|
on Regulation |
| By: | Martin Maegli; Christian Jaag; Martin Koller; Urs Trinkner |
| Abstract: | There is an increasing convergence between postal products and telecom applications which suggests the need for a co-evolution of regulation. But there is hardly any discussion in academia or in practice about the consequences for regulation. Relevant questions are: Which parts of current regulation will become redundant? Is there additional regulation needed due to new bottlenecks or changes in consumer behavior? In our qualitative analysis, we investigate the implications of intermodal competition and growing convergence between postal and telecommunications services on regulatory institutions and regimes. We set up a comparison between the networks and compare the scope of universal services and issues concerning market power regulation in the two different industries. |
| Keywords: | Convergence, Regulation, Post, Telecommunication, Universal service obligation, Access |
| JEL: | L41 L52 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0023&r=reg |
| By: | Bushnell, James; Wolfram, Catherine |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of the New Source Review (NSR) environmentalregulations on coal-fired electric power plants. Regulations that grew out of the Clean Air Act of 1970 required new electric generating plants to install costly pollution control equipment but exempted existing plants. Existing plants lost their exemptions if they made ``major modifications.'' We examine whether this caused firms to invest less in grandfathered plants, possibly leading to lower efficiency and higher emissions. We find evidence that heightened NSR enforcement reduced capital expenditures at vulnerableplants. However, we find no discernable effect on other inputs or emissions.This paper analyzes the effects of the New Source Review (NSR) environmental regulations on coal-fired electric power plants. Regulations that grew out of the Clean Air Act of 1970 required new electric generating plants to install costly pollution control equipment but exempted existing plants. Existing plants lost their exemptions if they made ``major modifications.'' We examine whether this caused firms to invest less in grandfathered plants, possibly leading to lower efficiency and higher emissions. We find evidence that heightened NSR enforcement reduced capital expenditures at vulnerable plants. However, we find no discernable effect on other inputs or emissions. |
| Keywords: | New Source Review; Environmental Regulations; productivity; electricity |
| JEL: | L51 L94 Q52 Q58 |
| Date: | 2010–03–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:31805&r=reg |
| By: | Renaud Bourlès; Gilbert Cette; Jimmy Lopez; Jacques Mairesse; Giuseppe Nicoletti |
| Abstract: | Based on an endogenous growth model, we show that intermediate goods markets imperfections can curb incentives to improve productivity downstream. We confirm such prediction by estimating a model of multifactor productivity growth in which the effects of upstream competition vary with distance to frontier on a panel of 15 OECD countries and 20 sectors over 1985-2007. Competitive pressures are proxied with sectoral product market regulation data. We find evidence that anticompetitive upstream regulations have curbed MFP growth over the past 15 years, more strongly so for observations that are close to the productivity frontier.<P>Les réglementations du marché des produits dans les secteurs amont limitent-elles la croissance de la productivité ? Résultats de données de panel pour les pays de l’OCDE<BR>En s?appuyant sur un modèle de croissance endogène, nous montrons dans cette étude que les imperfections de marché dans les secteurs amont abaissent les incitations à améliorer la productivité en aval. Cette conjecture est confirmée empiriquement par l?estimation d?un modèle qui différencie les effets potentiels, sur la productivité globale des facteurs (PGF), d?une concurrence insuffisante dans les secteurs amont selon la distance à la frontière technologique sectorielle. Ces estimations sont réalisées sur un panel de 15 pays de l?OCDE et 20 secteurs d?activité sur la période 1985-2007. La concurrence en amont est mesurée par des indicateurs sectoriels de régulation sur les marchés des biens. Les résultats montrent que, sur les 15 dernières années, les régulations anticompétitives dans les secteurs amont ont affaibli les gains de PGF, tout particulièrement pour les observations proches de la frontière technologique. |
| Keywords: | growth, productivity, competition, regulation, catching-up, productivité, croissance, régulation, rattrapage, compétition |
| JEL: | C23 L16 L5 O43 O57 |
| Date: | 2010–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:791-en&r=reg |
| By: | Stefan AMBEC; Mark A. COHEN; Stewart ELGIE; Paul LANOIE (IEA, HEC Montréal) |
