nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2014‒09‒25
sixteen papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Estimating the Price of ROCs By Bryan, Jeff; Lange, Ian; MacDonald, Alex
  2. Merit order effect and strategic investments in intermittent generation technologies By Silvia Concettini
  3. Searching for carbon leaks in multinational companies By Antoine Dechezleprêtre; Caterina Gennaioli; Ralf Martin; Mirabelle Muûls
  4. Regulation, Competition, Diversification, Governance and Costs: An Empirical Analysis of Public Utility and Manufacturing Firms in Japan By Fumitoshi Mizutani; Eri Nakamura
  5. Abatement Technology Search By Alain-Désiré Nimubona; Andrew Leach
  6. Similarities and Differences between U.S. and German Regulation of the Use of Derivatives and Leverage by Mutual Funds – What Can Regulators Learn from Each Other? By GaÅ‚kiewicz, Dominika
  7. Atténuation de l’effet de serre d’origine agricole : efficacité en coûts et instruments de régulation By Stephane De Cara; Bruno Vermont
  8. The Impact of Market Regulations on Intra-European Real Exchange Rates By Agnès Bénassy-Quéré; Dramane Coulibaly
  9. A note on price caps with demand uncertainty, quantity precommitment and disposal By A. Lemus; Diego Moreno
  10. The impact of financial (de)regulation on current account balances By Enrique Moral-Benito; Oliver Roehn
  11. Systemic importance of financial institutions: from a global to a local perspective? A network theory approach By Michele Bonollo; Irene Crimaldi; Andrea Flori; Fabio Pammolli; Massimo Riccaboni
  12. Macroprudential Regulation and the Role of Monetary Policy By William Tayler; Roy Zilberman
  13. Local Economic Conditions and the Nature of New Housing Supply By Christian A. L. Hilber; Jan Rouwendal; Wouter Vermeulen
  14. Are Banks Less Likely to Issue Equity When They Are Less Capitalized? By Valeriya Dinger; Francesco Vallascas
  15. Improving the role of equity crowdfunding in Europe's capital markets By Karen E. Wilson; Marco Testoni
  16. How does credit supply respond to monetary policy and bank minimum capital requirements? By Aiyar, Shekhar; Calomiris, Charles; Wieladek, Tomasz

  1. By: Bryan, Jeff; Lange, Ian; MacDonald, Alex
    Abstract: The UK government introduced the Renewable Obligation (RO), a system of tradable quotas, to encourage the installation of renewable electricity capacity. Each unit of generation from renewables created a renewable obligation certificate (ROC). Electricity generators must either; earn ROCs through their own production, purchase ROCs in the market or pay the buy-out price to comply with the quota set by the RO. A unique aspect of this regulation is that all entities holding ROCs receive a share of the buy-out fund (the sum of all compliance purchases using the buy-out price). This set-up ensures that the difference between the market price for ROCs and the buy-out price should equal the expected share of the buy-out fund, as regulated entities arbitrage these two compliance options. The expected share of the buy-out fund depends on whether enough renewable generation is available to meet the quota. This analysis tests whether variables associated with renewable generation or electricity demand are correlated with, and thus can help predict, the price of ROCs.
    Keywords: Renewable Obligation, Arbitrage, Electricity,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:sirdps:569&r=reg
  2. By: Silvia Concettini
    Abstract: This paper studies the strategic interactions between two electricity generators, the first producing with a \traditional" technology and the second employing a \renewable" technology characterized by the random availability of capacity due to the intermittency of its power source. The competition between the \traditional" and the \renewable" power producers is examined through a modified version of the two stage Dixit model for entry deterrence (Dixit, 1980) with Cournot competition in the post entry stage. The outcome of the game suggests that the \renewable" generator exploits the merit order rule which governs spot electricity markets to invest and produce as if it were a sort of Stackelberg leader. While in most cases producer's preferences over strategies do not depend on the average value of capacity availability, according to the value of this parameter the market may lead to an equilibrium which benefits both the \renewable" producer and the consumers. Given that production of electricity from the renewable source depends on actual weather conditions, the analysis of ex-post payoffs reveals that \renewable" producer's preferences over strategies may be reversed for small errors in the forecasting of the true value of the average capacity availability factor when the investment cost in the renewable technology is relatively low. In this case, the incentives for strategic behaviour of the \renewable" producer may be even stronger. The main insights of the model seem to be barely sensitive to changes in the market power of competitors: even when the \renewable" generator behaves as a competitive fringe in the spot market, it is able to infuence equilibrium outcome to its own advantage through investment choices although to a smaller degree than in the standard setting.
    Keywords: Competition, Renewable generation, Capacity investments, Merit order.
    JEL: D43 L13 L43 L94
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2014-44&r=reg
  3. By: Antoine Dechezleprêtre; Caterina Gennaioli; Ralf Martin; Mirabelle Muûls
    Abstract: Does climate change policy cause companies to shift the location of production, thereby creating carbon leakage? We examine the impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on the geographical distribution of carbon emissions within multinational companies based on data from the Carbon Disclosure Project for the period 2007- 2009. Our data includes regional emissions of 435 companies, of which 47 are subject to EU ETS regulation. We find no evidence that the EU ETS has induced a displacement of carbon emissions from Europe towards the rest of the world. Our results suggest that claims that the EU ETS would cause carbon leakage might have been exaggerated.
