|
on Regulation |
| By: | Wagner, Johannes (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI)) |
| Abstract: | The unbundling of formerly vertically integrated utilities in liberalized electricity markets led to a coordination problem between investments in the regulated electricity grid and investments into new power generation. At the same time investments into new generation capacities based on weather dependent renewable energy sources such as wind and solar energy are increasingly subsidized with different support schemes. Against this backdrop this article analyzes the locational choice of private wind power investors under different support schemes and the implications on grid investments. I find that investors do not choose system optimal locations in feed-in tariff schemes, feed-in premium schemes and subsidy systems with direct capacity payments. Consequently, inefficiencies arise if transmission investment follows wind power investment. A benevolent transmission operator can implement the first-best solution by anticipatory investment behavior, which is however only applicable under perfect regulation. Alternatively a location dependent network charge for wind power producers can directly influence investment decisions and internalize the grid integration costs of wind power generation. |
| Keywords: | Renewable Energy Investment; Transmission Investment; Coordination Problem; External Effects |
| JEL: | D47 D62 L92 Q28 Q48 |
| Date: | 2016–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:ewikln:2016_008&r=reg |
| By: | Sarikakis, Katharine; Rozgonyi, Krisztina |
| Abstract: | Historically, the development of tele-communications has been at the heart of State policy based on a set of principles revolving around notions of modernisation, on the one hand, and nation-building, on the other. They were operationalized in State planning for domestic infrastructure, regulation of market, and communication control. Internationally, telecommunications constituted a core piece in the toolbox of foreign policy and international trade hegemony. The physical scarcity of resources and high costs (i.e. frequencies, cables) and the principles of placing the State at the centre of managing the telecoms and media landscapes have dominated the largest part of communications history. With the successive waves of a. liberalisation and b. technological change, the role of the State has receded and the role of international organisations and private actors has become paramount in setting not only the scene for the technological development in the sector, but importantly, in shaping the principles under which the sector is regulated on a day to day basis. Technological and societal changes shaped the functioning of the telecoms sector, which has become an interconnected ecosystem. Further, regulatory change, in terms of actors, principles and processes is shaping the everyday experience of citizens (or users) around the globe: the role of the global telecommunication industry in social and economic development is underpinned by an unprecedented growth over the past 15 years (ITU International Telecommunications Union, 2015a). This growth is strictly connected to access to spectrum and to the adoption of mobile broadband services (ITU; UNESCO, 2015), (GSMA GSM Association, 2016), one of the most valuable public goods globally (Samuelson, 1954), (Samuelson, 1955), (Holcombe, 1977). The future of communication services lies with the utilization of spectrum bands, and scarcity thereof is a matter of public policy about the utilization of public communicative spaces (Sarikakis, 2012); therefore public accountability (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014) by its ‘users', i.e. telecom operators is a legitimate expectation of global and local publics. An often ignored dimension of principles and practice of public accountability of corporations around transparency and integrity, as the new core actors in the global communications regime. Historic failures and structural weaknesses in emerging, developing and least developed countries on forced implementation of competition policies and introduction of ‘one-size-fits-all' legal and regulatory frameworks have systematically failed to address serious concerns regarding corruption and integrity structures and have paved the way to current corruption incidents worldwide (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006; Sutherland, 2013). The demands of investors of industrialised countries dictated the implementation of historically and politically ungrounded policies and regulations with severe impacts to the accessibility and affordability of telecoms infrastructure in developing countries today, hence widening the digital divide. This paper explores the processes of governing spectrum and connects to accountability mechanisms of European telecom operators as key actors in providing an integrated infrastructure for global sharing of information with a significant impact to the global digital divide. We apply an analysis that takes into account multi-level, multi-actor, multi-purpose factors in the future of information infrastructure – to the increased role of spectrum management, to the effects and impact of globalization