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on Regulation |
| By: | Yan Liu; Guangâ€Zhen Sun |
| Abstract: | We develop a framework, extending the conventional duopoly model by replacing the Hotelling line with a simplex in highâ€dimension spaces, to study the competition and access regulation of multiple networks. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium when the substitutabilities of the networks are not too high, or the access charges are nearly costâ€based. We then analyse how the equilibrium market shares respond to marginal variations in the access charges under various regimes of access regulation, and thereby examine the efficiency implications of such regulation regimes. In particular, we analyze the asymmetric scenario in which some networks are incumbent and some are entrants. It is shown that some existing results of the duopoly do not extend to a multiâ€firm setting, largely because regulation of multiple networks is structurally far richer. |
| Keywords: | Telecommunications, oligopoly, network competition, access regulation. |
| JEL: | L96 L51 D43 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-25&r=reg |
| By: | Chongwoo Choe; Chander Shekhar |
| Abstract: | We study a voluntary pre-merger notification game under asymmetric information and characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria. It is shown that the equilibrium outcomes are similar to those when notification is compulsory. However, thanks to the signaling opportunity that arises when notification is voluntary, voluntary notification leads to lower enforcement costs for the regulator and lower notification costs for the merging parties. Some of the theoretical predictions are supported by exploratory empirical tests using merger data from Australia where pre-merger notification is voluntary. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary merger notification may achieve objectives similar to those achieved by compulsory systems at lower costs to the parties as well as to the regulator. |
| Keywords: | Merger regulation, pre-merger notification, abnormal returns. |
| JEL: | D21 G34 K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-20&r=reg |
| By: | Tatom, John |
| Abstract: | esident Obama has released a sweeping plan to respond to the financial crisis and to insure that it is not repeated by altering and expanding the federal regulatory framework for financial services firms. The plan outlines detailed and demanding reporting deadlines for various existing federal regulatory institutions to formulate plans for the changes and asks Congress for action on the plan by the end of this year. One of the main components of the plan is to create a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), to protect consumers and investors from deceptive or dangerous products. This is one of the four broad components of comprehensive regulatory reform proposed by the President and the one that has received the greatest endorsement from congressional leaders in terms of the urgency of action. Not surprisingly, the financial services industry has responded, arguing that a new regulator for consumer protection is not necessary and that it contradicts one of the principal goals of regulatory reform. This paper reviews the status quo, advantages and disadvantages of the proposed changes and the extent to which it addresses or does not address perceived issues arising from the financial crisis. |
| Keywords: | Financial regulatory reform; Consumer Financial Protection Agency; financial crisis; |
| JEL: | D18 G18 E44 |
| Date: | 2009–07–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16174&r=reg |
| By: | John Crow (Bank of Canada (formerly)) |
| Abstract: | The Bank of Canada must come to play a recognized, central leadership role in shaping policy if Canada is to better manage risks to financial sector stability. This can be accomplished by giving the Bank a clearly acknowledged oversight and investigative mandate regarding financial stability – which would not require statutory change – linked with the responsibility to report independently on the same. |
| Keywords: | financial services, Bank of Canada, financial sector stability |
| JEL: | E58 E62 E63 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdh:ebrief:82&r=reg |