nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2014‒10‒22
thirteen papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Let the Market Decide: The Case Against Mandatory Pick-and-Pay By Lawson Hunter; Edward Iacobucci; Michael Trebilcock
  2. Refinancing under Yardstick Regulation with Investment Cycles–The Case of Long-Lived Electricity Network Assets By Dominik Schober
  3. The Market Stability Reserve in Perspective By Marcu, Andrei
  4. Support mechanisms for renewables: How risk exposure influences investment incentives By Lena Kitzing; Christoph Weber
  5. The use of “Bonus-Malus†schemes for promoting energy-efficient household appliances: a case study for Spain By Ibon Galarraga; Luis M. Abadie
  6. Political institutions behind good governance By Raffaella SANTOLINI; David BARTOLINI
  7. The effects of energy costs on firm re-location decisions By Lucia Lavric; Nick Hanley
  8. Energy Prices, Energy Poverty, and Well-Being: Evidence for European Countries By Heinz Welsch; Philipp Biermann
  9. The fiscal incentive of GHG cap and trade. Permits may be too cheap and developed countries may abate too little By Jørgen Juel Andersen; Mads Greaker
  10. Cross-border Spillovers from European Gas Infrastructure Investments By Bouwmeester, M.C.; Scholtens, B.
  11. A Spatial Approach to Energy Economics: Theory, Measurement and Empirics By M. Scott Taylor; Moreno
  12. Liberalization of the Interurban Coach Market in Germany: Do Attitudes and Perceptions Drive the Choice between Rail and Coach? By Francisco J. Bahamonde-Birke; Uwe Kunert; Heike Link; Juan de Dios Ortúzar
  13. Managing for Development Results: Rail Infrastructure Tariffs - Enabling Private Sector Development in Mongolia's Railway Sector By Asian Development Bank (ADB); ; ;

  1. By: Lawson Hunter; Edward Iacobucci; Michael Trebilcock
    Abstract: A proposal by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to mandate “pick-and-pay” television offerings for Canadians is deeply misguided, according to a report from the C.D. Howe Institute. In “Let the Market Decide: The Case Against Mandatory Pick-and-Pay,” authors Lawson Hunter, Edward Iacobucci and Michael Trebilcock find that mandating consumers to be able to subscribe to pay and specialty services on a service-by-service basis would be a slippery slope to still more regulation, and would become irrelevant at best in the ongoing telecom revolution.
    Keywords: Governance and Public INstitutions, Telecommunications, broadcasting
    JEL: L82 L96
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdh:ebrief:184&r=reg
  2. By: Dominik Schober (Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics University of Duisburg-Essen)
    Abstract: In the context of yardstick regulation with long-lived assets, the influence of investment cycles and thereof resulting heterogeneous capital structures on the ability to recover capital is quite important. Investment decisions are based on whole investment cycles of the infrastructure. It is shown in this article that variable lifetimes of assets may cause substantial problems of capital-recovery under an efficient firm standard yardstick regulation based on historic (straight-line) depreciation. Resulting heterogeneous investment and cost cycles may cause instantaneous yardstick levels below the long-run refinancing level. Recovery is neither possible in later periods because of the efficient firm standard. An illustrating empirical example is used to demonstrate the relevance of the problem. Finally, two alternatives, branch average cost yardstick determination and correction factors based on the share of capital under depreciation, are discussed.
    Keywords: Electricity markets, yardstick regulation, benchmarking, infrastructure investment, capital-recovery, sustainable refinancing
    JEL: L51 L52
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dui:wpaper:1321&r=reg
  3. By: Marcu, Andrei
    Abstract: This Special Report aims to contribute to the debate on the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which was introduced by the European Commission in a legislative proposal of January 2014. The MSR would introduce a degree of supply management into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). This report is the result of various meetings with ETS-stakeholders throughout 2014. It discusses the MSR’s rationale and reviews the different options available for its design, governance and timing, as well as its consequences for the functioning of the EU ETS and the EU’s climate and energy policy.