of actors and to the role of private sector actors in shaping communication (Sarikakis & Rodriguez-Amat, 2013). The paper surveys the ways in which policies about public accountability and integrity are exercised globally and explores possible connects to the governance of spectrum utilization. We argue that corporate actors bear social and political responsibilities as political actors in the process of governance and discuss the role of European policies in shaping and enforcing those responsibilites. We further elaborate possible regulatory frameworks in the context of social (power) relations (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014) and of empowered inclusion (Warren, 2004) in regards to integrity. We further argue for the need of supra-national regulation at EU-level to secure integrity in spectrum management. We recommend possible and necessary sector-wide initiatives to implement new standards fostering transparency in spectrum licensing, including a minimum set of criteria to be implemented within the licensing process. |
| Keywords: | global communication governance,accountability,integrity,policy principles |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148702&r=reg |
| By: | Balmera, Roberto E.; Ünverb, Mehmet Bilal |
| Abstract: | Alternative telecommunications operators have continuously invested in their own infrastructure in recent years. After more than a decade since liberalization, competitive conditions have substantially changed, especially in urban areas. European regulatory authorities have acknowledged this development by starting regional deregulation. Additionally, different forms of cooperative investments in next generation broadband have appeared on the market. The effects of such schemes on competition, investment and welfare crucially depend on the fine details of implementation. For instance, in the case of joint ventures, it matters how investment costs are shared and how internal and external access prices are determined. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility to increase investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. This article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on co-investments in next generation broadband networks as well as practical cases. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation or in some cases even substituting for it. |
| Keywords: | next generation access,co-investment models,cooperative investment,investment sharing,investment cooperation |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148657&r=reg |
| By: | Lu Wang (Beijing Institute of Technology and Georgia Institute of Technology); Alice Favero (Georgia Institute of Technology); Marilyn Brown (Georgia Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | This study used the GT NEMS model to analyze how the proposed federal regulation on carbon emissions will impact investments in the U.S. electricity generating capacity at the federal and Census Division level for 2016-2030. Results show that in order to reduce emissions by 32% by 2030, cumulative investments will increase from 399 to 414 billion USD by 2030. Under the scenario which addresses carbon leakage - covering new and existing power plants - cumulative investment will reach 475 billion USD by 2030. Addressing carbon leakage will affect not only the size of the investments but also the direction: when only existing power plants are covered investments in natural gas remains almost unchanged (123 billion USD) relative to the Reference case; while under the scenario that covers all power plants, investment in natural gas will be 24% lower and the investments in renewable will be 64% higher than the Reference. Carbon regulation will produce not only losers and winners among energy sources but also among U.S. states. While the South and Midwest states will experience much higher increase in cumulative investments with respect to the national average; Northeast and West states will reduce their overall investments by 2030 under the policy scenarios. |
| Keywords: | Clean Power Plan, Climate Change Mitigation Policy, Investment, Electricity, United States |
| JEL: | Q42 Q43 Q48 Q58 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2016.77&r=reg |
| By: | Deniau, Philippe; Jaunaux, Laure; Lebourges, Marc |
| Abstract: | The European Commission (EC) draft Regulation (2016)2 on wholesale roaming market proposes a massive decrease of the regulated roaming wholesale price caps for data with a drop from €5ct/MB to €0.85 ct/MB to enable the abolition of retail roaming surcharges in Europe by 15 June 2017. However, according to both the “TSM” Regulation text (2015/2120 25th November 2015) itself which imposes the implementation of Roaming Like At Home (RLAH) in Europe and to the decision of the European Court of Justice upholding the first European roaming regulation (ECJ C-58/08 8 June 2010), a wholesale roaming regulation can be justified in parallel of retail regulation only in case of market failure in the wholesale market and in order to prevent the existence of competitive distortions between mobile operators on the internal market. Therefore, wholesale roaming markets regulation should only address identified competitiveness