|
on Regulation |
| By: | Grad, János |
| Abstract: | -- |
| Keywords: | flexible regulations,European Commission,radio regulation,technical neutrality |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52202&r=reg |
| By: | Major, Iván; Kiss, Károly M. |
| Abstract: | Cost-based pricing has dominated the regulatory regime of network industries - and first of all, the regulation of the infocommunications sector - in the European Union since the early 1990s. When privatization of network industries began in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), one of the main stumbling blocks on the road toward privately owned telecomm companies and postal services, energy producers and distributors, and other network industries was the lack of efficient and up-to-date industry regulations. From the mid-1990s, accessing countries that later became members of the EU, and other CEE countries that are still waiting for admission swiftly adopted the regulatory framework of the European Union. The EU has been striving for market opening and liberalization in these industries; it abolished industry regulation in several segments of the market of network industries. Now it applies so-called cost-based pricing in areas where regulation is still in place. CEE countries now use the same type of regulation as the advanced member states of the EU. But the regulatory capacity of most CEE countries is still far behind of their West European counterparts. Experts of network industries advocate, and telecommunications, energy and other market regulators in various parts of the world practice, cost-based pricing for inter-firm network access services. Cost-based pricing is carried out under the assumption that the regulator has perfect information regarding the costs of producing the services. We show in this paper that - under fairly general conditions - cost-based pricing creates incentives for regulated firms not to improve their efficiency. We also show that cost-based pricing results in smaller consumer welfare than incentive regulation that takes into account the existence of information asymmetry between the regulator and the firm. A model of interconnection with adverse selection and moral hazard is presented. -- |
| Keywords: | network industries,regulation,incentive contracts |
| JEL: | D8 L14 L51 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52194&r=reg |
| By: | Rasul, Azmat; McDowell, Stephen D. |
| Abstract: | -- |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itsp11:52339&r=reg |
| By: | Stawicki, Aleksander |
| Abstract: | This article sets out to contribute to the on-going discussion regarding the relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation, as well as the parallel application of competition law and regulatory instruments. Thus, this article attempts to provide a systematic outline of arguments which are conclusive for the proposition that sector-specific regulation must remain fully autonomous, while taking a critical stance with respect to the views of both the Supreme Court and academic lawyers who advocate the supremacy of competition law. |
| Keywords: | abuse of dominant position; sector-specific regulation |
| JEL: | K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34894&r=reg |
| By: | Sophie Bernard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the competition. An environmental regulation imposing a minimum level of remanufacturability is also introduced. The main results establish that, while collusion of the firms on the level of remanufacturability increases both profit and consumer surplus, a social planner could use collusion as a substitute for an environmental regulation. However, if an environmental regulation is to be implemented, collusion should be repressed since competition supports the public intervention better. Under certain circumstances, the environmental regulation can increase both profit and consumer surplus. Part of this result supports the Porter Hypothesis, which stipulates that industries respecting environmental regulations can see their profits increase. |
| Keywords: | remanufacturing ; competition ; environmental regulation ; porter hypothesis |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00638178&r=reg |
| By: | Hong, Soonho |
| Abstract: | The change in the telecommunication market can be explained with the change within the traditional telecommunication services and the introduction of new innovative services. In accordance with the changing telecommunication environment from Fixed/Circuit/Voice to Wireless/Packet/Data, each country is trying to improve its regulatory system and to build the infrastructure appropriate for the change. This study suggests the principals required for regulatory systems to vitalize innovative telecommunication services. It is make a road and let it be used freely. By comparing the regulatory environment of the U.S., EU and Korea about their policies for Fixed/Wireless networks, ex post regulations and net neutrality, the implications necessary to lead the future telecommunications market are suggested. In conclusion, the U.S. has its strength in Fixed networks, EU has it in Wireless networks and Korea needs to make a blue print of future networks which has not yet been experienced by any country of the world and, at the same time, needs to build a flexible regulatory system. -- |
| Keywords: | Regulation,Telecommunication,Innovative Service,Fixed/Wireless Network,Ex post,Net Neutrality,U.S.,EU,Korea |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52211&r=reg |
| By: | Kranz, Johann; Picot, Arnold; Roemer, Benedikt |
