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on Regulation |
| By: | Stühmeier, Torben; Wenzel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership. -- |
| Keywords: | media markets,two-sided markets |
| JEL: | L82 L13 D43 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:41&r=reg |
| By: | Cousin, Violaine |
| Abstract: | The present paper aims to propose an explanation for the rationale behind the current banking regulatory arrangement in China. A now stable and relatively healthy banking system emerged largely unscathed from the financial crisis without relying much on recognised international best practices in bank supervision. China combines a strong regulatory hand together with a capital adequacy requirements stick, without much intervention of foreign or private institutions in the larger sense of the term. After an in-depth review of the Chinese framework we recognise that it is exactly this lip service to private monitoring mechanisms on top of restrictive regulators that allows for stability and growth - at least for now. China uses Chinese supervision as the core and western regulatory instruments as useful add-ons - a manner similar to the catch phrase used over a century ago to rejuvenate China. |
| Keywords: | regulation; bank; china |
| JEL: | G28 G21 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:36040&r=reg |
| By: | Inci Kuzgun (Hacettepe University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, it is aimed to highlight the importance of number of workers as the basic criterion for regulation of labour market in Turkey as a case study. The number of workers has been used as a criterion for legislative arrangements by first Labour Law 3008 since 1936. From a policy standpoint, the message is that there is a relationship between using of number of workers for regulation of labour market and the characteristcs of economy and labour market. It is result of main share of micro and small enterprises. Thus, it is aimed to protect micro and small sized enterprises in Turkey. This protective approach has been observed in three points. In the considering two exceptions of Labour Law 4857,in regulation of employment protection and in the obligation of employers. The regulations of labour market based on the number of workers have been analyzed in this paper. |
| Keywords: | Turkey; the workers’ number; regulation of labour market; micro and small firms; criterion |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hac:hacwop:20126&r=reg |
| By: | Taisuke Matsubae; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | In Japan, TV platforms regulate themselves as to the length of the advertisements they air. Using modified Hotelling models, we investigate whether such self-regulation improves consumer and social welfare or not. When all consumers choose a single TV program (the utility functions of consumers satisfy the standard "full-coverage" condition), self-regulation always reduces consumer welfare. It improves social welfare only if the advertisement revenue of each platform is not small and the cost parameter of investments in improving the quality of TV programs is small. When some consumers have outside options (the standard "full-coverage" condition is not satisfied), self-regulation can benefit consumers because it increases the number of consumers who watch TV programs. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0829&r=reg |
| By: | Joseph E. Aldy (Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; Nonresident Fellow, Resources for the Future; and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research); Robert N. Stavins (Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School; University Fellow, Resources for the Future; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Because of the global commons nature of climate change, international cooperation among nations will likely be necessary for meaningful action at the global level. At the same time, it will inevitably be up to the actions of sovereign nations to put in place policies that bring about meaningful reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases. Due to the ubiquity and diversity of emissions of greenhouse gases in most economies, as well as the variation in abatement costs among individual sources, conventional environmental policy approaches, such as uniform technology and performance standards, are unlikely to be sufficient to the task. Therefore, attention has increasingly turned to market-based instruments in the form of carbon-pricing mechanisms. We examine the opportunities and challenges associated with the major options for carbon pricing: carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reductions. |
| Keywords: | : Global Climate Change, Market-Based Instruments, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Taxes, Cap-and-Trade, Emission Reduction Credits, Energy Subsidies, Clean Energy Standards |
| JEL: | Q54 Q58 Q40 Q48 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.82&r=reg |
| By: | Miller, Marcus (University of Warwick); Zhang, Lei (University of Warwick); Li, Han Hao (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Lending retail deposits to SMEs and household borrowers may be the traditional role of commercial banks: but banking in Britain has been transformed by increasing consolidation and by the lure of high returns available from wholesale Investment activities. With appropriate changes to the baseline model of commercial banking in Allen and Gale (2007), we show how market power enables banks to collect „seigniorage?; and how „tail risk? investment allows losses to be shifted onto the taxpayer. In principle, the high franchise values associated with market power assist regulatory capital requirements to check risk-taking. But when big banks act strategically, bailout expectations can undermine these disciplining devices: and the taxpayer ends up „on the hook?- as in the recent crisis. That structural change is needed to prevent a repeat seems clear from the Vickers report, which proposes to protect the taxpayer by a „ring fence?separating commercial and investment banking. |
| Keywords: | Money and banking, Seigniorage, Risk-taking, Bailouts, Regulation |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:65&r=reg |
| By: | Aldy, Joseph E. (Harvard University); Pizer, William A. (Duke University) |
| Abstract: | The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that unilateral domestic emission mitigation policies could cause adverse "competitiveness" impacts on domestic manufacturers as they lose market share to foreign competitors and relocate production activity--and emissions--to unregulated economies. We construct a precise definition of competitiveness impacts appropriate for climate change regulation that can be estimated exclusively with domestic production and net import data. We use this definition and a 20+ year panel of 400+ U.S. manufacturing industries to estimate the effects of energy prices, which is in turn used to simulate the impacts of carbon pricing policy. We find that a U.S.-only $15 per ton CO2 price will cause competitiveness effects on the order of a 1.0 to 1.3 percent decline in production among the most energy-intensive manufacturing industries. This amounts to roughly one-third of the total impact of a carbon pricing policy on these firms' economic output. |
| JEL: | F18 Q52 Q54 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp11-047&r=reg |
| By: | Alexander Brauneis (Institute of Financial Management, Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt); Michael Loretz (Institute of Banking and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz); Roland Mestel (Institute of Banking and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz); Stefan Palan (Institute of Banking and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz) |
