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on Regulation |
| By: | Noriaki Matsushima; Keizo Mizuno |
| Abstract: | We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding service-based firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure upgrades made by a regulated facility-based firm on service-based firms play a key role in the incentives for making these upgrades. The spillover effect can enhance the incentives for the regulated facility-based firm to make upgrades if access prices are not regulated. The existence of rival facility-based firms strengthens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to make infrastructure upgrades, especially when the spillover effect is significant. Furthermore, if access prices are not regulated, the existence of rival facility-based firms weakens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to foreclose service-based firms. |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0860&r=reg |
| By: | Giorgio Gualberti (Instituto Superior Técnico, Technical University of Lisbon); Luis Filipe Martins (ISCTE Business School, Lisbon); Morgan Bazilian (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg) |
| Abstract: | Reaching the objective of universal access to modern energy services will require large investments in infrastructure in developing countries. An important part of funding will be provided in the form of development finance and its effectiveness in producing positive impacts is crucial for this achievement. This paper presents a panel analysis of the relationship between the installed capacity of electricity generation, the development finance committed for the energy sector, and the gross fixed capital formation. We tested four models with a large dataset and found development finance to have, in most cases, a positive influence on installed base. |
| Keywords: | International Aid, Energy Access, Aid Effectiveness |
| JEL: | O19 O21 Q40 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.100&r=reg |
| By: | Ibon Galarraga; Luis M. Abadie; Alberto Ansuategi |
| Abstract: | Energy labels are used to promote the purchase of efficient appliances. Many countries in Europe use subsidies (namely energy efficiency rebates) to support these purchases as it is the case of Spain. A figure ranging from 50 to 105€ subsidy has been granted in the past for the acquisition of the most efficient appliances. This paper first analyses the impact of a 80€ subsidy on the dishwasher market and compares the results with a 40 € tax for non-labelled ones. The results take into account the effects that the policies generate in the market segment that is a close substitute, that is, cross effects. The paper shows that the subsidy is expensive for the Government, generates some welfare losses and it also generates a rebound effect as a consequence of the increase in the total number of appliances sold. The 40 € tax does not cost money to the Government, it generates a lower welfare loss and reduces the energy bill. However, the analysis is extended to go beyond the two extreme scenarios: subsidies without taxes and taxes without subsidies. Different combinations of both instruments are suggested and they are assessed based on their performance regarding economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness and political feasibility. |
| Keywords: | Energy efficiency rebates, deadweight losses, rebound effect |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2013-05&r=reg |
| By: | Ugur, Mehmet |
| Abstract: | We introduce new studies that argue in favour of: (i) according a central role to governance and regulation as potential determinants of innovation; and (ii) analysing the effects of governance and regulation on innovation in conjunction with the effects of the market structure. These studies were presented at an international conference at the University of Greenwich in September 2011 and will be published as an edited book titled Governance, Regulation and Innovation: Theory and Evidence on Firms and Countries (Edward-Elgar, 2013). The studies explore the relationship between governance and regulation widely defined and innovation, taking into account the interactions between governance and market structure as well as between different dimensions of governance. They contribute to existing literature by providing new empirical evidence and by pointing out to complementary and offsetting innovation effects that may result from interactions between economic governance institutions, corporate governance rules, regulation on the one hand and the market structure on the other. |
| Keywords: | Governance; corporate governance; regulation; innovation |
| JEL: | L5 E02 G3 O3 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:44151&r=reg |
| By: | David Heres; Steffen Kallbekken; Ibon Galarraga |
| Abstract: | The potential of taxation to correcting environmental externalities has been long recognized among economists. Yet, this welfare-enhancing policy commonly faces strong opposition by citizens. Conversely, externality-correcting subsidies frequently enjoy high levels of public acceptance. We conduct a lab experiment to explore public support for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. In an experimental market with a negative externality, participants vote on the introduction of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies under full or partial information concerning how the tax revenues will be spent and the subsidy paid for. Theoretically the two instruments should produce identical outcomes. We find substantially greater support for subsidies than taxes. This can partially be explained by the expectation that the subsidy will increase payoffs more than a tax, but not because it could be more effective in changing behavior. Furthermore, we find that under partial information, the preference for subsidies is even stronger. |
| Keywords: | Pigouvian taxes; subsidies; lab experiment; public policy; revenues; effectiveness |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2013-04&r=reg |
| By: | Enrica De Cian (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC)); Samuel Carrara (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC)); Massimo Tavoni (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC)) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether an inefficient allocation of abatement, due to constraints on the use of currently available low carbon mitigation options, can promote innovation in new technologies and eventually generate welfare gains. We focus on the case of nuclear power phase out, when accounting for endogenous technical change in energy efficiency and in low carbon technologies. The analysis uses the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH, which features multiple externalities due to both climate and innovation market failures. Our results show that phasing out nuclear power stimulates additional R&D investments and deployment of infant technologies with large learning potential. The innovation benefits which this would generate and that would not otherwise be captured due to intertemporal and international externalities almost completely offset the economic costs of phasing out nuclear power. The technological change benefit depends on the stringency of the climate policy and is distributed unevenly across countries. |
| Keywords: | Technological change, Climate policy, Nuclear phase-out |
| JEL: | H40 O33 Q40 Q55 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.96&r=reg |
| By: | Philippe Aghion (Harvard University); Antoine Dechezleprêtre (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics); David Hemous (INSEAD); Ralf Martin (Imperial College Business School and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics); John Van Reenen (Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and NBER) |
| Abstract: | Can directed technical change be used to combat climate change? We construct new firm-level panel data on auto industry innovation distinguishing between “dirty” (internal combustion engine) and “clean” (e.g. electric and hybrid) patents across 80 countries over several decades. We show that firms tend to innovate relatively more in clean technologies when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel prices. Furthermore, there is path dependence in the type of innovation both from aggregate spillovers and from the firm's own innovation history. Using our model we simulate the increases in carbon taxes needed to allow clean to overtake dirty technologies. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Innovation, Directed Technical Change, Automobiles |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.99&r=reg |
| By: | Halkos, George; Tzeremes, Nickolaos |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between renewable energy consumption and economic efficiency. For this reason conditional Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) estimators alongside with nonparametric regressions are applied in a sample of 25 European countries for the year 2010. Our results reveal that renewable energy consumption has a positive effect on countries’ economic efficiency for lower consumption levels while for higher levels the analysis reveals mixed effects, which are also subject to regional disparities. Finally, it appears that the effect of renewable energy consumption on countries’ economic efficiency depends also on countries’ specific regional characteristics as well as on the environmental policies adopted. |
| Keywords: | Renewable energy consumption; economic efficiency; data envelopment analysis; nonparametric regression |
| JEL: | C14 Q40 Q01 Q20 C60 O44 |
| Date: | 2013–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:44136&r=reg |