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on Regulation |
| By: | Christian Desmaris (LAET - Laboratoire Aménagement Économie Transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État [ENTPE] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon) |
| Abstract: | The European railway industry continues to undergo reform and liberalization due to European law incentives. Recent events in Italy give the country a special place in this process: a new competitor has commenced operations in the high-speed rail (HSR) market based on a private initiative. This paper aims to investigate this rail transport innovation looking for the driving forces and obstacles and to identify the main impacts for the Italian consumers. We also try to provide some interesting results helpful for other countries regarding passenger rail reforms. Based on the Italian case, it seems that open access competition in the HSR market is able to produce significant improvements in favour of passengers and also a ‘win-win’ game between all railway actors. |
| Keywords: | high-speed rail (HSR),Competition,Italy,Railway Reform,impacts for the Italian consumers |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01370373&r=reg |
| By: | Kaushal, Kevin R. (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Rosendahl, Knut Einar (School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Unilateral actions to reduce CO2 emissions could lead to carbon leakage such as relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries (EITE). To mitigate such leakage, countries often supplement an emissions trading system (ETS) with free allocation of allowances to exposed industries, e.g. in the form of output-based allocation (OBA). This paper examines the welfare effects of supplementing OBA with a consumption tax on EITE goods. In particular, we investigate the case when only a subset of countries involved in a joint ETS introduces such a tax. The analytical results suggest that the consumption tax would have unambiguously global welfare improving effects, and under certain conditions have welfare improving effects for the tax introducing country as well. Numerical simulations in the context of the EU ETS support the analytical findings, including that the consumption tax is welfare improving for the single country that implements the tax. |
| Keywords: | Carbon leakage; Output-based allocation; Consumption tax |
| JEL: | D61 F18 H23 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsseb:2017_005&r=reg |
| By: | Tomaso Duso; Florian Szücs; Veit Böckers |
| Abstract: | In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5,000 MW generation capacity as well as its extra-high voltage network. We analyze the effect of these divestitures on German wholesale electricity prices. Our identification strategy is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods when demand is high. Therefore, a decrease in market power should lead to convergence between peak and off-peak prices. Using daily electricity prices for the 2006 - 2012 period and controlling for cost and demand drivers, we find economically and statistically significant convergence effects after the implementation of the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, the price reductions appear to be mostly due to the divestiture of gas and coal plants, which is consistent with merit-order considerations. Placebo regressions support a causal interpretation of our results. |
| Keywords: | Electricity, wholesale prices, EU Commission, abuse of dominance, ex post evaluation, E.ON |
| JEL: | K21 L41 L94 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1685&r=reg |
| By: | Manjesh K. Hanawal; Shashank Mishra; Yezekael Hayel |
| Abstract: | The ongoing net neutrality debate has generated a lot of heated discussions on whether or not monetary interactions should be regulated between content and access providers. Among the several topics discussed, `differential pricing' has recently received attention due to `zero-rating' platforms proposed by some service providers. In the differential pricing scheme, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can exempt data traffic charges for accessing content from certain CPs or applications (zero-rated) and apply regular charges for accessing content from other CPs. This allows the possibility for Content Providers (CPs) to make `sponsorship' agreements to zero-rate their content and attract more user traffic. In this paper, we study the effect of differential pricing on various players in the Internet. We consider a model with a single ISP and multiple CPs where users select CPs based on the quality of service (QoS) and applicable traffic charges. We show that in a differential pricing regime 1) a CP offering low QoS can make more revenues than a CP offering better QoS through sponsorships. 2) QoS (mean delay) for end users can degrade compared to the case where no differential pricing is allowed. |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1709.09334&r=reg |
| By: | Muehlenbachs, Lucija (Resources for the Future, Washington DC); Staubli, Stefan (University of Calgary); Chu, Ziyan (Resources for the Future, Washington DC) |
| Abstract: | How much risk does a heavy truck impose on highway safety? To answer this question, we look at the rapid influx of trucks during the shale gas boom in Pennsylvania. Using quasi-experimental variation in truck traffic, we isolate the effect of adding a truck to the road. We find an additional truck raises the risk of a truck accident – and, at an even higher rate, the risk of nontruck accidents. These accidents pose an external cost in cases in which the truck is not found liable, not fully insured, or not directly involved. We show this external cost is capitalized in the insurance market: car insurance premiums of other road users increase when trucks are added to the road. |
| Keywords: | externality, trucking, hydraulic fracturing, traffic fatalities |
| JEL: | G22 H23 I18 Q58 R41 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10989&r=reg |
