nep-reg New Economics Papers
on Regulation
Issue of 2008‒11‒04
six papers chosen by
Christian Calmes
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais

  1. Does Lax Environmental Regulation Attract FDI when accounting for "third-country" effects? By Kukenova, Madina; Monteiro, Jose-Antonio
  2. Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions By David De La Croix; Clara Delavallade
  3. The London Agreement and the Cost of Patenting in Europe By Malwina Mejer; Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
  4. Norway: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications By Gaasland, Ivar; Garcia, Robert; Vardal, Erling
  5. Effects of Dismissal Protection Legislation on Individual Employment Stability in Germany By Bernhard Boockmann; Daniel Gutknecht; Susanne Steffes
  6. Escape from new york: the market impact of SEC Rule 12h-6 By Nuno Fernandes; Ugur Lel; Darius P. Miller

  1. By: Kukenova, Madina; Monteiro, Jose-Antonio
    Abstract: This paper investigates if differences in environmental regulations can influence FDI flows in a multi-country setting taking into account the so-called "third-country" effects. We examine bilateral FDI flows using a new extended OECD investment database which covers great number of host countries and a long sample period (1981-2005). The findings based on a spatial gravity-like model are largely plausible across specifications and confirm the existence of a negative relationship between FDI and environmental stringency, once we correct for endogeneity and spatial dependence. The evidence of a positive "third-country" effect for FDI suggests the prevalence of complex FDI from developed to developing countries. The spatial structure of the model allows also to underline the possible existence of competition in environmental standards between countries to attract FDI.
    Keywords: Complex FDI; Pollution Haven; Spatial Econometrics
    JEL: F18 Q56 C31 F1 F21
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11321&r=reg
  2. By: David De La Croix (CORE - Department of Economics - Université Catholique de Louvain); Clara Delavallade (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I)
    Abstract: Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth : public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distorsion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals' choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.
    Keywords: Public investment, optimal growth, corruption, political power.
    Date: 2008–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:paris1:halshs-00129741_v2&r=reg
  3. By: Malwina Mejer; Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
    Abstract: This paper analyses the consequences for the European Patent System (EPS) of the recently ratified London Agreement (LA), which aims to reduce the translation requirements for patent validation procedures in 15 out of 34 national patent offices. The simulations suggest that the cost of patenting has been reduced by 20 to 30 percent since the enforcement of the LA. With an average translation cost saving of €3,600 per patent, the total savings for the business sector amount to about €220 millions. The fee elasticity of patents being about -0.4, one may expect an increase in patent filings of eight to 12 percent. Despite the translation cost savings, the relative cost of a European patent validated in six (thirteen) countries is still at least five (seven) times higher than in the United States.
    Keywords: European patent system, London Agreement, patent fees, translation costs, fee elasticity
    JEL: P14 P51 O34
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_032&r=reg
  4. By: Gaasland, Ivar; Garcia, Robert; Vardal, Erling
    Abstract: "As a result of the Uruguay round, Norway was committed to reducing its domestic support for agriculture, in particular its aggregate measurement of support (AMS), which was to be reduced by 20 percent. We show that Norway has complied with its WTO commitments. However, Norway's AMS and total support have remained stable during 1995-2007, implying that the reduction commitment amounted to no more than reducing the “water under” an inflated AMS bound rate. Thus, the reductions in domestic support have neither affected agricultural policy nor the programs implemented. In fact, Norway has even managed to expand agricultural output relative to the 1986-1988 base upon which agricultural reforms are measured under the Uruguay round agricultural agreement. We analyze the implications of the proposed modalities for reduction commitments on agriculture under the Doha round of WTO negotiations in the Norwegian context. Simulation modeling is conducted to examine the consequences for the Norwegian agricultural sector based on the proposed reduction commitment scenarios. We find that Norway will be able to sustain a high level of agricultural support, thereby maintaining its current agricultural activity and production levels. To achieve this, however, Norway will have to change the composition of domestic support from market price support, paid for by consumers in the form of higher prices, to budgetary support. Market price support will be lower because of lower levels of tariff protection, but this can be offset by exploiting the scope for green box support." from authors' abstract
    Keywords: Norwegian agricultural policies, WTO Doha round, WTO compliance, Notification of domestic support, Globalization, Markets, AMS Support, Administered Prices,
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:812&r=reg
  5. By: Bernhard Boockmann; Daniel Gutknecht; Susanne Steffes
    Abstract: Changes in Dismissal Protection Legislation in Germany have been a subject to ongoing research in the past decade. The majority of these studies, however, has not been able to determine significant effects on job and worker flows in firms affected by the reforms. We estimate the impact of dismissal protection on individual employment stability using the 1999 reform as a "natural experiment".We provide insights into the effects of legislation on the firms’ matching behaviour. Our results hint at increased job security after the reform for those spells affected by it. This rise in stability was, however, accompanied by modest instability at start suggesting that firms facing additional firing costs tend to cease probation to shed unproductive job-worker matches. The latter effect, however, was not found to be significant.
    Keywords: J32, J65, C41
    JEL: J32 J65 C41
    Date: 2008–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iaw:iawdip:45&r=reg
  6. By: Nuno Fernandes; Ugur Lel; Darius P. Miller
    Abstract: We examine the stock market impact of SEC Rule 12h-6 which eased the ability of foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and as a result terminate their U.S. disclosure obligations under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. We document that the market reacted negatively to the ability of firms from weak disclosure and governance countries to more easily opt out of the stringent U.S. reporting and legal environment. Our findings suggest that shareholders of non-U.S firms place significant value on U.S. securities regulations, especially when the home country investor protections are weak.
    Keywords: International finance
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgif:945&r=reg

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