nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2015‒01‒31
ten papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. The impact of alternative public policies on the deployment of new communications infrastructure: A survey By Briglauer, Wolfgang ; Frübing, Stefan ; Vogelsang, Ingo
  2. A Nodal Pricing Model for the Nordic Electricity Market By Bjørndal, Endre ; Bjørndal, Mette ; Gribkovskaia, Victoria
  3. Diagnostic Report on the Bus Transport Sector By Briones, Roehlano M. ; Gundaya, Debbie M. ; Domingo, Sonny N.
  4. An Innovation Policy Framework: Bridging the gap between industrial dynamics and growth By Braunerhjelm, Pontus ; Henrekson, Magnus
  5. Power System Impacts of Electric Vehicles in Germany: Charging with Coal or Renewables? By Wolf-Peter Schill ; Clemens Gerbaulet
  6. Appraisal of increased public transport capacity: the case of a new metro line to Nacka, Sweden By Cats, Oded ; West , Jens ; Eliasson, Jonas
  7. From low-cost airlines to low-cost high-speed rail? The French case By Marie Delaplace ; Frédéric Dobruszkes
  8. Tradable Emissions Permits with Offsets By Nathan Braun ; Timothy Fitzgerald ; Jason Pearcy
  9. Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources By Christopher Costello ; Corbett Grainger
  10. Impact of nonrenewable on renewable energy: The case of wood pellets By Xian, Hui ; Gregory, Colson ; Michael, Wetzstein

  1. By: Briglauer, Wolfgang ; Frübing, Stefan ; Vogelsang, Ingo
    Abstract: Our survey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure. Since such investment is expected to induce substantial positive externalities, dynamic efficiency becomes a particularly important policy goal. The available policies refer to i) different kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated regulations, ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law implementation and competitive market structures including allowance of co-investment models, and iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable ('white') areas. Our survey identifies the most significant research gaps, finding that numerous studies related to the impact of access regulations exist, whereas only a much smaller branch of literature addresses the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies analyze the impact of public subsidies on new communications deployment. Moreover, our work allows for a generic framework for policy recommendations that identifies the comparative advantages of the individual policy options for different market structures and for varying degrees of externalities. We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or 'grey' areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment. Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in 'black' areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist.
    Keywords: survey,policy framework,investment,new communications infrastructure,regulation,competition,subsidies
    JEL: L43 L44 L96
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:15003&r=reg
  2. By: Bjørndal, Endre (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics ); Bjørndal, Mette (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics ); Gribkovskaia, Victoria (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics )
    Abstract: In the Nordic day-ahead electricity market zonal pricing or market splitting is used for relieving congestion between a predetermined set of bidding areas. This congestion management method represents an aggregation of individual connection points into bidding areas, and flows from the actual electricity network are only partly represented in the market clearing. Because of several strained situations in the power system during 2009 and 2010, changes in the congestion management method have been considered by the Norwegian regulator. In this paper we discuss nodal pricing in the Nordic power market, and compare it to optimal and simplified zonal pricing, the latter being used in today’s market. A model of the Nordic electricity market is presented together with a discussion of the calibration of actual market data for four hourly case studies with different load and import/exports to the Nordic area. The market clearing optimization model incorporates thermal and security flow constraints. We analyze the effects on prices and grid constraints and quantify the benefits and inefficiencies of the different methods. We find that the price changes with nodal pricing may not be dramatic, although in cases where intra-zonal constraints are badly represented by the aggregate transfer capacities in the simplified zonal model the nodal prices may be considerably higher on average and vary more than the simplified zonal prices. On the other hand nodal prices may vary less than the simplified zonal prices if aggregate transfer capacities are set too tightly. Allowing for more prices in the Nordic power market would make dealing with capacity limits easier and more transparent.