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsg:lsgwps:wp165&r=reg
  4. By: Fumitoshi Mizutani (Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University); Eri Nakamura (Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University)
    Abstract: The main purpose of this study is to investigate how regulation, competition, governance structure, and business diversification strategy affect the cost structure of firms. By using 358 observations comprised of public utility firms and manufacturing firms from 1989 to 2002, we estimate the translog cost function. From our empirical analysis, the following results are obtained: (i) The regulation factor does not affect the cost structure. (ii) Compared with the regulation factor, the competition factor shows a quite clear effect on a firm' s cost reduction. (iii) As a company diversifies further from its core industry into other industries, all of the firm' s business costs increase, indicating an apparent lack of economies of scope. (iv) The governance factor has an important effect on a firm' s cost structure. As the ratio of foreign shareholders increases and there is more dependence on one main bank, the costs of a firm decrease.
    Keywords: Regulation, Competition, Governance, Diversification Strategy, Japanese Firms
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kbb:dpaper:2013-25&r=reg
  5. By: Alain-Désiré Nimubona (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo); Andrew Leach (Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta)
    Abstract: We develop a three-stage model of abatement technology search, adoption, and deployment. Using this model, which draws on search theory tools more frequently used in labour and monetary economics, we compare market-based and command-and-control pollution control instruments with respect to the incentives each provides for abatement technology search and adoption, expected emissions reductions, and expected compliance costs. We show that the polluting firm always has more incentives to search for and adopt a more ecient abatement technology under either an emissions tax or a tradeable permit system than under an equivalently stringent emissions standard. We also show that while expected incentives for innovation are comparable under emissions taxes and tradeable permit regimes, the likelihood for total future compliance costs to be reduced after an increase in the stringency of environmental policy - the so-called Porter hypothesis - is higher with a tradeable permit regime.
    JEL: Q55 Q58 H23 D83
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wat:wpaper:1407&r=reg
  6. By: Gałkiewicz, Dominika
    Abstract: This study analyzes current regulation with respect to the use of derivatives and leverage by mutual funds in the U.S. and Germany. After presenting a detailed overview of U.S. and German regulations, this study thoroughly compares the level of flexibility funds have in both countries. I find that funds in the U.S. and Germany face limits on direct leverage (amount of bank borrowing) of up to 33% and 10% of their net assets, respectively. Funds can extend these limits indirectly by using derivatives beyond their net assets (e.g., by selling credit default swaps protection with a notional amount equal to their net assets). Additionally, issuer-oriented rules in the U.S. and Germany account for issuer risk differently: U.S. funds have greater discretion to undervalue derivative exposure compared to German funds. All analyses of this study reveal that under existing derivative and leverage regulation, funds in both countries are able to increase risk by using derivatives up to the point at which it is possible for them to default solely due to investments in derivatives. The results of this study are highly relevant for the public and regulators.
    Keywords: Regulation; mutual funds; leverage; derivative; credit default swaps
    JEL: G15 G18
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:474&r=reg
  7. By: Stephane De Cara (Economie Publique, INRA); Bruno Vermont (Economie Publique, INRA)
    Abstract: Du fait de son poids dans les émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES), l’agriculture peut (et doit) participer significativement à l’effort d’atténuation global. Les politiques publiques peuvent jouer un rôle important pour que les potentiels d’atténuation que peut offrir ce secteur soient mobilisés au meilleur coût pour la société. Ce texte synthétise les concepts qui sous-tendent les travaux d’économie appliquée qui ont examiné cette question. Il précise notamment le concept d’efficacité en coûts et le rôle que peuvent jouer les instruments économiques à cet égard. Les résultats de travaux récents portant sur cette question dans les cas français et européen illustrent l’importance des gains en efficacité permis par les instruments économiques. Ces éléments sont mis en regard de l’évolution récente des politiques climatiques et agricoles dans leur prise en compte de la question des émissions de GES d’origine agricole.
    Abstract: Given its weight in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), agriculture can (and should) contribute significantly to the global mitigation effort. Public policies may play an important role in realizing the mitigation potential in this sector at the lowest possible cost for the society. This text provides an overview of the concepts used in applied economics research works that have addressed this issue. In particular, it presents the concept of cost-effectiveness and the role that economic instruments can play in this regard. Recent results from studies that have examined this question in the French and European contexts illustrate the efficiency gains that can be expected from the implementation of economic instruments. These results are then used to analyze the recent trends in climate and agricultural policies with respect to the issue of GHG emissions from agriculture.
    Keywords: gaz à effet de serre, émission de gazinstrument économiqueprotoxyde d'azote, méthaneefficacitécoût
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inr:wpaper:270000&r=reg
  8. By: Agnès Bénassy-Quéré (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique); Dramane Coulibaly (EconomiX - CNRS : UMR7166 - Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)
    Abstract: We study the contribution of market regulations in the dynamics of the real exchange rate within the European Union. Based on a model proposed by De Gregorio et al. (1994a), we show that both product market regulations in montradable sectors and employment protection tend to inflate the real exchange rate. We then carry out an econometric estimation for European countries over 1985-2006 to quantify the contributions of the pure Balassa-Samuelson effect and those of market regulations in real exchange-rate variations. Based on this evidence and on a counter-factual experimient, we conclude that the relative evolution of product market regulations and employment protection across countries play a very significant role in real exchange-rate variations within the European Union and especially within the Euro area, through theirs impacts on the relative price of nontradable goods.
    Keywords: Real exchange rate; Balassa-Samuelson effect; product market regulations; employment protection
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00786095&r=reg
  9. By: A. Lemus; Diego Moreno
    Abstract: Since Littlechild (1983)'s report, price cap regulation has been regarded as an effective instrument to mitigate market power when precise information about cost and demand is available. Earle, Schmedders and Tatur (2007) establishes that the comparative static properties of price caps that hold when the demand is deterministic fail for a generic stochastic demand schedule. This note concerns the validity and interpretation of this result in a setting in which firms choose how much to produce ex-ante, but then upon observing the realization of demand choose how much of their output to supply, freely disposing of the output it does not supply.
