nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2016‒09‒11
five papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Assessing the competition between high-speed rail and airlines - A critical perspective By Frédéric Dobruszkes; Moshe Givoni; Catherine Dehon
  2. Product Market Deregulation and Growth; New Country-Industry-Level Evidence By Romain Bouis; Romain A Duval; Johannes Eugster
  3. An Analysis of OPEC’s Strategic Actions, US Shale Growth and the 2014 Oil Price Crash By Alberto Behar; Robert A Ritz
  4. Greening the Vehicle Fleet: Evidence from Norway’s CO2 Differentiated Registration Tax By Yan, Shiyu; Eskeland, Gunnar S.
  5. Testing Supply-Side Climate Policies for the Global Steam Coal Market - Can They Curb Coal Consumption? By Roman Mendelevitch

  1. By: Frédéric Dobruszkes; Moshe Givoni; Catherine Dehon
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/235543&r=reg
  2. By: Romain Bouis; Romain A Duval; Johannes Eugster
    Abstract: The paper investigates the economic effects of major product market reforms in some of the historically most protected non-manufacturing industries. It relies on a unique mapping between new annual data on reform shocks and sector-level outcomes for five network industries (electricity and gas, land transport, air transport, postal services, and telecommunications) in twenty-six countries spanning over three decades. The use of a threedimensional panel and careful instrumentation of reform shocks using external instruments enables us to control for economy-wide macroeconomic shocks and address possible sources of omitted variable bias more broadly. Using a local projection method, we find that major reductions in barriers to entry yield large increases in output and labor productivity over a five-year horizon, concomitant with a relative price decline. By contrast, there is only a weak positive effect on sectoral employment, and investment is essentially unaffected, suggesting that output gains from reform primarily reflect higher total factor productivity. It takes some time for these gains to materialize: effects become statistically significant two to three years after the reform, as prices start dropping, and productivity and output increase significantly. However, there is no evidence of any negative short-term cost from reform, including under weak macroeconomic conditions. These findings provide a clear case for intensifying product market reform efforts in advanced economies at the current juncture of weak growth.
    Keywords: Fiscal reforms;Nontariff barriers;Industry;Transportation;Energy;Communications services;Production;Labor productivity;Economic growth;Developed countries;Emerging markets;Structural reforms, deregulation, competition, entry barriers, product market, growth
    Date: 2016–06–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:16/114&r=reg
  3. By: Alberto Behar; Robert A Ritz
    Abstract: In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers including US shale oil out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a "regime switch" by OPEC. These include: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries. We show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output.
    Keywords: Oil sector;Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries;Markets;United States;Oil production;Supply and demand;Oil prices;Econometric models;Crude oil, OPEC, price crash, shale oil, market share, limit pricing
    Date: 2016–07–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:16/131&r=reg
  4. By: Yan, Shiyu (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Eskeland, Gunnar S. (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)
    Abstract: Fiscal policies are used to improve vehicle fuel efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector. Years of forceful reform in Norway may be seen as informative. From 2007, Norway has linked its new vehicle registration tax to CO2 intensities, later adapting it into a feebate form. We exploit a detailed dataset of new vehicle registrations, using fixed effects and instrumental variables in our econometric analysis. We find that the CO2 differentiated registration tax contributes significantly to shifting purchases towards low-emitting cars. A 1000NOK tax increase (about 120USD) is associated with a reduction of 1.13% - 1.58% in vehicle registrations, and the responsiveness in car choice to fuel costs is of the same magnitude. The estimated effect of the tax explains the majority (79%) of the reduction in average CO2 intensity in the new car fleet 2006 through 2011. A point estimate of the elasticity of the CO2 intensity with respect to the CO2 price is minus 0.06, whereas the elasticity with respect to (resulting) car prices is about minus 0.5. An intuitive model with ‘all’ car types losing demand to low-emitting types applies fairly well: low-emitting segments gain in share and do not get CO2 leaner, while high-emitting segments lose in share and become CO2 leaner. Moves between nine segments and within those segments are equally important.
    Keywords: CO2 intensity; new vehicle; vehicle registration tax; fuel cost; Pigovian taxation; green tax reform; greenhouse gas emission reductions
    JEL: C12 H23 Q00 Q50
    Date: 2016–08–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2016_014&r=reg
  5. By: Roman Mendelevitch
    Abstract: The achieved international consensus on the 1.5‐2°C target entails that most of current fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned. Currently, a majority of climate policies aiming at this goal are directed towards the demand side. In the absence of a global carbon regime these polices are prone to carbon leakage and other adverse effects. Supply‐side climate policies present an alternative and more direct approach to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels by addressing their production. Here, coal as both, the most abundant and the most emission-intensive fuel, plays a pivotal role. In this paper, I employ a numerical model of the international steam coal market (COALMOD‐World) to examine two alternative supply‐side policies: 1) a production subsidy reform introduced in major coal producing countries, in line with the G20 initiative to reduce global fossil fuel subsidies; 2) a globally implemented moratorium on new coal mines. The model is designed to replicate global patterns of coal supply, demand and international trade. It features endogenous investments in production and transportation capacities in a multi‐period framework and allows for substitution between imports and domestic production of steam coal. Hence, short‐run adjustments (e.g. import substitution effects) and long‐run reactions (e.g. capacity expansions) of exporting and importing countries are endogenously determined. Results show that a subsidy removal, while associated with a small positive total welfare effect, only leads to an insignificant reduction of global emissions. By contrast, a mine moratorium induces a much more pronounced reduction in global coal consumption by effectively limiting coal availability and strongly increasing prices. Depending on the specification of reserves, the moratorium can achieve a coal consumption path consistent with the 1.5‐2°C target.
    Keywords: Supply‐side climate policy, coal markets, reserves, subsidy removal, International trade
    JEL: C72 H25 Q35
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1604&r=reg

This nep-reg issue is ©2016 by Natalia Fabra. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.