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on Regulation |
| By: | Knieps, Günter; Stocker, Volker |
| Abstract: | Network neutrality regulations for the Internet have been discussed for about a decade. In Europe, recent efforts have produced a proposal by the European Commission for a network neutrality regulation. Envisaged is the introduction of a two-tiered Internet traffic regulation based on a regulatory market split between the markets for 'public' Internet traffic services and markets for specialized services giving higher and ensured quality of data transmission. We argue that regulatory market splits are artificial and the proposed regulation of markets for Internet traffic services constitutes a regulatory fallacy. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluivr:151&r=reg |
| By: | Genakos, Christos D.; Koutroumpis, Pantelis; Pagliero, Mario |
| Abstract: | We study the repeal of a regulation that imposed maximum wholesale and retail markups for all but five fresh fruits and vegetables. We compare the prices of products affected by regulation before and after the policy change and use the unregulated products as a control group. We find that abolishing regulation led to a significant decrease in both retail and wholesale prices. However, markup regulation affected wholesalers directly and retailers only indirectly. The results are consistent with markup ceilings providing a focal point for collusion among wholesalers. |
| Keywords: | markup regulation; markups; policy evaluation |
| JEL: | L0 L1 L4 L5 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10243&r=reg |
| By: | Carol Luengo; Marcelo Caffera; Carlos Chávez |
| Abstract: | Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator. Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense. |
| Keywords: | s Uncertainty; Risk; Compound risk; Fine; Emission standard; Economic experiment |
| JEL: | C91 L51 Q58 K42 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnt:wpaper:1407&r=reg |
| By: | Darmani, Anna (Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Royal Institute of Technology & Department of Business Administration, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid); Niesten, Eva (Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University); Hekkert, Marko (Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University) |
| Abstract: | In order to facilitate the transition to electricity sectors with low CO2 emissions, it is important to understand which firms invest in new renewable energy technologies, and which firms are responsive to energy policies. This study concentrates on the heterogeneous characteristics of investors in wind power that are embedded in the investors’ dynamic capabilities. The paper explores which type of investors display a positive reaction to the undifferentiated policy, and thus build up more assets in wind power. Empirical data is collected on investments in the Swedish wind energy industry in the Swedish tradable certificate system. The findings demonstrate that the cumulative wind power assets are indeed influenced by investors’ characteristics. Investors with a greater resource endowment, higher investment experience and a mixed generation portfolio hold higher share of assets in wind. The results also indicate that the investors’ age in the wind industry has a negative relation with the cumulative assets in wind, offering evidence on the important role of new entrants in this industry. This study offers insights for policy makers on which investors are responsive to the certificate system and invest in wind. It also implies that a more diversified set of policies could stimulate a greater variety of firms to invest in wind power. |
| Keywords: | Radical change; investors; electricity generation; dynamic capabilities; energy policy; wind power; incumbents; new entrants |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2014–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kthind:2014_008&r=reg |
| By: | Christian Jaag; Urs Trinkner; Jeffrey Yusof |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses the EU postal sector policy of the second Barroso Commission from 2010 to 2014. The main goal of the Commission is to achieve a single European market for postal services. The paper distinguishes between the following three objectives, whose implementation should lead to the achievement of an internal postal market: implementation of the Third Postal Directive; fostering e-commerce and parcel delivery; and enforce its State aid framework in the postal sector. The analysis shows that almost all Member States have transposed the Directive into national law and fully liberalized their markets, but nevertheless competition in all Member States has only developed to a limited extent. While there is strong growth of the e-commerce sector, a consistent alignment of State Aid policy with USO and full market opening is still under development. The current design of the USO and its financing may not be appropriate in times of fast changing technology and consumer needs. Therefore, the paper presents new approaches, suggesting to include new technologies or even proposing to establish an intermodal USO for postal and telecommunication services. |
| Keywords: | Barroso Commission, Postal Sector, Universal Service Obligation, State Aid, E-Commerce |
| JEL: | L43 L51 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0050&r=reg |
| By: | Jørgen Juel Andersen; Mads Greaker |
| Abstract: | The theoretical justiÖcation for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. However, for Öscally constrained governments this logic does not apply, as they have a Öscal incentive to let welfare concerns, rather than industrial cost effciency, guide their abatement policy. Then, global cost e¢ ciency will fail even if just a (small) subset of governments are Öscally constrained. Finally, we argue that any institutional change which breaks the connection between a governmentís abatement policy and its budget will increase welfare. |
| Keywords: | environmental policy, fiscal icentive, fiscal constraints, GHG cap and trade, welfare |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bny:wpaper:0027&r=reg |
| By: | Debabrata Chattopadhyay; Rahul Kitchlu; Rhonda L. Jordan |
| Keywords: | Environment - Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases Energy - Energy and Environment Science and Technology Development - Engineering Energy - Energy Production and Transportation Environment - Environment and Energy Efficiency |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wboper:20596&r=reg |
| By: | Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Abstract: | For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. |
| Keywords: | adaptation costs; auctions; behavioral contract theory; loss aversion; negotiations; procurement; renegotiations |
| JEL: | D03 D82 D83 H57 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10284&r=reg |