    Keywords: Price Cap Regulation, Capacity Investment and Withholding, Demand Uncertainty
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we1417&r=reg
  10. By: Enrique Moral-Benito (Banco de España); Oliver Roehn (OECD and CESIFO)
    Abstract: Global imbalances and financial market (de)regulation both feature prominently among the potential causes of the global financial crisis, but they have been generally discussed separately. In this paper, we take a different angle and investigate the relationship between financial market regulation and current account balances, an area for which there is limited empirical evidence. We use a panel of countries over the period 1980-2010 and employ a novel empirical approach which allows us to simultaneously account for model uncertainty, current account persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. We find robust evidence that financial market regulations affect current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the current account. In particular we find that lowering bank entry barriers is negatively associated with the current account balance. In contrast, bank privatisation and securities market deregulation tend to raise current account balances. Our results also highlight the need to control for persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for these factors, we find robust evidence for a wide range of current account theories in contrast to previous studies.
    Keywords: current account, financial markets, financial regulation, Bayesian model averaging, model uncertainty
    JEL: C11 F32 F41 G28
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:1424&r=reg
  11. By: Michele Bonollo (Credito trevigiano); Irene Crimaldi (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Andrea Flori (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Fabio Pammolli (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Massimo Riccaboni (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies)
    Abstract: After the systemic effects of bank defaults during the recent financial crisis, and despite a huge amount of literature over the last years to detect systemic risk, no standard methodologies have been set up until now. We aim to build a concise but comprehensive picture of the state of the art, illustrating the open issues, and outlining pathways for future research. In particular, we propose the analysis of some examples of local systems that attract the attention of the financial sector. This work is directed to both academic researchers and practitioners.
    Keywords: Systemic Risk, Counterparty Risk, Financial Networks, Basel Regulations, European Market Infrastructure Regulation
    JEL: G01 G18 G21
    Date: 2014–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ial:wpaper:9/2014&r=reg
  12. By: William Tayler; Roy Zilberman
    Abstract: We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:63933064&r=reg
  13. By: Christian A. L. Hilber; Jan Rouwendal; Wouter Vermeulen
    Abstract: We present a modified open monocentric city model that assumes that land is available for conversion into new housing throughout the city. The model predicts that positive local income shocks (i) increase the city's share of multi-family housing in new construction and (ii) lead to the construction of smaller units. We exploit the metro area samples of the American Housing Survey from 1984 to 2004 and find support for both predictions. We confirm that the adjustment process is driven by migration and is hindered by strict local land use control. Our findings imply that tight regulation may hamper metro area level labor market adjustment to positive economic shocks not only through limits on the quantity of newly supplied units but also by constraining their type to single-family houses and larger units that may be less suitable for would-be-migrants.
    Keywords: Local economic conditions, open monocentric city model, land conversion, housing supply, housing type, housing consumption, land use regulation, migration
    JEL: R11 R21 R31 R52
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:sercdp:0164&r=reg
  14. By: Valeriya Dinger (University of Osnabrueck); Francesco Vallascas (University of Leeds)
    Abstract: Debt overhang and moral hazard related to risk-shifting opportunities predict that low capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to issue equity. In contrast to this view, for an international sample of bank Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), we show that the likelihood of issuing an SEO is generally higher in low capitalized banks. We provide a series of tests exploring the variation of capital regulation, systemic conditions and market discipline to understand the driving forces behind this result. We find that market mechanisms rather than capital regulation are the primary, key driver of the decision to issue by low capitalized banks.
    Keywords: SEOs, Banking Regulation, Banking Crises, Counter-cyclical capital regulation
    JEL: G21 G28 G32
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iee:wpaper:wp0100&r=reg
  15. By: Karen E. Wilson; Marco Testoni
    Abstract: Summary Crowdfunding is a growing phenomenon that encompasses several different models of financing for business or other ventures. Despite the hype, equity crowdfunding is still the smallest part of the crowdfunding market. Because of its legal framework, Europe has been at the forefront of equity crowdfunding market development. Equity crowdfunding is more complex than other forms of crowdfunding and requires proper checks and balances if it is to provide a viable channel for financial intermediation in the seed and early-stage market in Europe. It is important to explore this new channel of funding for young and innovative firms given the critical role these start-ups can play job creation and economic growth in Europe. We assess the potential role of equity crowdfunding in the overall seed and early-stage financing market and highlight the potential risks of equity crowdfunding. We describe the current state of play in this nascent industry, considering both the innovations introduced by market operators and existing regulation. Currently in Europe there is a patchwork of national legal frameworks related to equity crowdfunding and this should be addressed in a harmonised way. Introduction Crowdfunding is increasingly attracting attention, most recently for its potential to provide equity funding to start-ups. Providing funding to young and innovative firms is particularly relevant given their importance for job creation and economic growth (OECD, 2013; Haltiwangner et al, 2011; Stangler and Litan, 2009). In addition, at a time when banking intermediation is under pressure (Sapir and Wolff, 2013), it is important for European Union policymakers to further explore alternative forms of financial intermediation. But questions remain about the appropriateness of crowdfunding for providing seed and early stage equity finance to new ventures and how this market could be developed and regulated. While there is growing hype around crowdfunding, there are also many wrong perceptions. The bulk of crowdfunding is for philanthropic projects (in the form of donations), consumer products often for creative ventures such as music and film (in the form of pre-funding orders) and lending. Equity crowdfunding, sometimes called crowdinvesting is relatively new and currently comprises the smallest part of the crowdfunding market. However, it is currently more active in