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on Regulation |
| By: | Marquez, Carlos |
| Abstract: | This research project tries to show that a unified discourse and a single global policy for liberalization and competition cuts across the economic and legal theory of transnational regulations of industry. The tension mediated by the concepts of harmonization, meaning that one regulation/standard is better that multiple regulations/standards, and the theory of international liberalization, meaning deregulation is better that regulation, brings many doubts about the phenomenon of international industrial regulation. The core of this project is to restate the problem of regulatory capture at a transnational level and show how it is possible, and profitable, for large corporations to capture transnational regulators with multilateral regulation or deregulation processes. |
| Keywords: | International industrial regulation; international law; soft law; hard law; harmonization; industrial organization; law and economics |
| JEL: | L51 K23 L59 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3642&r=reg |
| By: | STUMPF, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications services distinguishes between markets that are susceptible to ex ante regulation and those that are subject to competition law alone. The paper lays out the methodology for identifying relevant markets that may be considered for ex ante regulation. It also provides a summary of the relevant markets that should be susceptible to ex ante regulation based on an analysis of conditions likely to prevail in a ‘representative" member state. The paper finally addresses the role of the European Commission, and in particular its Relevant Markets Recommendation, as a means of providing guidance to NRAs. |
| Keywords: | EU regulatory framework; susceptibility to ex ante regulation; 3-criteria test; Relevant Markets Recommendation; market definition and modified Greenfield approach. |
| JEL: | K29 L51 L50 D82 K21 K23 L96 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3570&r=reg |
| By: | JONES, Siôn; SALSAS, Pau |
| Abstract: | The EU regulatory framework for e-communications was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2002, and became applicable from 2003. It has three primary objectives: (1) to promote competition; (2) to develop the single market; and (3) to promote citizens' rights. The European Commission's DG Information Society commissioned London Economics to estimate the level of e-communications investment in the EU and to examine its main drivers as part of a contributio to the Commission's 2006 review of the e-communications framework. This paper outlines some of the findings of that study. The paper provides a description of the process of collecting data on investment in physical infrastructure in the e-communciations sector by country and by sub-sector. It also presents the collected data, showing a decline in overall investment between 2001 and 2003 and a subsequent upturn in 2004. An econometric analysis of the drivers of investment over the period is undertaken, which suggests that better performing regulatory regimes, as measured by an OECD regulatory index, can contribute to higher levels of investment in the sector. |
| Keywords: | e-communications; investment; regulation |
| JEL: | L97 L50 D82 K29 L51 D74 K23 L96 L90 L43 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3568&r=reg |
| By: | Servaas Storm (Department of Economics, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands.); C.W.M. Nastepaad |
| Abstract: | The impact of labour market regulation on labour productivity growth is ambiguous: on the one hand, regulation raises labour adjustment costs, which negatively affects productivity; but on the other hand, regulation may (for various reasons) raise worker motivation and commitment and (by means of wage bargaining co-ordination) stimulate labour-saving technological progress, thus raising productivity. We present empirical evidence for a cross-section of 20 OECD countries (1984-1997) that relatively rigid (i.e. regulated and co-ordinated) labour markets promote long-run labour productivity growth. This conclusion is reinforced when we differentiate between (three) categories of labour markets in the OECD countries and test for differences in productivity performance. |
| Keywords: | labour productivity, employment security, labour flexibility, measurement, OECD countries |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:empelm:2007-04&r=reg |
| By: | Azmat, Ghazala; Manning, Alan; Van Reenen, John |
| Abstract: | Labour's share of GDP in most OECD countries has declined over the last two decades. Some authors have suggested that these changes are linked to deregulation of product and labour markets. To examine this we focus on a large quasi-experiment in the OECD: the privatization of many network industries (e.g. telecommunications and utilities). We present a model with agency problems, imperfect product market competition and worker bargaining which makes clear predictions on how the labour share, employment and wages respond to privatization and other regulatory changes. We exploit cross-country panel data on several network industries and find that privatization can account for a significant proportion of the fall of labour's share (a fifth overall, but over half in Britain and France). The impact of privatization has been offset by falling barriers to entry, which consistent with theory, dampens profit margins. |