| Abstract: | By integrating a communications system with the existing power grid, smart grids provide end-to-end connectivity. This enables all entities and components integrated in the electricity supply system to exchange information without knowing the network's structure. New services and applications such as demand response or virtual power plants that will aid to improve and optimize the use of electricity depend on the availability of a smart grid communication network. End-to-end communication networks require that the missing communications gap between consumers' premises and the remaining energy network is bridged by deploying an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). Given the current liberalized electricity markets' structure incumbent distribution system operators (DSOs) will control the AMI and the meter data. This gives rise to concerns about anti-competitiveness. We argue that leveraging the AMI in a social welfare maximizing way requires non-discriminatory access for all entitled parties to the (1) AMI and the (2) meter data through (3) interoperable standards. We discuss possible regulatory remedies to ensure a level playing-field for innovative services in smart grids and consider implications for research and regulation. -- |
| Keywords: | Regulation,Smart Grid,Smart Meter,Antitrust |
| JEL: | K21 O31 L51 L94 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52183&r=reg |
| By: | Dhaher, Omar |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates Palestine's institutional foundations in order to decide on the most appropriate telecommunications regulatory system. It is based on the work of Levy and Spiller's institutional endowment framework. Comments and adjustments to the framework are also discussed and regulation within fragile states is also analyzed. Depending on international reports and interviews with key stakeholders of the telecommunications sector, the paper present Palestine's institutional endowment framework in addition to adjustments needed to accommodate fragility and occupation. -- |
| Keywords: | Telecommunications regulation,Regulatory design,Institutional Reform |
| JEL: | L96 Z00 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52212&r=reg |
| By: | Swora, Mariusz |
| Abstract: | The smart grid is a concept for the development of power distribution grids that offers great promise for the realization of the ambitious objectives of European Energy Policy. In its Third Energy Liberalization Package, European energy law has introduced the concept of intelligent grids and intelligent metering systems. A new directive of EPBD (energy performance of buildings) is to press ahead with this trend. At the same time work is underway at the European Commission and with European Regulators concerning standardization and the new shape of regulatory policy in the implementation stage. The EU legislation and regulatory policy of the National Regulatory Authorities will have to take into consideration the current trends in the modernization of the networks. Among other things, this means revising the existing regulatory model, and that will have to take into account the performance and output of industry networks. |
| Keywords: | smart grids; smart metering; energy regulation; output-based regulation |
| JEL: | K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34897&r=reg |
| By: | Gruber, Harald; Koutroumpis, Pantelis |
| Abstract: | The paper assesses the scope for competition inducing infrastructure regulation in furthering the diffusion of innovation. The paper uses data on the adoption of broadband services comprising a global panel of 167 countries. The effects of different regulatory provisions are assessed. The result of this paper allows qualifying different elements of the regulatory debate on the consequences of access requirements, including mandatory unbundling. First, it suggests that interplatform competition is generally not leading to acceleration in broadband diffusion. Second, with respect to intra-platform competition, this has been analyzed at two different levels: full unbundling and retail competition. In the first case the competitor is investing in network infrastructure to be able to induce some degree of service differentiation. With retail competition the scope for service differentiation is much more limited and hence competition is most likely centered on price. While both lead to faster diffusion, the results consistently show that the effect from retail competition is proportionally about twice as strong compared to unbundling. Moreover, the analysis of the time profile of the effects show that this impact on diffusion first increases until the third or fourth year after introduction, but then dissipates away. Also here one can argue that retail differentiation leads to more intense price competition and therefore faster diffusion. Different robustness checks for the results are provided. -- |
| Keywords: | Broadband,regulation,innovation,service competition,platform competition,local loop unbundling |
| JEL: | L96 L51 O33 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52161&r=reg |
| By: | Christian Bender (University of Giessen) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the incentives to invest in Next Generation Access Networks (NGA) in a framework with horizontal product differentiation with price competition between an investing and an access seeking firm. Given uncertainty about the success of the NGA, I compare regulatory regimes with symmetric and with asymmetric risk allocation to the firms having the opportunity to cooperate and jointly roll-out the NGA. I find that private incentives to cooperate might coincide with the consumer surplus maximizing outcome. Whether the firms realize this socially desirable outcome depends on the outside option, i.e. the implemented access regime. The optimal regulatory policy is not only subject to the probability that the NGA succeed but depends even more on the degree of product differentiation in the retail market. Therefore, the implementation of different access regimes subject to the degree of product differentiation seems favorable. For heterogeneous retail products, an asymmetric risk allocation not only increases the chances of cooperation but lowers the risk of overinvestment. For homogeneous goods, a symmetric risk allocation is superior as it ensures sufficient investment incentives even if competition is very intensive. |