Europe than in other regions. Growth of crowdfunding Crowdfunding can be defined as the collection of funds, usually through a web platform, from a large pool of backers to fund an initiative. Two fundamental elements underpin this model and both have been enabled by the development of the internet. First, by substantially reducing transaction costs, the internet makes it possible to collect small sums from a large pool of funders: the crowd. The aggregation of many small contributions can result in considerable amounts of capital. Second, the internet makes it possible to directly connect funders with those seeking funding, without an active intermediary. Crowdfunding platforms assume the role of facilitators of the match. While people tend to talk about crowdfunding in general, the crowdfunding phenomenon encompasses quite heterogeneous financing models. There are four main types: Donation-based, in which funders donate to causes that they want to support with no expected compensation (ie philanthropic or sponsorship-based incentive).Reward-based, in which fundersâ?? objective for funding is to gain a non-financial reward such as a token gift or a product, such as a first edition release.Lending-based (crowd lending), in which funders receive fixed periodic income and expect repayment of the original principal investment.Equity-based (usually defined as crowdinvesting), in which funders receive compensation in the form of fundraiserâ??s equity-based revenue or profit-share arrangements. In other words, the entrepreneur decides how much money he or she would like to raise in exchange for a percentage of equity and each crowdfunder receives a pro-rata share (usually ordinary shares) of the company depending on the fraction of the target amount they decide to commit. For example, if a start-up is trying to raise â?¬50,000 in exchange for 20 percent of its equity and each crowdfunder provides â?¬500 (1 percent of â?¬50,000), the crowdfunder will receive 0.20 percent (1 percent of 20 percent) of the companyâ??s equity. The four models vary in terms of complexity and level of uncertainty. The donation-based model is the simplest. Legally the transaction takes the form of a donation. The risk is that the project does not achieve its declared goals, but the backer does not expect any material or financial return from the transaction. Equity crowdfunding is the most complex. From a legal standpoint, the funder buys a stake in the company, the value of which must be estimated. Moreover, the level of uncertainty in equity crowdfunding is much greater compared to the other models because it concerns the entrepreneurâ??s ability to generate equity value in the company, which is extremely difficult to assess. Overall, these complexities pose problems that are distinct and more fundamental than those of the other crowdfunding models. These complexities require special attention from policymakers, as this Policy Contribution will discuss. In general, crowdfunding is experiencing exponential growth globally. In the period 2009-13, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of the funding volumes was about 76 percent with an estimated total funding volume of $5.1bn in 2013. In terms of geography, the biggest market has been North America (and mostly the US where the concept of crowdfunding started) with 60 percent of the market volume, followed by Europe, which has 36 percent. Equity crowdfunding is the smallest category of the overall industry and had a CAGR of about 50 percent from 2010 to 2012. Most of that growth was through European crowdfunding platforms because legal barriers currently prevent the development of equity crowdfunding in the US (see Box 2). As a result, Europe is currently the leading market for this financing model (see further discussion in section 4). While in Europe equity crowdfunding is growing, the understanding of its risks and opportunities is still limited. We first assess the potential role of equity crowdfunding in the overall seed and early-stage financing market. Second, we point out the potential risks of equity crowdfunding. Third, we describe the state of this nascent industry considering both the innovations introduced by market players and existing regulation. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for policy. The seed and early-stage financing market Equity crowdfunding is receiving attention from policymakers as a potential source of funds for start-ups, a segment of the economy that has limited access to finance. Young firms have no track record and often lack assets to be used as guarantees for bank loans. In addition, information asymmetries make it difficult for investors to identify and evaluate the potential of these firms. Traditionally there have been three sources of equity funding for young innovative firms: founders, family and friends; angel investors; and venture capitalists. The most common source of funding for new ventures is the foundersâ?? own capital, even if that is funded through credit cards. Family and friends sometimes also provide finance to the entrepreneur in the first phases of development of the start-up (seed stage).Angel investors are experienced entrepreneurs or business people that choose to invest their own funds into a new venture. They typically invest in seed and early stage ventures with amounts ranging from $25,000 to $500,000. Angels invest not only for the potential financial return, but in many cases to give back by helping other entrepreneurs.Venture capital is considered â??professionalâ?? equity, in the form of a fund run by general partners, and aims at investments in firms in early to expansion stages. The source of capital pooled into venture capital funds is predominately institutional investors. Venture capital firms typically invest around $3m and $5m per round in a company. The contributions of angel investors and venture capital firms are not limited to the provision of finance. They are actively involved in monitoring the companies in which they invest and often provide critical resources such as industry expertise and a valuable network of contacts (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Hsu, 2004). The importance of angel investors has increased in recent years given the difficulties young innovative firms face in securing finance from other channels (Wilson, 2011). As a result of the financial crisis, banks are even more reluctant to fund young firms because of their perceived riskiness and lack of collateral (Wilson and Silva, 2013). Meanwhile, venture capital firms are focusing more on later-stage investments and have left a significant funding gap at the seed and early stage. Angel investors, particularly those investing through groups or syndicates, are active in this investment segment and thus help to fill this increasing financing gap. Equity crowdfunding departs from the models of traditional angel investors and venture capital firms because transactions are intermediated by an online platform. Some platforms play a more active role in screening and evaluating companies than others (see section 4). Also, their role during the investment and post-investment stages can vary dramatically. While there is a great deal of variation among the approaches adopted by the different platforms (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012), equity crowdfunding platforms generally follow the phases described in Figure 3. Platforms usually charge companies a fee, typically 5-10 percent of the amount raised, plus sometimes a fixed up-front fee. Some platforms also charge fees to investors that are either fixed or a percentage of the amount invested or a percentage of the profit for investment. For example, Crowdcube charges entrepreneurs 5 percent plus a £1,750 fee for successful fund raising. Symbid charges entrepreneurs a â?