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on Regulation |
| By: | Reynaert, Mathias |
| Abstract: | Emission standards are a major policy tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation. The welfare effects from this type of regulation depend on how firms choose to abate emissions, i.e., by sales-mixing (changing prices), by downsizing (releasing smaller cars), by technology adoption or by gaming emission tests. Using panel data covering 1998-2011, I find that the introduction of a EU-wide emission standard coincides with a 14% drop in emission ratings. I find that this drop is fully explained by technology adoption and gaming and not by sales mixing or downsizing. I estimate a structural model to find that the regulation missed its emission target and was not welfare improving. Abatement with sales mixing would have reduced emissions, but at high costs. The political environment in the EU shaped the design and weak enforcement of the regulation and explains the choices for abatement by technology adoption and gaming. |
| Keywords: | automobiles; Carbon Emissions; compliance; Environmental Regulation; fuel economy |
| JEL: | L5 Q5 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13756&r=all |
| By: | Reynaert, Mathias; Sallee, James |
| Abstract: | Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. This harms consumers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use it to analyze gaming of automobile carbon emission ratings in the EU. We document startling increases in gaming using novel data. We then analyze the effects of gaming in calibrated simulations. Over a wide range of parameters, we find that pass through substantially outweighs information distortions; on net, consumers benefit from gaming, even when they are fooled by it. |
| Keywords: | automobiles; Carbon Emissions; corrective taxation; Environmental Regulation; fuel economy; Gaming; Goodhart's Law |
| JEL: | H2 L5 Q5 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13755&r=all |
| By: | Özge Özdemir (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency); Benjamin F Hobbs (The Johns Hopkins University); Marit van Hout (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency); Paul Koutstaal (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) |
| Keywords: | Electricity markets, renewable policy, capacity subsidy, energy subsidy, renewable target |
| JEL: | H23 L94 Q28 Q48 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1911&r=all |
| By: | David Newbery (University of Cambridge) |
| Keywords: | British electricity supply, reforms, financing, renewables, tariffs, nuclear |
| JEL: | D43 H23 L94 Q48 Q54 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1907&r=all |
| By: | Paul Belleflamme; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | We consider two-sided platforms with the feature that some users on one or both sides of the market lack information about the price charged to participants on the other side of the market. With positive cross-group external effects, such lack of price information makes demand less elastic. A monopoly platform does not benefit from opaqueness and optimally reveals price information. contrast, in a two-sided singlehoming duopoly, platforms benefit from opaqueness and, thus, do not have an incentive to disclose price information. In competitive bottleneck markets, results are more nuanced: if one side is fully informed (for exogenous reasons), platforms may decide to inform users on the other side either fully, partially or not at all, depending on the strength of cross-group external effects and the degree of horizontal differentiation. |
| Keywords: | price transparency; two-sided markets; competitive bottleneck; platform competition; price information; strategic disclosure |
| JEL: | D43 L12 L13 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_099&r=all |
| By: | Grischa Perino (University of Hamburg, Germany); Robert Ritz (University of Cambridge); Arthur van Benthem (The Wharton Shool, University of Pennsylvania, USA) |
| Keywords: | Cap-and-trade, carbon leakage, carbon price floor, carbon pricing, EU ETS, overlapping policy, hybrid policy, waterbed effect |
| JEL: | H23 Q54 |
| Date: | 2019–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1910&r=all |
| By: | Mahir Sarfati (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden); Mahammad Reza Hesamzadeh (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden); Par Holmberg (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden) |
| Keywords: | Congestion management, Zonal pricing, Flow-based market coupling |
| JEL: | C61 C72 D43 L13 L94 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1909&r=all |
| By: | Dessouky, Maged; Fu, Lunce; Hu, Shichun |
| Abstract: | Railway has always been an effective mode to transport both people and goods. Freight trains are about four times more fuel efficient than trucks and passenger trains and are popular because of their blend of efficiency, speed and low emissions. Increasing rail network capacity, however, can be difficult and expensive. Finding more efficient ways to utilize existing rail network capacity can mitigate the impacts of growing freight demand. New communication technologies, such as Positive Train Control (PTC), have the potential to improve efficiency and minimize delays in freight and passenger railway operations. PTC enables trains to communicate and share critical information such as speed and location with each other in real time. This research brief highlights findings from the project, "Integrated Management of Truck and Rail Systems in Los Angeles," which simulated the complex, busy freight and passenger rail corridor between downtown Los Angeles and Pomona to evaluate the effectiveness of proposed new scheduling and dispatching algorithms using PTC. View the NCST Project Webpage |