| Keywords: | Next Generation Access Networks, investment, access regulation, cooperation |
| JEL: | D43 K23 L13 L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201149&r=reg |
| By: | Federico Boffa (University of Macerata); John Panzar (University of Auckland) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries in which the upstream “bottleneck” segment faces significant returns to scale while other (downstream) segments may be more competitive. In the proposed mechanism, the ownership of the upstream firm is allocated to downstream firms in proportion to their shares of input purchases. This mechanism, while preserving downstream competition, partially internalizes the benefits of exploiting economies of scale resulting from an increase in downstream output. We show that this mechanism is more efficient than a disintegrated market structure in which the upstream natural monopoly bottleneck sets a price equal to average cost. |
| Keywords: | Regulation, vertically related industries, co-ownership |
| JEL: | L22 L51 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2011/12/doc2011-38&r=reg |
| By: | Gorecki, Paul; Hennessy, Hugh; Lyons, Sean |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how local government planning regulations and charges affect the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. We explore the economic rationale for local government regulation of such infrastructure, which we suggest should be based on managing negative externalities. Using data from Ireland, we find that the observed geographical pattern of impact fees is inconsistent with the economic rationale for them. A simple econometric model of the number of telecoms masts in each country also suggests that the level of impact fees is negatively associated with mast deployment. This paper also examines other regulatory factors that affect the provision of new infrastructure. We find wide regional variation in these regulations but are unableto quantify their impact on infrastructure provision. Such regulatory complexity places extra compliance burdens on private operators, which may in turn distort the level and regional pattern of network investment. We suggest further regional harmonisation of development policy towards telecoms infrastructure to avoid exacerbating regional disparities in rollout of services. -- |
| Keywords: | Land use regulation,telecommunications infrastructure investment,impact fees |
| JEL: | H71 L96 R38 R52 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52160&r=reg |
| By: | Hilary Sigman (Rutgers University and NBER); Sarah Stafford (College of William and Mary) |
| Abstract: | Regulation of hazardous waste and cleanup of contaminated sites are two major components of modern public policy for environmental protection. We review the literature on these related areas, with emphasis on empirical analyses. Researchers have identified many behavioral responses to regulation of hazardous waste, including changes in the location of economic activity. However, the drivers behind compliance with these costly regulations remain a puzzle, as most research suggests a limited role for conventional enforcement. Increasingly sophisticated research examines the benefits of cleanup of contaminated sites, yet controversy remains about whether the benefits of cleanup in the U.S. exceed its costs. Finally, research focusing on the imposition of legal liability for damages from hazardous waste finds advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. reliance on legal liability to pay for cleanup, as opposed to the government-financed approaches more common in Europe. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics, Pollution, Liability, Enforcement, Superfund |
| JEL: | Q5 |
| Date: | 2010–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rut:rutres:201008&r=reg |
| By: | Knieps, Günter |
| Abstract: | In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on minimum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities. -- |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52149&r=reg |
| By: | Valcke, Peggy; Hou, Liyang; Stevens, David |
| Abstract: | Broadband over CATV networks is flourishing in the EU and in some Member States it even has already made significant impact on the retail broadband market. Our article aims to provide an overview of the regulatory treatment of broadband over CATV under the electronic communications regulatory framework. For this purpose, we carry out a survey of the different approaches within the 27 EU Member States. Based on the comments of the European Commission within the EU consultation procedure, our observation is that open Internet access obligations upon CATV operators remains limited. -- |
| Keywords: | access regulation,CATV,broadband |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52171&r=reg |
| By: | Stevens, David |
