nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2012‒02‒27
eighteen papers chosen by
Oleg Eismont
Russian Academy of Sciences
  1. Preventing Bubbles: What Role for Financial Regulation? By Lawrence J. White
  2. Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts By Nicholas Economides; Joacim Tag
  3. Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency By Giovanni Battista Ramello
  4. Transforming financial OTC Markets. Struggles around categories By Isabelle Huault; Hélène Rainelli-Weiss
  5. Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation of Banks: Is There Any Connection? By Lawrence J. White
  6. Macroprudential policies in an agent-based artificial economy By Marco Raberto; Andrea Teglio; Silvano Cincotti
  7. Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants under the Clean Air Act By Linn, Joshua; Mastrangelo, Erin; Burtraw, Dallas
  8. The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation By Chan, Gabriel; Stavins, Robert; Stowe, Robert; Sweeney, Richard
  9. Education, Vocational Training and R&D: Towards New Forms of Labor Market Regulation By Margarida Chagas Lopes
  10. Envisioning innovative groundwater regulation policies through scenario workshops in France and Portugal By Jean-Daniel Rinaudo; Marielle Montginoul; Marta Varanda; Sofia Bento
  11. Are clean technology and environmental quality conflicting policy goals? By Thierry Brechet; Guy Meunier
  12. Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries By Ciaian, Pavel,; Kancs, d’Artis; Swinnen, Jo; Van Herck, Kristine; Vranken, Liesbet
  13. Regulating Prostitution: Theory and Evidence from Italy By Giovanni Immordino; Francesco Flaviano Russo
  14. The Discriminatory Effect of Domestic Regulations on International Services Trade By Matthieu Crozet; Emmanuel Milet; Daniel Mirza
  15. Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries By Ciaian, Pavel,; Kancs, d’Artis; Swinnen, Jo; Van Herck, Kristine; Vranken, Liesbet
  16. Does Independence Affect Regulatory Performance? The case of national competition authorities in the European Union By Mattia Guidi
  17. Private antitrust enforcement revisited: The role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority By Tim Reuter
  18. The Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability By Charles Goodhart
  1. By: Lawrence J. White
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-08&r=reg
  2. By: Nicholas Economides; Joacim Tag
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-09&r=reg
  3. By: Giovanni Battista Ramello
    Abstract: In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.
    Keywords: aggregate litigation, efficiency, market for risk, hierarchy, regulation, innovation, asbestos
    JEL: K41 O31 G32 L23
    Date: 2011–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:24-2011&r=reg
  4. By: Isabelle Huault (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine); Hélène Rainelli-Weiss (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Paris - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Regulating financial OTC markets.
    Keywords: regulation, OTC markets, categories
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00671812&r=reg
  5. By: Lawrence J. White
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-03&r=reg
  6. By: Marco Raberto (University of Genova (Genova, Italy)); Andrea Teglio (Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain)); Silvano Cincotti (University of Genova (Genova, Italy))
    Abstract: Basel III is a recently-agreed regulatory standard for bank capital adequacy with focus on the macroprudential dimension of banking regulation, i.e., the system-wide implications of banks' lending and risk. An important Basel III provision is to reduce procyclicality of present banking regulation and promote countercyclical capital buffers for banks. The Eurace agent-based macroeconomic model and simulator has been recently showed to be able to reproduce a credit-fueled boom-bust dynamics where excessive bank leverages, while benefitting in the short term, have destabilizing effects in the medium-long. In this paper. we employ the Eurace model to test regulatory policies providing time varying capital requirements for banks, based on mechanisms that enforce banks to build up or release capital buffers, according to the overall conditions of the economy. As conditioning variables for these dynamic policies, both the unemployment rate and the aggregate credit growth have been considered. Results show that the dynamic regulation of capital requirements is generally more successful than fixed tight capital requirements in stabilizing the economy and improving the macroeconomic performance.
