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on Regulation |
| By: | Azumendi, Sebastian Lopez; Guasch, Jose Luis; Andres, Luis |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the literature that explores the link between regulatory governance and sector performance. The paper develops an index of regulatory governance and estimates its impact on sector performance, showing that indeed regulation and its governance matter. The authors use two unique databases: (i) the World Bank Performance Database, which contains detailed annual data for 250 private and public electricity companies in Latin America and the Caribbean; and (ii) the Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, which contains data on several aspects of the governance of electricity agencies in the region. The authors run different models to explain the impacts of change in ownership and different characteristics of the regulatory agency on the performance of the utilities. The results suggest that the mere existence of a regulatory agency, regardless of the utilities ' ownership, has a significant impact on performance. Furthermore, after controlling for the existence of a regulatory agency, the ownership dummies are still significant and with the expected signs. The authors propose an experience measure in order to identify the gradual impact of the regulatory agency on utility performance. The results confirm this hypothesis. In addition, the paper explores two different measures of governance, an aggregate measure of regulatory governance, and an index based on principal components, including autonomy, transparency, and accountability. The findings show that the governance of regulatory agencies matters an d has significant effects on performance. |
| Keywords: | National Governance,Infrastructure Regulation,Governance Indicators,Banks & Banking Reform,Emerging Markets |
| Date: | 2008–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4494&r=reg |
| By: | Jeanette Findlay |
| Abstract: | The persistence of gendered pay inequality some 30 years after its formal prohibition raises questions over the mechanisms sustaining it. Recent contributions highlight the role of low skills visibility and valuation in maintaining pay inequality in predominantly female occupations. We examine the skills and rewards of early years’ workers and the organisational processes that define them. We do so at an important juncture when the importance and regulation of the ‘early years’’ sector has increased significantly; and following extensive organisational restructuring aimed at delivering pay equality. We conclude that whilst the application of more systematic forms of skill measurement have improved the relative rewards of nursery nurses, highly gendered constructions of their skills, particularly those most closely linked to mothering, continue to impact negatively on their valuation. The presence of caring activities appears to eclipse their role in education. Complex institutional and organisational factors maintain important aspects of gender inequality. |
| Keywords: | caring, early years’, gender, grading, inequality, pay, skills, valuation |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2007_43figures&r=reg |
| By: | Carmen Pagés-Serra (Inter-American Development Bank); Alejandro Micco (Central Bank of Chile) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the economic effects of employment protection legislation in a sample of developed and developing countries. Implementing a difference-in-differences test lessens the potentially severe endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-country regressions. This test is based on the hypothesis that employment protection regulations are more binding in sectors of activity exposed to higher volatility in demand or supply shocks. The analysis indicates that more stringent legislation slows down job turnover by a significant amount, and that this effect is more pronounced in sectors that are intrinsically more volatile. The paper also finds that employment and value added decline in the most affected sectors, and employment and output effects are driven by a decline in the net entry of firms. In contrast, average employment per plant is not significantly affected. |
| Keywords: | Employment Protection Legislation, Employment Reallocation, Gross Job Flows, Employment, Firm Entry and Exit |
| JEL: | J23 J32 J63 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:1077&r=reg |
| By: | Marcel Boyer; Donatella Porrini |
| Abstract: | Using a structural model of the interactions between governments, firms and insurance companies, we characterise the distortions in environmental liability sharing between firms and insurance companies that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. These distortions stem from three factors: the presence of moral hazard, the non congruence between firms/insurers objectives and social welfare, and the courts’ imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firms. We characterize cases where the efficient liability sharing factor is above or below its full information perfect implementation level. We derive comparative statics results indicating how sensitive the liability sharing factor is to changes in parameters (parameters that underlie the firm profit level and volatility, the cost of safety care, the monitoring cost, the social cost of public funds, the effectiveness of care in reducing the probability of accident) that are relevant for the characterization of optimal policies (liability sharing, safety care standards) toward environmental protection or the prevention of industrial accidents. We derive policy implications regarding environmental disaster insurance policies. <P>À l’aide d’un modèle structurel des interactions entre les gouvernements, les entreprises et les assureurs, nous caractérisons les distorsions dans le partage des responsabilités entre entreprises et assureurs qu’implique la mise en place imparfaite des politiques gouvernementales. Ces distorsions résultent de trois facteurs : la présence de risque moral, la non-congruence des objectifs des entreprises, des assureurs et de bien-être social, et l’observation imparfaite des efforts de prévention des entreprises par le système judiciaire. Nous dérivons des résultats de statique comparée montrant la sensibilité du facteur de partage des responsabilités à des changements dans les paramètres sous-jacents à la profitabilité, au coût des efforts de prévention, à l’efficacité de ces efforts dans la réduction de la probabilité d’accident, au coût de monitoring, au coût social des fonds publics, et qui sont pertinents à la caractérisation des politiques optimales (partage de responsabilité, standard légal du niveau de prévention) de protection environnementale et de prévention des accidents. Nous en déduisons certaines implications quant aux politiques relatives à l’assurance contre les désastres environnementaux. |
| Keywords: | Liability sharing, environmental insurance, safety care, moral hazard, principal-agent., Partage de responsabilité, assurance environnementale, effort de prévention, risque moral, principal-agent. |
| JEL: | D82 G32 K13 K32 Q28 |
| Date: | 2008–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-03&r=reg |