    Keywords: Nodal pricing; Zonal pricing; Congestion management; Electricity market simulation
    JEL: Q00
    Date: 2014–12–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2014_043&r=reg
  3. By: Briones, Roehlano M. ; Gundaya, Debbie M. ; Domingo, Sonny N.
    Abstract: The bus transport sector evolved from a highly regulated and concentrated market with a handful of players in the 1970s to a more liberalized albeit still regulated market with hundreds of small operators. Major reforms in bus transport regulation were carried out in the early 1990s and 2000s among which were more liberal policy and a supposed moratorium on new franchises. The current market operates under a complicated regime where regulation and enforcement is shared by several agencies. Market inefficiencies manifest in too many operators and buses, and indiscipline in the road adding to traffic congestion problems in the Metro. The fragmented nature of both the sector`s regulatory and supply side impedes synchronization among stakeholders and incurs huge costs to industry operators and the riding public.
    Keywords: competition policy, Philippines, bus transport sector, congestion cost, transport policy
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phd:dpaper:dp_2015-02&r=reg
  4. By: Braunerhjelm, Pontus (Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS) & Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) ); Henrekson, Magnus (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) )
    Abstract: This paper examines policy measures that foster the creation of innovations with high inherent potential and that simultaneously provide the right incentives for individuals to create and expand firms that disseminate such innovations in the form of highly valued products. In so doing, we suggest an innovation policy framework based on two pillars: (i) the accumulation, investment, and upgrading of knowledge and (ii) the implementation of mechanisms that enable knowledge to be exploited such that growth and societal prosperity are encouraged. Knowledge is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for growth. To secure industrial dynamics and growth in the long term, institutions must be designed both to encourage sophisticated knowledge investments and to stimulate the creation, diffusion and productive use of knowledge in all sectors of the economy. We argue that the latter area has been overlooked in the policy discussion and that a coherent innovation policy framework must include tax policy, labor market regulation, savings channeling, competition policy, housing market regulation, and infrastructure to foster growth and future prosperity.
    Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Innovation; Institutions; Innovation policy; R&D; Technology transfer; University-industry relations
    JEL: J24 O31 O32 O57
    Date: 2015–01–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0391&r=reg
  5. By: Wolf-Peter Schill ; Clemens Gerbaulet
    Abstract: We analyze future scenarios of integrating electric vehicles (EV) into the German power system, drawing on different assumptions on the charging mode. We use a numerical dispatch model with a unit-commitment formulation which minimizes dispatch costs over a full year. While the overall energy demand of the EV fleets is rather low in all scenarios, the impact on the system’s load duration curve differs strongly between charging modes. In a fully userdriven mode, charging largely occurs during daytime and in the evening, when power demand is already high. User-driven charging may thus have to be restricted in the future because of generation adequacy concerns. In contrast, cost-driven charging is carried out during night-time and at times of high PV availability. Using a novel model formulation that allows for intermediate charging modes, we show that even a slight relaxation of fully userdriven charging results in much smoother load profiles as well as lower charging costs. Different charging patterns go along with respective changes in power plant dispatch. By 2030, cost-driven EV charging strongly increases the utilization of lignite and hard coal plants, whereas additional power in the user-driven mode is predominantly generated from natural gas and hard coal. Specific CO2 emissions of EV are substantially larger than those of the overall power system, and highest under cost-driven charging. Only in additional model runs, in which we link the introduction of EVs to a respective deployment of additional renewable generation capacity, electric vehicles become largely CO2-neutral.
