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on Regulation |
| By: | Marit E. Klemetsen; Knut Einar Rosendahl; Anja Lund Jakobsen (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impacts of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on the environmental and economic performance of Norwegian plants. The EU ETS is regarded as the cornerstone climate policy both in the EU and in Norway, but there has been considerable debate regarding its effects due to low quota prices and substantial allocation of free allowances to the manufacturing industry. Both quota prices and allocation rules have changed significantly between the three phases of the ETS. The rich data allow us to investigate potential effects of the ETS on several important aspects of plant behavior. The results indicate a weak tendency of emissions reductions among Norwegian plants in the second phase of the ETS, but not in the other phases. We find no significant effects on emissions intensity in any of the phases, but positive effects on value added and productivity in the second phase. Positive effects on value added and productivity may be due to the large amounts of free allowances, and that plants may have passed on the additional marginal costs to consumers. |
| Keywords: | Tradable emissions quotas; emissions intensity; productivity; propensity score matching; difference-in-differences |
| JEL: | C23 C54 D22 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:833&r=reg |
| By: | Ahlfeldt, Gabriel; Koutroumpis, Pantelis; Valletti, Tommaso |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that having access to a fast Internet connection is an important determinant of capitalization effects in property markets. Our empirical strategy combines a boundary discontinuity design with controls for time-invariant effects and arbitrary macro-economic shocks at a very local level to identify the causal effect of broadband speed on property prices from variation that is plausibly exogenous. Applying this strategy to a micro data set from England between 1995 and 2010 we find a significantly positive effect, but diminishing returns to speed. Our results imply that disconnecting an average property from a high-speed first-generation broadband connection (offering Internet speed up to 8 Mbit/s) would depreciate its value by 2.8%. In contrast, upgrading such a property to a faster connection (offering speeds up to 24 Mbit/s) would increase its value by no more than 1%. We decompose this effect by income and urbanization, finding considerable heterogeneity. These estimates are used to evaluate proposed plans to deliver fast broadband universally. We find that increasing speed and connecting unserved households passes a cost-benefit test in urban and some suburban areas, while the case for universal delivery in rural areas is not as strong. |
| Keywords: | capitalization; digital speed; Internet; property prices; universal access to broadband |
| JEL: | H4 L1 R2 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11046&r=reg |
| By: | Alberto Casagrande; Daniela Di Cagno; Alessandro Pandimiglio; Marco Spallone |
| Abstract: | Traditional models of tax enforcement assume that the decision to be tax compliant is the result of an interaction between individual taxpayers and a dedicated tax agency. Evidence shows that tax compliance is the result of a far more complex decision rule, involving both individual and group motivations, along with non-monetary components. In this paper, we consider a game in which the individual decision to be tax compliant is affected both by strategic competition between taxpayers and the psychological cost of being detected (i.e., shame). We ran a laboratory experiment using a sample of 138 students at the Centro di Economia Sperimentale A Roma Est (CESARE), in the experimental lab at the LUISS “Guido Carli†University of Rome, to evaluate the efficiency of random versus targeted audit rules and to verify the interaction between strategic competition and shame. The experimental results show that strategic competition between taxpayers plays a critical role in reducing tax evasion. In addition, shame reinforces this competition, but plays no significant role on its own (i.e., without competition). |
| Keywords: | Tax evasion, Lab Experiment, Shame, Competition |
| JEL: | H26 C91 C72 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1505&r=reg |
| By: | Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CIRAD - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - AgroParisTech - AgroParisTech); Sébastien Houde (University of Maryland) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how moral hazard problems can cause sub-optimal investment in energy efficiency, a phenomenon known as the energy efficiency gap. We focus on contexts where both the seller and the buyer of an energy saving technology can take hidden actions. For instance, a home retrofit contractor may cut on the quality of installation to save costs, while the homeowner may increase her use of energy service when provided with higher energy efficiency. As a result, neither energy efficiency quality nor energy use are fully contractible. We formalize the double moral hazard problem and discuss how it can help rationalize the energy efficiency gap. We then compare two policy instruments: minimum quality standards and energy-savings insurance. Their relative efficiency depends on the balance between the monitoring costs associated with the former and the deadweight loss of the consumer's action induced by the latter. Calibrating the model to the U.S. retrofit industry, we find that at current market conditions, standards tend to outperform insurance. We also find that the welfare gains from undoing the double moral hazard are substantially larger than those from internalizing carbon dioxide externalities associated with underlying energy use. |
| Keywords: | Energy efficiency gap, moral hazard, energy-savings insurance, minimum quality standard, credence good, rebound effect. |
| Date: | 2015–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01260907&r=reg |
| By: | Silvia Cruz (UNICAMP - University of Campinas [Campinas] - University of Campinas); Sônia Paulino (University of Sao Paolo); Faïz Gallouj (Clersé - UMR CNRS 8019 - Institut de Sociologie et d'Anthropologie - Université Lille 1 - Sciences et technologies) |
| Abstract: | This paper is devoted to public services innovation in the municipal solid waste sector. It analyses the implementation of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in the Bandeirantes and São João landfills in the municipality of São Paulo, Brazil. The study is based on the concept of Public-Private Innovation Networks in services (ServPPINs). Using the ServPPIN concept it was possible to identify competence gaps affecting the stakeholders involved in these CDM projects. We focus in particular on those organisational and relational competence gaps that are likely to weaken innovation feasibility in services related to solid waste. In fact, innovation is closely linked to the development of new competences among service providers and users. For the most part, these will arise out of changes in interactions between actors-given that the projects in question include the coordination of various actors (public, private, and citizen). |
| Keywords: | landfill,public service innovation,clean development mechanism,ServPPIN |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01247615&r=reg |
| By: | Villas-Boas, Sofia B; Hilger, James; Stevens, Andrew; Hallstein, Eric |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences |
| Date: | 2016–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt6nh0g7fg&r=reg |