¬250 registration fee plus 5 percent of the amount raised and charges investors 2.5 percent of the amount invested. Seedrs charges entrepreneurs 7.5 percent of the amounts raised and charges investors 7.5 percent of the profits from the investment. To understand how equity crowdfunding can complement the market incumbents in seed and early-stage finance, we have to consider characteristics such as investment size, investment motives, the risk/return profile, the investment model and investor characteristics. Figure 4 shows the funding per project in equity-based crowdfunding. Compared to the other sources of finance described above, we can see that equity crowdfunding mostly operates in the financing segment covered by angel investors1. Another characteristic that equity crowdfunding has in common with angel investors is that financial return is not the sole motive for an investment. Crowdfunders might also derive social and emotional benefits from financing a company. In other words, they are likely to be motivated to provide funding to a company to be connected with an entrepreneurial venture that shares their own values, vision or interests. A survey of Seedrs2 users revealed that the three top motivations for investors to fund start-ups are the desire to help new businesses get off the ground, the ability to exploit tax reliefs3, and the hope of achieving meaningful financial returns (Seedrs, 2013). In terms of investment preferences, venture capitals tend to concentrate on technology-based companies, which typically are high-risk/high-return investments. Angel investors tend to invest in a wider range of sectors and geographies, covering some investment segments in which venture capital typically would not invest (Wilson, 2011). Because the crowd might encompass quite heterogeneous investment motives, the investment spectrum of equity crowdfunding can be even broader. For example, Seedrs users have invested in sectors as diverse as food and drink, high-tech, art and music, fashion and apparel, real estate and many others (Seedrs, 2014). The fact that crowdinvestors derive also non-financial benefits from the investment implies that they might also be willing to accept higher risks or lower returns than an investor seeking to maximise financial returns (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). Unlike venture capital and angel investment, equity crowdfunding requires entrepreneurs to publicly disclose their business idea and strategy. This early information disclosure might be harmful for firms with an innovative business model that can be easily imitated (Hemer, 2011; Agrawal et al, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014a). Therefore, crowdfunding might be most beneficial for start-ups that can protect their intellectual capital through means other than secrecy, or for start-ups whose business is not particularly innovative. Another common element shared by business angels and crowdinvestors is that neither type of financing model necessarily involves an active financial intermediary that makes the investment decisions. Venture capital firms pool financial commitments from institutional investors into funds and then select a portfolio of companies over time in which they invest. For angel investors and crowdinvestors, the decision to finance a company is ultimately made by the individual investor. Some equity crowdfunding platforms pool the funds of the crowd into an investment vehicle and act towards the company as the representative of the interests of the crowd. However, even in this case the platform does not act as a financial intermediary in portfolio management for the crowd, and the decision to invest in a specific company is taken by the individual investor. While angel investors are typically high net worth individuals who are sophisticated investors, crowdinvestors are individuals that might or might not have experience and knowledge of financial markets and early-stage financing. Moreover, while angel investors tend to invest locally, crowdinvestors might invest in start-ups that are quite distant from them. Agrawal et al (2011) show that the average distance between a revenue-sharing crowdfunding platform's entrepreneurs and investors was approximately 3,000 miles (4,828 km). According to their study, only 13.5 percent of the investors provided funds to entrepreneurs within 50 km. Table 1 summarises the key characteristics of equity crowdfunders, angel investors and venture capitalists, highlighting their similarities and differences. Overall, equity crowdfunding can provide a complementary channel through which start-ups can obtain finance. In addition, equity crowdfunding can provide some advantages by fully exploiting the potential of the internet. For example, crowdfunding allows a start-up to gain online visibility in the first phases of its development. As crowdinvestors are also potential consumers, an entrepreneur can benefit from crowdfunding through early advertisement of its products and by obtaining information on potential market demand and product preferences (Agrawal et al, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014a). This early assessment of demand could help to reduce inefficient investments in start-ups with weak business potential. Compared with traditional angel investing transactions that rely mostly on word-of-mouth, crowdfunding can improve the efficiency of the market by enabling faster and better investor-company matches. Moreover, geographical factors that might affect traditional forms of seed and early-stage financing might be less important in crowdfunding (Mollick, 2013a; Agrawal et al, 2011 and 2013). Finally, the crowdfunding industry is well-positioned to benefit from the so-called 'big data' paradigm (Agrawal et al, 2013). Being online-based, crowdfunding deals leave data trails on investors, entrepreneurs, companies and deals, unlike angel investment and even most venture capital transactions. Through time, the analysis of this data could enable crowdfunding platforms to provide better matches between investors and companies and maximise the correlation between the crowd and product demand. Risks in equity crowdfunding Seed and early-stage financing can be high risk but with the hope of a high return. Eurostat data4 show that in EU the one-year survival rate for all enterprises created in 2009 was 81 percent, while the five-year survival rate of all enterprises started in 2005 was only 46 percent. Despite the expertise of professional investors, the risk of investing in start-ups remains high. Shikhar Ghosh, senior lecturer at Harvard Business School, analysed data from more than 2,000 US companies that received venture financing and found that about 30-40 percent of them fail, while more than 95 percent fail to generate the expected return on investment (WSJ, 2012). There is a misconception about success rates and returns on investment in start-ups (Shane, 2008) and the average individual is not aware of the risks. The characteristics of crowdfunding can make investments in seed and early-stage companies even riskier. Information asymmetry problems common to seed and early-stage financing are exacerbated in equity crowdfunding. Below we describe