,Denzel J.; Rosenthal,Nicole; Balabanyan,Ani; Kochnakyan,Arthur; Nguyen,Tu Chi; Rana,Anshul; Foster,Vivien
    Abstract: This paper analyzes power utilities in 15 jurisdictions to understand the determinants of success for reforms aimed at improving financial viability and cost recovery in the power sector and the impacts of these reforms on metrics of sector performance. The analysis finds that electricity tariffs are rarely high enough to cover the full costs of service delivery, even where the cost of service is low, and that few countries adequately manage volatile costs and maintain cost recovery levels over time. Almost everywhere, power utilities often impose a substantial fiscal burden and contingent liabilities on government budgets. Over the past 30 years, cost recovery levels have increased on average, but progress has been uneven, with over half of the case study jurisdictions experiencing a decline compared with the pre-reform period. The record of reforms of price formation, especially tariff setting through regulatory agencies, is mixed. On average, countries that have made more progress on utility governance and decision making perform better on cost recovery. The paper concludes with proposed modifications to the conceptual framework underpinning the economic analysis of power sector reforms as well as immediate, practical implications for understanding cost recovery as part of the overall power sector reform agenda.
    Date: 2020–01–30
  3. By: Illmann, Ulrike (TU Dresden, Germany); Kluge, Jan (Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, Austria,)
    Abstract: A comprehensive roll-out of public charging infrastructure will be costly. However, its impact on the diffusion of electric vehicles (EVs) is not clear at all. Our study aims at estimating the extent to which an increasing availability of public charging infrastructure promotes consumers’ decisions to switch to EVs. We make use of a German data set including monthly registrations of new cars at the ZIP-code level between 2012 and 2017 and match it with the official registry of charging stations. We measure charging infrastructure by its visibility, capacity and abundance in order to estimate its impact on EV adoption. A CS-ARDL approach is deployed in order to identify the structural long-run relationship between charging infrastructure and monthly EV registrations. There is evidence of a positive long-run relationship but on a rather low scale. We conclude that consumers do not necessarily react to the mere number of chargers but attach more importance to charging speed.
    Keywords: Electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, CS-ARDL
    JEL: L90 O18 O33 R42
    Date: 2019–11
  4. By: Intini, Mario; Waterson, Michael
    Abstract: In Britain, the key source of renewable generation is wind, most abundant on the west coast of Scotland, where there is relatively little demand. For this reason, an interconnector, the Western Link, was built to take electricity closer to demand. When the Link is operating, payments by National Grid to constrain wind farms not to produce will be lower, we may predict, since fewer or less restrictive constraints need be imposed. But the Link has not been working consistently. We empirically estimate the link’s value. Focusing on the three most recent episodes of outage, starting on 4th May 2018 up to 25th September 2019, our essential approach is to treat these outages as a natural experiment using hourly data. Our results reveal that the Link had an important role in costs saved and price constrained and MWh curtailed reductions. We estimate a cost-saving of almost £30m. However, the saving appears to drop over time, so we investigate wind farms’ behavior. We find that wind farms behave strategically since the accuracy of wind forecasting depends on the relevant prices impacting their earnings.
    Keywords: Interconnector ; Electricity Market ; Wind forecasting ; Wind Generators ; Pricing Strategies.
    JEL: D22 D47 H54 L22 Q41 Q47
    Date: 2020
  5. By: Mariia Soloviova; Tiziano Vargiolu
    Abstract: Our paper aims to model supply and demand curves of electricity day-ahead auction in a parsimonious way. Our main task is to build an appropriate algorithm to present the information about electricity prices and demands with far less parameters than the original one. We represent each curve using mesh-free interpolation techniques based on radial basis function approximation. We describe results of this method for the day-ahead IPEX spot price of Italy.
    Date: 2020–02
  6. By: Halkos, George
    Abstract: During the last decades energy sector has undergone thoughtful structural changes, getting towards a more competitive environment, a process that it is highly controlled and monitored by regulatory authorities. The differences in the pace and extent of market reforms are mainly related to the starting point of each reform and the problems associated with the internal environment of the market. The applied theoretical and analytical contributions provide guidance to policy-makers and government officials in designing new policy scenarios for the investigation of the role of competition in the energy sectors. The empirical contributions provide evidence to support and inform current policy debates and should be of benefit to policy-makers and researchers worldwide.
    Keywords: Energy sector; competition; liberalization; energy market legislation.
    JEL: D40 Q30 Q40 Q43 Q48 Q50 Q58
    Date: 2020–01
  7. By: Marco Buso (Department of Economics and Finance, Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan and Interuniversity Centre for Public Economics (CRIEP)); Michele Moretto (DSEA, University of Padova); Dimitrios Zormpas (Department of Mathematics, University of Bologna)
    Abstract: We study the optimal design of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) when there is unobservable action on the private party’s side. We show that if the private party does not have negotiating power over the project’s surplus, no inefficient delays are attributable to the moral hazard issue. However, if the private party has negotiating power, the first-best timing is not guaranteed. This time discrepancy is shown to be costly in terms of overall project efficiency. The explicit consideration of the private party’s negotiating power can explain empirical evidence showing that private parties in PPPs reap excess returns.
    Keywords: public projects, public-private partnerships, moral hazard, real options, investment timing
    JEL: D81 D82 D86 H54
    Date: 2020–02
  8. By: G. Cornelis van Kooten
    Keywords: climate, agriculture, global warming, wildfire, emissions, agricultural policies
    JEL: Q18 Q54
    Date: 2020–02
  9. By: Yoann Queyroi (CREG - Centre de recherche et d'études en gestion - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour); Pierre Marin (CREG - Centre de recherche et d'études en gestion - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour)
    Date: 2019–03–05
  10. By: Jesús Botero García; David Cardona Vásquez; John García Rendón
    Date: 2019–12–01

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