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:cepswp:9695&r=reg
  4. By: Lena Kitzing; Christoph Weber (Chair for Management Sciences and Energy Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen)
    Abstract: We analyse quantitatively how risk exposure from different support mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs and premiums, can influence the investment incentives for private investors. We develop a net cash flow approach that takes systematic and unsystematic risks into account through cost of capital and the Capital Asset Pricing Model as well as through active liquidity management. Applying the model to a specific case, a German offshore wind park, we find that the support levels required to give adequate investment incentives are for a feed-in tariff scheme approximately 5-7% lower than for a feed-in premium scheme. The effect of differences in risk exposure from the support schemes is significant and cannot be neglected in policy making, especially when deciding between support instruments or when determining adequate support levels.
    Keywords: investment risk, support policies, unsystematic risk, liquidity management, offshore wind, feed-in tariffs
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dui:wpaper:1403&r=reg
  5. By: Ibon Galarraga; Luis M. Abadie
    Abstract: Subsidies to promote the purchase of energy-efficient household appliances have been extensively used in many countries. This paper deals with the case of the Spanish rebate scheme, and proposes the use of both subsidies and taxes as a more effective way of promoting efficient appliances. The authors propose a sophisticated methodology for designing optimal combinations of taxes and subsides depending on different policy goals such as budget neutrality, increasing the proportion of efficient appliances, etc.
    Keywords: energy efficiency, Spain, rebates, appliances, rebound effect.
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2014-06&r=reg
  6. By: Raffaella SANTOLINI (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali); David BARTOLINI (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali)
    Abstract: The present work looks at the role of political institutions - political regimes and electoral rules - in determining the performance of the government to define and implement sound policies for the economy. The results of the empirical investigation on a panel of 80 democracies over the period 1996-2011, show an important impact of the political regime on the performance of the government - the presidential regimes reduces the quality of the government -, while electoral rules do not matter. However, the analysis shows that the interaction between political regimes and electoral rules plays a crucial role for the quality of the government. In particular, a presidential regime improves the government performance when associated with a majoritarian rule, while worsens it when combined with a proportional rule.
    Keywords: electoral rule, government eectiveness, political system, regulatory quality
    JEL: D72 H11
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:405&r=reg
  7. By: Lucia Lavric (Department of Economics, Duke University); Nick Hanley (School of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews)
    Abstract: Energy costs are partly driven by environmental policy choices. In this paper, the effects of variations in energy costs – as measured by end-user electricity prices – on firm relocation decisions are investigated. Using a discrete choice model a nd a data base which has not previously been exploited to study this problem, we investigate the effects of variations in energy costs both for a sub-set of re-locating European firms in terms of which country they move to; and then for a larger set of firms in terms of the decision to re-locate or not in response to higher energy prices. We find that energy costs play a significant role in determining relocation destinations, and that this effect is asymmetric between firms moving into and out of a country , and between high energy intensity and low energy intensity sectors. The findings of the paper have implications for the Pollution Havens Hypothesis, since they show the extent to which the effects of climate policy on domestic energy costs can be expected to impact on firm relocation decisions both into and out of a country.
    Keywords: firm re-location, energy costs, Pollution Havens Hypothesis, climate policy, carbonleakage
    JEL: D22 F18 Q41 Q52
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sss:wpaper:201402&r=reg
  8. By: Heinz Welsch (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics); Philipp Biermann (University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper uses data on the life satisfaction of more than 100,000 individuals in 21 European countries, 2002-2011, to study the relationship between subjective well-being and the prices for households of electricity, oil and gas. We find that energy prices have statistically and economically significant effects on subjective well-being. The effect sizes are smaller than but comparable to the effects of important personal factors of well-being. Effects above average are found in individuals from the lowest income quartile. In addition, effects are strongest at times when required energy expenditures can be expected to be high. The empirical results are consistent with the prediction that greater energy poverty implies a greater effect of energy prices on well-being.
