|
on Regulation |
| By: | Mary Lovely; David Popp |
| Abstract: | Countries who adopted regulation of coal-fired power plants after 1980 generally did so at a much lower level of per-capita income than did early adopters -- poor countries regulated sooner. This phenomenon suggests that pioneering adopters of environmental regulation provide an advantage to countries adopting these regulations later, presumably through advances in technology made by these first adopters. Focusing specifically on regulation of coal-fired power plants, we ask to what extent the availability of new technology influences the adoption of new environmental regulation. We build a general equilibrium model of an open economy to identify the political-economy determinants of the decision to regulate emissions. Using a newly-created data set of SO2 and NOX regulations for coal-fired power plants and a patent-based measure of the technology frontier, we test the model's predictions using a hazard regression of the diffusion of environmental regulation across countries. Our findings support the hypothesis that international economic integration eases access to environmentally friendly technologies and leads to earlier adoption, ceteris paribus, of regulation in developing countries. By limiting firms' ability to burden shift, however, openness may raise opposition to regulation. Our results suggest that domestic trade protection allows costs to be shifted to domestic consumers while large countries can shift costs to foreign consumers, raising the likelihood of adoption. Other political economy factors, such as the quality of domestic coal and election years, are also important determinants. |
| JEL: | F18 O33 Q53 Q55 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14286&r=reg |
| By: | Nillesen, P.; Pollitt, M.G. |
| Abstract: | Consolidation in many sectors has lead to the formation of “groups of companies”. Extracting all the potential cost savings from these independent or separate operating units is a challenge given asymmetric information. We develop a step-by-step approach that applies regulatory benchmarking techniques to set efficiency targets for operating units. Holding company management – like a regulator – will want to set targets to encourage efficient operation but in the absence of full information on effort, costs and environmental conditions. Our approach using the parallel with regulation incorporates issues such as measurement error and potential environmental factors that could influence the underlying efficiency score. We demonstrate the approach using data from the US electricity distribution sector and show that substantial savings can be extracted using this approach that was originally developed for regulatory purposes. |
| Keywords: | benchmarking, regulation, operating companies, electricity distribution |
| JEL: | L98 M21 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0834&r=reg |
| By: | Brunekreeft, G. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a social cost benefit analysis of ownership unbundling (as compared to legal und functional unbundling) of the electricity transmission system operators in Germany. The study relies on the Residual Supply Index for its competitive concept. The analysis models some 15 effects, grouped in three categories: the competition effect, the interconnector effect and the cost effect. Facing a looming capacity shortage, we find that the total available generation capacity and the effect of unbundling on capacity are of crucial importance. Overall, for the base-case, the net weighted discounted social-cost-benefit effect (weighted-?SCB) is likely to be positive, but small. |
| Keywords: | unbundling, electricity, networks, regulation, competition |
| JEL: | L11 L50 L94 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0833&r=reg |
| By: | Stephen Davies (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia); Matthew Olczak (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision. |
| Keywords: | tacit collusion, collective dominance, single dominance, coordinated effects, merger remedies |
| JEL: | L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-28&r=reg |
| By: | Ojo, Marianne |
| Abstract: | This paper traces developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to its present form (Basel II). In highlighting the flaws of the 1988 Accord, an evaluation is made of the Basel Committee’s efforts to address such weaknesses through Basel II. Whilst considerable progress has been achieved, the paper concludes, based on one of the principal aims of these Accords, namely the management of risk, that more work is still required particularly in relation to hedge funds and those risks attributed to non bank financial institutions. |
| Keywords: | risk;management;regulation;banks;Basel;Committee |
| JEL: | K2 G21 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10051&r=reg |
| By: | Alan J. Auerbach |
| Abstract: | Like many other developed economies, the United States has imposed fiscal rules in attempting to impose a degree of fiscal discipline on the political process of budget determination. The federal government has operated under a series of budget control regimes that have been complex in nature and of debatable impact. Much of the complexity of these federal budget regimes relates to the structure of the U.S. federal government. The controversy over the impact of different regimes relates to the fact that the rules have no constitutional standing, leading to the question of whether they do more than clarify a government's intended policies. In this paper, I review US federal budget rules and present some evidence on their possible effects. From an analysis of how components of the federal budget behaved under the different budget regimes, it appears that the rules did have some effects, rather than simply being statements of policy intentions. The rules may also have had some success at deficit control, although such conclusions are highly tentative given the many other factors at work during the different periods. Even less certain is the extent to which the various rules achieved whatever objectives underlay their introduction. |
| JEL: | D78 H62 J11 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14288&r=reg |
| By: | V. Kerry Smith; Carol Mansfield; Aaron Strong |
| Abstract: | This paper reports estimates of consumers' preferences for plans to improve food safety. The plans are distinguished based on whether they address the ex ante risk of food borne illness or the ex post effects of the illness. They are also distinguished based on whether they focus on a public good -- reducing risk of illness for all consumers or allowing individual households to reduce their private risks of contracting a food borne pathogen. Based on a National Survey conducted in 2007 using the Knowledge Network internet panel our findings indicate consumers favor ex ante risk reductions and are willing to pay approximately $250 annually to reduce the risk of food borne illness. Moreover, they prefer private to public approaches and would not support efforts to reduce the severity of cases of illness over risk reductions. |
| JEL: | H42 Q18 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14287&r=reg |
| By: | Kenneth P. Brevoort; John D. Wolken |
| Abstract: | Deregulation and technological change have reduced the transactions costs that led to the dominance of local financial service suppliers, leading some to question if distance still matters in banking. This debate has been particularly acute in small business banking, where transactions costs are believed to be particularly high. This paper provides a detailed review of the literature on distance in banking markets, highlighting the reasons why geographic proximity is believed to be important and examining the changes that may have affected its importance. Relying on new data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, we examine how distances between small firms and their financial service suppliers changed over the 1993-2003 decade. Our analysis reveals that distances increased, though the extent varied substantially across financial services and supplier types. Generally, increases were observed in the early half of the decade, while distances declined in the following five years. There was also a trend towards less in person interaction between small firms and their suppliers of financial services. Nevertheless, most relationships remained local, with a median distance of 5 miles in 2003. The results suggest that distance, while perhaps not as tyrannical as in the past, remains an important factor in banking. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2008-34&r=reg |