| Abstract: | Twenty years ago, Harvard Business School economist and strategy professor Michael Porter stood conventional wisdom about the impact of environmental regulation on business on its head by declaring that well designed regulation could actually enhance competitiveness. The traditional view of environmental regulation held by virtually all economists until that time was that requiring firms to reduce an externality like pollution necessarily restricted their options and thus by definition reduced their profits. After all, if there are profitable opportunities to reduce pollution, profit maximizing firms would already be taking advantage of those opportunities. Over the past 20 years, much has been written about what has since become known simply as the Porter Hypothesis (“PH”). Yet, even today, there is conflicting evidence, alternative theories that might explain the PH, and oftentimes a misunderstanding of what the PH does and does not say. This paper provides an overview of the key theoretical and empirical insights on the PH to date, draw policy implications from these insights, and sketches out major research themes going forward. |
| Keywords: | Porter Hypothesis, environmental policy, innovation, performance. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iea:carech:1002&r=reg |
| By: | Margit Molnar |
| Abstract: | The global crisis exposed weaknesses in the Hungarian financial system that pose risks to financial stability. Excessive risk-taking by banks and households had been masked by relatively stable exchange rates, the expected early adoption of the euro and unusually lax credit conditions in international markets. With credit becoming scarcer and dearer, the domestic economy was hit through multiple channels. The steep depreciation of the forint boosted households’ debt burden, while banks were hit by the drying up of liquidity, including in swap markets for Swiss francs. A major lesson learnt from the crisis is that the approach to household lending needs to change: a stronger protection for borrowers should be combined with a tighter regulation of lenders. Enhancing competition in the banking market would also impose discipline on lending behaviour. Financial supervision should be strengthened by enhancing the powers of the financial supervisor to avoid abusive practices and excessive risk taking. A better early-warning system needs to be created for the monitoring and assessment of systemic risks, in which a more formal Financial Stability Council should play a prominent role. This Working Paper relates to the 2010 OECD Economic Survey of Hungary (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/hungary).<P>Renforcer la stabilité financière en améliorant la réglementation en Hongrie<BR>La crise mondiale a révélé des faiblesses du système financier hongrois qui mettent en péril la stabilité financière. Les risques excessifs pris par les banques et les ménages avaient été masqués par la relative stabilité du taux de change, les anticipations d'adoption rapide de l'euro, et la détente inhabituelle des conditions de crédit sur les marchés internationaux. Quand le crédit est devenu plus rare et plus cher, l'économie hongroise a été touchée de multiples façons. La forte dépréciation du forint a beaucoup alourdi l'endettement des ménages, tandis que les banques ont souffert de l'assèchement de la liquidité, notamment sur le marché des contrats d'échange de forints contre francs suisses. Une des principales leçons de la crise est qu'il est nécessaire de modifier les modalités des prêts aux ménages : il faut conjuguer une plus grande protection des emprunteurs et l'application d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse aux prêteurs. Un renforcement de la concurrence sur le marché bancaire disciplinerait aussi le comportement des prêteurs. Il convient de renforcer la surveillance financière en donnant davantage de pouvoirs à l'autorité de régulation financière pour empêcher les pratiques abusives et la prise de risques excessifs. Il faut aussi créer un meilleur système d'alerte précoce pour le suivi et l'évaluation des risques systémiques, dans le cadre duquel un Conseil de stabilité financière ayant un caractère plus formel devrait jouer un rôle prédominant. Ce document de travail est lié à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE sur la Hongrie de 2010 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/hongrie). |
| Keywords: | Hungary, government policy and regulation, bank, financial crisis, financial markets and the macroeconomy, Hongrie, banque, crise financière, marchés de capitaux et macroéconomie, réglementation et politiques publiques |
| JEL: | E44 G18 G21 |
| Date: | 2010–06–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:786-en&r=reg |
| By: | Jeremy Lawson |
