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on Regulation |
| By: | Elcin Akcura |
| Abstract: | Renewable energy sources have a critical role to play in contributing to the diversity, sustainability and security of energy supplies. The main objectives of the paper is to gain an understanding of UK households' preferences for the type of mechanism that is used to support renewables. Two self-designed contingent valuation method (CVM) surveys are used to explore whether the type of payment option has an impact on households' willingness to pay for increasing share of renewable energy in electricity generation. The paper also investigates whether the type of payment mode affects respondents' self-reported certainty of paying their stated valuations.The results indicate that the likelihood of paying a positive amount for supporting renewable energy is higher under a mandatory scheme compared to a voluntary payment option in the UK. Respondents have a higher level of certainty in paying their stated WTP under a mandatory payment scheme. |
| Keywords: | Contingent Valuation Method, Payment Method, Renewable Energy, Green Tariffs, Willingness to Pay, Zero Inflated Ordered Probit Model |
| JEL: | C35 D10 D12 D80 |
| Date: | 2013–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1339&r=reg |
| By: | Thomas Greve; Michael G. Pollitt |
| Abstract: | One of the biggest challenges in the area of infrastructure investment is the provision of funding to finance activities. This paper presents an auction design which can reduce the financing cost of infrastructure investments by allowing the length of the regulatory funding period to be determined via an auction. The auction allows bidders to submit bids against a payment for periods of varying length. Thus instead of, for example, a fixed 20-year contract period, some bidders might want to bid for financing over a longer period, say 25 or 30 years. This can be desirable in terms of securing more favourable terms in the financial markets. Our auction design can secure efficiency and lower financing costs. Our auction is motivated by the auctions currently being undertaken by the UK energy regulator (Ofgem) for financing offshore transmission assets. Although the auction was designed with electricity transmission in mind, the auction could be used in other areas of infrastructure investments |
| Keywords: | Auctions, Contracts, Investments, Regulation |
| JEL: | D44 D86 E43 |
| Date: | 2013–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1348&r=reg |
| By: | Rabindra Nepal; Tooraj Jamasb |
| Abstract: | Economic theory suggests that market-based policies and reforms should promote energy efficiency in developing and transition countries. This paper, therefore, analyses the impacts of a varied set of market-oriented macro-level reforms on macro level energy efficiency across the transition countries. Since the early 1990s, these economies experienced a rapid marketization process which transformed them from central planning towards more market driven economies. The results from the relatively new bias corrected fixed-effect analysis (LSDVC) technique suggest that between 1990 and 2010, reforms in overall market liberalisation, financial sector and infrastructure industries, excluding the power sector, drove the energy efficiency improvements in these countries. Also, privatisation programmes only improved energy efficiency in the SEE countries. Thus, the empirical evidence support market driven energy efficiency policies aimed at addressing the market failures in the network industries and capital markets. We conclude that these results can help explain the energy efficiency policy puzzles in developing and transition countries where energy efficiency improvement can be a leading policy response to growing climate change and security of supply concerns. |
| Keywords: | market reforms, energy efficiency, transition countries, institutions |
| JEL: | P28 Q54 C33 |
| Date: | 2013–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1345&r=reg |
| By: | Robert W. Hahn; Robert A. Ritz |
| Abstract: | We evaluate a recent U.S. initiative to include the social cost of carbon (SCC) in regulatory decisions. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first systematic test of the extent to which applying the SCC has affected national policy. We examine all economically significant federal regulations since 2008, and obtain a surprising result: Putting a value on changes in carbon dioxide emissions does not generally affect the ranking of the preferred policy compared with the status quo. Overall, we find little evidence that use of the SCC has affected U.S. policy choices to date. We offer an explanation related to the political economy of regulation. |
| Keywords: | Cost-Benefit Analysis; Social Cost of Carbon; Climate Policy; Regulatory Innovation |
| JEL: | H43 K32 Q51 Q58 |
| Date: | 2013–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1346&r=reg |
| By: | Clémence Christin (Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, France); Jean-Philippe Nicolai (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Jerome Pouyet (Paris School of Economics, France) |
| Abstract: | Under imperfect competition, the effect of a cap-and-trade system on indus- try profits depends on the type of abatement technology that is used by firms: industries that use process-integrated technologies are more affected than those using end-of-pipe abatement technologies. The interaction between environmental policy and the evolution of the market structure is then studied. In particular, a reserve of pollution permits for new entrants is justified when the industry uses a process-integrated abatement technology, while a system with a preemption right may be justified in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology. |
| Keywords: | Cap-and-trade system; imperfect competition; abatement technologies. |
| JEL: | L13 Q53 Q58 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:13-186&r=reg |
| By: | Andrey Yakovlev (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Institute for Industrial and Market Studies. Director;); Andrey Tkachenko (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Empirical analysis of the enterprises and markets in transition economies. Researcher;); Olga Demidova (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Empirical analysis of the enterprises and markets in transition economies. Laboratory Head;); Olga Balaeva (National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Empirical analysis of the enterprises and markets in transition economies. Senior Researcher;) |
| Abstract: | The reform of budget-sector entities enables us to compare the impact of different types of public procurement regulations in budget and autonomous organizations in Russia. Such analysis is important in light of the critical discussion of the effects of current procurement regulation (94-FL), as well as taking into account the introduction of the Federal Contract System in 2014. Using the difference-in-differences methodology, we shall consider public procurements of two national universities in 2011–2012. All procurements of the first university were regulated by the 94-FL requirements. Procurements of the second university were regulated by the 94-FL until June 2011. Later this university introduced its own Procurements Provision. A comparative analysis of procurements of these organizations enables us to estimate the impact of the different types of regulations on the effectiveness of public procurement, as measured by the level of competition and price decline in public tenders, as well as the timely execution of procurement contracts. |
| Keywords: | public procurement, public organizations, institutional reforms, procurement effectiveness |
| JEL: | H57 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:08/pa/2013&r=reg |