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on Regulation |
| By: | Behringer, Stefan |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications. |
| JEL: | L96 L51 L41 K21 D40 |
| Date: | 2008–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11795&r=reg |
| By: | Méon, Pierre-Guillaume (BOFIT); Weill, Laurent (BOFIT) |
| Abstract: | This paper tests whether corruption may act as an efficient grease for the wheels of an oth-erwise deficient institutional framework. We analyze the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 developed and developing countries. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we observe that corruption is consistently detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | governance; corruption; income; aggregate productivity; efficiency |
| JEL: | C33 K40 O43 O47 |
| Date: | 2008–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofitp:2008_020&r=reg |
| By: | Lopez, Maria Claudia; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K. |
| Abstract: | In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both led to higher contributions. The results from the second stage reveal that government regulations always complemented community enforcement efforts. While the subjects tended to reduce their sanctioning efforts under the government regulations, contributions and earnings were significantly higher than without government interventions. In fact, the combination of community and government enforcement efforts generated near-perfect contributions to the public good. However, more research into the combined roles of government intervention and community enforcement efforts is needed because the complementarity we find may be situation-specific. |
| Keywords: | Field experiments, public goods, government regulation, community enforcement, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, C93, H41, Q2, |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:umamwp:42128&r=reg |
| By: | Morris M. Kleiner (University of Minnesota and NBER); Alan B. Krueger (Princeton University and NBER) |
| Abstract: | This study provides the first nation-wide analysis of the labor market implications of occupational licensing for the U.S. labor market, using data from a specially designed Gallup survey. We find that in 2006, 29 percent of the workforce was required to hold an occupational license from a government agency, which is a higher percentage than that found in studies that rely on state-level occupational licensing data. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a license. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a license requirement than are nonunion or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions -- that is about 15 percent, but unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs. |
| Keywords: | occupational licensing; regulation; wages |
| JEL: | J8 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:indrel:1069&r=reg |
| By: | Dzhumashev, Ratbek |
| Abstract: | Corrupt bureaucrats manipulate rules and regulations to coerce the private agents to pay bribes. In such an environment the cost of dealing with the public sector is uncertain as the regulations are not observed as they are originally defined. Combined with weak enforcement and compliance, predation of corrupt bureaucrats makes private disposable income volatile. We study this uncertainty within a stochastic dynamic growth model framework, where we generalize the corruption caused uncertainty as a shock to disposable income of agents. Consequently, corruption creates two adverse effects in the economy: higher risks associated with private investments and lower returns on private capital due to increased public burden. Both effects tend to lower the demand for investments, thus long run growth is compromised in the economy with the corrupt public sector. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; public input; growth; burden |
| JEL: | D73 H21 D99 |
| Date: | 2008–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11772&r=reg |