| Abstract: | Our research starts from the general observation that everywhere around the globe, an increasing number of regulatory tasks, traditionally falling under the responsibility of government, are being transferred to so-called independent regulatory authorities (i.e. independent from market actors, but quite often, also from political actors). This is, for instance, the case in the recently liberalized network industries (e.g. energy, railways), but also in the financial or the audiovisual media sector. In some cases (e.g. the electronic communications sector in the European Union), powers attributed to these regulatory authorities even prevent other, more democratically legitimate, institutions, like governments or parliaments, to interfere with the regulatory policy (cf. Judgment 424/07 of the Court of Justice in the German regulatory holidays case of December 3rd, 2009). Especially in that case, the question becomes: who's watching the watchdog? -- |
| Keywords: | Independent regulatory bodies,regulation,media and communications law |
| JEL: | K23 K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52192&r=reg |
| By: | Sutherland, Ewan |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the application of national antitrust law and the implementation of the European Union's telecommunications directives to the markets in the United Kingdom, against the declared policy objective of raising national competitiveness. It illustrates the complexity of the systems that have been created over three decades, with complex and interlocking regulatory, self-regulatory, judicial and appellate bodies, interacting with the parliamentary systems to form a regulatory state. Where markets have failed, or thought likely to fail, the state at different levels (UK, national and municipal) has supported studies and subsidized the provision of broadband Internet access. The regulator, using its sectoral antitrust powers, agreed with British Telecom to functional separation, transferring the enduring bottleneck of local access to a separate subsidiary. While the UK describes itself as a regulatory leader this is difficult to evaluate, given the number and the frequencies of changes, nonetheless the claim seems very difficult to substantiate. -- |
| Keywords: | Governance,Competitiveness,Regulatory state,Great Britain,United Kingdom |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52164&r=reg |
| By: | Freund, Natascha; Ruhle, Ernst-Olav |
| Abstract: | The telecommunications markets in the European Union have gone through a period of rapid technological as well as economic change. After the market opening in the late 1990s, the approach to regulate these markets has likewise changed over time. Whereas a sectorspecific framework dominated the phase from 1998-2002, a more prominent role of competition law regulating telecommunications markets has become visible within the last years. The two reviews of the regulatory framework (2002 and 2010) have seen sector-specific measures being scaled back and competition law measures gaining a more prominent role. This paper tries to analyse the development from sector-specific regulation towards competition law in its application to telecommunications markets in the EU. It draws conclusions from the changes in the different reviews and demonstrates how these modifications of the framework have taken place. Additionally, the practical implementations are analysed with respect to two countries. Despite the fact, that EU member states are following a joint approach (EU framework), there are still differences on the national level as regards the application of regulatory instruments and the regulation of specific markets. This can be demonstrated by looking at how national regulatory authorities conduct the process of for example market definition, market analysis, SMP designation and levying of remedies. In the paper Germany and Austria are analysed, two neighbouring countries, with similar principles in the transposition of EU frameworks into national legislation, but with strongly different outcomes as regards specific regulatory measures in terms of e.g. market analysis, price regulation, organisation of the regulatory authorities etc. Thereby we demonstrate that although the EU framework tends to achieve harmonisation, there are still a number of differences between member states in practical implementation. The paper is organised as follows: after the introduction in section 1, section 2 draws the picture of the development of the most important elements of the EU regulatory framework over time. Thereby. we specifically look at the issues of market definition, analysis and dominance designation but also issues of access and interconnection are analyzed. This encompasses conclusions regarding the overall trends of development in the design of the EU regulatory framework. Section 3 analyses the corresponding developments in the Austrian and the German telecommunications act, especially with respect to the balance between the role of sector-specific regulation and competition law in national legislation. This is done be looking at some specific topics such as, market definition and analysis, organization of the regulatory authority, potential conflicts between regulatory authority and competition authority regarding competences and responsibilities, possibilities of enforcement, and the treatment of margin squeeze. Section 4 contains our conclusions with respect to the practical implementation in member states against the overall goal of harmonisation and demonstrates differences in the way EU legislation has been transposed to national legislation in a comparison between Germany and Austria. -- |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52208&r=reg |
| By: | Götz, Georg |
