|
on Regulation |
| By: | Bodo Knoll; Hans Pitlik (WIFO); Martin Rode |
| Abstract: | Are people happier if they experience freedom from regulation, and how do individual attitudes towards liberalisation influence personal life satisfaction? Based on data from European and World Values Surveys and the Economic Freedom of the World project we find evidence for positive effects of low regulation and pro-market attitudes on life satisfaction. Paradoxically, people who are opposed to market oriented policies sometimes benefit most from deregulation. |
| Keywords: | government, regulation, life satisfaction, attitudes, ideology |
| Date: | 2012–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2012:i:441&r=reg |
| By: | Krancke, Jan; Vidal, Miguel; Fier, Andreas |
| Abstract: | Traditionally, neoclassical economics has been the guiding framework in the development of legislative and regulatory rules in the telecommunication markets. The regulatory perspective has long assumed a static environment. However, telecommunication markets have evolved into extremely dynamic, innovative and technology-driven markets. At the same time, economic theory has moved well beyond simple, static concepts of neo-classical analysis. Inter alia, Schumpeterian Economics, Institutional Economics and modern Industrial Organization provide a broader framework more suitable to analyze modern telecom markets. Drawing on an extended theoretical baseline and on major industry trends, we propose a more comprehensive framework for telecom regulation - the new regulatory pentagon - based on the cornerstones competition, investment and innovation, convergence and platformization, macroeconomics and growth and, lastly, commitment and credibility. -- |
| Keywords: | Telecommunications,Regulation,Network investments,Platforms,Innovation,Next generation networks |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse12:66976&r=reg |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Heimeshoff, Ulrich; Jovanovic, Dragan |
| Abstract: | The German reserve power market was subject to important regulatory changes in recent years. A new market design was created by synchronization and interconnection of the four control areas. In this paper, we analyze whether or not the reforms led to lower prices for minute reserve power (MRP). In contrast to existing papers, we use a unique panel dataset to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the four German regional markets. Moreover, we control for endogeneity by using weather data as instruments for electricity spot market prices. We find that the reforms were jointly successful in decreasing MRP prices leading to substantial cost savings for the transmission system operators. -- |
| Keywords: | Competition,Frequency Control,Minute Reserve Power,Regulation,Productive Efficiency,Welfare |
| JEL: | C33 C36 L59 L94 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:75&r=reg |
| By: | Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Strand, Jon |
| Abstract: | This paper studies interactions between a"policy bloc's"emissions quota market and an offset market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy"fringe"of countries (such as for the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol). Policy-bloc firms enjoy free quota allocations, updated according to either past emissions or past outputs. Both overall abatement and the allocation of given abatement between the policy bloc and the fringe are then inefficient. When the policy-bloc quota and offset markets are fully integrated, firms buying offsets from the fringe, and all quotas and offsets, must be traded at a single price; the policy bloc will either not constrain the offset market whatsoever, or ban offsets completely. These cases occur when free allocation of quotas is less (very) generous, and the offset market delivers large (small) quota amounts. Governments of policy countries would instead prefer to buy offsets directly from the fringe at a price below the policy-bloc quota price. The offset price is then below the marginal damage cost of emissions and the quota price in the policy bloc is above the marginal damage cost. This is also inefficient as the policy bloc, acting as a monopsonist, purchases too few offsets from the fringe. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change Economics,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Markets and Market Access,Energy Production and Transportation,Carbon Policy and Trading |
| Date: | 2012–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6281&r=reg |