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on Regulation |
| By: | Tangerås, Thomas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Tåg, Joacim (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission. |
| Keywords: | Cross-border ownership; Decentralized regulation; International markets; Network |
| JEL: | L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2014–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1005&r=reg |
| By: | Miklós Antal; Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh |
| Abstract: | Energy conservation is widely accepted as an important strategy to combat climate change. It can, nevertheless, stimulate new energy uses that partly offset the original savings. This is known as rebound. One particular rebound mechanism is re-spending of money savings associated with energy savings on energy intensive goods or services. We calculate the average magnitude of this "re-spending rebound" for different fuels and countries. We find that emerging economies, neglected in past studies, typically have substantially larger rebounds than OECD countries. The effect is generally stronger for gasoline than for natural gas and electricity. Paradoxically, strengthening financial incentives to conserve energy tends to increase rebound. This is expected to gain importance with climate regulation and peak oil. We discuss the policy implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | rebound effect, re-spending, emerging economies |
| Date: | 2014–02–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2014:i:463&r=reg |
| By: | Mauritzen, Johannes (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Tangerås, Thomas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | We analyse in a theoretical framework the link between real-time and day-ahead market performance in a hydro-based and imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market. Theoretical predictions of the model are tested on data from the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool Spot (NPS).We reject the hypothesis that prices at NPS were at their competitive levels throughout the period under examination. The empirical approach uses equilibrium prices and quantities and does not rely on bid data nor on estimation of demand or marginal cost functions. |
| Keywords: | Hydro power; Market power; Nord Pool Spot |
| JEL: | D43 D92 L13 L94 Q41 |
| Date: | 2014–02–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1009&r=reg |
| By: | Roslyn Layton |
| Abstract: | Although it is often idealized as a technologically connected continent, Europe’s broadband system is actually highly fragmented and in great need of overall improvement. The European Union should simplify and reduce regulation of broadband providers, remove barriers to consolidation, and embrace a market-led, technology-neutral approach to broadband. |
| Keywords: | tech policy,internet regulation,European Union,CICT-feed,broadband |
| JEL: | A O |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aei:rpaper:40279&r=reg |
| By: | Bahman Kashi (Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus and Queen's University, Canada) |
| Abstract: | In this article we argue that the conventional financing and contractual arrangements in private power generation projects encourage the independent power producers (IPPs) to overstate the capital cost as a risk-mitigation strategy. Since the markup is only added to the capital cost, and not to the operating costs, it promotes the use of cheaper and less efficient power plants. The distortion in the choice of technology results in economic losses over the life of the plants. The findings of this research have important policy implications that can assist regulatory bodies, governments, and international financing agencies to adopt a more informed approach to the integration of private investment into the electricity generation capacity of developing countries. |
| Keywords: | IPP, PPA, privatization, power generation, electricity, risk management |
| JEL: | L94 D61 L33 L20 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:dpaper:248&r=reg |
| By: | Elda Brogi |
| Abstract: | European regulation of the media is influenced by the economic regulation of networks, contents, and e-commerce, to which it is very close. However, media regulation has one peculiar differentiating characteristic: it cannot concentrate only on market competition, as the rest of modern economic regulation does, but has to pursue other fundamental values. In particular, media pluralism and media freedom emerge as policy goals that are essential for democracy and human rights in Europe. In this paper, we discuss the EU’s search for a point of equilibrium in Member States’ resistance to the relinquishing of their power in the sector; we describe the current debate, and suggest some possible directions for development. |
| Keywords: | regulation |
| Date: | 2014–02–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0365&r=reg |
| By: | Andrey Yakovlev (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Aleksandra Bashina (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Olga Demidova (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In the 2000s the Russian government considered electronic auctions (e-auctions) as the best way to procure goods for public needs. In this paper we confirm this proposition using an empirical dataset of contracts for the procurement of granulated sugar in Russia in 2011. Our data shows that unit prices are higher in the case of long-term contracts. This result can be explained by the rigidity of public procurement regulations as Russian legislation allows only fixed price contracts. Under these conditions suppliers can participate in public procurement tenders for long-term contracts only if their price includes a “risk premium” covering additional expenses of the supplier in case of an unfavorable turn in the market. Our analysis shows that sugar prices in Russian public procurement are lower for contracts with higher volume. These results are in the line with conclusions of previous studies of public procurement in other countries. The influence of competition measured by the number of suppliers participating in the procurement procedure has a quadratic form. It means that the effect of a new participant is lower when number of competitors is higher and vice versa. Our analysis also shows that there are essential distinctions in the influence of the same factors on contract prices for competitive procedures and void auctions |
| Keywords: | public procurement, e-auctions, procurement effectiveness |
| JEL: | H57 P35 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:13/pa/2014&r=reg |
| By: | Malaguti, Maria Chiara; Guerrieri, Alessandra |
| Abstract: | Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments area. |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:ecriwp:8860&r=reg |
| By: | Tian Tang; David Popp |
| Abstract: | The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project-based carbon trade mechanism that subsidizes the users of climate-friendly technologies and encourages technology transfer. The CDM has provided financial support for a large share of Chinese wind projects since 2002. Using pooled cross-sectional data of 486 registered CDM wind projects in China from 2002 to 2009, we examine the determinants of technological change in wind power from a learning perspective. We estimate the effects of different channels of learning—learning through R&D in wind turbine manufacturing, learning from previous experience of installation, and learning through the network interaction between project developer and turbine manufacturer—on technological change, measured as reductions in projected costs or as increased capacity factor across CDM wind projects. While we find that a manufacturer’s R&D and previous installation experience matter, interactions between wind turbine manufacturers and wind project developer lead to the largest cost reductions. Whereas existing literature suggests that wind power firms can learn from the experience of other wind farm developers, our results indicate that wind power firms mainly learn from their own experience and that knowledge spillovers mostly occur within certain partnerships between wind project developer and foreign turbine manufacturers in China’s wind power industry. |
| JEL: | O33 O38 Q42 Q48 Q54 Q55 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19921&r=reg |