| Abstract: | Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter invest-ments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based approach to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing price floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm has the opportunity to switch from a high-carbon “dirty” technology to a low-carbon “clean” technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real market data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We show these findings to be robust to a large variety of input parameter settings. |
| Keywords: | Carbon price, price floor, technological change, investment decision, real option approach |
| JEL: | D81 O38 Q55 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.74&r=reg |
| By: | Joseph E. Aldy (Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Nonresident Fellow, Resources for the Future, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research); Robert N. Stavins (Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School, University Fellow, Resources for the Future, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Emissions of greenhouse gases linked with global climate change are affected by diverse aspects of economic activity, including individual consumption, business investment, and government spending. An effective climate policy will have to modify the decision calculus for these activities in the direction of more efficient generation and use of energy, lower carbon-intensity of energy, and – more broadly – a more carbon-lean economy. The only approach to doing this on a meaningful scale that would be technically feasible and cost-effective is carbon pricing, that is, market-based climate policies that place a shadow-price on carbon dioxide emissions. We examine alternative designs of three such instruments – carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, and clean energy standards. We note that the U.S. political response to possible market-based approaches to climate policy has been and will continue to be largely a function of issues and structural factors that transcend the scope of environmental and climate policy. |
| Keywords: | Global Climate Change, Market-Based Instruments, Carbon Pricing, Carbon Taxes, Cap-And-Trade, Clean Energy Standards |
| JEL: | Q54 Q58 Q40 Q48 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.73&r=reg |
| By: | Magnus Söderberg (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech); Makoto Tanaka (GRIPS - National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies - National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) |
| Abstract: | We claim that a reason for why unregulated investor-owned local monopolies do not always charge the monopoly price is that they are threatened by customer complaints that may lead to retaliations from local elected officials. When investor-owned monopolies are exposed to this threat they will mimic the price(s) of their neighbour(s); the stronger the threat, the higher the spatial price correlation. The threat increases when elected officials have pro-consumer preferences and neighbours are geographically close. The empirical analysis, based on a complete cross-sectional data set from the Swedish district heating sector in 2007, confirms the theoretical predictions. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00659458&r=reg |
| By: | Brian Burgoon; Panicos O. Demetriades; Geoffrey R.D. Underhill |
| Abstract: | This article seeks to clarify how we understand domestic and international sources of globalization and specifically how we explain financial liberalization across countries. The article also develops our understanding of the underlying legitimacy of financial liberalization. We debate e.g. Abiad and Mody (2005) and others who have found political factors to have little impact on financial openness. Using the same data undergirding such conclusions we argue, in contrast, that even a slight broadening of the political variables employed in the model and much closer attention to “input” and “output” aspects of the political legitimacy of financial liberalization over time reveal a more central role for politics in shaping liberalization. Input legitimacy involves the representation of stakeholders in initial and ongoing decisions to liberalize, while “output” legitimacy concerns liberalization’s distributional consequences and management thereof over time. Several empirical measures of domestic-national and international political factors plausibly influence such aspects of legitimacy and are found to play a significant role in shaping liberalization, suggesting legitimation politics to be more important to financial openness than existing studies have typically acknowledged. |
| Keywords: | financial openness; liberalization dynamics; financial regulation; political legitimacy; political variables; financial reform |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:11/45&r=reg |
| By: | Maria J. Gil-Molto; Bouwe Dijkstra |
| Abstract: | In this paper we model an oligopoly where .rms invest in abatement technologies and emissions are taxed by the government. We show that a stricter environmental policy does not necessarily lead to an increase in .rms.R&D investment into cleaner production methods. In fact, the emission-to-output ratio may be a U-shaped function of the environmental damage parameter. This result holds both when the government can commit and in the social optimum. When the government cannot commit, this relationship is ambiguous except in markets with few .rms. Our results further suggest that if the emission-to-output ratio is decreasing throughout, output is a U-shaped function of the environmental damage. |
| Keywords: | Environmental innovation; environmental taxation; commitment; oligopoly |
| JEL: | L12 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:11/35&r=reg |
| By: | RAM SINGH (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India) |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on two issues--the problems with the compulsory acquisition of land, and the regulatory and institutional impediments that obstruct voluntary land transactions. We argue that any compulsory acquisition based process is intrinsically inefficient and unfair, even if it is accompanied by presumably benevolent schemes such as land-for-land and the R&R packages. Moreover, it is inherently prone to litigation. We demonstrate how what we call the 'regulatory hold-up' precludes a large number of potential transactions in agriculture land, and puts a downward pressure on land prices. The paper offers suggestions for reforming the legal and regulatory framework governing the land and its use. Finally, we discuss the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement (LARR) Bill 2011. We show that the bill leaves open several backdoors for the states to favour companies. Movreover, it fails to address the fundamental causes behind rampant disputes and litigation over compensation. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:209&r=reg |
| By: | Adamos Adamou (University of Cyprus); Sofronis Clerides (University of Cyprus and CEPR); Theodoros Zachariadis (Cyprus University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Vehicle taxation based on CO2 emissions is increasingly being adopted worldwide in order to shift consumer purchases to low-carbon cars, yet little is known about the effectiveness and overall economic impact of these schemes. We focus on feebate schemes, which impose a fee on high-carbon vehicles and give a rebate to purchasers of low-carbon automobiles. e estimate a discrete choice model of demand for automobiles in Germany and simulate the impact of alternative feebate schemes on emissions, consumer welfare, public revenues and firm profits. The analysis shows that a well-designed scheme can lead to emission reductions without reducing overall welfare. |
| Keywords: | CO2 emissions, German Automobile Market, Feebates, Carbon Taxation |
| JEL: | Q5 Q53 Q58 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.96&r=reg |