nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2011‒01‒16
twelve papers chosen by
Oleg Eismont
Russian Academy of Sciences

  1. Trade Liberalization, Environmental Regulation and Self-Regulation of Multinational Firms By Fabrice DARRIGUES; Jean-Marc MONTAUD
  2. Structural unemployment and the regulation of product market By Alexandre Janiak
  3. The Use of International Standards in Technical Regulation By Barbara Fliess; Frédéric Gonzales; Jeonghoi Kim; Raymond Schonfeld
  4. Containing systemic risk : paradigm-based perspectives on regulatory reform By de la Torre, Augusto; Ize, Alain
  5. Policy Choice versus Science in Regulating Animal Cloning under the WTO Law By Maria Weimer
  6. Preparing for Basel IV : why liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II) By Ojo, Marianne
  7. Systemic Risk, an Empirical Approach By G. de Cadenas-Santiago; L. de Mesa; A. Sanchís
  8. Performance based regulations: the viability of the modelling approach as a methodology for building energy compliance demonstration. By Raslan, R.M.S.
  9. A framework for analyzing competition in the banking sector : an application to the case of Jordan By Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez
  10. To err is human: rating agencies and the interwar foreign government debt crisis By Marc Flandreau; Norbert Gaillard; Frank Packer
  11. Mortgage lending in Korea : an example of a countercyclical macroprudential approach By Chang, Soon-taek
  12. Growth and the Optimal Carbon Tax: When to switch from exhaustible resources to renewables? By Frederick van der Ploeg; Cees Withagen

  1. By: Fabrice DARRIGUES; Jean-Marc MONTAUD
    Abstract: Trade Liberalization, Environmental Regulation and Self-Regulation of Multinational Firms
    Date: 2010–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tac:wpaper:2010-2011_5&r=reg
  2. By: Alexandre Janiak
    Abstract: I assess the impact of product market regulation on unemployment in a large-firm model of the labor market with search frictions and firm entry and exit. Two regulatory frictions are considered: administrative costs of establishing a new firm and the share of capital entrepreneurs recover when exiting. Product market regulation explains half the unemployment gap between Continental Europe and the United States in the calibrated model. More precisely, exit regulation is responsible for the entire explained gap, entry regulation playing no role. The degree of returns to scale and the presence of fixed capital in the model are important assumptions behind those results.
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edj:ceauch:274&r=reg
  3. By: Barbara Fliess; Frédéric Gonzales; Jeonghoi Kim; Raymond Schonfeld
    Abstract: To what extent are governments drawing on relevant international standards in their technical regulations, as mandated by the WTO TBT Agreement? A number of sources of data exist, including electronic databases maintained by governments, but they cannot be used to obtain systematic, international perspective, because there is no harmonised international format and they are incomplete. This study develops an analytical frame for collecting and presenting data on the use of standards in regulation in any sector, as a basis for effective monitoring of the actual extent of use of international standards in regulation and for empirical analysis of the trade effects. This template is then applied to collect and report for five OECD countries detailed factual information on technical regulations, their objectives and standards use in three sectors – electrical household appliances, equipment for natural gas and telephony. The research finds that core government policies confirm the receptiveness of policy and regulation to the use of international standards. It illustrates the difficulty of identifying, for a given sector, which standards are used, for which regulatory objectives, and with which links – direct or indirect – to standards used internationally. The data collected in the harmonised format of the template show how transparency of data on standards use could be improved. Improved transparency can facilitate efforts to improve harmonisation where this can help to remove barriers to trade. Explicit identification of regulatory objectives can ensure that attempts to promote wider harmonisation take account of those objectives. Also, the range of non-national standards actually used as a basis for technical regulation is greater than sometimes acknowledged, and wider knowledge of their availability and use could be helpful to regulators. Another benefit of transparency is that factual presentations of the use of standards in technical regulations provide a source of rich and accurate data for use in empirical work on how regulatory use of standards influences international trade.