some of the issues that might arise in each phase of the investment. Selection and valuation Before investing in a company, business angels and venture capitalists routinely perform due diligence to assess the potential value of the firm. This can be costly in terms of time and resources. However, evidence shows that due diligence is a major determinant in achieving returns on the investment (Wiltbanks and Boeker, 2007). This expense is often justified in light of the considerable size of such investments. Because their investments are relatively small, crowdinvestors have less incentive to perform due diligence. Moreover, individual investors have the possibility of free-riding on the investment decisions of others. This implies that the crowdfunding community may systematically underinvest in due diligence (Agrawal et al, 2013). Crowdfunders also likely lack the expertise and skills to perform adequate due diligence. Since everyone is able to join, the crowd often includes non-professional investors, who do not have the knowledge or capabilities to properly estimate the value of a company. Finally, company valuation performed by a crowd might be affected by social biases and herding behaviour5. Evidence suggests that a crowdfunderâ??s investment decision might be affected by those of the other investors (Agrawal et al, 2011; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Moreover, different studies have found that both the crowd and entrepreneurs are typically initially overoptimistic about potential outcomes (Mollick, 2013b; Agrawal et al, 2013). Investment Equity crowdfunding often relies on standardised contracts that are provided by the portal. However, equity investment into seed and early-stage firms often requires tailored contracts to align the interests of the entrepreneur to those of the investor. For example, venture capital and business angels use various covenants in their contracts, such as anti-dilution provisions that protect against down-rounds6, tag-along rights7 that facilitate exit opportunities, and liquidation preferences that secure higher priority in the distribution of value (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014a). Moreover, in order to reduce risk exposure and increase control over the entrepreneurâ??s behaviour, seed and early-stage investors often split their investments into tranches that are conditional on the attainment of defined milestones. All of these mechanisms are difficult to replicate in the crowdfunding setting. Another strategy applied by venture capitalists and business angels is to invest in a portfolio of companies in order to diversify their risk. Equity crowdfunders might be able to replicate this strategy given that crowdfunding platforms expose them to a variety of projects. However, non-professional investors might not be aware of the importance of this strategy and could potentially concentrate all their investments in a single venture. For example, Seedrs statistics show that 41 percent of investors hold only one company in their portfolio (Seedrs, 2014). Moreover, crowdfunders might not be able to participate in follow-on investment rounds. The failure to do so might mean that the investorâ??s shares get diluted, thus reducing their chances to attain a positive return from the investment. Post-investment support and monitoring As we have described, business angels and venture capitalists not only provide finance to start-ups, but are also actively involved in increasing the value of the company. While the crowd could potentially provide active support to the venture, there are reasons to believe that this support can be less valuable than that provided by traditional seed and early-stage financiers. Given their typical small level of investment, crowdfunders have less incentive to provide active support to the company because the return for their action is lower (Agrawal et al, 2013). However, if too many investors choose to become active, it could be excessively costly for a small firm to manage a crowd of investors that want to participate. This is particularly relevant considering that the venture has limited ability to select its crowdinvestors. Moreover, high information asymmetry also characterises the post-investment phase, thus limiting the monitoring potential of the crowd. One of the elements contributing to the increase in information asymmetry is geographical distance between funders and the entrepreneur. While this characteristic enables backers to attain access to a wider pool of entrepreneurs (and visa-versa), it also entails higher monitoring costs. Literature suggests that distance increases the costs that an investor must bear in order to monitor the venture (Grote and Umber, 2007). This is in line with the observation that venture capital funds invest predominantly in firms close to them (Lerner, 1995). Finally, the lack of repeated interactions reduces the potential of reputation as a mechanism to incentivise the entrepreneur to behave in line with the interests of the investor (Agrawal et al, 2013). In other online marketplaces, such as eBay, participants have a low incentive to misbehave because, if they do, they might, in effect, be prevented from participating in the market in the future because of the feedback and ratings mechanisms. Since sourcing equity finance through the internet is often a one-time event for an entrepreneur, the incentives for behaving correctly are lower, which can lead to potential fraud. More active crowdfunding platforms screen companies. However, not all platforms have the same standards. Exit The lack of adequate monitoring is particularly worrisome in a setting in which investments often take 5-10 years or more to produce a return, if any. Crowd investors might not appreciate that long periods are necessary for these investments to either succeed or fail, or that most of these investments are unlikely to yield any return. Moreover, equity investments are mostly long-term illiquid assets. Therefore, it is important that non-professional investors are adequately informed about the illiquid characteristics of this asset class. For equity investments to provide a return to investors, a positive 'exit' must take place at some point. This can be through an initial public offering (IPO) or, as more often the case, through a merger or acquisition (M&A). Unfortunately, these positive exits became increasingly rare during the financial crisis. In Europe, EVCA data (2013) shows that only 15 percent of venture capital exits in 2012 (in terms of number of companies) were through trade sales, and even fewer, 5 percent, were IPOs. These numbers are clearly lower than pre-crisis (2007) figures that pointed to 22 percent of exits through trade sales and 8 percent through IPOs. For angel investments and equity crowdfunding investments, the path to a positive exit can be longer and even less likely. IPOs and M&As do not happen by chance. Venture capitalists and the firms themselves often have an exit strategy in mind from the beginning and proactively work towards making it a reality over a long period (Wilson and Silva, 2013). In conclusion, the lack of adequate pre-investment screening and due diligence, weaker investment contracts and poorer post-investment support and monitoring can make the risk associated with equity crowdfunding significantly higher than the risk usually borne by business angels and venture capitals. Moreover, while the potential for fraud is exacerbated in the equity crowdfunding setting, information asymmetry