| Abstract: | This paper re-examines the effect of the regulatory regime on both penetration and coverage of broadband access to the internet. The framework also allows for an evaluation of different public policy measures such as subsidization of broadband demand and supply. A welfare analysis asks what the optimal regulatory regime is and whether and how high-speed access to the internet should be subsidized. Using an approach similar to Valletti et al. (2002), the paper highlights the importance of population density for whether firms invest to provide internet access. The analysis reveals a trade-off between coverage and penetration. -- |
| Keywords: | broadband internet,penetration,coverage,subsidies |
| JEL: | L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52166&r=reg |
| By: | Kariuki Nyaga, Joseph |
| Abstract: | The East African Community (EAC)'s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector has been confronted with the convergence phenomenon. This is a concept that describes the trend of blurring boundaries between the traditionally distinct ICT sectors, namely: Information Technology (IT), broadcasting and telecommunications. This is significant for the EAC since the driving force behind this convergence phenomenon is that of efficiency. It necessitates the need to rethink the current legislative and regulatory frameworks in the ICT sector in order to cope with this phenomenon. The need to address this is pertinent since adapting to legislative and regulatory frameworks that are fully converged will expand access to ICT, stimulate economic growth, technological advancement, and also faster integration process of the EAC. Therefore this paper aims to demonstrate the following: Implications and challenges of this trend for the EAC legislative and regulatory frameworks; the need for a common legislative and regulatory framework that is fully converged. It therefore focuses on the inadequacies of the existing legislative and regulatory frameworks and reveals the lacunae in the present frameworks and how they fail to adequately address convergence phenomenon. The paper recommends effective, workable and consistent proposals on how to address the inadequacies. This brings awareness and deepens the understanding of the regulatory convergence issues to the ICT stakeholders in the region and the challenges of convergence on the existing frameworks. This will contribute to better legislative and regulatory frameworks in the EAC ICT market. It will therefore enable the region to enjoy the benefits of convergence and minimise instances of inefficiency in regulation of these converged ICT markets. -- |
| Keywords: | East African Community (EAC),Legislative and Regulatory Harmonization,Convergence,Information and Communication Technology (ICT),Regulation |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52170&r=reg |
| By: | Kosa, Zsuzsanna |
| Abstract: | This paper builds up a vision for regulatory framework for ICT markets from a public utility perspective. Cloud computing is considered as a tool for serving small and medium enterprises and distributed intelligent applications like intelligent transport services, health care information services or distance learning services. These applications are to be the modern service infrastructure both for business- or public-usages. Dependency of the individuals, communities and businesses is growing from the availability, affordability, safety and security of the ICT infrastructure. An innovation based, four phased business model for the infrastructure is shown. Voluntary industrial based communities may regulate themselves. Standardisation is shown as a measure for regulation to achieve a trusted agent position. -- |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure regulation,Cloud computing,Standardisation,Innovation |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52156&r=reg |
| By: | Sung, Nakil; Kwon, Mi-ae |
| Abstract: | Contra the current trend of deregulation, mobile wireless markets in the OECD member states appear, until recently, to have been more or less concentrated. The study estimates the equations for market concentration, mobile prices, and profits using annual panel data from 24 OECD member states for the 1998-2009 period, in order to assess their interaction. Mobile prices, measured by revenue per minute in constant USD PPP, are regarded as a direct measure of consumer welfare. Estimation results indicate that in the second half of the 2000s, market concentration had no effect on mobile prices, whereas the positive relationship between market concentration and profits persisted. In other words, the market-power hypothesis is rejected in the second half of the 2000s. This empirical result provides a strong case for a recent lenient approach towards regulation and merger attempts in OECD mobile wireless markets. Additionally, the study provides evidence that regulatory policies have affected mobile market structure and performance. -- |
| Keywords: | Mobile wireless markets,market structure,market performance,regulatory policy,competition |
| JEL: | L11 L96 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52204&r=reg |
| By: | Janda, Karel; Rausser, Gordon |
| Abstract: | This paper describes the major issues in the clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and the current regulative initiatives aimed at removing the market opaqueness. The core of the paper is the comparison of the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). The similarities and the major differences of these two regulative approaches are emphasized. The major similarities between EMIR and the Dodd-Frank Act relate to the mandatory clearing for standardized contracts, the scope of the derivatives covered, the exemptions from clearing for end-users and the reporting of cleared and uncleared derivative transactions by nearly all financial counterparties. The major differences arise with the restrictions on bank proprietary trading, with separation of derivative trading activities from commercial banking activities, with central counterparties (CCP) ownership rules and with the establishment of mandatory exchange trading requirement. |
