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on Regulation |
| By: | Ambec, Stefan; Ehlers, Lars |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.18.324&r=reg |
| By: | Ambec, Stefan; Cohen, Mark; Elgie, Stewart; Lanoie, Paul |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.14.320&r=reg |
| By: | Ojo, Marianne |
| Abstract: | This paper considers and assesses various explanations attributed as principal factors of the recent Financial Crisis. In particular, it focuses on two principal regulatory tools which constitute the basis of the framework promulgated by recent Basel Committee's initiatives, that is, Basel III. These two regulatory tools being capital and liquidity requirements. Various conclusions have been put forward to explain what triggered the recent Financial Crisis. This paper aims to explain why the Basel Committee's liquidity requirements and present proposals aimed at addressing liquidity risks, still represent a very modest milestone in efforts aimed at addressing challenges in prudential regulation and supervision. Even though problems attributed to capital adequacy requirements are considered by many authorities to have triggered the recent Crisis, the paper will highlight how runs on banks are triggered by liquidity crises and that liquidity risks cannot be isolated from systemic risks. In so doing, it will incorporate the roles assumed by information asymmetries and market based regulation – hence elaborate on how market based regulation could serve to address problems which trigger liquidity risks. Imperfect knowledge being a factor which is contributory to liquidity crises and bank runs, and market based regulation being essential in facilitating disclosure - since the Basel Committee's focus on banks and prudential supervision cannot on its own, address the challenges encountered in the present regulatory environment. Furthermore, it will address measures and proposals which could serve as bases for future regulatory reforms - as well as criticisms and challenges still encountered by recent Basel Committee initiatives. |
| Keywords: | capital; liquidity; Basel III; Basel Committee; lender of last resort; banks; insurance; securities; information asymmetry; market based regulation; bail outs; disclosure; moral hazard; Dodd Frank Act; Financial Crisis |
| JEL: | K2 E52 D8 |
| Date: | 2010–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27627&r=reg |
| By: | Alfredo Gigliobianco (Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department); Claire Giordano (Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department) |
| Abstract: | The paper provides a qualitative assessment of the role mainstream economic theory had in orienting Italy’s banking legislation from its political unification (1861) to the introduction of the 1936 Banking Act. Five regulatory regimes are considered. Whilst market discipline and self-regulation arguments characterized the first sub-period (1861-1892), the debate over convertibility and limits on note issuance was intense in the second (1893-1906). The third sub-period (1907-1925) was punctuated by two banking crises: the first (1907) vindicated economists who had stressed the need of a lender of last resort à la Bagehot; the second (1921-23) confirmed – to no avail – the dangers congenital to bank-industry ties. The following sub-period (1926-1930) was inaugurated by the first commercial bank regulation (1926) and responded to the prevailing economists’ call for restricting bank competition. The 1936 regulation, which inaugurated the approximately five-decade long fifth regime, matured in a virtual vacuum of professional economic debate. Overall, two key factors were found to affect the degree to which legislation drew upon contemporary economic thought: a) the severity of the preceding crisis; and b) the timing of the subsequent regulation. |
| Keywords: | banking crises, prudential regulation, economic theory |
| JEL: | B15 G28 N4 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:workqs:qse_5&r=reg |
| By: | Trumbull, Gunnar; Trumbull, Gunnar |
| Abstract: | Theories of legitimate regulation have emphasized the role of governments either in fixing market failures to promote greater efficiency, or in restricting the efficient functioning of markets in order to pursue public welfare goals. In either case, features of markets serve to justify regulatory intervention. I argue that this causal logic must sometimes be reversed. For certain areas of regulation, its function must be understood as making markets legitimate. Based on a comparative historical analysis of consumer lending in the United States and France, I argue that national differences in the regulation of consumer credit had their roots in the historical conditions by which the small loan sector came to be legitimized. Americans have supported a liberal regulation of credit because they have been taught that access to credit is welfare promoting. This perception emerged from an historical coalition between commercial banks and NGOs that promoted credit as the solution to a range of social ills. The French regulate credit tightly because they came to see credit as both economically risky and a source of reduced purchasing power. This attitude has its roots in the early postwar lending environment, in which loans were seen to be beneficial only if they were accompanied by strong government protections. These cases suggest that national differences in regulation may trace to historically contingent conditions under which markets are constructed as legitimate. |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:reg:wpaper:638&r=reg |
