|
on Regulation |
| By: | Thorsten Beck; Ross Levine; Alexey Levkov |
| Abstract: | Policymakers and economists disagree about the impact of bank regulations on the distribution of income. Exploiting cross-state and cross-time variation, we test whether liberalizing restrictions on intra-state branching in the United States intensified, ameliorated, or had no effect on income distribution. We find that branch deregulation lowered income inequality. Deregulation lowered income inequality by affecting labor market conditions, not by boosting the business income of the poor, nor by enhancing educational attainment. Reductions in the earnings gap between men and women and between skilled and unskilled workers account for the bulk of the explained drop in income inequality. |
| JEL: | D31 G28 O16 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13299&r=reg |
| By: | Jens Høj |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to construct indicators that measure the strength of policies aimed at preserving and promoting market competition by empowering antitrust and sectoral authorities. The indicators, which cover both general and sector-specific competition policies, extend previous OECD work covering economy-wide and sector-specific regulations that restrict competition and promote governance. It focuses on information for 2003 provided by a number of OECD sources. The results show relatively little variation in the overall indicator across countries, partly reflecting the convergence of competition policies across the OECD area over the past decade. However, inspection of individual elements reveals that enforcement efforts (both in terms of devoted resources and actually implemented sanctions) and policies in network industries vary considerably across countries. Thus, the main conclusion arising from this work is that member countries have been improving the general competition policy framework, but still have to fully implement the improved framework. Moreover, there remains a considerable scope for further progress in promoting competition in network industries. <P>Indicateurs de l'efficacité de la politique de la concurrence dans les pays de l'OCDE <BR>Ce document de travail présente la construction d'indicateurs mesurant l'impact des politiques qui encouragent le maintien et le développement de la concurrence des marchés en renforçant les autorités pro-concurrentielles et sectorielles. Ces indicateurs qui couvrent les politiques de concurrence au niveau global et sectoriel sont un prolongement des travaux précédents de l'OCDE concernant les restrictions de la concurrence dans l'économie au sens large ainsi que par secteur. Les indicateurs décrits ici sont construits à partir de données en provenance de sources de l'OCDE et concernent l'année 2003. L'indicateur le plus agrégé varie peu d’un pays à un autre, reflétant en partie la convergence des politiques pro-concurrentielles au sein de l’OCDE au cours de la dernière décennie. Une analyse plus détaillée montre cependant que les efforts de mise en oeuvre des régulations sur les marchés des biens et services (ressources allouées, sanctions prises) et les politiques concernant les industries de réseaux sont beaucoup plus variables. Au total, les pays membres ont certes mis en place des politiques pro-concurrentielles théoriquement bonnes, mais il reste encore à compléter leur mise en oeuvre. De plus, il subsiste de nombreux domaines, notamment dans les industries de réseau où l'amélioration de la concurrence peut grandement progresser. |
| Keywords: | politique de la concurrence, regulated industries, enforcement, product market competition, antitrust law, concurrence sur les marchés de biens |
| JEL: | K2 L5 |
| Date: | 2007–08–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:568-en&r=reg |
| By: | Arthur Grimes (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research); Yun Liang (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research) |
| Abstract: | Land prices within monocentric cities typically decline from the centre to the urban periphery. More complex patterns are observed in polycentric and coastal cities; discrete jumps in value can occur across zoning boundaries. Information on these patterns within Auckland is important to understand: (a) the nature of Auckland's development, including the impact of infrastructure investments; and (b) the effects of regulation in causing discrete land valuation changes. One such regulation in Auckland is the metropolitan urban limit (MUL); we specifically examine whether the existence of this growth limit affects land prices. We do so in the context of a model of all Auckland land values over a twelve-year period, finding a strong zoning boundary effect on land prices. |
| Keywords: | growth limits; zoning restrictions; boundary effects; land value gradients |
| JEL: | R14 R38 R52 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtu:wpaper:07_09&r=reg |
| By: | Glenn Jenkins (Queen's University, Canada); Chun-Yan Kuo (Queen's University, Canada); Aygul Ozbafli (Queen's University, Canada) |