    Keywords: Basel III, macroprudential regulation, agent-based models and simulation
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/05&r=reg
  7. By: Linn, Joshua (Resources for the Future); Mastrangelo, Erin; Burtraw, Dallas (Resources for the Future)
    Abstract: The Clean Air Act has assumed the central role in U.S. climate policy, directing the Environmental Protection Agency to develop regulations governing the emissions of greenhouse gases from existing coal-fired power plants. The cost and environmental effectiveness of policy options depend on abatement costs, the magnitude of emissions reduction opportunities, and the sensitivity of plant utilization. This paper examines the operation of electricity-generating units over 25 years to estimate the marginal costs and potential magnitude of emissions reductions that could result from improvements in their operating efficiency. We find that a 10 percent increase in coal prices causes a 0.3 to 0.9 percent heat rate reduction, broadly consistent with engineering assessments of abatement costs and opportunities. We also find that coal prices have a significant effect on utilization, but that will vary depending on the policy design. The results are used to compare cost-effectiveness of alternative policies.
    Keywords: efficiency, regulation, greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, coal, performance standards
    JEL: L94 Q54
    Date: 2012–01–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-11-43-rev&r=reg
  8. By: Chan, Gabriel (Harvard University); Stavins, Robert (Harvard University); Stowe, Robert (Harvard University); Sweeney, Richard (Harvard University)
    Abstract: The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. This paper, which draws upon a research workshop and a policy roundtable held at Harvard in May 2011, investigates critically the design, enactment, implementation, performance, and implications of this path-breaking application of economic thinking to environmental regulation. Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world's atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation.
    JEL: Q52 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp12-003&r=reg
  9. By: Margarida Chagas Lopes
    Abstract: Labor market regulation and its relations with education and training have been performing an historical trajectory which closely intertwined with developments in economic thought. Under the form of human capital theories, neo-classical economics set the bridge between labor market equilibrium and education outputs for decades. The functionalist approach behind that lasting relationship was to be challenged by economic crises and globalization, which imposed the unquestionable supremacy of the demand for skilled work. Likewise, even if only that more strict perspective of education would prevail, which fortunately is not the case, time and hazard came to undertake its denigration on the grounds of a severe loss of regulatory efficiency as globalization was setting up.In this paper we shed light on the increasing role which innovation is called to perform in labor market hetero regulation in the present phase of globalization. Depending on the institutional design throughout which R&D become embedded in nowadays societies, evidence clearly reveals how innovation strategies are to be found so asymmetrically implemented between developed and developing countries, thereby leading to the enlarging divide between the “new North” and “new South” globalization off springs.
    Keywords: labor market regulation, education and training, innovation, knowledge, North-South divide, Portugal
    JEL: I24 J24
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:soc:wpaper:wp082011&r=reg
  10. By: Jean-Daniel Rinaudo (BRGM - Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières - BRGM); Marielle Montginoul (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs et Usages - CIRAD : UMR90 - IRD - CEMAGREF-UR IRMO - AgroParisTech); Marta Varanda (ICS - ICS - University of Lisbon); Sofia Bento (ISEG - ISEG - Technical University of Lisbon)
    Abstract: Groundwater management policies will need to be revised in many Mediterranean countries, in light of the impact of climate change and the increasing demand for water. In this paper, we analyze stakeholder perceptions of three groundwater policy scenarios which respectively assume a strengthening of state intervention, the introduction of market regulation mechanisms, and the transfer of regulation responsibility to farmers. The method consists of organizing scenario workshops with experts, institutional representatives, and farmers. It is applied in two case studies in France and Portugal. From a methodological viewpoint, the research demonstrates the farmers' ability to contribute to an exploratory assessment of possible future water management scenarios. From a policy viewpoint it clarifies expectations concerning State intervention and self-regulation by farmers. It also provides some insights regarding the acceptability of tradable groundwater permits in two European contexts.
    Keywords: Climate change; groundwater management; water markets; self-regulation; France; Portugal; scenario workshops.