| By: | Jokivuolle, Esa (Bank of Finland Research); Kiema, Ilkka (University of Helsinki); Vesala, Timo (Danske Bank A/S, Finland) |
| Abstract: | We show how banks’ excessive risk-taking, stemming from informational asymmetries in loan markets, can lead to an excessive output loss when a recession starts. Risk-based capital requirements can alleviate the output loss by reducing excessive risk-taking in ‘normal’ times. Model simulations suggest that the differentiation of risk-weights in the Basel framework might be further increased in order to take full advantage of the allocational effects of capital requirements. Our analysis also provides a new rationale for the countercyclical elements of capital requirements. |
| Keywords: | bank regulation; Basel III; capital requirements; credit risk; crises; procyclicality |
| JEL: | D41 D82 G14 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2010_017&r=reg |
| By: | Viral V. Acharya; Hamid Mehran; Anjan V. Thakor |
| Abstract: | Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It balances effi ciently the market discipline imposed by owners of risky debt on managerial rent-seeking against the asset-substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this generates an equilibrium featuring systemic risk in which all banks choose inefficiently high leverage to fund correlated assets. A minimum equity capital requirement can rule out asset substitution but also compromises market discipline by making bank debt too safe. The optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be unavailable to creditors upon failure, and be available to shareholders only contingent on good performance. |
| Keywords: | Bank capital ; Moral hazard ; Systemic risk |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1024&r=reg |
| By: | Itai Agur; Maria Demertzis |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that a rate hike has countervailing effects on banks’ risk appetite. It reduces risk when the debt burden of the banking sector is modest. We model a regulator whose trade-off between bank risk and credit supply is derived from a welfare function. We show that the regulator cannot optimally neutralize the welfare effects that the interest rate has through bank incentives. The larger the correlation between banks’ projects, the more important the role for monetary policy. In a dynamic setting, not internalizing bank risk leads a monetary authority to keep rates low for too long after a negative shock. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy; Financial stability; Maturity mismatch; Leverage; Regulation |
| JEL: | E43 E52 E61 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:271&r=reg |
| By: | Christian Flachsland; Steffen Brunner; Ottmar Edenhofer; Felix Creutzig |
| Abstract: | Current policies in the road transport sector fail to deliver consistent and efficient incentives for greenhouse gas abatement (see companion article by Creutzig et al., 2010a). Market-based instruments such as cap-and-trade systems close this policy gap and are complementary to traditional policies which are required where specific market failures arise. Even in presence of strong existing non-market policies, cap-and-trade delivers additional abatement and efficiency by incentivizing demand side abatement options. This paper analyzes generic design options and economic impacts of including the European road transport sector to the EU ETS. The point of regulation in a road transport cap-and-trade system should be upstream in the fuel chain to ensure effectiveness (cover all life-cycle emissions and avoid double-counting), efficiency (incentivize all abatement options) and low transaction costs. Based on year 2020 marginal abatement cost curves from different models and current EU climate policy objectives we show that in contrast to conventional wisdom road transport inclusion would not change the EU ETS allowance price. This puts concerns over industrial carbon leakage as a consequence of adding road transport to the EU ETS into perspective. |
| Keywords: | Climate Policy, Road Transport, Cap-and-trade |
| JEL: | Z0 Z1 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecc:wpaper:2&r=reg |
| By: | Paul Conway; Richard Herd; Thomas Chalaux; Ping He; Jianxun Yu |
| Abstract: | The extent of competition in product markets is an important determinant of economic growth in both developed and developing countries. This paper uses the 2008 vintage of the OECD indicators of product market regulation to assess the extent to which China’s regulatory environment is supportive of competition in markets for goods and services. The results indicate that, although competition is increasingly robust across most markets, the overall level of product market regulation is still restrictive in international comparison. These impediments to competition are likely to constrain economic growth as the Chinese economy continues to develop and becomes more sophisticated. The paper goes on to review various aspects of China’s regulatory framework and suggests a number of policy initiatives that would improve the extent to which competitive market forces are able to operate. Breaking the traditional links between state-owned enterprises and government agencies is an ongoing challenge. Reducing administrative burdens, increasing private sector involvement in network sectors and lowering barriers to foreign direct investment in services would also increase competition and enhance productivity growth going forward. Some of the reforms introduced by the Chinese government over the past two years go in this direction and should therefore help foster growth. This paper relates to the 2010 OECD Economic Review of China (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/china).