| Abstract: | The Canadian Cost-Benefit Analysis Guide: Regulatory Proposals, sets out the general methodology and analytical steps to perform a cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulatory changes. To make the Guide operational, this case study has been prepared following the analytical approach recommended by the Guide. In 1994 the sulphur content of Canadian gasoline was found to be high and varied widely across the country. Scientists and health experts have found evidence that emissions of pollutants from vehicles cause considerable harm to the health of Canadians and to the environment. In order to derive the net economic benefits, we integrate the economic benefits with the economic costs for each of the alternative scenarios. In the cost-benefit analysis, all private costs must be measured in terms of their economic opportunity costs. The results indicate that reducing the sulphur in gasoline for any scenario under consideration would generate substantial net health benefits or well-being for Canadians as a whole. Estimates of the net present value (at an eight percent discount rate) range from $1,809 million to $2,663 million. |
| Keywords: | Gasoline, Sulphur, Cost-Benefit, Environment |
| JEL: | D61 Q52 Q53 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1134&r=reg |
| By: | Clare Leaver |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that bureaucrats are susceptible to 'minimal squawk' behavior. I develop a simple model in which a desire to avoid criticism can prompt, otherwise public-spirited, bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this behavior are at odds with the received view that agencies should be structured to minimise the threat of 'capture'. I test between theories of bureaucratic behaviour using a matched panel of U.S. State Public Utility Commissions and investor-owned electric utilities. The data soundly reject the capture hypothesis and are consistent with the minimal squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with an increase in the incidence of rate reviews in periods of falling input costs and, in turn, lower household electricity bills. |
| Keywords: | Bureaucratic Behavior, Professional Pride, Career Concerns, Regulatory Capture, Dynamic Panel Data Models |
| JEL: | C23 C25 D73 J45 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:344&r=reg |
| By: | Elijah Brewer, III; Julapa Jagtiani |
| Abstract: | This paper examines an important aspect of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) policy employed by regulatory agencies in the United States. How much is it worth to become TBTF? How much has the TBTF status added to bank shareholders’ wealth? Using market and accounting data during the merger boom (1991-2004) when larger banks greatly expanded their size through mergers and acquisitions, we find that banking organizations are willing to pay an added premium for mergers that will put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. We estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the nine merger deals that brought the organizations over $100 billion in total assets. These added premiums may reflect that perceived benefits of being TBTF and/or other potential benefits associated with size. |
| Keywords: | Bank mergers |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedkrw:rwp07-05&r=reg |
| By: | Antonio Nicita; Matteo Rizzolli; Maria Alessandra Rossi |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the interface between two important institutional pillars of market exchange – Intellectual Property (IP) law and Antitrust law – in light of a theory of property rights incompleteness. This theory interprets property as an incomplete bundle of both defined and undefined rights over actual and potential uses of given resources and defines externalities as joint claims over rival production uses of undefined entitlements, irrespective of whether the object of property rights has a tangible or intangible nature. The paper argues that traditional distinctions between physical property and IP based on attributes of tangibility, rivalry and excludability are misleading and bases on the substantial homogeneity of property rights and IPRs an argument supporting the complementarity between IP law and Antitrust law. Far from being an unjustified ex-post limitation to existing property rights, likely to undermine ex-ante incentives, Antitrust intervention represents one of the means by which incompletely specified property rights (both intellectual and tangible) might be redefined over time as externalities emerge. |
| JEL: | O34 L4 |
| Date: | 2007–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:509&r=reg |
| By: | Tobias Wenzel |
| Abstract: | This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition a market failure arises: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. I analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that in the short run prices will remain constant, but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise and opening hours will increase in two steps, immediately after deregulation and further over time. Finally, employment in the retail sector increases. |
| Keywords: | Opening hours, retailing, deregulation |
| JEL: | L13 L51 L81 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0013&r=reg |