issues. This paper deals with the question of the competitiveness of the wholesale roaming market regarding two angles: the existence of competitive mechanisms and incentives in wholesale roaming markets and the average level of wholesale roaming market prices in comparison with the corresponding level of full production costs. It shows that wholesale roaming markets exhibit competition mechanisms and incentives triggered by roaming volume growth resulting from the perspective of RLAH retail regulation. It also shows that in 2015, the average level of wholesale roaming market prices in Europe is equivalent to the average level of wholesale roaming production costs. Therefore the wholesale roaming market is competitive. Strong regulatory intervention such as large decrease of wholesale roaming caps is neither justified nor proportionate, generates serious risk of distortion of visited markets and jeopardises investments in mobile networks. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148664&r=reg |
| By: | Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg); Florian Landis (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)); Miguel Angel Tovar Reaños (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)) |
| Abstract: | Over the last decade Germany has boosted renewable energy in power production by means of massive subsidies. The flip side are very high electricity prices which raises concerns that the transition cost towards a renewable energy system will be mainly borne by poor households. In this paper, we combine computable general equilibrium and microsimulation analysis to investigate the cost-effectiveness and incidence of Germany’s renewable energy promotion. We find that the regressive effects of renewable energy promotion could be attenuated by alternative subsidy financing mechanisms which achieve the same level of electricity generation from renewable energy sources. |
| Keywords: | renewable energy policy, feed-in tariffs, CGE, microsimulation |
| JEL: | Q42 H23 C63 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zen:wpaper:66&r=reg |
| By: | Lehr, William; Sicker, Douglas |
| Abstract: | According to Cisco's VNI forecast, "consumer Internet video traffic will be 85 percent of all consumer Internet traffic in 2020, up from 76 percent in 2015," and the majority of this traffic will be entertainment-oriented video. Many might view this as the (near) realization of the promised convergence of digital broadband delivery platforms that has been coming since first generation broadband services started becoming available in the mid-1990s. A question we should ask is whether this is the Internet we want? Even if one concludes that the marriage between entertainment media and the Internet is a foregone conclusion, it is worthwhile to consider what this may mean for the design, regulation, and economics of the Internet. In this paper, we critically examine the proposition that the conventional wisdom that convergence toward “everything over IP,” or even stronger, “everything over the Internet,” is efficient, inevitable, or desirable may be wrong. Convergence means different things in technical, economic, and policy terms. Building a single network that is optimized for 80% entertainment video traffic might disadvantage other services. Moreover, the economics of media entertainment are distinct from, and potentially in conflict with, the economics motivating many of the usage cases most often cited as justification for viewing the Internet as an essential infrastructure. Finally, separately managing the traffic for Internet and video services may be advantageous in addressing regulatory agenda items such as performance measurement, set-top boxes, universal service, OVD reclassification, and Internet interconnection. While most of the traffic may share the same physical (principally, wired) conduit into homes, it may be more efficient and flexible to segregate traffic into multiple logically distinct networks; and doing so may facilitate technical, market, and regulatory management of the shared resources. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148683&r=reg |
| By: | Czajkowski, Mikołaj; Sobolewski, Maciej |
| Abstract: | Recent theoretical models of network competition with call externalities demonstrate strategic incentives of incumbent providers to reduce receiver benefits in rival network by excessive off-net pricing. Such anti-competitive pricing practices have a potentially damaging impact on financial standing of a late entrant, leading to non-convergence of long-run market shares – an outcome that has been observed in many European mobile markets. The theoretical reasoning behind call externalities assumes that receiving calls contribute to consumer utility hence, receiver benefits drive subscription choices. So far no attempts have been made to test this critical assumption in a rigorous manner. We use data elicited from prepaid and postpaid users of mobile telephony in Poland in a discrete choice experiment designed specifically to model subscription choices when operators set termination-based discriminatory tariffs under calling party pays regime. Receiver benefits are controlled with an incoming price – a variable informing about the cost of off-net calls paid by subscribers originating a call from other networks. The model also accounts for switching costs and network effects. We find that call externalities are significant driver of subscription choices, albeit their influence has smaller magnitude than direct price effects. Next, we assess the impact of excessive off-net pricing on the structure of market shares of mobile operators in Poland and estimate customer base stealing effect encountered by the late entrant. Our empirical findings support a widespread view that call externalities might have indeed limited market competition and late entrants' growth in many European countries. |