<P>Règlementation du marché des produits et concurrence en Chine<BR>L’étendue de la concurrence sur le marché des produits est un déterminant important de la croissance économique dans les pays développés et en développement. Ce papier utilise la version 2008 des indicateurs de réglementation du marché des produits de l’OCDE pour évaluer dans quelle mesure l’environnement règlementaire en Chine favorise la concurrence sur les marchés de biens et services. Les résultats indiquent que, bien que la concurrence s’intensifie sur la plupart des marchés, le niveau général de la réglementation demeure restrictif au plan international. Ces entraves à la concurrence sont susceptibles de freiner la croissance à mesure que l’économie chinoise continue de se développer et devient plus sophistiquée. Ce papier examine ensuite différents aspects du cadre règlementaire chinois, et suggère différents types de mesures qui donneraient une plus grande latitude aux forces de marché. Briser les liens traditionnels entre entreprises publiques et agences gouvernementales reste un défi. Réduire les contraintes administratives, accroître la participation du secteur privé dans les secteurs de réseau et abaisser les barrières à l’investissement direct étranger dans les services stimuleraient aussi la concurrence et les progrès de productivité. Certaines des réformes introduites par le gouvernement chinois durant les deux dernières années vont dans ce sens et devraient donc encourager la croissance. Ce document se rapporte à l’Étude économique de la Chine de l’OCDE, 2010, (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/chine). |
| Keywords: | productivity, macroeconomic policies, China, regulatory, productivité, politique macro-économique, régulation, Chine |
| Date: | 2010–12–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:823-en&r=reg |
| By: | Erlend Nier; Ouarda Merrouche |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates empirically the drivers of financial imbalances ahead of the global financial crisis. Three factors may have contributed to the build-up of financial imbalances: (i) rising global imbalances (capital flows), (ii) monetary policy that might have been too loose, (iii) inadequate supervision and regulation. Panel data regressions are performed for OECD countries from 1999 to 2007, so as to shed light on the relative importance of these factors, as well as the extent to which these factors might have interacted in fuelling the build-up. We find that the build-up of financial imbalances was driven by capital inflows and an associated compression of the spread between long and short rates. The effect of capital inflows on the build-up is amplified where the supervisory and regulatory environment was relatively weak. We find that, by contrast, differences in monetary policy cannot account for differences across countries in the build-up of financial imbalances ahead of the crisis. |
| Keywords: | Balance of trade , Bank credit , Bank regulations , Bank supervision , Capital flows , Capital inflows , Cross country analysis , Current account balances , Financial crisis , Financial sector , Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009 , Monetary policy , |
| Date: | 2010–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/265&r=reg |
| By: | M. Conti; Giovanni Sulis |
| Abstract: | Using data for 51 manufacturing and service sector for the period 1970-2005 in 14 countries, this paper show that employment protection legislation has a negative and significant effect on growth of value added and hours of work in more human capital intensive sectors. We argue that labour market regulation has a negative impact on the technology adoption mechanism through its heterogeneous impact on firms workforce adjustment requirements. In fact, technology adoption depends both on the skill level of the workforce and the capacity of firms to optimally adjust their employment levels as technology changes. As a consequence, firing costs have a relatively stronger impact in sectors in which technology adoption is more important. Our empirical results are robust to various sensitivity checks such as interactions of human capital intensity with other country level variables, of employment protection with other sector level variables and endogeneity of firing restrictions. We also show that the negative effect of EPL is stronger the smaller the distance from the technology frontier and after the 1990s. |
| Keywords: | Growth; Human Capital; Technology Adoption; Employment Protection Legislation; Sectors |
| JEL: | J24 J65 O47 O52 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201028&r=reg |
| By: | Philip Keitel |
| Abstract: | In November 2009, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued regulations that protect consumers from being charged certain fees when, under a discretionary overdraft service, financial institutions pay transactions from a deposit account that contains insufficient funds. Under the regulations, consumers must receive notices that explain any discretionary overdraft services offered to them by their bank. In addition, consumers may not be charged overdraft fees for ATM or one-time debit transactions unless they have opted in to this service. During the rulemaking process, the Board extensively interviewed consumers and tested model notices to understand how consumers think about and use overdraft services. This paper describes banks’ overdraft programs, examines lessons learned from consumer testing, and explains how information obtained during consumer testing influenced the rulemaking. In addition, this paper presents some insights about more effective ways of conveying key information about overdraft services to consumers. |
