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on Regulation |
| By: | Kanbur, Ravi (Cornell University) |
| Abstract: | The informality discourse is large and vibrant, and is expanding rapidly. But there is a certain conceptual incoherence to the literature. New definitions of informality compete with old definitions leading to a plethora of alternative conceptualisations. While some individual studies may apply a tight definition consistently, the literature as a whole is in a mess. This article proposes that informality and formality should be seen in direct relation to economic activity in the presence of specified regulation(s). Relative to the regulation(s), four conceptual categories that can help frame the analysis are: (A) regulation applicable and compliant, (B) regulation applicable and non-compliant, (C) regulation non-applicable after adjustment of activity, and (D) regulation non-applicable to the activity. Rather than use the generic labels 'informal' and 'formal', it would be preferable if the analysis focused on these four categories (or even more disaggregated as appropriate). A central determining factor in the impacts of regulation on economic activity across these four categories is the nature and intensity of enforcement. While lack of enforcement is well-documented, an understanding of its determinants − why and to what extent a government would not enforce a regulation that it has itself passed, and why non-enforcement varies from one context to another, is relatively neglected in the literature. Thus, specificity on regulation and on enforcement is the key to achieving conceptual clarity in the analytical literature and in the policy discourse on informality. |
| Keywords: | informality, regulation, enforcement |
| JEL: | J42 J88 O17 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4186&r=reg |
| By: | Dalen, Dag Morten (Handelshøyskolen BI); Habeth, Tonje (Handelshøyskolen BI); Strøm, Steinar (Department of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick based price regulation schemes on a selection of drugs experiencing generic competition. The retail price cap, termed “index price”, on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the three lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This is supposed to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to trigger price competition. Using monthly data over the period 1998-2004 for the 6 drugs (chemical entities) included in the index price system, we estimate a structural model enabling us to examine the impact of the reform on both demand and market power. Our results suggest that the index price helped to increase the market shares of generic drugs and succeeded in triggering price competition. |
| Keywords: | Discrete choice; demand for pharmaceuticals; monopolistic competition; evaluation of yardstick based price regulation |
| JEL: | C35 D43 I18 L11 |
| Date: | 2009–06–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2006_001&r=reg |
| By: | Fares Triki (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relation between liquidity and asset prices. It shows that, when banks balance sheets are marked to market and banks are targeting a financial leverage level - a situation similar to current environment - formation of Leverage Bubble phenomenon and suggests a new regulation rule based on a Dynamic Leverage Ratio (DLR) rule. |
| Keywords: | Financial crises, rational bubbles, Dynamic Leverage Ratio, mark to market accounting, asset pricing, macroprudential regulation, market liquidity. |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00390688_v1&r=reg |
| By: | John Vickers |
| Abstract: | One of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a firm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals? And if supply is required, on what terms? These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009. The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes, and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation. |
| Keywords: | Property rights, refusal to supply, price squeeze, Intellectual property, Sequential innovation, Antitrust |
| JEL: | K21 L41 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:436&r=reg |
| By: | Iversen, Tor (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics); Kopperud, Gry Stine (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics) |
| Abstract: | In Norway specialized health services are provided both by public hospitals and by privately practicing specialists who have a contract with the public sector. Patients’ co-payment is the same irrespective of the type of provider they visit. The ambition of equity in the allocation of medical care is high among all political parties. The instruments for auditing whether these goals are fulfilled are not equally ambitious. The objective of the present study is to explore whether laws and regulations that govern the allocation of specialist health care resources in fact are fulfilled. Panel data from the Survey of Living Conditions are merged with data on capacity and spatial access to primary and specialist care. We find that accessibility and socio-economic variables play a considerable role in determining both the probability of at least one visit and the number of visits to a private specialist. A person with a higher university degree living in a municipality with the highest value of the geographical accessibility index has a 46%-points higher probability of at least one visit to a private specialist compared with a person with junior high living in a municipality with the lowest value of the accessibility index. With regard to visits to a hospital outpatient department these variables are not found to have significant effects. We conclude that public ambitions and regulations are fulfilled for specialist services provided by public hospitals. With regard to the provision of services provided by publicly financed private specialists we find a discrepancy between public goals and surveyed practice. |
| Keywords: | specialist health services; utilization; equity; private/public provision; survey data |
| JEL: | H42 H51 I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2009–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2005_002&r=reg |