| Abstract: | European energy policy faces a number of interrelated challenges, including making the transition to a low–carbon economy, increasing cross–border competition in electricity and gas markets and diversifying Europe’s energy supply. The EU has developed a comprehensive strategy in all of these areas, encapsulated in 2020 targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, raising renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency. These targets are underpinned by an Emissions Trading Scheme, legally binding reduction commitments by member states for the emissions not covered by the trading scheme, the third energy liberalisation package and the Energy Security and Solidarity Plan. The steps the EU have taken are worthwhile but there is also room for improvement. To ensure that the transition to a low–carbon economy is achieved at a low cost, the EU should seriously consider including all transport sectors in the Emissions Trading Scheme when practical and appropriate, and ensure that only sectors rigorously identified as being at genuine risk of carbon leakage should continue to receive free allowances until 2020. Consideration should be given to making use of an EU–wide market instrument to deliver the EU’s renewable energy target, and it will be important to ensure that the 10% renewable transport fuel target efficiently achieves its objectives of sustainability and security of supply given the high cost of many renewable transport fuels. Measures to raise energy efficiency will have to be designed carefully so that the overall cost of mitigation is not raised. The Commission’s third energy market liberalisation package should be strengthened by requiring full ownership unbundling of transmission service operators and ensuring the powers of the proposed Agency for Co–operation of Energy Regulators are broad enough to contribute effectively to a truly single European energy market. This Working Paper relates to the 2010 Economic Survey of the European Union. (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/EuropeanUnion)<P>Politique énergétique européenne et le passage à une économie sobre en carbone<BR>La politique énergétique de l’Europe doit relever plusieurs défis interdépendants, dont le passage à une économie sobre en carbone, l’accentuation de la concurrence transfrontalière sur les marchés de l’électricité et du gaz et la diversification des sources d’énergie. Dans tous ces domaines, l’Union européenne a conçu une stratégie globale inscrite dans les objectifs de 2020 pour la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, qui fait une plus grande place aux énergies renouvelables et favorise l’augmentation de l’efficacité énergétique. Ces objectifs reposent sur plusieurs piliers : le système communautaire d’échange de quotas d’émission (SCEQE), des engagements de réduction légalement contraignants des États membres pour les émissions non couvertes par le système d’échange, le troisième paquet énergie et le Plan d’action européen en matière de sécurité et de solidarité énergétiques. Les mesures prises par l’Union européenne sont louables, mais des améliorations sont toutefois possibles. Pour passer au moindre coût à une économie sobre en carbone, l’UE devrait sérieusement envisager d’inclure tous les secteurs des transports dans le système d’échange de quotas d’émission lorsque c’est possible et judicieux, et veiller à ce que seuls les secteurs rigoureusement identifiés comme présentant un risque significatif de fuite de carbone continuent de recevoir des quotas gratuits jusqu’en 2020. Il faudrait envisager de mettre en place un instrument de marché à l’échelle européenne pour réaliser l’objectif de développement des énergies renouvelables, et vu le coût élevé de nombreux carburants de transport renouvelables, il conviendra de veiller à ce que l’objectif de 10 % de carburant renouvelable réponde à l’ambition d’assurer la durabilité et la sécurité des approvisionnements. Les mesures en faveur de l’efficacité énergétique devraient être conçues avec le plus grand soin si l'Europe veut éviter de payer un coût total plus important. Il faudrait renforcer le troisième paquet énergie de la Commission, en exigeant une séparation patrimoniale totale des exploitants de services de transport et en veillant à doter la future Agence de coopération des régulateurs de l’énergie de pouvoirs suffisamment importants pour qu'elle puisse efficacement travailler à la mise en place d'un véritable marché unique européen de l’énergie. Ce document de travail porte sur l'Étude économique de l'Union Européenne (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/UnionEuropeénne ) |
| Keywords: | European Union, renewable energy, emissions trading, Climate change mitigation, energy market regulation, Union européenne, énergies renouvelables, Atténuation du changement climatique, échanges de droits d'émission, régulation du marché de l'énergie |
| JEL: | Q4 Q5 |
| Date: | 2010–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:779-en&r=reg |
| By: | Martin Gaynor; Rodrigo Moreno-Serra; Carol Propper |
| Abstract: | The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from non experimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a pro-competitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between hospitals. Patients were given choice of location for hospital care and provided information on the quality and timeliness of care. Prices, previously negotiated between buyer and seller, were set centrally under a DRG type system. Using this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design we estimate the impact of the introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. Our data set is large, containing information on approximately 68,000 discharges per year per hospital from 160 hospitals. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. Patients discharged from hospitals located in markets where competition was more feasible were less likely to die, had shorter length of stay and were treated at the same cost. |