| By: | Federico Etro (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca) |
| Abstract: | This article derives antitrust implications for markets where entry can be regarded as endogenous (contrary to most analysis within the post-Chicago tradition). Many applications concern issues of abuse of dominance. Endogenous entry requires a wide revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities and multi-sided markets, bundling products, price discriminating and delegating to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies without exclusionary purposes and without affecting welfare negatively. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers (that take place only if create enough cost efficiencies and do not harm consumers), the evaluation of collusive cartels (that are unfeasible in markets where entry is endogenous) and state aids for exporting firms (which are always unilaterally optimal for international markets with free entry). The spirit of the policy recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis in a solid game-theoretic framework. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Endogenous entry, Leadership, Chicago school |
| JEL: | L1 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:122&r=reg |
| By: | Andrea Bassanini |
| Abstract: | The impact of four labour market policies – employment protection legislation, minimum wages, parental leave and unemployment benefits – on productivity is examined here, using annual cross-country aggregate data on these policies and industry-level data on productivity from 1979 to 2003. We use a "difference-in-differences" framework, which exploits likely differences in the productivity effect of policies in different industries. Our identifying assumption is that a specific policy influences worker or firm behaviour, and thereby productivity, more in industries where the policy in question is likely to be more binding than in other industries. The advantage of this approach is twofold. First, as in standard cross-country analysis, we can exploit the cross-country variation of policies. Second, in contrast with standard cross-country analysis, we can control for unobserved factors that, on average, are likely to have the same effect on productivity in both policy-binding and non-binding industries. <BR>Nous examinons l'impact de quatre politiques du marché du travail – la législation pour la protection de l'emploi, le salaire minimum, le congé parental et l'indemnisation du chômage – sur la productivité. Pour ces politiques, nous utilisons des données annuelles agrégées comparables entre pays ainsi que des données sectorielles sur la productivité de 1979 à 2003 sont utilisées. Nous analysons ces données sur la base d'une méthode de "différence de différences", qui exploite la variabilité des effets des politiques dans les différents secteurs. Notre stratégie d'identification se fonde sur l'hypothèse que les comportements des entreprises ou des salariés, et donc leur productivité, sont davantage influencés par une politique dans les secteurs d'activité où celle-ci est vraisemblablement plus contraignante. L'avantage de cette approche est double. D'une part, à l'instar des analyses agrégées concernant plusieurs pays, nous pouvons exploiter la variabilité des politiques entre les pays. D'autre part, contrairement à ces analyses, nous pouvons contrôler pour des facteurs inobservés qui, en moyenne, ont vraisemblablement le même effet sur la productivité dans les secteurs où les politiques sont contraignantes et dans les secteurs où elles ne le sont pas. |
| JEL: | J24 O47 |
| Date: | 2007–06–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:elsaab:54-en&r=reg |
| By: | Justus Haucap; Uwe Pauly; Christian Wey |
| Abstract: | This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry barriers for alternative unions. As we argue many recent labor policy measures, which make wages more flexible, serve to further stabilize the labor cartel, while truly pro-competitive proposals have not been implemented exactly because of their destabilizing effects.We propose policy measures that remove entry barriers and facilitate outside competition by alternative collective bargaining organizations. |
| Keywords: | Labor market cartel, labor market institutions, collective bargaining |
| JEL: | J52 K31 L12 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0009&r=reg |
| By: | R. Alan Seals |
| Abstract: | This paper adds to the literature estimates of local labor market effects on gang participation. I use data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) to model the probability of gang involvement. The effect of the local unemployment rate is statistically significant and positive, across a wide-range of model specifications. However, robustness checks reveal gang participation of individuals less than sixteen years-of-age (the legal minimum age for most jobs) is not responsive to the local unemployment rate. Gang participation among individuals with lower ASVAB scores is more sensitive to the local unemployment rate. |
| Keywords: | gang participation, NLSY, intelligence, unemployment |
| JEL: | J00 J19 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mts:wpaper:200711&r=reg |