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on Regulation |
| By: | Paul de Bijl; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | The introduction of packet-switched telephony in the form of VoIP raises concerns about current regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for traditional telephony on PSTN networks. In this paper, we analyze the effect of access regulation and retail price regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP. In particular, we show that with endogenous consumer choice between PSTN and VoIP telephony, higher prices for terminating access to the PSTN network make VoIP less likely to succeed and lead to lower profits of operators that offer VoIP telephony exclusively |
| Keywords: | telecommunications; voice over broadband (VoB); voice over Internet protocol (VoIP); entry; access; regulation; imperfect competition |
| JEL: | L96 L51 L13 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:109&r=reg |
| By: | Paul de Bijl; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | In the light of converging services for voice, data, and video, this paper discusses the challenges for telecommunications regulation from a European perspective. The Netherlands, a country with excellent conditions for facilities-based competition, is discussed as a case in point. With dynamic issues at the heart of the debate, the role of regulation and government intervention more generally is to create and possibly to sustain conditions among operators to upgrade their networks and to provide innovative services. A fresh look at current regulation suggests that an overhaul may be needed. |
| Keywords: | telecommunications regulation; convergence; network access; IP networks; competition; innovation; NGN networks |
| JEL: | L96 L5 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:108&r=reg |
| By: | Donze, Jocelyn; Dubec, Isabelle |
| Abstract: | We show that regulating the interchange fee at cost reduces banks’ incentives to deploy free ATMs over time. Simultaneously, more and more pay-to-use ATMs are deployed by independent ATM deployers. These results are consistent with the recent evolution of the British ATM market. |
| Keywords: | Banks ; ATMs ; Interchange Fees ; Regulation |
| JEL: | G2 L1 |
| Date: | 2008–10–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10893&r=reg |
| By: | Michiel Bijlsma; Roel van Elk |
| Abstract: | Most studies of competition law enforcement treat competition authorities as all-knowing, unwavering and benevolent. They do not behave opportunistically, do not face asymmetric information and choose their actions to optimize social welfare. In this paper, we drop one of these assumptions, and study a competition authority that can not commit to a particular investigation strategy. As a consequence, a competition authority’s decisions to investigate will be driven by the (ex-post) desistance effect instead of the (ex ante) deterrence effect of an investigation policy. The resulting opportunistic behaviour may lead to a suboptimal investigation strategy.<BR> To analyse the interplay between investigation policies, deterrence and desistance, we study a model in which a competition authority monitors multiple sectors and faces a budget constraint that prevents it from deterring cartels in all sectors simultaneously. We find that, in the absence of commitment, developing a sector specific reward scheme based on the number of captured cartels can improve welfare. |
| Keywords: | cartels; competition law; commitment |
| JEL: | L13 L41 L44 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:110&r=reg |