nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2014‒03‒30
five papers chosen by
Natalia Fabra
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

  1. Optimal Renewable-Energy Subsidies By Mark Andor; Achim Voss
  2. Efficient contracts for government intervention in promoting next generation communications networks By Briglauer, Wolfgang; Holzleitner, Christian
  3. Network Regulation and Regulatory Institutional Reform: Revisiting the Case of Australia By Rabindra Nepal; Flavio Menezes; Tooraj Jamasb
  4. A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation By Alessandro Avenali; Tiziana D'Alfonso; Claudio Leporelli; Giorgio Matteucci; Alberto Nastasi; Pierfrancesco Reverberi
  5. Exploring the transition potential of renewable energy communities By Gabriella Doci; Eleftheria Vasileiadou; Arthur Petersen

  1. By: Mark Andor; Achim Voss
    Abstract: We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets. The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under uncertainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity generation (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest that some of the most popular promotion instruments are likely to cause welfare losses.
    Keywords: Peak-load pricing; capacity investment; demand and supply uncertainty; renewable energy sources; energy policy; optimal subsidies; feed-in tariffs
    JEL: Q41 Q48 H23
    Date: 2014–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0473&r=reg
  2. By: Briglauer, Wolfgang; Holzleitner, Christian
    Abstract: Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ('next generation access', NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. --
    Keywords: contract theory,public utilities,next generation telecommunications networks,subsidies
    JEL: H20 L43 L44 L51 L52 L96
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14022&r=reg
  3. By: Rabindra Nepal (School of Economics, The University of Queensland); Flavio Menezes (School of Economics, The University of Queensland); Tooraj Jamasb (Durham University Business School, Durham)
    Abstract: It is well-understood that the success of liberalizing the electricity supply industry depends crucially on the quality and design of the regulatory and institutional framework. This paper analyses the regulatory arrangements that underpin the work of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). These arrangements are contrasted with the regulatory structure of electricity provision in Norway. A key difference between the reform processes in the two countries relates to the lack of privatization in Norway and the coexistence of private and publicly owned generators and distributors in Australia. This comparative analysis allows us to make several recommendations to improve regulatory arrangements in Australia. These include greater independence for the AER, better coordination among regulatory institutions, greater use of benchmarking analysis, greater customer involvement, and improving market transparency and privatization of government-owned corporations. However, the success of privatization will hinge upon the effectiveness of the regulatory environment.
    Date: 2014–03–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:510&r=reg
  4. By: Alessandro Avenali (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Tiziana D'Alfonso (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Claudio Leporelli (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Giorgio Matteucci (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Alberto Nastasi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"); Pierfrancesco Reverberi (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")
    Abstract: We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that generates an efficient slot allocation, where prices are built on a measure of the best use of each slot in serving end users. Incentive prices are set by considering the structure of the air transport network (and thus interdependencies among slots at different airports) in a given region, and the effect on both quantity and quality of passenger air transport in the region. Therefore, incentive prices should better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with pure market mechanisms (auctions and trading).
    Keywords: Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Administered incentive pricing; Market mechanisms
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aeg:report:2014-03&r=reg
  5. By: Gabriella Doci; Eleftheria Vasileiadou; Arthur Petersen
    Abstract: Although in the last decades a transition toward a sustainable energy system with renewables has been advocated by many, it is still uncertain where the support and required investments for renewables can come from. In this article we introduce and analyze a special type of investor group: renewable energy communities, which are grassroots initiatives that invest in 'clean energy' in order to meet consumption needs and environmental goals and thereby – even unwittingly – conduce to the spread of renewables. The aim of the present study is to explore the potential of renewable energy communities, as social niches, to contribute to transitions in the energy system. To do so, we propose three indicators for measuring the transition potential of social niches, based on proxies for technological innovations derived from the literature. In addition, we reinterpret the notion of niches and the way transition occurs by arguing that niches are complex systems in which both technological and social innovations develop simultaneously and that during transition entire niches link up with the regime. Furthermore, we make a distinction between internally and externally oriented niches based on their orientation and application focus. Our results show that renewable energy communities in the Netherlands are internally oriented social niches that have the potential for upscaling and contribute to sustainability transitions. We use a comparative case study analysis complemented by a systematic literature and documentary review to show that these communities are already changing the Dutch energy system, by connecting to regime actors. Their further advancement depends on strengthening their links to established actors, but also on providing a favorable regulatory framework.
    Keywords: crowd science, funding
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ein:tuecis:1406&r=reg

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