| Keywords: | Call externalities,personal network effects,switching costs,mobile telephony,stated preference,discrete choice experiment,random parameters logit model |
| JEL: | L1 L86 O3 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148706&r=reg |
| By: | Löschel, Andreas; Lutz, Benjamin Johannes; Managi, Shunsuke |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effect of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on the economic performance of manufacturing firms in Germany. Our difference-in-differences framework relies on several parametric conditioning strategies and nearest neighbor matching. As a measure of economic performance, we use the firm specific distance to the stochastic production frontier recovered from official German production census data. None of our identification strategies provide evidence for a statistically significant negative effect of emissions trading on economic performance. On the contrary, the results of the nearest neighbor matching suggest that the EU ETS rather had a positive impact on the economic performance of the regulated firms, especially during the first compliance period. A subsample analysis confirms that EU ETS increased the efficiency of treated firms in at least some two-digit industries. |
| Keywords: | Control of Externalities,Emissions Trading,Economic Performance,Manufacturing,Difference-in-Differences,Nearest Neighbor Matching,Stochastic Production Frontier |
| JEL: | Q52 D22 Q38 Q48 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:91&r=reg |
| By: | Ghislandi, Simone; Kuhn, Michael |
| Abstract: | It is frequently argued that the high costs of clinical trials prior to the admission of new pharmaceuticals are stifling innovation. At the same time, regulation of the access to markets is often justified on the basis of consumers` inability to detect the true quality of a product. We examine these arguments from an information economic perspective by setting a framework where the incentives to invest in R&D are influenced by the information structure prevailing when the product is launched in the market at a later stage. In this setting, by changing the information structure, regulation (or the lack of) can thus indirectly affect R&D efforts. More formally, we construct a moral hazard - cum - adverse selection model in which a pharmaceutical firm exerts an unobservable effort towards developing an innovative (high quality) drug (moral hazard) and then announces the (unobservable) quality outcome to an uninformed regulator and/or consumers (adverse selection). We compare the outcomes in regard to innovation effort and expected welfare under two regimes: (i) regulation, where products undergo a clinical trial designed to ascertain product quality at the point of market access; and (ii) laissez-faire with free entry, where the revelation of quality is left to the market process. Results show that whether or not innovation is greater in the presence of entry regulation crucially depends on the efficacy of the trial in identifying (poor) quality, on the probability that unknown qualities are revealed in the market process, and on the preference and cost structure. The welfare ranking of the two regimes depends on the differential effort incentive and on the net welfare gain from implementing full information instantaneously. For example, in settings of vertical monopoly, vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation with no variable cost of quality, entry regulation tends to be the preferred regime if the effort incentive under pooling is relatively low and profits do not count too much towards welfare. A complementary numerical Analysis shows how the outcomes vary with the market and cost structure. (authors' abstract) |
| Keywords: | adverse selection; (entry) regulation; moral hazard; pharmaceutical industry; R&D incentives |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:4886&r=reg |
| By: | Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)); Xaquín Garcia-Muros (Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Students); Mikel Gonzalez-Eguino (Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3)); Luis Rey (Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3)) |
| Abstract: | Intensity standards have gained substantial momentum as a regulatory instrument in US climate policy. Based on numerical simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model we show that intensity standards may rather increase than decrease counterproductive carbon leakage. Moreover, standards can lead to considerable welfare losses compared to emission pricing via carbon taxation or an emissions trading system. The tradability of standards across industries is a mechanism that can reduce these negative effects. |