| Keywords: | OTC Derivatives; Centralized Clearing; Regulation; EMIR; Dodd-Frank |
| JEL: | G28 G01 |
| Date: | 2011–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35036&r=reg |
| By: | Elżanowski, Filip M. |
| Abstract: | This article presents the duties and powers of the President of the Energy Regulatory Office as the national regulatory authority of Poland within the scope of implementing the Third Energy Package. The article closely examines the changes and omissions connected with implementing the regulations of the Third Liberalization Package. Such implementation has not been fully executed. The biggest shortages are visible in two fields: the realization of the aims of Articles 35 and 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Concerning Article 35 of the Directive, the changes to the legal position of the President of URE (i.e., loosening his ties with the sphere of governmental administration, something strongly advocated by negative developments which have taken place in the legal and constitutional status of the authority over the last six years) have not been implemented. |
| Keywords: | energy law; national regulatory authority; energy market; EU law; Third Energy Package; President of the Energy Regulatory Office |
| JEL: | K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34887&r=reg |
| By: | Rob Aalbers; Henri de Groot |
| Abstract: | <p>In this CPB Discussion Paper, we study how regulators may improve upon the efficiency of their energy technology adoption programs by exploiting readily observable information to limit rent extraction by firms.</p><p>Using panel data on 862 investment decisions in the Netherlands, we find that rent extraction is closely linked not only to technology characteristics, but also to the firm's capital budgetting technique. In particular, we find that rms are more likely to extract rent when either the technology's pay-back period or its required investment is lower, but less likely if they do not use a formal capital budgeting technique. Standard firm characteristics, such as size and sector, correlate with firms' use of capital budgeting techniques, thereby partly resolving the regulator's asymmetric information problem.</p> |
| JEL: | D22 H25 H32 O33 Q48 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:194&r=reg |
| By: | Joachim Fuenfgelt; Guenther G. Schulze (Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, environmental policy, transboundary pollution, common agency, strategic interaction |
| JEL: | Q58 F5 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fre:wpaper:14&r=reg |
| By: | Christine Brandstätt; Gert Brunekreeft; Nele Friedrichsen |
| Abstract: | Smart contracts based on voluntary participation and optionality can be a low transaction cost solution to implement locational signals in distribution networks and thereby avoid network investment. This paper examines the efficiency properties of smart contracts. Based on a three-node example network we show that cases exist in which smart contracts can achieve a pareto-improvement compared to the status-quo even with voluntary participation. With the pareto improvement at least one party is better of under a smart contract without worsening the situation for anyone else. We note that this requirement is very restrictive and leaves significant potential for efficiency improvements by smart contracts untapped. We then discuss the implementation of smart contracts with incentive regulation. There are two main tasks for the regulator: allowing network operators flexibility to offer such contracts and incentivizing network operators to do so. |
| Keywords: | network investment, distribution networks, locational pricing, smart contracts |
| JEL: | D23 D43 L14 L22 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bei:00bewp:0010&r=reg |
| By: | Brito, Duarte; Pereira, Pedro; Vareda, João |
| Abstract: | We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated rm that owns a wholesaler and a retailer. The entrant owns a retailer. Either retailer needs access to the input produced by the wholesaler to operate. The incumbent can make an investment that improves the quality of the input produced by the wholesaler. The regulator sets the access price and is unable to commit. The legislator sets the regulator's objective function and is able to commit. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment. -- |
| Keywords: | Investment,Dynamic Consistency,Regulator's Objective |
| JEL: | L43 L51 L96 L98 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itsp11:52341&r=reg |
| By: | Théret, Bruno |
| Abstract: | The paper addresses the issue of rethinking the welfare state as a part of a broader national system of social protection (NSSP) and a mode of societal regulation. In order to overcome the theoretical limits of bottom-up comparative analysis of welfare states, one builds a structural model of such a NSSP, inspired by french “régulation” theory. In this model, the nucleus of every NSSP is composed of three specific relationships bounding the economic and the political orders to the domestic sphere via the mediation of specific institutions: first a relationship of economic consubstantiality (social insurance for example), second a relationship of political alliance with the State (the welfare-state), third a relation of protection of the domestic order (the mix of social insurance benefits and public assistance allocations that insures the reproduction of life chances of the individual in the family framework). But a fourth