|
on Regulation |
| By: | Brüning, Anna |
| Abstract: | Due to the 3rd Energy Package of 2009 the regulation of European electricity transmission did change considerably. Before, cross-border electricity issues have been regulated by voluntary contractual agreements between Transmission System Operators. Now, the new-founded Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) are guiding this process together with the European Commission. Currently, these organizations are developing network codes to be implemented as binding EU electricity transmission regulation within the next years. This paper analyzes, if this new regulation process does promote the creation of an internal electricity market as well as a better integration of intermittent renewable ('green') energies due to the multilevel governance approach. -- |
| Keywords: | EU Energy Policy,Transmission Grids,Renewable Energies,Regulation Theory,Multi-level Governance Theory |
| JEL: | L43 L59 L94 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ipewps:312014&r=reg |
| By: | Farrell, Niall; Lyons, Seán |
| Abstract: | We analyse the distributional impact of financing energy and environmental policies through additional charges on electricity consumption, focussing on the impact Ireland’s flat-rate Public Service Obligation (PSO) levy has on domestic consumers. Switching Ireland’s flate-rate charge to a unit-based charge results in reduced regressivity across the entire income distribution. A unit-based scheme reduces aggregate burden for most households on low incomes. Regressive impacts are greater for a subset of heavy electricity users. Incremental block pricing (IBP) exaggerates these effects. A hybrid fixed/variable structure mitigates regressivity for high users but lessens overall regressivity reduction. Redistribution via Ireland’s Household Benefits Package is sub-optimal relative to a hypothetical equivalised income-based scheme. Net of ‘merit order’ savings, flat charges redistribute burden incidence from rich to poor whilst fixed per-unit charges have a neutral effect. IBP shifts cost to heavy users, predominantly large households. IBP results in a negative net burden for the majority of households across all income groups. |
| Keywords: | Renewable Energy Support Schemes; Distributional Impact; Policy Cost |
| JEL: | H22 H23 Q42 Q5 Q58 |
| Date: | 2014–02–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53488&r=reg |
| By: | Georg Zachmann; Amma Serwaah; Michele Peruzzi |
| Abstract: | See also blog post 'Does Europe need a renewables target?' Low-carbon energy technologies are pivotal for decarbonising our economies up to 2050 while ensuring secure and affordable energy. Consequently, innovation that reduces the cost of low-carbon energy would play an important role in reducing transition costs. We assess the two most prominent innovation policy instruments (i) public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) subsidies and (ii) public deployment policies. Our results indicate that both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the greatest effect coming from deployment. Finally, we find significant cross-border effects, especially for winddeployment. Increased deployment in one country coincides with increased patenting in nearby countries. Based on our findings we argue that both deployment and RD&D support are needed to create innovation in renewable energy technologies. However, we worry that current support is unbalanced. Public spending on deployment has been two orders of magnitude larger (in 2010 about â?¬48 billion in the five largest EU countries in 2010) than spending on RD&D support (about â?¬315 million). Consequently, basing the policy mix more on empirical evidence could increase the efficiency of innovation policy targeted towards renewable energy technologies |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:wpaper:811&r=reg |
| By: | Miklós Antal; Jeroen van den Bergh |
| Abstract: | Energy conservation is widely accepted as an important strategy to combat climate change. It can, nevertheless, stimulate new energy uses that partly offset the original savings. This is known as rebound. One particular rebound mechanism is re-spending of money savings associated with energy savings on energy intensive goods or services. We calculate the average magnitude of this “re-spending rebound” for different fuels and countries. We find that emerging economies, neglected in past studies, typically have substantially larger rebounds than OECD countries. The effect is generally stronger for gasoline than for natural gas and electricity. Paradoxically, strengthening financial incentives to conserve energy tends to increase rebound. This is expected to gain importance with climate regulation and peak oil. We discuss the policy implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | Rebound effect, re-spending, emerging economies |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feu:wfeppr:y:2014:m:2:d:0:i:9&r=reg |
| By: | Huse, Cristian |
| Abstract: | In the first year after the inception of the Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR), green cars had carved over 25 percent market share in the new vehicle market, an effect of unprecedented scale if compared to recent policies incentivizing the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles. By awarding vehicles satisfying certain emission criteria a rebate, but giving alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs, those able to run on alternative fuels) a more lenient treatment than regular fuel vehicles (RFVs, those able to run only on gasoline and diesel), the GCR created a regulatory loophole which led carmakers to increase the emissions of AFVs as compared to RFVs. This paper examines the impact of regulation on market developments comparing CO2 emissions (and fuel economy) of AFVs and RFVs. Once carmakers adjust their product lines to the policy, CO2 emissions of AFVs increased significantly as compared to those of RFVs, thus undermining the very objectives of the GCR. |
| Keywords: | Automobiles; Emissions; Environmental policy; Alternative fuel vehicles; Flexible-fuel vehicles; Fuel economy; Greenhouse gases; Regulation; Alternative fuels; Renewable fuels. |
| JEL: | H23 L51 L62 L98 Q42 Q48 Q53 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48909&r=reg |
| By: | Thilo Grau |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the trade-offs for using feed-in tariffs or tenders to remunerate different scales of solar photovoltaics (PV) projects. In recent years, European countries increasingly combined feed-in tariffs for small renewables systems with tenders for large installations. This study develops an analytic framework to quantify deployment effectiveness of responsive feed-in tariff adjustment mechanisms across project scales and to compare specific cost effectiveness factors of feed-in tariffs and tenders for PV plants with their dynamic cost trends. To assess deployment effectiveness, an analytic model is used to simulate installations and feed-in tariffs for different project sizes. Then semi-structured interviews with German and French project developers are conducted to identify additional factors to be considered for a comparison of feed-in tariffs and tenders, and to explore how different remuneration schemes impact cost of capital and transaction costs. The paper finally discusses the relative merits of feed-in tariffs and tenders. |
| Keywords: | Feed-in tariff, tender, solar photovoltaics |
| JEL: | O33 Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1363&r=reg |
| By: | Garret Kent Fellows (University of Calgary) |
| Abstract: | I present a dynamic steady state model of firm behavior under an imperfect rate of return constraint such that a margin exists between the regulated rate of return and the firm's average cost of capital. Revenue is assumed to be a function of labor and heterogeneous capital inputs differentiated by asset durability. In comparing the input demand functions derived from constrained and unconstrained versions of the model, the results indicate that the regulated firm will over invest in assets with high durability (which has the effect of inflating the steady-state capital stock) and assets which reduce the average cost of capital (which has the effect of inflating the margin between the regulated rate of return and the cost of capital) relative to an unregulated firm. |
| Date: | 2014–02–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2014-37&r=reg |