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on Regulation |
| By: | Sam Paltridge |
| Abstract: | All OECD countries recognise the benefits that stem from high speed broadband networks and have made tremendous progress in recent years in fostering their deployment. Nonetheless, many challenges remain in terms of how to enhance and expand these networks to meet the growing demands of an increasingly digital economy and society. Although private investments have been the overwhelming source of finance for high speed networks in OECD countries, municipal networks have been used in a number of OECD countries to fill gaps or provide substantial areas of service in a region, city or smaller town and surrounding locations. This report examines some of the experience with these municipal broadband networks in selected OECD countries. Municipal networks are defined here as high speed networks that have been fully or partially facilitated, built, operated or financed by local governments, public bodies, utilities, organisations, or co-operatives that have some type of public involvement. The models and experience of these networks have varied from being highly successful to not meeting expectations. In some cases, they have provided welcome competition by offering an alternative infrastructure and have opened the market for retail Internet service providers by separating the basic infrastructure from services. In other cases, they have enabled the use of shared infrastructure. Some have built on a long tradition of municipalities providing services from entities owned by them, such as the provision of utility services like energy, water, gas, or cable television. Some have involved public private partnerships, others have been privatised following initial public ownership and some are community driven. |
| Date: | 2015–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaac:26-en&r=reg |
| By: | Antonio Carvalho (Centre for Energy Economics Research and Policy, Heriot-Watt University) |
| Abstract: | Since the end of the Soviet Union, the power sector in the countries resulting from its disintegration has evolved from a context of central planning towards independent regulation. There is great heterogeneity in reform progress in transition countries, with consequences to service quality and prices in utilities and also the view the population has of such services. This paper conducts an overview of the modern power sector in transition economies and analyses drivers of reported household satisfaction with the quality of electricity services in 27 countries using cross-sectional survey data from the EBRD Life in Transition Survey II, in a context of improving regulatory and infrastructural frameworks, using an ordinal random effects model with a probit link function. Key drivers of reported satisfaction are the uses of electricity within the household and some characteristics such as age, economic conditions and general life satisfaction. However, there is no evidence of the effect of power sector reform on the opinion of households. This points that the general life experience in transition can be the key driver of how households feel about utilities, as reform brings conflicting effects that stem from increasing cost sustainability, competition, transparency and quality of the service. |
| Keywords: | Electricity, Transition Economies, Household Satisfaction, Ordinal Probit |
| JEL: | P21 P28 C25 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hwc:wpaper:001&r=reg |
| By: | Jean-Pierre Amigues (Toulouse School of Economics (INRA and LERNA)); Gilles Lafforgue (Université de Toulouse, Toulouse Business School); Michel Moreaux (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and LERNA)) |
| Abstract: | Using a standard Hotelling model of resource exploitation, we determine the optimal energy consumption paths from three options: dirty coal, which is non-renewable and carbon-emitting; clean coal, which is also non-renewable but carbon-free thanks to carbon capture and storage (CCS); and solar energy, which is renewable and carbon-free. We assume that the atmospheric carbon stock cannot exceed an exogenously given ceiling. Taking into account learning-by-doing in CCS technology, we show the following results: i) Clean coal exploitation cannot begin before the outset of the carbon constrained phase and must stop strictly before the end of this phase; ii) The energy price path can evolve non-monotonically over time; and iii) When the solar cost is low enough, an unusual energy consumption sequence along which solar energy is interrupted for some time and replaced by clean coal may exist. |
| Keywords: | Clean Energy, Food Demand, Land Quality, Renewable Fuel Standards, Transportation |
| JEL: | Q24 Q32 Q42 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2015.20&r=reg |
| By: | Jean-Philippe Nicolaï (ETH-Zürich) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the long-term investment decisions of firms that are regulated by an emissions tax and that perceive a degree of market power in their respective output markets. Firms invest in abatement equipment that is fixed over the medium term (e.g., buying a new generator). This paper focuses on environmental regulation with and with- out commitment. In the commitment case, the government announces a long-run tax on emissions, and firms decide upon their investment levels. In the no-commitment case, the regulator announces a tax level and is free to modify it once firms have invested. This paper considers differentiated product goods and determines whether no-commitment regulation leads to more lenient or more stringent regulation than regulation with commitment. |
| Keywords: | Pollution permits; Imperfect competition; Investment; Strategic effects. |
| JEL: | L13 Q50 L51 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2015.19&r=reg |