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00658994&r=reg
  11. By: Thierry Brechet; Guy Meunier
    Abstract: In this paper we analyze the effects of an environmental policy on the diffusion of a clean technology in an economy where firms compete on the output market. We show that the share of adopting firms is non-monotonic with the stringency of the environmental policy, and that the adoption of the clean technology may well increase the pollution level. We also compare the effects of an emission tax and tradable pollution permits on welfare, technology adoption, and pollution level. We show that, depending on the stringency of the policy, either the tax or the permits can yield a higher degree of technology adoption and pollution. Actually, technology adoption and environmental quality may be conflicting in discriminating among the instruments.
    Keywords: innovation, technology adoption, environmental regulation
    JEL: H23 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2012–02–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eus:wpaper:ec0112&r=reg
  12. By: Ciaian, Pavel,; Kancs, d’Artis; Swinnen, Jo; Van Herck, Kristine; Vranken, Liesbet
    Abstract: All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:fmwppr:116&r=reg
  13. By: Giovanni Immordino (Università di Salerno and CSEF); Francesco Flaviano Russo (University of Naples "Federico II" and CSEF)
    Abstract: We set up an equilibrium model of prostitution where potential clients and sex workers simultaneously choose whether to demand and supply sex under three different legal regimes: prohibition, regulation and laissez-faire. We then calibrate the model to match some key facts about the prostitution market in Italy and we compare the effect of alternative policies on the total quantity of prostitution exchanged in equilibrium and on the harm associated to it. The main findings are: (i) The best prohibition regime is one where it is illegal to buy but not to sell sex. (ii) Public health policies that reduce the risk of contracting a Sexually Transmittable Disease increase the quantity and, for a small reduction of the infection probability, also the harm. However, asymmetric prevention policies that reduce the risk of contagion only for sex workers reduce harm at a small cost in terms of increased total quantity. (iii) While regulation is preferable to minimize the harm, prohibition is best if the social goal is to minimize the quantity.
    Keywords: Prostitution, Regulation, Prohibition, Lasseiz-faire.
    JEL: L51 I18 O17 H21
    Date: 2012–02–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:308&r=reg
  14. By: Matthieu Crozet; Emmanuel Milet; Daniel Mirza
    Keywords: Trade in services, Domestic Regulations, Firm Heterogeneity
    JEL: F1 L8 A A
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2012-02&r=reg
  15. By: Ciaian, Pavel,; Kancs, d’Artis; Swinnen, Jo; Van Herck, Kristine; Vranken, Liesbet
    Abstract: In this paper, we describe the regulations governing the rental markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on various kinds of regulations and institutions connected with the land rental market, including price, tenancy duration, quantity and other regulations, as well as transaction costs. The diverse government regulations on price restrictions and tenancy duration are analysed, along with the social norms observed for rental payments and contracts. The paper also examines the type and registration of contracts, the contract enforcement rules, the regulations on the inheritability of contracts and the pre-emptive right of tenants to buy the land.
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eps:fmwppr:117&r=reg
  16. By: Mattia Guidi
    Abstract: Despite having always been assumed to be true, a relationship between the independence of regulatory agencies and their performance has never been formally tested. This paper aims at verifying whether formal regulatory independence affects the performance of national competition authorities in the EU member states. The author presents and discusses a statistical analysis which shows that greater formal independence leads competition authorities to investigate more cases and to issue more decisions.
    Date: 2011–12–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0302&r=reg
  17. By: Tim Reuter (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)
    Abstract: It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both imply desistance of the violation. The trial option might induce these parties to be less willing to contribute evidence to public cases. Private trials crowd out public prosecution and can have ambiguous effects on the number of enforcement errors.
    Keywords: private and public enforcement, damages, antitrust litigation
    JEL: K21 K41 K42 L41
    Date: 2012–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1204&r=reg
  18. By: Charles Goodhart
    Abstract: Neither the achievement of price stability, via the MPC, nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the FSA, led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), FPC in the UK. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective.
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp203&r=reg
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