nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2017‒07‒09
eight papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Coalitional cohesion in technology policy: The case of the early solar cell industry in the United States By Ergen, Timur
  2. Can tenants afford to care? Investigating the willingness-to-pay for improved energy efficiency of rental tenants and returns to investment for landlords By Collins, Matthew; Curtis, John
  3. The environmental tax and subsidy reform in Mexico By Johanna Arlinghaus; Kurt van Dender
  4. Leaving an emissions trading scheme – insights from the United Kingdom By Richard S.J. Tol
  5. In brief...Road to recovery? Economic benefits of new infrastructure By Stephen Gibbons; Teemu Lyytikäinen; Henry Overman; Rosa Sanchis-Guarner
  6. Policy options for a socially balanced climate policy By Schwerhoff, Gregor; Dao, Nguyen Thang; Edenhofer, Ottmar; Grimalda, Gianluca; Jakob, Michael; Klenert, David; Siegmeier, Jan
  7. Towards a new UK industrial strategy By Richard Davies; Anna Valero
  8. Default Effects and Follow-On Behavior: Evidence from an Electricity Pricing Program By Meredith Fowlie; Catherine Wolfram; C. Anna Spurlock; Annika Todd; Patrick Baylis; Peter Cappers

  1. By: Ergen, Timur
    Abstract: The paper traces the rise and decline of solar cell commercialization efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s in the United States. It shows how technology policies for photovoltaic appliances gained and lost support in a time of increasing uncertainty about future resource supplies and the future of energy provision. Contrary to conventional explanations of the long history of failures to commercialize renewable energy technologies that emphasize path dependencies around established energy technologies, this paper explains the rise and decline of early solar cell policies from the perspective of internal sectoral developments. It demonstrates that cohesion among political economic supporters was critical for public perceptions of the intermediary success of the effort, to continuous investment by industry, and to the maintenance of political support. The paper suggests that support for new industries and technologies is dependent on sectoral order among supporting groups over time. The case of the early photovoltaics policies illustrates how the failure to keep groups unified and committed undermined the implementation of the technology policies, weakened the credibility of the developmental effort, and ultimately led to a decline in political support. The paper contributes to recent debates about the conditions of successful industrial and technology policies by demonstrating that network failures have an important political dimension if ruptures of sectoral cooperation feed back on state support for the respective industry or technology.
    Keywords: technology policy,renewable energy,institutional change,governance,innovation,Technologiepolitik,erneuerbare Energien,institutioneller Wandel,Governance,Innovation
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:177&r=reg
  2. By: Collins, Matthew; Curtis, John
    Abstract: Throughout the developed world, residential buildings in the rental sector exhibit lower levels of energy efficiency than the owner-occupied building stock. A double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation method is used to examine how much renters are willing to pay in their monthly rent for improved energy efficiency, measured via energy performance certificates. The results of this analysis are used to examine the returns to investment available to landlords for various measures. Using an administrative dataset of residential retrofits, we examine the upfront cost to landlords of engaging in energy efficiency retrofits of varying depths and calculate the relevant payback period. Conditional upon possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay, we find that tenants in Ireland are willing to pay an average of over €40 for each one-grade improvement in their accommodation’s Building Energy Rating. We find short payback periods for attic and cavity wall insulation and prohibitively long payback periods for external wall insulation and solar heating.
    Date: 2017–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp565&r=reg
  3. By: Johanna Arlinghaus (OECD); Kurt van Dender (OECD)
    Abstract: In a bold policy effort, Mexico recently moved away from subsidies to transport fuels, increased tax rates on these fuels and introduced a carbon tax. This paper analyses these reforms using a broad set of criteria that consider the main practical dimensions of environmental policy design: environmental effectiveness, equity and distributional impacts, broader tax system impacts, macroeconomic effects, compliance and administration, policy process and consistency. The reforms significantly improve the extent to which the external costs of energy use are reflected in prices and increase government revenues, but, as price deregulation progresses further, more attention may need to be devoted to analysing and addressing the policies’ distributive effects. The analysis also highlights that ease of administration and collection are an important and desirable property of carbon taxes, especially in emerging market contexts.