| Keywords: | unilateral climate policy; carbon leakage; intensity standards; computable general equilibrium |
| JEL: | D21 H23 D58 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zen:wpaper:61&r=reg |
| By: | Ryan Kellogg |
| Abstract: | What are the implications of gasoline price volatility for the design of fuel economy policies? I show that this problem has a strong parallel to Weitzman's (1974) classic model of using price or quantity controls to regulate an externality. Changes in fuel prices act as shocks to the marginal cost of complying with the standard. Assuming constant marginal damages from fuel consumption, an application of Weitzman (1974) implies that a fixed fuel economy standard reduces expected welfare relative to a “price” policy such as a feebate or, equivalently, a fuel economy standard that is indexed to the price of gasoline. When the regulator is constrained to use a fixed standard, I show that the usual approach to setting the standard—equate expected marginal compliance cost to marginal damage—is likely to be sub-optimal because the standard may not bind if the realized gasoline price is sufficiently high. Instead, the optimal fixed standard will be relatively relaxed and may be non-binding even at the expected gasoline price. Finally, I show that although an attribute-based standard allows vehicle choices to flexibly respond to gasoline price shocks, the resulting distortions imply that the optimal fuel economy standard is not attribute-based. |
| JEL: | H23 L51 L91 Q48 Q50 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23024&r=reg |
| By: | Marcus, J. Scott; Petropoulos, Georgios |
| Abstract: | In its Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the importance of lowering the price paid for basic cross-border delivery by consumers and by small and medium size retail shippers. Consumers and SMEs may have few alternatives to the National Postal Operators (NPOs), or may be unaware of the options that they have. These concerns led to the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal in May 2016.3 With its legislative proposal, the Commission has sought (1) to strengthen the data gathering powers of Member State postal regulatory authorities, and to oblige them to collect data at both retail and wholesale levels; (2) to increase transparency into pricing for those who use cross-border parcel delivery services; (3) to oblige Member State postal regulatory authorities to assess annually the affordability of these services; and (4) to open cross-border Terminal Dues (TD) and Inward Land Rates (ILR) arrangements to competitors There are parallels that can be drawn between the payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery and those of telecommunications, especially those of international mobile roaming. As with roaming, it is clear that the linkages between wholesale payments between and corresponding retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy. Another useful lesson is that Member State postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to address cross-border problems not only because of limitations in their respective mandates, but also because they have no incentive to take challenging measures to benefit residents of other countries. There are, however, also important differences between roaming versus parcel delivery. Where high wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear instead to be below cost. This implies that it is the “spread” between retail price and the wholesale payment that is inflated, at least for small retail shippers and for consumers. Reviewing the Commission's proposed Regulation with all of this in mind, it appears to be on target. The main question that remains open is whether NPOs will be able to adjust TD and ILR rates upward to reflect true costs, as they will be strongly motivated to do; here as well, however, there are grounds for cautious optimism. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148689&r=reg |
| By: | Hawthorne, Ryan |
| Abstract: | The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) has over the last six years, in line with other regulators in many jurisdictions, reduced call termination rates (the price one operator charges another to complete a call between two networks) by more than 80%. A key question is what impact this has had on retail prices. Theoretical work suggests that reducing call termination rates could result in a ‘waterbed effect', where retail prices for mobile services increase after a call termination rate reduction, since profits from fixed to mobile calls declines and this reduces the profitability of attracting customers, and operators accordingly ‘soften' retail price competition. On the other hand, operators might choose a high mobile to mobile termination rate in order to exclude rivals. The extent of this ‘waterbed effect' therefore depends on the extent to which fixed to mobile calls matter and the extent of market symmetry. South Africa has a relatively small, and declining fixed line network and significant asymmetries between mobile