| Keywords: | competition, hospitals, quality |
| JEL: | I18 I11 L13 L32 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:10/242&r=reg |
| By: | Schiller, Jörg |
| Abstract: | Die Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler, wird aktuell vor allem vor dem Hintergrund der Bedeutung und Zukunft der Honorarberatung und -vermittlung intensiv diskutiert. Im Rahmen des vorliegenden Beitrags werden zunächst wichtige ökonomische Erkenntnisse zur Vertriebswegewahl von Versicherungsunternehmen dargestellt. Aufbauend auf zentrale betriebs- und gesamtwirtschaftliche Funktionen unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler wird untersucht, wie durch unterschiedliche Entlohnungsformen Vermittlern effiziente Anreize gesetzt werden können. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch der Frage nachgegangen, ob und inwieweit Regulierungsmaßnahmen, wie zum Beispiel ein generelles Verbot oder die Offenlegung von Provisionszahlungen sowie das sogenannte 'Provisionsabgabeverbot', notwendig und geeignet sind, die Effizienz von Versicherungsmärkten zu erhöhen. -- The compensation and regulation of independent intermediaries is an important issue in insurance markets. With this respect, the profitability and importance of fee-for-service and commission compensation of intermediaries is lively discussed in academia and in the insurance industry. This paper summarizes economic rationales why and in which lines of business insurance companies sell their products via independent intermediaries. With this respect, it is analyzed how different forms of compensation affect important market functions of independent intermediaries. Finally, the economic impact of certain regulatory interventions, like a mandatory disclosure or a general ban of any commissions and the German ban for intermediaries to share commission with policyholders, on market efficiency is discussed. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fziddp:182010&r=reg |
| By: | Margit Molnar |
| Abstract: | Product market regulation on average is Slovenia does not appear particularly stringent, but heavy state involvement and high market concentration in several industries call for the gauging of competitive pressures in Slovenian industries. Owing to such characteristics, more sophisticated measures than the simple comparison of relative price levels is needed. Mark-ups can provide valuable information on competitive pressures in various sectors of the economy, reflecting pressures stemming from rules of conduct imposed by regulators as well as those arising from such factors as trade and FDI or increasing consumer demands in terms of price and quality. Conversely, the lack of competitive pressure may stem from heavy state involvement in the manufacturing and service sectors. This study is a first attempt to estimate mark-ups for manufacturing and service industries in Slovenia and in addition, its novelty is that it i) estimates mark-ups at a detailed level of sectoral disaggregation and ii) allows for non-constant returns to scale. The estimation is done for the period 1993-2006 and uses firm level data of the Amadeus database. In general, the estimated mark-ups are higher for services than manufacturing industries, but some manufacturing industries have high mark-ups in international comparison. This Working Paper relates to the 2009 OECD Economic Survey of Slovenia (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/slovenia).<P>Mesurer la concurrence dans les branches d'activité slovènes : estimation des marges<BR>En moyenne, la réglementation des marchés de produits en Slovénie ne semble pas particulièrement restrictive, mais l'ampleur de l'intervention de l'État et la forte concentration du marché dans plusieurs secteurs requièrent une évaluation des pressions concurrentielles dans les branches d'activité slovènes. Compte tenu de ces caractéristiques, des mesures plus élaborées que la simple comparaison des niveaux de prix relatifs s'imposent. Les taux de marge peuvent être riches d'enseignements sur les pressions concurrentielles qui s'exercent dans divers secteurs de l'économie, reflétant les pressions qui résultent des règles de conduite imposées par les autorités de régulation, ainsi que celles qui découlent de facteurs tels les échanges et l'investissement direct étranger (IDE) ou l'augmentation des exigences des consommateurs en termes de prix et de qualité. Inversement, le manque de pressions concurrentielles peut avoir pour origine l'ampleur de l'intervention de l'État dans les industries manufacturières et les services. Cette étude est une première tentative d'estimer les marges dans les industries manufacturières et les services en Slovénie ; en outre, elle se caractérise par deux nouveautés : i) les marges y sont estimées à un niveau de ventilation sectorielle très poussé et ii) l'étude tient compte de rendements d'échelle non constants. Cette estimation est effectuée pour la période 1993-2006, à partir de données par entreprise tirées de la base de données Amadeus. En général, les marges estimées sont plus élevées pour les services que pour les industries manufacturières, mais ces dernières affichent dans certains cas des taux de marge élevés en termes de comparaison internationale. Ce document de travail se rapporte à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE sur la Slovénie de 2009 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/slovenie). |
