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on Regulation |
| By: | Guiseppe Fiori (Boston College); Giuseppe Nicoletti (OECD); Stefano Scarpetta (OECD; IZA); Fabio Schiantarelli (Boston College; IZA) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of product market liberalization on employment when there are interactions between policies and institutions in product and labor markets. Using panel data for OECD countries over the period 1980-2002, we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labor market regulation is high. Moreover, there is evidence in our sample that product market deregulation promotes labor market deregulation. We show that these results are mostly consistent with the basic predictions of a standard bargaining model (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)), once one allows for a full specification of the fall back position of the unions. |
| Keywords: | Employment, Competition, Deregulation, Liberalization, Unions |
| JEL: | J23 J50 L50 |
| Date: | 2007–04–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:663&r=reg |
| By: | Trillas, Francesc (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona); Staffiero, Gianandrea (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | This survey reviews the relationship between regulation and distribution, focusing on regulatory reform in developing countries. The characteristics of these countries impose constraints on appropriate regulatory policies. These constraints condition: i) the terms of the trade-off between firms' rents and efficiency, including the commitment problem in the presence of sunk investments; and ii) the probability of success of removing cross-subsidies. The choices made at reforming infrastructure industries may have a significant impact on perceived distribution and development, and this impact will drive attitudes toward reform. Distributive problems are channeled through politics and institutions, conditioning the potential solutions to the commitment problem. These issues have been extensively explored by the academic literature, which provides guidance on how to address second-generation regulatory reforms. |
| Keywords: | regulation; privatization; infrastructures; development; distribution; |
| JEL: | O12 |
| Date: | 2007–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0665&r=reg |
| By: | Clara Delavallade (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I]) |
| Abstract: | This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations. |
| Keywords: | Supply of corruption, administrative corruption, state capture, informal activity, competitiveness, North Africa. |
| Date: | 2007–04–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00143412_v1&r=reg |
| By: | Pande, Rohini |
| Abstract: | Building on the large and growing empirical literature on the political behaviour of individuals in low income countries this chapter seeks to understand corruption through the lens of political economy -- particularly in terms of the political and economic differences between rich and poor countries. Our focus is on the political behaviour of individuals exposed to democratic political institutions. We review the existing literature on the determinants of individual political behaviour to ask whether we can understand the choice of political actors to be corrupt and, importantly, of other individuals to permit it, as a rational response to the social or the economic environment they inhabit. We also discuss the implications of this view of corruption for anti-corruption policies. |
| Keywords: | corruption; development |
| JEL: | O12 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6273&r=reg |
| By: | Pierre Cahuc; Stephane Carcillo |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes an ex ante evaluation of the effects of new labor contracts such as the "Contrat Nouvelle Embauche" (CNE) introduced in France in 2005. The lessons we draw are of sufficiently general interest to be applicable to other countries or reforms of employment protection laws. Using a model that captures the characteristics of the French labor market, we simulate the effects of this reform on unemployment, employment, and welfare. We estimate that the CNE will lead to the creation of 70,000 additional jobs in the long run, but at the cost of a slight deterioration in welfare. |
| Keywords: | Employment protection , labor contract , reform , search models , |
| Date: | 2007–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/301&r=reg |
| By: | Yannick Gabuthy; Eve-Angéline Lambert |
| Abstract: | La législation sur la protection de l’emploi a fait l’objet de nombreuses analyses concernant son impact macroéconomique sur les performances du marché du travail. Cependant, une littérature plus récente s’intéresse aux effets de la protection de l’emploi, relative notamment au licenciement individuel, sur le comportement des agents économiques impliqués dans la relation de travail. Ces analyses montrent que les règles juridiques encadrant la rupture de cette relation ne sont pas neutres. En effet, elles influencent non seulement le comportement des protagonistes lors de cette éventuelle rupture (que ce soit dans le choix du mode de séparation ou dans la négociation des indemnités de licenciement qui en découle) mais également au sein de la relation de travail (notamment en termes d’incitations `a l’investissement spécifique). A cet égard, toute politique législative devrait tenir compte de cette capacité réactive des agents économiques afin de structurer efficacement les règles juridiques relatives au licenciement individuel. |
| JEL: | A12 K31 K4 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-14&r=reg |
| By: | Alessandro Gambini; Marco Arnone; Salim M. Darbar |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and governance of the supervisory agency, based on assessments of the Basel Core Principles and the IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies, covering 116 and 53 countries, respectively, with 51 common to both. We find a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision; moreover, better accountability and integrity practices of the banking supervisors are associated with higher independence, which in turn is associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles. These results are largely robust to different stages of financial development. |
| Keywords: | Bank supervision , governance , Basel Core Principles , transparency , accountability , |
| Date: | 2007–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:07/82&r=reg |