| By: | Andrea Baranzini (Haute Ecole de Gestion Genève, University of Apllied Sciences Western Switzerland); Jeroen van den Bergh (Institute of Environmental Science annd Technology (UAB); ICREA; Institute of Environmental Studies & Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (LSE)); Stefano Carattini (Haute Ecole de Gestion Genève, University of Apllied Sciences Western Switzerland; Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (LSE)); Richard Howarth (Environmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College); Emilio Padilla (Department of Applied Economics (UAB)); Jordi Roca (Faculty of Economics and Business (UB)) |
| Abstract: | The idea of a global carbon price has been a recurrent theme in debates on international climate policy. Discarded at the Conference of Parties (COP) of Copenhagen in 2009, it remained part of deliberations for a climate agreement in subsequent years. Unfortunately, there is still much misunderstanding about the reasons for implementing a global carbon price. As a result, ideological and political resistance against it prospers. Here we present the main arguments in favor of a carbon price to stimulate a fair and well-informed discussion about climate policy instruments. This includes arguments that have received surprisingly little attention so far. It is stressed that a main reason to use carbon pricing is environmental effectiveness, so not only economic efficiency (including the special case of cost-effectiveness). In addition, we provide ideas on how to implement a uniform global carbon price, whether using a carbon tax or emissions trading. |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea1507&r=reg |
| By: | Juliane Fudickar (Freie Universität Berlin) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of a net neutrality regulation on the competition between content providers and the investment incentives of the internet service provider. We consider a situation where the monopoly internet service provider is vertically integrated with one of the content providers, and content providers compete in prices. Without net neutrality the vertical integrated firm can prioritise the delivery of its own content. We find that, under prioritisation, the integrated internet service provider and consumers as a whole are unambiguously better off. The competing content providers might also be better off under prioritisation if the congestion intensity is high. From a social welfare perspective prioritisation is also desirable unless product differentiation and congestion intensity are low. Contrary to some claims by internet service providers, we find that investment incentives are not always higher under prioritisation. |
| Keywords: | Vertical integration, Network neutrality, Competition, Investment |
| JEL: | L13 L41 L42 L88 |
| Date: | 2015–09–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015014&r=reg |
| By: | Reinhilde Veugelers |
| Abstract: | This contribution focuses on the heterogeneity in innovation capacity within Europe across its different Member States. Who are the leading and who are the lagging EU countries? Is there a trend towards convergence over time? And how has the crisis affected this trend of convergence? We then take a look at the research and innovation policies which the EU countries have in place and try to assess whether these policies match with the heterogeneous EU countries’ innovation capacity positions. We examine both the budgets allocated by EU Member States to R&I as well as the various kinds of R&I policy programmes being deployed. More particularly, we examine how heterogeneous the deployment of policy instruments is across EU member states and whether this matches with the heterogeneity in innovation capacity development among EU countries. Notwithstanding the large and increasing heterogeneity among EU countries in innovation capacity development, the evidence on innovation policies in EU countries shows a relative homogeneity of policy mixes in different countries. Current innovation policy mixes of instruments do not well reflect the countries’ levels of innovation capacity development. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, innovation policy, institutional reforms, multi-level governance |
| JEL: | O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feu:wfepbr:y:2015:m:8:d:0:i:8&r=reg |
| By: | Mauro Massaro (Istituto Regionale per la Programmazionae Economica della Toscana); Leonardo Piccini; Patrizia Lattarulo (Istituto Regionale per la Programmazionae Economica della Toscana) |
| Abstract: | Local public transport has long been the object of a complex reform process directed at reducing the costs and improving the supply of services. The strategy proposed at European level is competition on the market, similarly to other local public services. Tuscany has been one of the first regions to actually implement the process. The experiment of a unique bidding system is currently under way, so it might represent a relevant case study on the possible effects of reform. Although not over yet, the competitive bid has already entailed some important transformations in the system of local public transport, starting processes of business integration, consolidation of operators by way of shareholding, and cost efficiency. |
| Keywords: | public transport, road transport |
| JEL: | R42 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irp:report:597&r=reg |
| By: | Robert C. Schmidt (Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the political economy of climate policy in a simple framework with asymmetric information between voters and politicians. Two parties are engaged in electoral competition and announce policy platforms. An environmental catastrophe (e.g., a tipping point in the climate system) is approaching with some probability that depends on the state of nature. Climate policy can reduce this probability. Each party receives a private signal about the true state of nature, whereas voters possess little information and only know the prior probability distribution. We analyze under what conditions parties can reveal their private signals truthfully to the voters under electoral competition, and when the implemented policy is optimal, given the available information. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, signaling, climate catastrophe, voting, intuitive criterion |
| JEL: | D72 D83 Q54 |
| Date: | 2015–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:wpaper:2015015&r=reg |