| By: | Teng Ma (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University); Kenji Takeuchi (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of air pollution control within the thermal power sector during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (BOG08). Using data on pollution control equipment and energy intensity, we investigate for significant differences in their levels between provinces under the regional control policy for BOG08 and other provinces. The results suggest that the energy intensity of thermal power plants improved in 2007 and 2008 in provinces designated as areas requiring coordinated air pollution control for the Olympic Games. On the other hand, we found weaker statistical evidence for treatment effects on pollution control equipment. |
| Keywords: | Air pollution; China; Beijing Olympic Games; Thermal power sector |
| JEL: | Q52 L51 L94 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1718&r=reg |
| By: | Thomas R. Covert; Ryan Kellogg |
| Abstract: | The recent large-scale use of railroads to transport crude oil out of newly discovered shale formations has no recent precedent in the U.S. oil industry. This paper addresses the question of whether crude-by-rail is simply a transient phenomenon, owing to delays in pipeline construction, or whether it will be a durable presence in the industry by reducing investment in pipeline infrastructure. We develop a model of crude oil transportation that highlights how railroads generate option value by: (1) giving shippers the ability to flexibly increase or decrease volumes shipped in response to price shocks; and (2) allowing shippers to opportunistically send oil to multiple destinations. In contrast, pipelines have low amortized costs but lock shippers into debt-like ship-or-pay contracts to a single destination. We calibrate this model to the recently constructed Dakota Access Pipeline and find that the elasticity of pipeline capacity to railroad transportation costs lies between 0.24 and 0.61, depending on parameters such as the upstream oil supply elasticity. These values are likely conservative because they neglect economies of scale in pipeline construction and the presence of cost-saving contracting in rail. Our results imply that crude-by-rail is an economically significant long-run substitute for pipeline transportation and that regulatory policies targeting environmental and accident externalities from rail transportation would likely substantially affect pipeline investments. |
| JEL: | L13 L71 L95 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23855&r=reg |
| By: | Marc GRONWALD; Ngo Van LONG; Luise ROEPKE |
| Abstract: | We show that a green paradox can be weak, or strong, or extreme. A weak green paradox arises when a green - intentioned policy measure worsens the quality of the environment at least in the near term. A strong green paradox outcome is obtained if the policy ends up causing greater cumulative environmental damages than under the business - as - usual scenario , though it may raise welfare , for example by adding productive green capacity. An extreme green paradox arises when aggregate welfare (net of environmental damages) falls as result of a poorly designed green - intentioned policy. We illustrate numerically the three degrees of green paradox using a model with a capacity - constrained green backstop technology in direct competition with fossil fuels. |
| Keywords: | capacity constraints, green paradox, climate change, simultaneous resource use |
| JEL: | Q38 Q54 H23 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montec:02-2017&r=reg |
| By: | David Besanko; Ulrich Doraszelski; Yaroslav Kryukov |
| Abstract: | We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other. |
| JEL: | D21 D43 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23829&r=reg |
| By: | Karen Clay; Akshaya Jha; Nicholas Muller; Randall Walsh |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs new estimates of the air pollution and greenhouse gas costs from long-distance movement of petroleum products by rail and pipelines. While crude oil transportation has generated intense policy debate about rail and pipeline spills and accidents, important externalities – air pollution and greenhouse gas costs – have been largely overlooked. Using data for crude oil transported out of North Dakota in 2014, this paper finds that air pollution and greenhouse gas costs are nearly twice as large for rail as for pipelines. Moreover, our estimates of air pollution and greenhouse gas costs are much larger than estimates of spill and accidents costs. In particular, they are more than twice as big for rail and more than eight times as big for pipelines. Our findings indicate that the policy debate surrounding crude oil transportation has put too much relative weight on accidents and spills, while overlooking a far more serious source of external cost: air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. |
| JEL: | L92 Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23852&r=reg |
| By: | Kevin R. Williams (Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Airfares are determined by both intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand. I estimate a model of dynamic airline pricing accounting for both forces with new flight-level data. With model estimates, I disentangle key interactions between the arrival pattern of consumer types and remaining capacity under stochastic demand. I show that the forces are complements in airline markets and lead to significantly higher revenues, as well as increased consumer surplus, compared to a more restrictive pricing regime. Finally, I show that abstracting from stochastic demand leads to a systematic bias in estimating demand elasticities. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic pricing, Intertemporal price discrimination, Price discrimination, Stochastic demand, Pricing, Airlines, Dynamic discrete choice |
| JEL: | L11 L12 L93 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:3003&r=reg |