| Keywords: | Consumers' preferences ; Overdrafts ; Regulation |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpdp:10-03&r=reg |
| By: | Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur (EHESS - Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales - Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris); Amir Rezaee (LEO - Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans - CNRS : UMR6221 - Université d'Orléans, EDHEC - Edhec); Angelo Riva (IREBS - Institut de recherche de l'European Business School - European Business School, IDHE - Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Economie - CNRS : UMR8533 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I - Université Paris VIII Vincennes-Saint Denis - Université de Paris X - Nanterre - École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan) |
| Abstract: | Theoretical and historical experience suggests a financial centre may either include a single, consolidated and loosely regulated stock exchange attracting all intermediaries and actors, or a variety of exchanges going from strictly regulated to completely unregulated and adapted to the needs of different categories of intermediaries, investors and issuers. Choosing between these two solutions is uneasy because few substantial changes occur at this "meta-regulatory" level. The history of the Paris exchanges provides a good example, since two legal changes in opposite directions occurred in the late 19th century, when Paris was the second financial centre in the world. In 1893, a law threatened the existing two-exchanges equilibrium by diminishing the advantages of the more regulated exchange; in 1898, another law brought them back. We analyse the impact of these two changes on the competition between the exchanges in terms of securities listed, traded volumes and spreads. We conclude competition among exchanges is a delicate matter and efficiency is not always where one would think. |
| Keywords: | Paris Stock exchange ; microstructure ; monopoly ; regulation |
| Date: | 2010–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00547470_v1&r=reg |
| By: | Nicholas Economides (Stern School of Business, NYU); Benjamin Hermalin (Haas School of Business, U.C. Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | Pricing of Internet access has been characterized by two properties. Parties are directly billed only by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) through which they connect to the Internet and the ISP charges them on the basis of the amount of information transmitted rather than its content. These properties define a regime known as “network neutrality.” In 2005, some large ISPs proposed that application and content providers directly pay them additional fees for accessing the ISPs’ residential clients, as well as differential fees for prioritizing certain content. We analyze the private and social incentives to introduce such fees when the network is congested and more traffic implies delays. We find that network neutrality is welfare superior to bandwidth subdivision (granting or selling priority service). We also consider the welfare properties of the various regimes that have been proposed as alternatives to network neutrality. In particular, we show that the benefit of a zero-price “slow lane” is a function of the bandwidth the regulator mandates be allocated it. Extending the analysis to consider ISPs’ incentives to invest in more bandwidth, we show that, under general conditions, their incentives are greatest when they can price discriminate; this investment incentive offsets to some degree the allocative distortion created by the introduction of price discrimination. A priori, it is ambiguous whether the offset is sufficient to justify departing from network neutrality. |
| Keywords: | network neutrality, two-sided markets, Internet, monopoly, price discrimination, regulation, congestion |
| JEL: | L1 D4 L12 L13 C63 D42 D43 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1025&r=reg |
| By: | Felix Creutzig (Department of Economics of Climate Change, TU Berlin); Emily McGlynn; Jan Minx; Ottmar Edenhofer |
| Abstract: | The global rise of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its potentially devastating consequences require a comprehensive regulatory framework for reducing emissions, including those from the transport sector. Alternative fuels and technologies have been promoted as means for reducing the carbon intensity of the transport sector. However, the overall transport policy framework in major world economies is geared towards the use of conventional fossil fuels. This paper evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of current climate policies for road transport that (1) target fuel producers and/or car manufacturers, and (2) influence use of alternative fuels and technologies. With diversifying fuel supply chains, carbon intensity of fuels and energy efficiency of vehicles cannot be regulated by a single instrument. We demonstrate that vehicles are best regulated across all fuels in terms of energy per distance. We conclude that price-based policies and a cap on total emissions are essential for alleviating rebound effects and perverse incentives of fuel efficiency standards and low carbon fuel standards. In tandem with existing policy tools, cap and price signal policies incentivize all emissions reduction options. Design and effects of cap and trade in the transport sector are investigated in the companion article (Flachsland et al., 2010). |