    Keywords: carbon pricing, distributional effects, energy taxation, fossil-fuel subsidies, tax reform
    JEL: H23 Q48 Q52
    Date: 2017–07–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ctpaaa:31-en&r=reg
  4. By: Richard S.J. Tol (Department of Economics, University of Sussex; Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam; CESifo, Munich)
    Abstract: The United Kingdom may opt to leave the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for greenhouse gases. If so, a central plank of UK climate policy will need to be replaced at short notice. The UK is a large importer of emission permits, and meeting its climate policy targets would be much harder and dearer without the EU ETS. The impact on the EU would be limited, although UK permits circulating in the rest of the EU would lose their legal standing between Brexit and 2021. Non-EU countries take part in the EU ETS, and this appears to be the best option for the UK post-Brexit.
    Keywords: climate policy; tradable permits; Brexit; EU ETS
    JEL: Q54
    Date: 2017–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:1017&r=reg
  5. By: Stephen Gibbons; Teemu Lyytikäinen; Henry Overman; Rosa Sanchis-Guarner
    Abstract: New investment in roads can produce economic benefits, even in mature infrastructure networks like the UK's, according to research by Henry Overman and colleagues. At the same time, they argue, improved evaluation of new UK road schemes is badly needed. New investment in transport infrastructure is seen as a key plank of a modern industrial strategy, and is central to many local economic growth strategies. This study looks at the impact of UK road investment on jobs.
    Keywords: productivity, employment, accessibility
    JEL: D24 O18 R12
    Date: 2017–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:510&r=reg
  6. By: Schwerhoff, Gregor; Dao, Nguyen Thang; Edenhofer, Ottmar; Grimalda, Gianluca; Jakob, Michael; Klenert, David; Siegmeier, Jan
    Abstract: Climate policies, including removing fossil fuel subsidies or imposing carbon prices, can be designed in a way that is both efficient in addressing climate change and results in a fair distribution of the associated costs.
    Keywords: G20,climate policy,distribution
    JEL: D62 E62 H21 H22
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201734&r=reg
  7. By: Richard Davies; Anna Valero
    Abstract: The regulation of business has been a rollercoaster ride for the UK over the past 20 years. Drawing on their work with the LSE Growth Commission, Anna Valero and Richard Davies outline an opportunity to build a new system based on transparency, independence and a long-term outlook. They note that stable policy frameworks are needed to stimulate business investment, but support for specific part s of the economy should not be restricted to high performance-high growth sectors. Industrial strategy should be given a new law or long-lasting mandate since the ultimate objective should be for it to be insulated from political cycles.
    Keywords: UK industrial strategy, business regulation, UK economy
    Date: 2017–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:502&r=reg
  8. By: Meredith Fowlie; Catherine Wolfram; C. Anna Spurlock; Annika Todd; Patrick Baylis; Peter Cappers
    Abstract: We study default effects in the context of a residential electricity pricing program. We implement a large-scale randomized controlled trial in which one treatment group is given the option to opt-in to time-based pricing while another is defaulted into the program but allowed to opt-out. We provide dramatic evidence of a default effect – a significantly higher fraction of households defaulted onto the time-based pricing plan enroll in the program, even though opting out simply involved making a phone call or clicking through to a website. A distinguishing feature of our empirical setting is that we observe follow-on behavior subsequent to the default manipulation. Specifically, we observe customers’ electricity consumption in light of the pricing plan they face. This, in conjunction with randomization of the default provision, allows us to separately identify the electricity consumption response of “complacent” households (i.e., those who only enroll in time-based pricing if assigned to the opt-out treatment). We find that the complacent households do reduce electricity use during higher priced peak periods, though significantly less on average compared to customers who actively opt in. However, with complacents comprising approximately 75 percent of the population, we observe significantly larger average demand reductions among consumers assigned to the opt-out group. We examine the extent to which the behavioral responses we observe are consistent with a standard model of switching costs, or with alternative mechanisms including inattention, and preferences constructed based on contextual features of the choice setting.
    JEL: D03 L51 L94 Q41
    Date: 2017–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23553&r=reg

This nep-reg issue is ©2017 by Natalia Fabra. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.