    Keywords: energy price; energy poverty; fuel poverty, consumer welfare; subjective well-being
    JEL: Q41 I31 D12
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:dpaper:369&r=reg
  9. By: Jørgen Juel Andersen; Mads Greaker (Statistics Norway)
    Abstract: The theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal costs of abatement equal the equilibrium price of emission permits. Abatement is then globally cost efficient. We demonstrate, however, that when the "participants" are national governments this logic may no longer apply: when a national government struggles to raise its desired first-best amount of funds for the provision of public goods, the option of emission trading generates a fiscal incentive that is, generally, inconsistent with a cost effective distribution of abatement. In market equilibrium, global cost efficiency will fail even if just a (small) subset of the participating governments are fiscally constrained: since the fiscally constrained governments will engage in too much abatement, the equilibrium price of GHG emissions will be too low, fiscally unconstrained countries will abate too little, and global GHG abatement costs will not be minimized. Finally, we argue that any institutional change which breaks the direct connection between a national government's abatement policy and its budget is likely to increase welfare.
    Keywords: climate policy; cap and trade; public goods provision
    JEL: Q55 Q58
    Date: 2014–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:785&r=reg
  10. By: Bouwmeester, M.C.; Scholtens, B. (Groningen University)
    Abstract: We investigate international investment in natural gas infrastructure. In particular, we analyze cross-border cost spillovers related to the investment expenditure of five European countries in a multi-regional input-output model. Value added coefficients and employment coefficients are used to translate the impacts into employment compensation, capital compensation and employment hours required. We find that spillovers are generally larger for employment compensation compared to capital compensation, that the spillovers primarily flow to a limited set of countries, and that most employment hours are created for medium skilled-labor. Hence, we suggest that investment plans should not be assessed from a national perspective, but from an EU perspective.
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugsom:14028-eef&r=reg
  11. By: M. Scott Taylor (University of Calgary); Moreno
    Abstract: This paper sets out a simple spatial model of energy exploitation to ask how the location and productivity of energy resources may affect the distribution of economic activity around the globe. This is a very large research question, and we take one small step towards answering it by combining elements from resource and energy economics into one framework that links the spatial productivity of energy sources (both renewable and non-renewable) to the incentives for economic activity to concentrate. Our theory provides a novel scaling law; a magnification effect; and reveals a complementarity between infrastructure investment and spatially productive energy resources. Our empirical work provides estimates of key model attributes and reviews related empirical work supporting our approach.
    Date: 2014–09–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2014-67&r=reg
  12. By: Francisco J. Bahamonde-Birke; Uwe Kunert; Heike Link; Juan de Dios Ortúzar
    Abstract: In January 2013 the interurban passenger transport market in Germany was liberalized and several coach carriers emerged offering an alternative to the Deutsche Bahn, a state owned rail monopoly. The coach carriers have attempted to position themselves not just through lower prices but also through product differentiation, for example marketing their services as the most ecological way to travel. Hence, it is important to consider attitudes and perceptions when analyzing this market. One year after liberalization we conducted a stated-choice experiment among students and employees at the Technical University of Berlin, where participants had to choose between different interurban public transport alternatives (regional and intercity trains or interurban coaches). Additionally, the experiment gathered perception and attitudinal indicators used to construct latent variables. Our results show that attitudes and perceptions indeed affect the way individuals choose between different transport modes and, therefore, they must be taken into account when analyzing the interurban passenger market in Germany.
    Keywords: Liberalization, Coach Market, Latent Variables, Hybrid Discrete Choice Modelling, Attitudes and Perceptions
    JEL: R41
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1415&r=reg
  13. By: Asian Development Bank (ADB); (East Asia Department, ADB); ;
    Abstract: Railways are essential for the development and diversification of Mongolia’s economy. The Government of Mongolia recognizes that structural changes will be required to improve the efficiency of the rail sector and to provide incentives for private sector investment. A key step toward rail sector reform is to institute a tariff system for the use of rail infrastructure that provides “open access” to the rail network. This report proposes a system of rail infrastructure tariffs to enable liberalization of the freight market and spur private sector investment in Mongolia’s rail sector.
    Keywords: Railways, Mongolia, Infrastructure, Transport, adb, asian development bank, asdb, asia, pacific, poverty asia, mongolia, railway, rail infrastructure, Ulaanbaatar Railways, open access rail freight, rail transport, infrastructure tariffs, railway infrastructure, freight market, private infrastructure development, railway investment
    Date: 2014–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:asd:wpaper:rpt146251&r=reg

This nep-reg issue is ©2014 by Natalia Fabra. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.