| Keywords: | Engineering, Delays, Freight trains, Freight transportation, Headways, Passenger trains, Positive train control, Railroad tracks, Switches (Railroads) |
| Date: | 2019–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsdav:qt4c43d0gt&r=all |
| By: | Edward J. Balistreri (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD)); Daniel T. Kaffine; Hidemichi Yonezawa |
| Abstract: | A country choosing to adopt border carbon adjustments based on embodied emissions is motivated by both environmental and strategic incentives. We argue that the strategic component is inconsistent with commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We extend the theory of border adjustments to neutralize the strategic incentive, and consider the remaining environmental incentive in a simplified structure. The theory supports border adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price, because price signals sent through border adjustments inadvertently encourage consumption of emissions intensive goods in unregulated regions. The theoretic intuition is supported in our applied numeric simulations. Countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy and consistency with international trade law. JEL classifications: F13, F18, Q54, Q56 Keywords: climate policy, border tax adjustments, carbon leakage, trade and carbon taxes. |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:19-wp591&r=all |
| By: | Rodríguez, Jesús; Puch, Luis A.; Marrero, Gustavo; Díaz Rodríguez, Antonia |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how changes in energy intensity and the switch to renewables can boost economic growth. To do so, we implement a dynamic panel data approach on a sample of 134 countries over the period 1960 to 2010. We incorporate a set of control variables, related to human and physical capital, socio-economic conditions, policies and institutions, which have been widely used in the literature on economic growth. Given the current state of technology, improving energy intensity is growth enhancing at the worldwide level. Moreover, conditional to energy intensity, moving from fossil fuels to frontier renewables (wind, solar, wave or geothermic) is also positively correlated with growth. Our results are robust to the specification of the dynamic panel with respect to alternative approaches (pooled OLS, within group or system GMM), and to alternative specifications (accounting for heterogeneity across countries, a set of institutional factors, and other technical aspects). |
| Keywords: | Dynamic Panel Data Models; Renewables; Energy Intensity; Growth |
| JEL: | Q43 Q2 O5 C23 |
| Date: | 2019–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:28461&r=all |
| By: | Chi Kong Chyong (University of Cambridge) |
| Keywords: | Natural gas, European single gas market, security of supply, regulatory policy |
| JEL: | L94 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1908&r=all |
| By: | Seppälä, Timo; Mattila, Juri; Rajala, Risto |
| Abstract: | Abstract It is predicted that in 2030, the energy consumption of the ICT sector will be 21% of the world’s energy consumption, but will resources be enough to carry out all the digital technology development trends at the same time? Trends, such as the transition to the ecommerce, the transition of mobile services to the fifth-generation network, video streaming, online gaming and the rise of electric cars, all increase the need for both storage and computing capacity and energy as well. More broadly, the geographical location of digital resources and infrastructures has implications to country’s security of supply, for example in systems of systems development of smart traffic. The ecological effects of digitalization should also be explored through the lens of digital ecology and sustainability. |
| Keywords: | ICT, Energy efficiency, Computing capacity, Emissions trading, Security of supply |
| JEL: | O3 O33 Q4 Q5 |
| Date: | 2019–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:briefs:80&r=all |
| By: | André de Palma; Julien Monardo (ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan) |
| Keywords: | Natural Monopoly,Regulation,Subadditivity of Costs,Economies of Scale,Average Cost,Ramsey-Boiteux,Incentive,Multiproduct Firm |
| Date: | 2019–05–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02121079&r=all |
| By: | Klaus S. Friesenbichler (WIFO) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the determinants of aggregate per-capita investments into the telecom sector. We provide results of panel econometric estimates for EU and OECD countries covering the period from 2005 to 2013. The findings show a positive effect of infrastructure-based competition between xDSL broadband and cable-TV broadband subscriptions on investments. We use cross-country variance in open access regulations to examine their effect on investments and find a negative effect for bitstream regulations. The regression results are used to assess the magnitude of these factors, thereby providing valuable inputs to the policy debate on broadband promotion. |
| Date: | 2019–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2019:i:583&r=all |