makes investments in the start-ups of even well-intentioned entrepreneurs riskier, since the competence of the entrepreneur and the quality of the business plan cannot be properly assessed. While there are some successful equity crowdfunding cases (such as the biotech start-up Antabio8 in France, which succeeded in producing a positive return for its investors) and failure cases (such as the liquidation of betandsleep9 or sporTrade10 in Germany), the industry still lacks a sufficient track record to assess its ability to create value for both investors and entrepreneurs. Crowdfunding platforms and the regulatory environment The issues we have raised demonstrate the greater exposure that equity crowdfunding market has compared to other forms of seed and early-stage investment. In particular, adverse selection problems could increase the cost of capital up to the point at which only low-quality ventures will eventually choose to seek financing through crowdfunding, while high-quality ventures will continue to secure venture capital or angel investor financing (Agrawal et al, 2013). Competition between platforms and between the crowdfunding industry and traditional financing is pushing platforms to design innovative solutions to avoid the unintended consequence of creating a â??market for lemonsâ??. Overall, the main limitation of equity crowdfunding is that it allows a non-professional investor, who might lack the incentive and/or capabilities to adequately assess and monitor a start-up, to make an investment. Efforts to address this limitation to date have included the introduction of an intermediary between the crowd and the company that is able to perform these tasks, or the reduction of the crowd to only qualified investors. The first approach involves the provision of an active intermediary that could act as a representative of the interests of the crowd in performing due diligence and monitoring start-ups. Following this trend, many platforms are active in performing due diligence, while others operate a nominee and management system in which they represent the interests of investors with the crowdfunded business (eg Seedrs). Another example is provided by platforms such as MyMicroInvest in Belgium, which allows investors to co-invest with an experienced business angel. In this case, the crowd benefits from the financial contracting skills and from the post-investment monitoring of an experienced active investor. While this approach provides some benefits, it also entails some risks: by leveraging the investment decisions of a business angel, this mechanism may increase the risk propensity of the angel, thus biasing his or her investment decisions. A second approach is to reduce the crowd, by limiting the investment to a restricted group of people, possibly accredited investors, each contributing more capital than the average crowd investor. In this case, crowdinvesting would more closely resemble angel investor groups than the typical crowdfunding model. Examples of this model are CircleUp and FundersClub in the US or Seedups based in Ireland, whose offers are restricted to accredited investors. Other examples are platforms that impose high investment minimums, thus reducing the crowd to a few investors. Finally, some platforms (such as Seedrs and Crowdcube in the UK) require crowdinvestors to pass a test before investing in a company, to certify that they are sufficiently aware of the investment risk. The efficacy of these measures needs to be evaluated and appropriate policies should take into account these assessments. Moreover, while the market gives incentives to platforms to adopt the best practice, some platforms could deviate from the best practices because of lack of long-term vision, incompetence or other hidden interests (Griffin, 2012). The financial crisis showed that leaving the financial market to self-regulate can be costly. Many of these crowdinvestors could lose their money before the market has time to self-correct and force out inadequate platform models. Crowdfunding platforms have an incentive to build a good reputation by securing attractive deals for their crowds, since in the long run reputation results in market-share gains. Apart from this reputational incentive, platforms differ in the structure of fees they derive from the deals. As described in section 2, most of the platforms derive revenues as a percentage of the amount raised, while only a few (eg Seedrs) derive monetary benefit from a successful exit by imposing a fee as a percentage of investorâ??s profits. This typical fee structure implies that platforms derive monetary incentive to close deals while there are only reputational incentives to provide successful deals in the long run. If long-run reputational incentives are lower than short-term monetary incentives, conflicts of interest could arise and platforms might downplay investment risk to the crowd in order to secure deals. In light of this potential conflict of interest, a supervisory body for crowdfunding platforms is probably desirable. From a legal standpoint, equity crowdfunding is currently possible in some jurisdictions by exploiting exemptions to existing securities regulations (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). Securities laws generally require an issuer to register with the national securities authority and to comply with strict reporting standards in order to gain access to the general public. These requirements are prohibitively expensive for small firms, which are the typical beneficiaries of crowdfunding. In the EU, exemptions as defined in national regulations pertaining to prospectus and registration requirements, allow start-ups to gain access to the general public through equity crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). Exemptions include the maximum amount that can be offered to the public, the maximum number of investors to whom the offer is made, the minimum contribution imposed on investors and whether the offer is made to â??qualifiedâ?? or â??accreditedâ?? investors. While these exemptions to existing securities legislation allow small firms access to the general public for financing, they also imply weaker protections for investors. EU member states have adopted different practices on whether the equity crowdfunding platform must register as an investment intermediary or obtain a bank license. For example, in Germany, crowdinvesting platforms explicitly stating that they do not provide any investment advice or brokerage service have no obligation to provide any documentation in terms of advisory records or to act in the interest of the investor (Dapp and Laskawi, 2014). As a result, most German platforms are not registered as investment intermediaries (ECN, 2013). In the UK, platforms are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) (ECN, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). In France, equity crowdfunding platforms such as Wiseed, Anaxago, Finance Utile and SmartAngels are registered as financial investment advisers, since their activities consist of advice in providing financing (ECN, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). Finally, national corporate laws can also have an effect on equity crowdfunding (De Buysere et al, 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014b). For example, because they are relatively inexpensive in most countries, closely held company types (eg private limited liabilities companies) are the typical entity type chosen by start-ups. However, in many countries