relation must be introduced in the model in order to loop it dynamically, namely the wage-labor relation, or more widely, the set of market coverages of domestic life (wage, fringe benefits, private insurances, savings). The model is used to obtain a logical typology and a set of ideal-types of NSSP that add to the usual threefold clustering of Welfare States a fourth type exemplified by Japan. Then, building the same type of structural model for the national system of political representation (NSPR), and examining the institutional complementarities between NSSP and NSPR, one defines different national modes of societal regulation among which the Japanese configuration of its social and political institutions appears as one of the ideal-types. Finally, focusing on the French case, one examines, through the concepts of societal coherence and hybridization, how institutional change can be grasped in the framework of this theoretical approach of societal regulation. |
| Keywords: | Economie et régulation; structural analysis; institutional complementality; international comparisons; social regulation; welfare state; |
| JEL: | Z10 B52 P51 O57 H1 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7628&r=reg |
| By: | Schlicht-Schmälzle, Raphaela; Teltemann, Janna; Windzio, Michael |
| Abstract: | This article analyses from a cross-national comparative perspective how deregulation of compulsory education affects two central educational outcomes: efficiency and equality. The conflict between public regulation on the one hand and the market model on the other hand describes one of the most fundamental political struggles. In several fields of societal life, such as compulsory education, the state traditionally holds a strong monopoly in almost all capitalist societies. However, using three waves of PISA school level data we show that the degree of public regulation varies cross-nationally. The central finding of our analyses is that deregulation of education increases educational achievement of individual students across all social classes and thereby fosters the educational efficiency of the national education systems. Nevertheless, it also becomes evident that higher social classes benefit more strongly from deregulation, which increases the degree of educational inequality. These results indeed confirm that deregulation of education provokes an efficiency-versus-equality trade-off in national education systems. -- Der Konflikt zwischen einer staatlichen Regulation schulischer Bildung auf der einen Seite und einem deregulierten Marktmodell auf der anderen Seite stellt eine der fundamentalsten politischen Auseinandersetzungen der letzten Jahrzehnte dar. Traditionellerweise hält der Staat das Monopol der Bildungsorganisation, doch seit einigen Jahren haben verschiedene Länder verstärkt auf eine Privatisierung und Flexibilisierung schulischer Bildung gesetzt. Allerdings variiert der Grad der Standardisierung bzw. Deregulierung über verschiedene nationale Bildungssysteme deutlich. Der Beitrag untersucht mithilfe eines internationalen Vergleichs wie sich eine Deregulierung des schulischen Sektors auf die zentralen bildungspolitischen Outcomes Effizienz (bzw. Leistung) und Chancengleichheit auswirkt. Mit Daten aus drei Wellen der OECD PISA-Studie zeigen wir, dass sich eine Deregulierung des schulischen Sektors positiv auf die Leistungen aller Schüler auswirkt und somit die Effizienz von Bildungssystemen steigert. Allerdings wird auch deutlich, dass höhere soziale Schichten stärker von einer Deregulierung profitieren. Damit bestätigt sich die Annahme, dass die Deregulierung schulischer Bildung zu einem Trade-off zwischen Effizienz und Gleichheit führt. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:sfb597:157&r=reg |
| By: | Cherry, Barbara A. |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the likely combinatorial effects of U.S. deregulatory broadband policies and the evolution of law as applied to corporations as a general matter. It explains how legal developments in both areas have dismantled bodies of law or doctrines that had developed to address corporate power in both commercial and political spheres and to protect consumers from vulnerability in commercial activities. Moreover, the coexistence of these developments enables an unprecedented transfer of corporate power between economic and policymaking institutions. With the decline in regulatory constraints, as well as the rise in constitutional rights to block attempts to impose regulatory constraints, there is a resurgent rise of corporate power. The result may be a phase transition undermining the rule of law so critical to sustainable democracies. -- |
| Keywords: | Antitrust,broadband,common carriers,constitutional rights,consumer protection,corporations,telecommunications |
| JEL: | K23 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse11:52207&r=reg |
| By: | Czarnecka, Marzena; Ogłódek, Tomasz |
| Abstract: | This article presents problems associated with the development of competition on the Polish energy market in the context of tariffs and pricing. National standards are set against the background of European legislation and the activities of the Energy Regulatory Office. The thesis is that the tariffs concerning distribution should be approved by the President of this authority because it is a natural monopoly, something the authors demonstrate in the following part of the article. However, the tariffs concerning selling should be free from confirmation even for households because this is a typical market. The authors do not ignore legal analysis and practical issues. |
| Keywords: | energy law; tariff; energy market |
| JEL: | K21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34886&r=reg |