| Keywords: | Entry Regulation; Labour share; Privatization; Wages |
| JEL: | E22 E24 E25 J30 L32 L33 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6348&r=reg |
| By: | Luca Anderlini; Leonardo Felli; Andrew Postlewaite |
| Abstract: | We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court.The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). Anactive court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. Theinstitutional role of the court is to maximize the parties' welfare under a veil ofignorance.In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of "menu contracts" betweenthe informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, wefully analyze this case.We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is notcontractible ex-ante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact.If however we let all "widgets" be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. Inthis case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do notexist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs. |
| Keywords: | Optimal Courts, Informational Externalities, Ex-ante Welfare, Informed Principal, Menu Contracts. |
| JEL: | C79 D74 D89 K40 L14 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stitep:/2006/511&r=reg |
| By: | Franz Kronthaler |
| Abstract: | The paper explores what macroeconomic factors can tell us about the effectiveness of recently enacted national competition laws. Qualitative evidence suggests that numerous countries fall short in implementing competition law. Furthermore, there seems to be significant differences between countries. To examine what factors might contribute to the explanation of effectiveness of competition law panel regression analysis is used. The results indicate that the level of economic development matters, however the institutional learning curve is also relevant. Furthermore, larger countries should be more concerned with competition advocacy activities than smaller countries and it seems to be the case that the problem of capture of competition law is serious in countries with high levels of corruption. |
| Keywords: | Competition law enforcement, developing and transition countries |
| JEL: | K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:7-07&r=reg |
| By: | Era Dabla-Norris; Gabriela Inchauste |
| Abstract: | The paper relies on a rich firm-level data set on transition economies to examine the role of informality as an important channel through which regulatory and other policy constraints affect firm growth. We find that firms reduce their formal operations with a higher tax and regulatory burden, but increase it with better enforcement quality. In terms of firm growth, we find a differential impact of regulatory burden and enforcement quality on formal and informal firms. In particular, we find that growth in formal firms is negatively affected by both tax and financing constraints, while these constraints are insignificant for growth in informal firms. Moreover, formal firm growth improves with better enforcement as measured by fair and impartial courts, while informal firm growth is constrained by organized crime, pointing to their inability to take full advantage of the legal and judicial systems. Finally, when we look at country-wide institutions, we find that higher regulatory burden reduces firm growth. An interactive term between a country-wide measure of the rule of law and a proxy for formality suggests that better enforcement quality dampens the relatively weaker growth in formal firms. |
| Date: | 2007–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/112&r=reg |
| By: | Sandra Blome; Kai Fachinger; Dorothee Franzen; Gerhard Scheuenstuhl; Juan Yermo |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a stylised assessment of the impact of investment-relevant pension fund regulations and accounting rules on contribution and investment strategies within the context of an asset-liability model (ALM) specifically designed for this purpose. The analysis identifies a substantial impact of regulations which, in a simplified way, resemble those in place in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States. The ALM model shows that regulations affect funding costs primarily through the choice of investment strategy. Strict funding regulations may force sponsors to make up funding shortfalls in bad economic times and lead them to invest more conservatively, which ultimately raises net funding costs. The paper also shows that fairvalue accounting standards (with immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses) can contribute to higher funding levels than required by regulators. <P>Réglementation des organismes de retraite et gestion des risques : Résultats d'un exercice d'optimisation fondé sur un modèle de GAP <BR>Nous présentons dans cette étude une évaluation simplifiée de l'impact qu'ont les règles comptables et les dispositions réglementaires applicables aux organismes de retraite en matière de placements sur les stratégies de cotisation et d'investissement, dans le cadre d'un modèle de gestion actif-passif (GAP) spécialement élaboré à cet effet. Nous mettons en évidence l'existence d'un impact sensible des dispositions réglementaires qui, pour simplifier, ressemblent à celles qui sont en vigueur en Allemagne, aux États-Unis, au Japon, aux Pays-Bas et au Royaume-Uni. Le modèle de GAP montre que l'influence exercée par les dispositions réglementaires sur le coût des capitaux passe essentiellement par le choix de la stratégie d'investissement. Une réglementation stricte en matière de financement peut contraindre les promoteurs de plans de retraite à combler les déficits de financement en période de conjoncture économique défavorable, et les amener à investir avec davantage de prudence, ce qui entraîne à terme une augmentation du coût net des capitaux. Nous montrons également dans cette étude que les normes de comptabilisation à la juste valeur (impliquant la prise en compte immédiate des gains et pertes actuariels) peuvent contribuer à des niveaux de financement plus élevés que ceux requis par les autorités de réglementation. |