these company types have limitations or might be prohibited from offering equity to new investors. Even when allowed, equity transactions for these kinds of companies often require formalities, such as notarial intervention, which increases the costs for start-ups. Despite the harmonising role played by Directive 2010/73/EU (Box 1), the EU remains a patchwork of different regulations. This lack of uniformity inhibits the development of a pan-European industry by making cross-border deals more difficult, and highlights the lack of consensus on whether equity crowdfunding could be welfare-enhancing or not. Considerations for policymakers Crowdfunding can be an additional tool for providing seed and early-stage equity finance to new ventures. However, policymakers should proceed with caution by carefully assessing the risks of this new financial intermediation tool. We argue that the challenges that equity crowdfunding poses are distinct and more complex than those posed by other forms of crowdfunding. As we have outlined, the risks also differ from other forms of seed and early-stage equity finance, such as angel investing and venture capital. Equity crowdfunding can open up additional channels for new ventures to access finance at a time when securing funding is difficult, but the risks, including those related to investor protection, need to be addressed. These risks could result from potential fraudulent activities of start-ups or platforms or, more likely, poor investment decisions made by unsophisticated investors. The current legal framework mainly addresses this issue by reducing the exposure that individual investors can have to riskier assets. The goal is to make sure that the investor is able to bear a potential loss. However, as the equity crowdfunding volumes continue to grow, this solution does not prevent the potential loss of significant amounts of capital. Overall, the legal framework should not allow a crowd of investors, who might lack the incentive and/or the expertise to invest in a start-up, to do so without adequate intermediation and protection. If the crowd is made up of non-qualified investors, we argue that there should be at least one participant that legally represents the interest of the crowd in the investment in a business. This participant could be the crowdfunding platform. The crowd could also be allowed to co-invest alongside professional investors. However, also in this case, the platform should take significant steps to protect the interests of the crowd from the misbehaviour of other investors. Finally, in order to monitor potential conflicts of interest of platforms, supervision by national security authorities is important. Crowdfunding currently is a highly deregulated market with little legal protection provided to funders. In the EU, some member states have introduced ad-hoc legislation for crowdfunding, while some others will introduce new laws soon. The European Commission is currently studying equity crowdfunding, along with the other forms of crowdfunding, to assess its risks and opportunities. In this regard, the Commission started a public consultation late in 2013 and published a Communication in March 2014 (EC, 2014). At this stage, the Commissionâ??s efforts are focused on increasing awareness of the opportunities and risks of crowdfunding, spreading best practice and improving the general understanding of this growing phenomenon. The Commission is also exploring the potential of a â??quality labelâ?? to spread good practice and build user confidence. Being based online, equity crowdfunding has the potential to contribute to a pan-European seed and early-stage financial market to support European start-ups. However, in order to maximise this benefit, harmonised policies to address equity crowdfunding models should be adopted in common by all member states. This approach would maximise the benefits of equity crowdfunding and help to reduce the risks. We urge the Commission to work with member states to address the current patchwork of national legal frameworks, which constitute an obstacle to the development of this nascent model of funding across Europe. Finally, legislators should take a holistic approach in assessing the regulatory burden on the industry. Corporate law in many countries imposes limitations or prohibits closely held company types â?? the typical legal form chosen by start-ups â?? from selling equity to new investors. These provisions are another significant obstacle to the development of equity crowdfunding. Corporate laws should be harmonised and should take into account this new financing channel for start-ups. In addition, other financial regulations which might interact with and have an impact on the market should be assessed. In conclusion, all types of crowdfunding can provide significant and new sources of funding for many types of organisations, ranging from charities to companies. Equity crowdfunding, however, is more complex and requires the proper checks and balances if it is to provide a viable channel for financial intermediation in the seed and early-stage market in Europe. Notes 1. Nevertheless, this distribution might not reflect simply the investment preferences of the crowd. Legal constraints currently provide upper limits to the capital that can be raised from nonqualified investors. See section 4. 2. Seedrs is an equity crowdfunding platform based in the United Kingdom. It allows users to invest as little as £10 into the start-ups. In the first 18 months since its launch in July 2012, Seedrs collected more than â?¬6.8 million through 56 funded campaigns and counted more than 29,000 users. 3. In particular, the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) launched by the UK government in April 2012. REFERENCES
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:polcon:844&r=reg
  16. By: Aiyar, Shekhar (International Monetary Fund); Calomiris, Charles (Columbia Business School); Wieladek, Tomasz (Bank of England)
    Abstract: We use data on UK banks’ minimum capital requirements to study the interaction of monetary policy and capital requirement regulation. UK banks were subject to both time-varying capital requirements and changes in interest rate policy. Tightening of either capital requirements or monetary policy reduces the supply of lending. Lending by large banks reacts substantially to capital requirement changes, but not to monetary policy changes. Lending by small banks reacts to both. There is little evidence of interaction between these two policy instruments. The differences in the responses of small and large banks, and the lack of interaction between capital requirement changes and monetary policy, have important policy implications. Our results confirm the theoretical consensus view that monetary policy should focus on price stability objectives and that capital requirement changes are a more effective tool to achieve financial stability objectives related to loan supply. We also identify important distributional consequences within the financial system of these two policy instruments. Finally, our findings do not corroborate theoretical models that raise concerns about complex interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential variation in capital requirements.
    Keywords: loan supply; capital requirements; monetary policy; macroprudential regulation
    JEL: E44 E51 E52 G18 G21
    Date: 2014–09–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0508&r=reg

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