    Keywords: Korea, Mexico, Canada, European Union, United States, transparency, natural gas, standards, WTO, technical barriers to trade, technical regulations, harmonisation, international standards, telephones, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, household appliances
    Date: 2010–07–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:traaab:102-en&r=reg
  4. By: de la Torre, Augusto; Ize, Alain
    Abstract: Financial crises can happen for a variety of reasons: (a) nobody really understands what is going on (the collective cognition paradigm); (b) some understand better than others and take advantage of their knowledge (the asymmetric information paradigm); (c) everybody understands, but crises are a natural part of the financial landscape (the costly enforcement paradigm); or (d) everybody understands, yet no one acts because private and social interests do not coincide (the collective action paradigm). The four paradigms have different and often conflicting prudential policy implications. This paper proposes and discusses three sets of reforms that would give due weight to the insights from the collective action and collective cognition paradigms by redrawing the regulatory perimeter to internalize systemic risk without promoting dynamic regulatory arbitrage; introducing a truly systemic liquidity regulation that moves away from a purely idiosyncratic focus on maturity mismatches; and building up the supervisory function while avoiding the pitfalls of expanded official oversight.
    Keywords: Debt Markets,Emerging Markets,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Labor Policies
    Date: 2011–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5523&r=reg
  5. By: Maria Weimer
    Abstract: After genetically modified organisms and nanotechnology, EU food regulators are currently facing the challenge of choosing an appropriate policy approach towards animal cloning for food supply. While different regulatory options are being discussed, the ultimate choice of the EU is likely to have ramifications for EU’s compliance with the international legal trade order of the WTO. In this paper I take the EU policy debate as a starting point to outline the main legal issues that future EU regulation on animal cloning could raise with regard to the most pertinent WTO Agreements, the GATT, the SPS Agreement, and the TBT Agreement. I argue that any future legal assessment of EU policy in this area should pay particular attention to the thorough delineation between the scopes of application of these agreements, since the choice of the applicable WTO regime will directly impact on the extent to which the EU enjoys regulatory autonomy to pursue its policy choice. In the light of the recent Panel report in EC-Biotech the applicability of the SPS Agreement also to future EU measures on animal cloning appears likely thereby resulting in strong constraints on EU policy choice. This appears problematic seeing that strong criticism is voiced against the extensive interpretation of the concept of an SPS measure, as undertaken by the Panel in EC-Biotech; and that doubts persist as to whether potential risks related to animal cloning can, in fact, be characterized as sanitary and phytosanitary risks.
    Keywords: GATT; international trade; non-discrimination; non-tariff barriers; regulation; regulatory politics; WTO
    Date: 2010–12–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0087&r=reg
  6. By: Ojo, Marianne
    Abstract: Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen in response to recent Basel Committee's initiatives aimed at addressing capital and liquidity standards, the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel Committee to address such criticisms and challenges. As well as presenting and drawing attention to proposals which could serve as means of addressing challenges presented by liquidity risks, Part I of the paper concludes with the result that market based regulation is an essential and vital tool in the Basel Committee's efforts to address some of the challenges presented by liquidity risks. The present paper highlights the Basel Committee's acknowledgement of this conclusion. Furthermore, it draws attention to other areas which are considered to constitute fertile substrates for purposes of future research. This paper will also illustrate why the potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the dissemination of information to appropriate recipients, appropriate volume of disseminated information, when to disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as ownership structures and effective corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability.
    Keywords: liquidity risks; systemic risks; capital; standards; Basel III; moral hazard; disclosure; information; Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR); Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR); accountability; corporate governance
    JEL: K2 E32 G3 D8
    Date: 2010–12–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27778&r=reg
  7. By: G. de Cadenas-Santiago; L. de Mesa; A. Sanchís
    Abstract: We have developed a quantitative analysis to verify the extent to which the sources of systemic risk identified in the academic and regulatory literature actually contribute to it. This analysis shows that all institutions contribute to systemic risk albeit to a different degree depending on various risk factors such as size, interconnection, un-substitutability, balance sheet and risk quality. From the analysis we conclude that using a single variable or a limited series of variables as a proxy for systemic risk generates considerable errors when identifying and measuring the systemic risk of each institution. When designing systemic risk mitigation measures, all contributing factors should be taken into account. Likewise, classifying institutions as systemic/non-systemic would mean giving similar treatment to institutions that may bear very different degrees of systemic risk, while treating differently institutions that may have very similar charge of systemic risk inside. Therefore, we advocate that some continuous approach to systemic risk -in which all institutions are deemed systemic but to varying degrees- would be preferable. We acknowledge that this analysis may prove somehow limited in the way that it is not founded on a predefined conceptual approach, does not fully consider other very relevant qualitative factors1 and accounts only for some of the relevant sources of systemic risk in the banking system2. These limits are currently set due to data availability and state of the art in empirical research, but we believe that these should not hinder our work identifying the true sources of systemic risk and our aim to help avoiding any partial and thus limited prudential policy approach.