| Keywords: | Fuel efficiency standards, low carbon fuel standards, climate change |
| JEL: | Z0 Z1 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecc:wpaper:1&r=reg |
| By: | Francesco Decarolis (University of Wisconsin - Madison); Cristina Giorgiantonio (Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department); Valentina Giovanniello (Tribunale di Roma) |
| Abstract: | Despite the many reforms in the public procurement sector in recent years, the Italian system is still marked by high levels of fragmentation and is considerably exposed to the risks of collusion, corruption and of ex-post renegotiations with the winning contractors. Other deficiencies are also present at the planning stages of the works. These problem areas appear ascribable in part to the current regulations on the awarding of public works contracts, which do not guarantee the correct functioning of the selection mechanisms of private contractors. Indications from the economic literature and international comparisons suggest that improvements could arise from: i) the elimination of automatic exclusion mechanisms for anomalous tenders (which would reduce the risk of collusion between bidders); ii) the centralization of assessments of anomalous offers under the responsibility of larger adjudicating authorities and with an increase in the surety guarantees given by the winning bidders, which would reduce the risk of subsequent renegotiations; iii) the reinforcement of measures to combat corruption; iv) a greater standardization of planning and, for the more complex auctions, the use of competitive dialogue. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure, Auctions, Regulation |
| JEL: | D44 H57 K23 L22 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_83_10&r=reg |
| By: | Ambec, Stefan; Sebi, Carine |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.19.325&r=reg |
| By: | Ivaldi, Marc; Mccullough, Gerard |
| Abstract: | The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators. |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L41 L92 |
| Date: | 2010–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:23459&r=reg |
| By: | José-María Da-Rocha (Universidade de Vigo); María-José Gutiérrez (University of the Basque Country) |
| Abstract: | Endogenous fisheries management in a stochastic model: Why do fishery agencies use TACs along with fishing periods? The aim of this paper is to explain under which circumstances using TACs as instrument to manage a fishery along with fishing periods may be interesting from a regulatory point of view. In order to do this, the deterministic analysis of Homans and Wilen (1997)and Anderson (2000) is extended to a stochastic scenario where the resource cannot be measured accurately. The resulting endogenous stochastic model is numerically solved for finding the optimal control rules in the Iberian sardine stock. Three relevant conclusions can be highligted from simulations. First, the higher the uncertainty about the state of the stock is, the lower the probability of closing the fishery is. Second, the use of TACs as management instrument in fisheries already regulated with fishing periods leads to: i) An increase of the optimal season length and harvests, especially for medium and high number of licences, ii) An improvement of the biological and economic variables when the size of the fleet is large; and iii) Eliminate the extinction risk for the resource. And third, the regulator would rather select the number of licences and do not restrict the season length. |
| Keywords: | fisheries management, TAC, season lengths, stock uncertainty |
| JEL: | Q22 Q28 Q57 |
| Date: | 2010–12–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:201013&r=reg |
| By: | Thomas H. Klier; Joshua Linn |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an overview of the economics literature on the effect of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on the new vehicle market. Since 1978, CAFE has imposed fuel economy standards for cars and light trucks sold in the U.S. market. This paper reviews the history of the standards, followed by a discussion of the major upcoming changes in implementation and stringency. It describes strategies that firms can use to meet the standards and reviews the CAFE literature as it applies to the new vehicle market. The paper concludes by highlighting areas for future research in light of the upcoming changes to CAFE. |
| Keywords: | Fuel ; Energy consumption ; Automobiles - Prices |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2011-01&r=reg |
| By: | Miguel A. López-Morell (Universidad de Murcia); Jos M. O'Kean (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Pablo de Olavide & IE Business School) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this article is to analyse the strategies employed by the Rothschilds until 1940 to limit competition in the non ferrous international market. We will study how they opted for rigid demand products of highly concentrated supply which were favourable to market control (mercury, nickel, lead and copper and sulphur) by assuming administrative monopolies (mercury from Spanish Almadn Mines) or through control of the leading businesses of the respective markets (Le Nickel, Pearroya and Rio Tinto). We will also analyse how the family was able to gain worldwide monopolies, or if not, how they promoted collusive oligopolies with the competition in any number of forms in their quest to maintain profitability and to flee from any competition. |
| Keywords: | International Raw material markets, Cartels, Rothschild, mining, Non-ferrous metals. |
| JEL: | N50 D43 L13 L72 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:10.17&r=reg |