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on Regulation |
| By: | Emmanuel Farhi; Mikhail Golosov; Aleh Tsyvinski |
| Date: | 2008–03–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000002006&r=reg |
| By: | Köhler, Matthias |
| Abstract: | Although there is anecdotal evidence that merger control may constitute a barrier to the integration of European retail banking markets, systematic empirical evidence is missing until now. This paper aims to fill this gap. Based on a unique dataset on the transparency on merger control in the EU banking sector, we estimate the probability that a bank is taken over as a function of its characteristics, country characteristics and the transparency of merger control in the banking sector. The results indicate that a bank is systematically more likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if the regulatory process is transparent. Particularly large banks are less likely to be taken over by foreign credit institutions if merger control lacks transparency. This is in line with the hypothesis that governments may block crossborder bank merger because they want the largest institution in the country to be domestically owned. Domestic mergers are not affected. This suggests that merger control may therefore constitute an important barrier to cross-border consolidation and that further integration of EU banking markets requires a higher degree of transparency of the regulatory process. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7020&r=reg |
| By: | Gatti, Donatella (University of Paris 13) |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates the impact of ownership concentration on GDP growth, for a sample of 18 OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2004. The econometric analysis shows that more concentrated ownership can speed up growth, for countries approaching the technological frontier, provided that labour market regulation is sufficiently tight. In the absence of employment regulation, the logic of financial markets discipline applies and dispersed ownership appears as more favorable for growth. Based on econometric results, impact coefficients are calculated allowing to evaluate the growth points gained/lost following a given change in ownership concentration. This exercise reveals that a reform in the domain of ownership structure can yield sizeable effects in terms of growth. Importantly, these effects are unequally distributed across countries: Anglo-Saxon countries would take more advantage of deregulation (i.e. increased dispersion of ownership in a context of deregulated labour markets) while continental European countries would benefit more from increased concentration of ownership in a context of reinforced labour regulation. |
| Keywords: | ownership concentration, labour market regulation, growth, developed countries |
| JEL: | O43 O57 G32 K31 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3415&r=reg |
| By: | Rod Tyers; Lucy Rees |
| Abstract: | The retreat from public ownership of service firms and industries has left behind numerous private monopolies and oligopolies supervised by regulatory agencies. Services industries in government and private ownership generate two-thirds of Australia's value added and employ three quarters of its workforce. This study offers an economy-wide approach that represents monopoly and oligopoly behaviour explicitly. It examines the implications of oligopoly rents for factor markets and the real exchange rate, the extent of sectoral interactions and the potential economy wide gains from tighter price cap regulation, with the results confirming the merit of an economy-wide approach. External shocks, like the present "China boom", are also simulated. Such positive shocks are shown to expand the potential for oligopoly rents and therefore to raise the bar for regulatory agencies. Moreover, less than tight price caps are shown to exacerbate entry-exit hysteresis in boom and bust cycles. |
| JEL: | C68 D43 D58 L13 L43 L51 L80 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2008-490&r=reg |
| By: | Maug, Ernst (Chair for Corporate Finance, University of Mannheim and Sonderforschungsbereich 504); Ackerman, Abraham |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate how the enactment and enforcement of insider trading restrictions affect the way in which information about acquisitions is released before the actual acquisition announcement. We analyze a sample with almost 19,000 acquisition announcements from 48 countries. We find that insider trading legislation strongly affects the information revealed to the market in the runup phase before the announcement whereas the impact of subsequent enforcement actions by regulators is much weaker and mostly insignificant. The impact of insider trading legislation is stronger in countries with more effective judicial systems. We conclude that market participants rationally anticipate the degree of law enforcement. |
| Date: | 2007–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:07-34&r=reg |
| By: | Damania, Richard; Yalcýn, Erkan |
| Abstract: | There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, lobbying, political competition |
| JEL: | D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7128&r=reg |
| By: | Sa, Filipa (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | High levels of employment protection reduce hiring and firing and have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the employment level. Immigrants, being new to the labor market, may be less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights, which may create a gap between the costs for employers of hiring a native relative to hiring an immigrant. This paper tests that hypothesis drawing on evidence for the EU and on two natural experiments for Spain and Italy. The results suggest that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) gives immigrants a comparative advantage relative to natives. Stricter EPL is found to reduce employment and reduce hiring and firing rates for natives. By contrast, stricter EPL has no effect on most immigrants and may even increase employment rates for those who have been in the country for a longer time. |
| Keywords: | employment protection, immigration |
| JEL: | J6 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3414&r=reg |