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdacee:17-2010&r=reg
  8. By: Raslan, R.M.S.
    Abstract: With the increasing international shift from prescriptive to performance-based regulations, a legislative call for the integration of predictive assessment tools in the design process has emerged. In relation to this, the requirements of Article 3 of the Directive on Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD) were transposed into UK legislation with the introduction of the Building and Approved Inspectors (Amendment) Regulations 2006 (England and Wales) in April 2006. These introduced the ‘National Calculation Methodology’ (NCM), a unified compliance demonstration route for energy performance criteria specified in Approved Document Part L (Conservation of Fuel and Power), supported through the use of modelling-based building energy performance prediction (BEPP) tools accredited for the purposes of implementing associated calculations. This thesis presents an assessment of adopting the methodology, utilising a mixed-method research design to investigate key parameters identified as measures by which to quantify the success of this approach. Firstly, the adaptive capability of the UK construction industry is assessed through the analysis of primary data collected from a longitudinal survey. Secondly the applicability of the methodology is analysed through in-depth interviews examining the role of key actors and the varying dynamics of implementation and enforcement. Finally, a comparative evaluation is carried out to assess the adequacy of accredited BEPP tools. The main findings outline the shortcomings of the adaptation strategy adopted by industry and the inconsistent implementation and enforcement strategies employed. The results of the comparative tool study in particular highlight three important issues; a large degree of predictive variability between key compliance benchmarks, the lack of consistency in granting approval (a pass/fail result) between tools and limitations in the scope of their applicability. The research concludes that although a number of positive aspects can be associated with the introduction of a modelling-based approach for compliance demonstration, due to the aforementioned issues, considerable efforts are still required to extend its usefulness as a credible legislative support tool for performance-based regulations.
    Date: 2010–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/134389/&r=reg
  9. By: Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez
    Abstract: This paper proposes a framework to analyze competition in the banking sector using Jordan as an example. In particular, the paper pursues a multi-pronged approach to analyze competition including (i) an examination of the extent to which the market is contestable (that is, has low barriers to bank entry and exit), (b) an evaluation of the behavior of bank spreads, and (iii) an assessment of non-structural and direct measures of bank competition such as the H-statistic and the Lerner Index. This approach provides a more comprehensive framework to examine competition in the banking sector, compared with the commonly used alternative of looking only at bank concentration figures. In the case of Jordan, the analysis indicates that although concentration has declined, competition in the country is low and has decreased over time.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Markets and Market Access
    Date: 2010–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5499&r=reg
  10. By: Marc Flandreau; Norbert Gaillard; Frank Packer
    Abstract: During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we do not find that superior forecasting capacities can explain the agencies' growing importance.
    Keywords: sovereign credit ratings, Great Depression, financial crisis, international bond markets
    Date: 2010–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bis:biswps:335&r=reg
  11. By: Chang, Soon-taek
    Abstract: Regulatory regimes are actively discussing macroprudential policy. Korea pursued a countercyclical macroprudential approach to prevent the overheating of mortgage lending and to minimize the risk of loan default. The Korean financial supervisory authority made adjustments in response to both the condition of the housing market and trends in mortgage loans. The lessons learned from the Korean experience are applicable to other situations. First, regulations regarding loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios and other restrictions on mortgage lending can be employed as an important part of a countercyclical framework. Next, measures need to be applied in a timely manner and according to the specific conditions of each country. Finally, authorities should preemptively prepare macroprudential instruments before banks enter a period of rapid mortgage lending to avoid reckless mortgage lending operations and weaken any speculative motive in the housing market.
    Keywords: Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Banks&Banking Reform,Housing Finance
    Date: 2010–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5505&r=reg
  12. By: Frederick van der Ploeg; Cees Withagen
    Abstract: Optimal climate policy is studied in a Ramsey growth model. A developing economy weighs global warming less, hence is more likely to exhaust fossil fuel and exacerbate global warming. The optimal carbon tax is higher for a developed economy. We analyze the optimal time of transition from fossil fuel to renewables, amount of fossil fuel to leave in situ, and carbon tax. Subsidizing a backstop without an optimal carbon tax induces more fossil fuel to be left in situ and a quicker phasing in of renewables, but fossil fuel is depleted more quickly. Global warming need thus not be alleviated.
    Keywords: carbon tax, renewables, exhaustible resources, global warming, growth, intergenerational inequality aversion, second best, Green Paradox
    JEL: D90 E13 Q30 Q42 Q54
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:oxcrwp:055&r=reg

This nep-reg issue is ©2011 by Oleg Eismont. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.