| Keywords: | investment, investissement, accounting, comptabilité, pension fund |
| JEL: | G23 J32 |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:dafaab:8-en&r=reg |
| By: | Felix Hüfner; Jens Lundsgaard |
| Abstract: | While several sectors in the economy have been deregulated, the Swedish housing market remains distorted, hindering an optimal matching of supply and demand. In the rental market the rent setting framework with its focus on cost-based rents in the public sector prevents a price response, leading to long queues in some regions and vacancies in others. Many Swedes that would have preferred otherwise are driven into the owner-occupied segment, where prices are increasing strongly, and rising above an estimated fundamental value. The supply of new dwellings is made more difficult by an uncompetitive construction industry, coupled with cumbersome planning regulations and few incentives for municipalities to issue more land. On the fiscal side, real estate taxes are below neutral levels, implying an indirect subsidy to housing. This paper presents a review of the recent steps to abolish real estate taxes and also proposes comprehensive reform of regulations in the rental housing sector. This paper relates to the OECD Economic Survey of Sweden 2007 (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/sweden). <P>Le marché du logement suédois : Moins réglementer pour obtenir une meilleure allocation des ressources <BR>Alors que plusieurs secteurs de l’économie ont été déréglementés, le marché suédois du logement reste soumis à de fortes distorsions qui entravent un rapprochement optimal de l’offre et de la demande. Sur le marché locatif, les loyers sont essentiellement fonction de ceux que pratique le secteur public dans l’optique des coûts, ce qui empêche une réaction normale des prix et crée de longues files d’attente dans certaines régions, tandis que des logements restent vacants dans d’autres. Un grand nombre de Suédois sont contraints malgré eux d’accéder à la propriété, avec des prix en forte hausse, et augmentant au dessus d’une valeur fondamentale estimée. L’offre de logements neufs subit les effets négatifs d’un manque de concurrence dans le secteur de la construction, se doublant de très strictes règles d’urbanisme et d’une faible incitation des communes à classer de nouveaux terrains en zone constructible. Sur le plan fiscal, l’impôt foncier est déjà inférieur au niveau de neutralité, ce qui veut dire que le logement est indirectement subventionné. Ce document passe en revue de manière critique les récentes étapes pour supprimer les taxes foncières et propose également une réforme compréhensive des réglementations du secteur locatif. Ce document de travail se rapporte à l’Étude économique de l’OCDE de la Suède 2007 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/suede). |
| Keywords: | Sweden, Suède, house prices, prix des logements, housing taxation, impôt foncier, rent regulation, réglementation du secteur locatif, rental housing, marché locatif, housing supply, offre de logements |
| JEL: | D12 D61 H11 H21 H31 |
| Date: | 2007–06–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:559-en&r=reg |
| By: | Ju, Jiandong; Wei, Shang-Jin |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a simple model to study the relationship between domestic institutions - financial system, corporate governance, and property rights protection - and patterns of international capital flows. It studies conditions under which financial globalization can be a substitute for reforms of domestic financial system. Inefficient financial system and poor corporate governance in a country may be completely bypassed by two-way capital flows in which domestic savings leave the country in the form of financial capital outflows but domestic investment takes place via inward foreign direct investment. While financial globalization always improves the welfare of a developed country with a good financial system, its effect is ambiguous for a developing country with an inefficient financial sector/poor corporate governance. However, the net effect for a developing country is more likely to be positive, the stronger its property rights protection. This is consistent with the observation that developed countries are often more enthusiastic about capital account liberalization around the world than many developing countries. A noteworthy feature of this theory is that financial and property rights institutions can have different effects on capital flows. |
| Keywords: | corporate governance; financial development; international capital flows; property rights protection |
| JEL: | F2 F3 |
| Date: | 2007–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6343&r=reg |