|
on Regulation |
| By: | Frank A. Wolak |
| Abstract: | Charging full requirements customers for distribution network services using the traditional cents per kilowatt-hour (KWh) price creates economic incentives for consumers to invest in distributed generation technologies, such as rooftop solar photovoltaics, despite the fact that marginal cost of grid-supplied electricity is lower. This paper first assesses the economic efficiency properties of this approach to transmission and distribution network pricing and whether current approach to distribution network pricing implies that full-requirement customers cross-subsidize distributed solar customers. Using data on quarterly residential distribution network prices and distributed solar installations from California’s three largest investor-owned utilities I find that larger amounts of distributed solar capacity and more geographically concentrated solar capacity predict higher distribution network prices and average distribution network costs. This result continues to hold even after controlling for average distribution network costs for the utility, Using these econometric model estimates, I find that 2/3 of the increase in residential distribution network prices for each of the three utilities between 2003 and 2016 can attributed to the growth distributed solar capacity. The paper then investigates the extent of the legal obligation that distributed solar generation customers have to pay for sunk costs of investments in the transmission and distribution networks. The paper closes with a description of an alternative approach to distribution network pricing that is likely to increase the economic signals for efficient electricity consumption and the incentive for cost effective installation of distributed solar generation capacity. |
| JEL: | L94 Q02 Q42 Q5 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25087&r=reg |
| By: | Sebastian Wehrle; Johannes Schmidt |
| Abstract: | Low CO2 prices have prompted discussion about political measures aimed at increasing the cost of carbon dioxide emissions. These costs affect, inter alia, integrated district heating system operators (DHSO), often owned by municipalities with some political influence, that use a variety of (CO2 emis- sion intense) heat generation technologies. We examine whether DHSOs have an incentive to support measures that increase CO2 emission prices in the short term. Therefore, we (i) develop a simplified analytical framework to analyse optimal decisions of a district heating operator, and (ii) investigate the market-wide effects of increasing emission prices, in particular the pass- through from emission costs to electricity prices. Using a numerical model of the common Austrian and German power system, we estimate a pass-through from CO2 emission prices to power prices between 0.69 and 0.53 as of 2017, depending on the absolute emission price level. We find the CO2 emission cost pass-through to be sufficiently high so that low-emission district heating systems operating at least moderately efficient generation units benefit from rising CO2 emission prices in the short term. |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1810.02109&r=reg |
| By: | Yektansani, Kiana; Espinola-Arredondo, Ana |
| Keywords: | Environmental and Nonmarket Valuation, Industrial Org./Supply Chain Management, Behavioral & Institutional Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274000&r=reg |
| By: | Harker Steele, Amanda J.; Bergstrom, John C. |
| Keywords: | Household and Labor Economics, Environmental and Nonmarket Valuation, Production Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274186&r=reg |
| By: | Ye, Fanglin; Paulson, Nick; Khanna, Madhu |
| Keywords: | Industrial Org./Supply Chain Management, Risk and Uncertainty, Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274199&r=reg |
| By: | Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John |
| Abstract: | We analyze a market where some consumers only consider buying from a specific seller while other consumers choose the best deal from several sellers. When sellers are able to discriminate against their captive customers, we show that discrimination harms consumers in aggregate relative to the situation with uniform pricing when sellers are approximately symmetric, while the practice tends to benefit consumers in sufficiently asymmetric markets. |
| Keywords: | Price discrimination; captive customers; consideration sets |
| JEL: | D43 D8 L13 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89284&r=reg |
| By: | Florian Ploeckl (University of Adelaide) |
| Abstract: | "Public monopolies operate with substantial regional differences in their efficiency. This paper uses the Reichspost, the German Imperial Postal Service, to investigate what factors explain these differences. Additionally scale effects and the comparative efficiency on input and output side are investigated." |
| Keywords: | "Productivity, Public Service, Postal Service, Germany" |
| JEL: | D24 N73 N93 |
| Date: | 2017–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehs:wpaper:17013&r=reg |
| By: | Panagiota Papadimitri (Portsmouth Business School); Fotios Pasiouras (Montpellier Business School); Gioia Pescetto (Portsmouth Business School); Ansgar Wohlschlegel (Portsmouth Business School) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory decisionmaking in the US banking industry. In particular, we assess whether elected officials with power in Congress impact regulatory decision making in the banking industry. Political influence is captured by whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected official holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the banking and financial services industry. As a proxy for regulatory decisions, we take into account formal regulatory enforcement actions issued against US commercial banks over the period 2000-2015. We find an inverse relationship between our political influence variable and enforcement likelihood. In general, the results are robust to the use of alternative model specifications and the restriction of our sample. However, we find that various bank and environmental characteristics are important conditional factors. |
| Keywords: | Political influence, Congressional Committees, Banking supervision, Enforcement actions |
| JEL: | G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2018–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pbs:ecofin:2018-09&r=reg |
| By: | Kaplan, Jonathan D.; Eschker, Erick |
| Keywords: | Demand and Price Analysis, Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis, Food Safety and Nutrition |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:273984&r=reg |