operators (there are two entrants and two incumbents). Measuring retail prices over time in South Africa presents us with an opportunity to test whether, in circumstances where fixed to mobile calls don't matter as much, operators are asymmetric, call termination rates do indeed facilitate entry and cause a reduction in retail prices. A key problem with retail mobile prices in South Africa is that each of the mobile operators offer a wide variety of packages. In order to overcome this challenge, a hedonic regression approach will be used to develop an index of quality adjusted prices, and estimate the impact of call termination rate reductions on quality adjusted prices. The preliminary results of this analysis show that ‘waterbed effects' do indeed exist in respect of postpaid prices in South Africa, and this result is robust to using quality adjusted prices or mean prices. This means that operators would choose low call termination rates in order to soften competition, absent an exclusionary strategy. The choice of high call termination rates by incumbent operators prior to Cell C's entry in 2001, and pressure on resistance to regulatory steps to reduce termination rates when Telkom Mobile entered in 2010, are therefore consistent with an exclusionary strategy on the part of MTN and Vodacom. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148673&r=reg |
| By: | Gugler, Klaus; Haxhimusa, Adhurim |
| Abstract: | Using hourly data, we show that the convergence of German and French electricity spot prices depends on the employed generation mix structure, on the trade (export/import) capacity between the two countries, and on characteristics of neighbouring markets. Only when German and French electricity markets employ "similar" generation mixes price spreads vanish, and the likelihood for congestion of electricity flows is significantly reduced. This implies that, at least, a part of the convergence that was documented in recent literature is spurious, because it is not (only) driven by the forces of arbitrage, but by the similarity of the Generation structures. The direction of congestion matters in this regard. Furthermore, we document consistent evidence for the most important predictions of trade theory if markets are characterized by increasing marginal cost (i.e. supply) curves and limited cross-border capacities. (authors' abstract) |
| Keywords: | Market Integration; Electricity; Renewables; Technology Differences; Jaffe Index |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:5222&r=reg |
| By: | Gugler, Klaus; Haxhimusa, Adhurim; Liebensteiner, Mario; Schindler, Nora |
| Abstract: | The recent transformation of European electricity markets with increasing generation from intermittent renewables brings about many challenges. Among them, decaying wholesale prices, partly due to support schemes for renewables, may send insufficient investment signals for other technologies. We investigate the investment decision in a structural equation based on the Tobin's q-model, which we extend by both industry- and firm-technology-specific uncertainty. We utilize rich and novel data at the disaggregated firm generation technology level of European electricity generating firms for the period 2006-2014. Our results show that investment in any generation technology follows market incentives despite sunk and irreversible capital, confirming the implications of the q-model. Moreover, while firm-technology-specific uncertainty decreases firms' investment activity, especially in coal and gas, aggregate uncertainty triggers firms' investment. Our results raise concerns about system reliability in the long run since conventional technologies still serve as a flexible system back-up. (authors' abstract) |
| Keywords: | Tobin's q; Uncertainty; Investment; Electricity |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:5177&r=reg |
| By: | Houpis, George; Serdarevic, Goran; Vetterle, Jonas |
| Abstract: | Governments around the world recognise widespread broadband access as a facilitator of economic growth. As a result we observe that many countries have introduced National Broadband Policies which set ambitious targets for broadband coverage. Fixed network may not be commercially viable in more remote rural areas because the cost of roll out is too high. Therefore mobile networks are likely to play an important role in achieving these national targets. In particular, for rural and remote areas of a country where fixed networks are not viable, mobile will likely be the primary form of broadband access. Whilst Governments are interested in maintaining competitive markets there may be some rural areas of a country that are so uneconomic that even mobile network competition may not achieve coverage, either within the required timeframe or at all. It may, however, be desirable for such areas to be covered because of the wider economic benefits of widespread broadband availability. This paper presents and evaluates different forms of supply-side intervention that can be used to achieve mobile broadband coverage in rural areas. |
| Keywords: | Competition Policy,Network Economics,Telecommunications Policy,Economics of Regulation |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse16:148674&r=reg |