| Keywords: | competition, imperfect competition, monopoly, Slovenia, market behaviour, firm production, concurrence, monopole, Slovénie, concurrence imparfaite, comportement sur le marché, production des entreprises |
| JEL: | D21 D4 L12 |
| Date: | 2010–06–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:787-en&r=reg |
| By: | Bushnell, James; Chen, Yihsu |
| Abstract: | The allocation or assignment of emissions allowances is among the most contentious elements of the design of emissions trading systems. Policy-makers usually try to satisfy a range of goals through the allocation process, including easing the transition costs for high-emissions firms, reducing leakage to unregulated regions, and mitigating the impact of the regulations on product prices such as electricity. In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the US western electricity market to assess the potential impacts of various allocation proposals. Several proposals involve the ``updating'' of allowance allocation, where the allocation is tied to the ongoing output of plants. These allocation proposals are designed with the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigating leakage, and of mitigating the costs to high-emissions firms. However, some forms of allocation updating can also inflate allowance prices, thereby limiting the benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms. Thus, the anticipated benefits from allocation updating can be diluted and further distortions introduced into the trading system. |
| Keywords: | electricity markets; Cap-and-Trade; Emissions Leakage |
| JEL: | H23 Q50 Q54 |
| Date: | 2010–07–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:31804&r=reg |
| By: | Carlos D. Santos (Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico) |
| Abstract: | Competition has long been regarded as productivity enhancing. Understanding the mechanism by which competition affects innovation and productivity is therefore an important topic for economic policy. The main contribution of this paper is to disentangle the relationship between competition and two sides of innovation: product and process. I write down a model and discuss the conditions under which we can identify the causal mechanism. Overall I find that competition, measured by the number of competitors or market shares, has negative effects on product innovation and no effects on process innovation. The explanation is very simple. By shifting demand, competition directly changes the optimality condition for product but not for process innovation. Thus, competition has no direct effects on process innovations or, as a consequence, productivity. |
| Keywords: | competition, innovation, R&D, product innovation, process innovation |
| JEL: | L11 L60 O30 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2010-26&r=reg |
| By: | Jiang, Yong; Koo, Won |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this study is to examine the possible local impacts of cap-and-trade climate policy on agricultural producers in the Northern Plains. This study explicitly considers farmer behavior with respect to agricultural opportunity in carbon offset provision and ability of adaptation to mitigate the production cost impact under a cap-and-trade climate policy. Based on empirically estimated farmer behavior models, a policy simulation with agricultural census data identifies farmer acreage enrollment in carbon offset provision, carbon offset supplies and revenues, the production cost impacts of carbon prices, and impacts on net farm income and their distributions among heterogeneous farmers. Our analysis find that: 1) farmer ex ante preferences in general are biased against participating in carbon credit programs although farmer involvement increases with carbon prices; 2) with the fertilizer industry exempted from cap-and-trade regulation, the production cost impacts would be small, and more than half of the farms or farmland would probably gain for a carbon price higher than $10 per metric ton of carbon; and 3) the production cost impacts with a capped fertilizer industry would be 2 times higher, and more than half of the farms or farmland would lose unless the carbon price could reach beyond $55 per metric ton of carbon. This study sheds some light on agricultural potential to adapt to economy-wide climate change mitigation while providing a bottom-up economic assessment of the costs and benefits of a cap-and-trade climate policy to agricultural producers in the short run. |
| Keywords: | greenhouse gas, cap-and-trade, climate change, agricultural impact, economics, carbon offsets, Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, Land Economics/Use, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iatr10:91278&r=reg |