    Keywords: Electric vehicles, power system, dispatch model, renewable energy
    JEL: Q42 R41 Q54
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1442&r=reg
  6. By: Cats, Oded (Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands ); West , Jens (KTH ); Eliasson, Jonas (KTH )
    Abstract: One of the most common motivations for public transport investments is increased capacity. However, appraisal methodologies for projects meant to increase capacity are relatively less well developed compared to methodologies for projects aiming to reduce travel times. Each of the consequences of capacity limitations - crowding, risk for denied boarding and unreliable waiting and travel times - can increase the generalized travel costs. The appraisal of capacity improvements requires supply and demand models able to capture the processes that lead to uneven distributions of vehicles and passengers and monetary valuations of e.g. crowding, delays and unexpected waiting times. This paper integrates these building blocks into a comprehensive framework for appraisal. A case study of a metro extension that partially replaces an overloaded bus network in Stockholm demonstrated that congestion effects may account for a substantial share of the expected benefits. A cost-benefit analysis based on a conventional static model will miss more than half of the benefits. This suggests that failure to represent dynamic congestion effects may substantially underestimate the benefits of projects primarily designed to increase capacity rather than reduce travel times.
    Keywords: Public transport; Capacity; Appraisal; Dynamic assignment; Cost-benefit analysis
    JEL: R40
    Date: 2015–01–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2015_002&r=reg
  7. By: Marie Delaplace ; Frédéric Dobruszkes
    Abstract: This paper explores OUIGO (pronounced ‘we go’), the low-cost high-speed rail (HSR) service launched by the French state-owned railways in April 2013. In this exploration, we: (1) compare OUIGO with the traditional French HSR and the low-cost airlines (LCAs), and (2) analyse fares proposed by OUIGO and its competitors. We thus analyse the new service in terms of production conditions, communication, marketing, booking, network geography, at-terminal and on-board experience and fares. We find that the railway industry’s constraints (including market regulations, technical rigidities and incumbent employment relations) affect the OUIGO business model, which appears as a hybrid between LCAs and traditional French HSR carriers, although fares can be very attractive indeed.
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/186381&r=reg
  8. By: Nathan Braun (Industrial Economics ); Timothy Fitzgerald (Montana State University ); Jason Pearcy (Montana State University )
    Abstract: This chapter extends the existing theory of tradable emissions permit markets to allow for tradable permits and offsets. Offsets are currently incorporated into the EU ETS, and in the future similar assets will likely become a feature of many pollution control systems. A model is developed with multiple compliance assets, offset quotas, and different transaction costs across compliance assets. Either offset usage quotas or additional transaction costs associated with surrendering offsets can lead to an equilibrium price difference between permits and offsets, as experienced in the EU ETS. Another result of the chapter shows that offset usage quotas alone cannot explain observed offset behavior in the EU ETS, but combining offset usage quotas with firm-level heterogeneity in transaction costs can be consistent with observed EU ETS behavior. Annual compliance data from Phase I and II of the EU ETS are used to support the consistency of the theory.
    Keywords: Pollution Control, Emission Permits, Emission Offsets, Cap and Trade
    JEL: Q52 Q53 Q54
    Date: 2014–02–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnu:wpaper:1002&r=reg
  9. By: Christopher Costello ; Corbett Grainger
    Abstract: We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator’s choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters, rather than between producers and consumers, as in the traditional regulatory capture paradigm. When incumbent resource users have weak property rights, they have an incentive to pressure the regulator to allow resource extraction at an inefficiently rapid rate. In contrast, when property rights are strong, this incentive is minimized or eliminated. We build a theoretical model in which different property right institutions can be compared for their incentives to exert influence on the regulator. The main theoretical prediction - that stronger individual property rights will lead the regulator to choose more economically efficient extraction paths - is tested empirically with a novel panel data set from global fisheries. Exploiting the variation in timing of catch share implementation in our panel data, we find that regulators are significantly more conservative in managing resources for which strong individual property rights have been assigned to firms; this is especially pronounced for resources that have been overexploited historically.
    JEL: H23 H41 L2 Q2 Q22
    Date: 2015–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20859&r=reg
  10. By: Xian, Hui ; Gregory, Colson ; Michael, Wetzstein
    Keywords: Nonrenewable, Renewable, Sustainability, Time series, Wood pellets, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q21, Q31, Q40,
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea15:196833&r=reg

This nep-reg issue is ©2015 by Natalia Fabra. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.