| By: | Stefano Capri (Cattaneo University (LIUC)); Rossella Levaggi (University of Brescia (UNIBS)) |
| Abstract: | Risk sharing is becoming increasingly an increasingly popular instrument to regulate the price of new drugs. In the recent past, forms of risk-sharing agreements between the public regulator and the industry have been proposed and implemented, but their effects on price and profits are still controversial. Methods: We develop a model aimed at studying the effects on price and expected pro.t of several risk-sharing agreement between a regulator and the industry, based on the ex post effectiveness of the drug. We assume that the probability of being listed depends on the relative performance of the new drug in terms of effectiveness and budget required. The price is set according to the declared effcacy of the new drug, but if ex post the effectiveness falls short of what declared, several forms of penalties may be used by the regulator. Results: We show that the number of patients that are treated is not necessarily affected by risk-sharing/risk-shifting mechanisms; the price for which the drug is listed may be higher than without risk-sharing, but the expected profit of the industry is: a) always lower for risk-shifting schemes; b) for true risk-sharing it depends on the bargaining power of the company. Conclusions. Our model shows the difference between risk-sharing and risk shifting. The .rst mechanism could be used by the regulator to reduce uncertainty while the second is used to reduce the expected price of the drug. In the presence of risk sharing the listing price is not a good proxy for value for money. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:liu:liucec:234&r=reg |
| By: | Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. |
| Abstract: | This paper identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting is contrary to equilibrium. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance to conclude concerted action. |
| Date: | 2010–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jhu:papers:565&r=reg |
| By: | Bandza, Alexander J.; Vajjhala, Shalini P. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Recent policy debates suggest that geologic carbon sequestration (GS) likely will play an important role in a carbon-constrained future. As GS evolves from the analogous technologies and practices of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operations to a long-term, dedicated emissions mitigation option, regulations must evolve simultaneously to manage the risks associated with underground migration and surface tresspass of carbon dioxide (CO2). In this paper, we develop a basic engineering-economic model of four illustrative strategies available to a sophisticated site operator to better understand key deployment pathways in the transition from EOR to GS operations. All of these strategies focus on whether or not a sophisticated site operator would store CO2 in a geologic formation. We evaluate these strategies based on illustrative scenarios of (a) oil and CO2 prices; (b) leakage estimates; and (c) transportation, injection, and monitoring costs, as obtained from our understanding of the literature. Major results reveal that CO2 storage in depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs after oil recovery is associated with the greatest net revenues (i.e., the “most-preferred” strategy) under a range of scenarios. This finding ultimately suggests that GS regulatory design should anticipate the use of the potentially leakiest, or “worst,” sites first. |
| Keywords: | carbon sequestration, enhanced oil recovery, leakage, regulatory design, risk management |
| JEL: | Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2010–07–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-29-rev&r=reg |
| By: | Badri Narayanan G. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, employment has fallen in the organised textile sector despite an aggregate rise in output and capital. This paper analyses the role of various factors that influence employment using 3- digit classification of Indian textile industry from 1973-74 to 1997-98. Our results document that the fall in employment can be explained in terms of rise in wages, output shocks, lack of capital utilisation and trade restrictiveness pertaining to Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Environmental regulations enhance employment in the sub-sectors that are most likely to be influenced by them. The results are robust to different measures of capital, its utilisation and disaggregation to state-level. We also illustrate that in a post-MFA regime, employment in the sector is bound to increase owing to absence of trade restrictions and prospects of huge investment in general and in complying with environmental regulations, though the labour regulations might aect the magnitude of that increase. [Working Paper No. WP-2005-005] |
| Keywords: | organised, textile sector, capital, Multi-Fibre, utilisation |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2720&r=reg |